Showing posts with label Ahmed Badawi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ahmed Badawi. Show all posts

Friday, December 01, 2023

FILM France24 investigates massacre in Darfur Sudan

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor:  Every week I read hundreds of news reports and thousands of socials commenting on Sudan and South Sudan.

Most of it is propaganda, self-serving promo, activism, lazy journalism, AI. Little hard news coming out of Sudan is made public. Khartoum's destroyed.


People in organisations such as the UN can’t speak out, others work quietly in Port Sudan or neighbouring countries. Aid agencies must remain neutral.


This report by France 24 acts as a powerful witness to the pain and despair of long-suffering Sudanese facing a bleak future. It reduced me to tears. 


Much of the report is from Chad. Let's hope readers will view it more than once and listen closely to those who've been brave enough to be filmed.  


Note, the report says "accounts are reminiscent of the atrocities committed during the 2003-2013 war in Darfur". In reality, the Darfur war never ended.


The video can produce subtitles in different languages. It is simple to do: 

  • click on the video
  • go to its bottom frame
  • click on ‘CC’ to activate subtitles
  • click on  ‘wheel’ for Settings
  • click on ‘Subtitles/CC' - keep it in English or:
  • click on ‘Auto-Translate’ to see a list of other languages
  • click on desired language.
  • For viewers with special visual needs such as larger subtitles:
  • click on ‘Subtitles/CC’ and see 'options' in top right corner
  • click on ‘options’ to view and select from list of options.

___________________________


Report from REPORTERS France 24 English

Anchor MARK OWEN @markowenf24

Nairobi correspondent ELODIE COUSIN @MlleCsn

Dated Friday, 01 December 2023, 13:23 - here is a copy in full:


Stories of horror: Investigating a massacre in Sudan's Darfur region



Since the start of Sudan's brutal civil war in April, mass killings of civilians have been perpetrated in the West Darfur region. Our team investigates atrocities committed against the local Masalit ethnic group.


Since the start of the war in Sudan on April 15, the capital Khartoum has been the scene of a deadly power struggle between warring generals Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo. But in the west of the country, in Darfur, a different horror is unfolding. Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary and local Arab militia groups are systematically targeting the African Masalit ethnic group. Numerous videos have emerged of torture, massacres and arbitrary arrests. Refugees speak of sexual violence.


Our team went to the border between Chad and Sudan, where 450,000 people have taken refuge, to hear their stories. These accounts are reminiscent of the atrocities committed during the 2003-2013 war in Darfur, in which 300,000 people were killed, according to the UN. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has since opened an investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against the main military leaders of the time.


Our Nairobi bureau brings us this special report.


View original: https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/reporters/20231201-stories-of-horror-investigating-a-massacre-in-sudan-s-darfur-region or https://f24.my/9yI7


[End]

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Why have international creditors reneged on repeated promises to cancel Sudan’s foreign debt?

Darfur, southern Sudan, and other ordinary Sudanese in the so-called ‘periphery’ where economic and social development lags far behind Khartoum, stand to gain most if international creditors did what they had repeatedly promised to do following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and then the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement: cancel Sudan’s foreign debt.

Crucially, Sudan’s (pre-1989) external debt must get wiped off immediately because it needs wiggle room urgently to take on new foreign loans to lay down the roots of an economic take off and, in turn, come finally to grips with the pattern of inequitable economic development in Darfur, south Sudan and other areas of the ‘periphery’ that lies at the heart of Sudan’s history of instability. [...]
For a more nuanced discussion on Sudan’s foreign debt issue, see these recent postings by Ibrahim Adam on the IMF blog: (IMF Direct on Sudan’s foreign debt – a discussion).

Source: Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur
Indebted to the Save Darfur Coalition?
By Ahmed Badawi Wednesday, October 14, 2009 
Ahmed Badawi has written and advised extensively on country risk on Sudan at The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dun & Bradstreet, and Fitchratings. He is also the former Middle East and Africa spokesperson for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington D.C. He was also the speechwriter for the Government of Sudan during the north-south Sudan peace talks. Currently, Ahmed Badawi is an advisor to the Government of National Unity, Sudan, and Chief Consultant to the Global Relations Centre, based in Khartoum.

9 Responses to “Indebted to the Save Darfur Coalition?”
Alex de Waal:
October 14th, 2009 
Ahmed is absolutely correct that the great majority of Sudan’s original debt was run up in the 1970s and early 1980s, and that the majority of today’s debt represents a build up of arrears since Sudan ceased managing the debt in a conventional way in 1985. (see: http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/11/26/recalling-the-unmanageable-crisis-of-the-1980s/).

International aid was a crucial part of Nimeiri’s ability to grease the wheels of the patronage machine in Sudan and when the aid was suspended for even a short time in March 1985, his time was up. For the next four years, the transitional and elected governments struggled to keep politically afloat at home and on at least talking terms with their creditors abroad. It was too much to manage and democracy collapsed.

After the 1989 coup and the 1990 decision by Hassan al Turabi to support Saddam Hussein, Sudan was cut off from all forms of debt relief and international assistance. Two things then happened.

The first was that the government welcomed any other form of financial assistance, and one of those who came offering funds was Osama bin Laden. International financial ostracism tends to push its targets into the arms of criminals and others.

The second was that, unable to purchase the loyalty of domestic clients, the NIF used a combination of force and ideological fervour. After being cut off from external financial assistance, the Hamas administration in Gaza has done something similar.

In my view it is not a clever strategy to try to use these measures against the Sudan government. It is somewhat naive to suppose that they might work this time around, having been counterproductive on previous occasions.

Ana Majnun:
October 14th, 2009 
It seems to me a perfectly good strategy to use debt forgiveness as a way of leveraging NCP to continue (!?) moving to establishment of the rule of law and civil freedoms. Besides, what kind of PSRP process would condone expulsion of humanitarian relief organizations in the poorest region of the country?
Ana

Ahmed Badawi:
October 14th, 2009 
Dear Ana:
I’m sure it does seem a perfectly good strategy to you; but then again, you haven’t had to carry the burden of that strategy – as Sudanese do/have done, do you? (see post above). Sudanese don’t want to be shut out of the IMF/WB etc. It’ (the anti-debt forgiveness stance)is not in our name.

Plus, I would also encourage you to take a look a the comments by Ibrahim Adam and the IMF i listed at the end of the post, and think a little deeper about the consequences. Read the IMF report that is also linked.

My point, Ana? This issue is not a “one-trick pony”, that should be looked at – let alone linked – to the ‘issue of the moment’ (CPA, DPA, NGOS, UN, political parties, call it the flavour of the hour, if you will). This issue – debt forgiveness – is not about Sudan October 2009; the implications and consequences run much larger than that.
Ahmed Badawi

Kevin Jon Heller:
October 14th, 2009 
The author’s post assumes, of course, that Bashir’s regime would use the funds freed up by debt forgiveness for economic development — an assumption for which he offers no evidence. I do admire, however, the author’s ability to discover yet another reason to describe the regime as the victim instead of the perpetrator. Not that we should exepct anything different — after all, the author was once paid to shill for the Bashir regime. The only difference is that now he works for free.

As for Alex’s comments — do you really think you are going to convince anyone other than Bashir supporters like the post’s by arguing that the international community should continue to prop up Bashir’s regime because if they don’t (a) the regime will do business with terrorists and (b) it will become even more violent? Blackmail doesn’t seem like a very sound rationale for foreign aid.

Alex de Waal:
October 15th, 2009 
Dear Kevin,
Is the international community “propping up” the Sudan government? I don’t think so. International players are relatively marginal in the overall Sudanese political scene. The Sudan government relies overwhelmingly on its internal base, which is a mixture of its financial/patronage power, and its security institutions, enormously assisted by the weakness and disarray of its adversaries. (And one reason, in my view, why the internal opposition is so weak is its tendency to look outside for its support.)

The second point has nothing to do with blackmail. It’s not as though the Sudan government, or any other government, is a mega-version of an individual, controlled by a single will. As it happens, this government has never used this threat and I don’t believe that it would do so. But what happens when the government is cut off from western and relatively transparent sources of funds? Inevitably, its institutions turn to different ways of obtaining funds. Another source, much more accessible and attractive at the moment, is Asia. (Recall that the late 1990s campaign to get Talisman Energy to withdraw from Sudan was successful, and Asian companies filled the gap.) As for “even more violent”: with the levels of violent fatalities in Darfur hovering around the 100/month mark, those of us who have seen wars rather more violent than this, are indeed worried that these are in prospect.

The world is not divided into “for us or for Bashir”. Some of us (which includes, I strongly suspect, the majority of Sudanese) are for a more constructive political and economic engagement with Sudan, precisely because that will help shift the political centre of gravity in Sudan away from the sterile military/militaristic polarization to a civil-political process that nurtures democracy.

Ahmed Badawi:
October 15th, 2009
Dear Kevin: You missed the point. Completely.
I’m not describing “the regime as the victim”, but ordinary Sudanese people instead.
Secondly, Sudan’s unsustainable external debt is also pulling down the Government of South Sudan: it also wants to borrow money internationally, too (as it’s legally entitled to under the CPA), to butress economic development amongst its constituents. But it can’t until the foreign debt forgiveness issue is resolved.
Ahmed Badawi

Kevin Jon Heller:
October 16th, 2009
Ahmed,
As Sean Brooks points out, I didn’t miss the point at all. You are quite transparently trying to rationalize the actions of the Bashir regime by blaming the international community for not doing enough to help the government economically. And you are implying, without any evidence whatsoever, that the Bashir regime would use additional funds (beyond what it needs to purchase weapons) for economic development.
Kevin

Kevin Jon Heller:
October 16th, 2009
Alex,
It’s interesting. Whenever someone defends calling Bashir to account for his many international crimes, the response is always “anyone who replaces Bashir will be just as bad.” Whenever someone criticizes giving international aid to Bashir without preconditions, the response is always “Bashir isn’t the Sudanese government.” How convenient!
Kevin

Ahmed Badawi:
October 18th, 2009 at 9:20 am
Dear Kevin:
Thanks for your latest comment.
I, however, repeat again: you have missed the point completely by continuing to distill the foreign debt relief issue to a simple -and banal – focus on rewarding or punishing President Al-Bashir, whereas my post drew attention to the huge costs to ordinary Sudanese (Darfuris included) of the failure of international creditors to cancel Sudan’s pre-1989 odious debts.

Kevin, as for your demand of “evidence” that President Al Bashir’s “regime” would put “additional funds” from debt relief or new loans to good use, here’s a simple remedy: make the disbursement of new development finance conditional on projects that benefit the poor (i.e. use the global norm).

The tap can always be switched off if they are not.

I doubt strongly that President Al Bashir’s “regime” would object to those disbursal conditions, so why not give it a whirl – if only just for the good of conflict-affected Darfuri and southern Sudanese civilians – whose interests you claim to defend?
Best regards,
Ahmed Badawi

Thursday, August 13, 2009

Call to Lift US sanctions on Sudan (Ahmed Badawi)

Quote of the Day
"Lift US sanctions from Sudan. Sanctions have no support among the local population, Darfur included.  Abolishing unpopular and unjustified sanctions would not prevent the US airing its concerns on Sudan." - Ahmed Badawi

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur:
Call to Lift US Sanctions from Sudan Deserves Praise not Derision
By Ahmed Badawi
Thursday, August 13th, 2009
The US government and the American people sincerely want to do the right thing by Sudan. Help turn it into a democratic, stable, equitable, prosperous and, preferably, united country. However, US Congressional hearings about Sudan usually follow the same, stale format: a raft of, frankly woefully under-informed, testimonies focused solely on condemning loudly the behaviour of the Sudanese government in the latest conflict of the hour in Africa’s largest country, and calling for harder ‘sticks’ (i.e. ratcheting up US sanctions) to be used to effect the ‘right’ response by Khartoum.

Certainly, a lot of the actions of the Sudanese government during much of the early phase of the Darfur conflict (and in the earlier and much longer north-south civil war) were reprehensible – as Sudan’s own official investigation into the conflict, published in 2005, readily acknowledged. Even so, US Presidential Envoy to Sudan, General J. Scott Gration, never a man to kow-tow to public opinion, has just embarked on what his predecessors knew was the correct course, but were too scared to travel on: swallow hard (very hard), face down the fierce headwinds in US government and civil society, and make an impassioned plea for Congress to remove US economic sanctions from Sudan.

General Gration must have had his full metal jacket on - and reinforced - for the testimony. He also broke the mould by calling for Sudan’s removal from the US State Department’s State Sponsor of Terrorism list, which comes with a thicket of US economic sanctions below the iceberg.

The general noted that there was “no evidence” for Sudan’s inclusion on the list, which he referred to as a “political” (rather than a national security-related) decision; the CIA – hardly an institution prone to overstatement, Senator Russ Feingold - has referred to Sudan’s strong record on counterterrorism cooperation as having “saved American lives”.
Popular in the US he certainly ain’t, but stark raving mad or naive he is definitely not: General Gration simply realises that truth is an offence, not a sin; US sanctions make steering Sudan on to the right track tougher, not easier, and have actually damaged US interests by inflicting harm on, not help to, the very Sudanese people the US seeks to support.

Put simply, US sanctions perpetuate economic under-development and poverty - the universally acknowledged crux of Sudan’s history of internal conflicts. It’s high time the American public realises likewise, and supports repealing the thicket of sanctions quickly.

Sanctions have a direct proportional relationship with the bottom of the pyramid: they hurt the poor hardest. Sudan has been no exception. Take a couple examples of the debilitating – and Medusa-like - micro impact of US sanctions, which go unmentioned in the US media focus on Sudan.

Millions of ordinary Sudanese families and individuals from the north, south, east and west cannot receive directly the lifeline (in most cases, literally) of foreign exchange remittance inflows from family members working abroad in the United States, wreaking havoc on the planning and budgets of millions of Sudanese households for basics like schooling fees and medical bills.

Presently, remittances sent from the United States can only get to ordinary Sudanese families or individuals in two expensive – and delay-ridden – ways: 1) remittances are routed to the recipient via regional money exchange bureaux; and 2) remittances are paid directly to the recipient by a local middleman, once the sender deposits the sum in the US bank account of the middleman.

Both options incur costly ‘processing fees’ and amount to an extra income tax imposed by sanctions on US remittances destined to ordinary Sudanese individuals and families, which over time can equal the cost of sending another child to school.
US sanctions also cause inordinately long delays (often as long as twenty working days) on private remittances sent from the UK and other Western countries to ordinary Sudanese, owing to the dominant role of the US in the global payment and clearance settlement system.

Small and medium size businesses in Sudan – the bedrock of the economy and incubator of job and wealth creation – also find themselves essentially locked out from accessing short-term international trade finance due to US sanctions. The global reputational impact of the sanctions means that even most non-US banks are also unwilling to extend short-term trade credits to all but a handful of Sudanese companies.

Moreover, even local firms that can access trade finance incur a ‘sanctions premium’ on loans which, in turn, feeds through to ordinary Sudanese consumers in the form of higher costs for goods and services; in other words a regressive income tax.
In the key agriculture sector, meanwhile, Sudanese subsistence farmers remain blocked from accessing the lucrative US export market and American technologies and best environmental management practices to boost crop yields; US sanctions therefore narrow the escape from poverty for nearly half of Sudan’s working population.

Health and other humanitarian items imported from the United States are currently exempted from sanctions. But even here, the lengthy, morale-sapping bureaucratic process in getting approval to import spare parts for hospital machinery, issued by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, has resulted in numerous instances of needless deaths of ordinary Sudanese men, women, and infants – as every medic in the country can testify.

The macro impact of US economic sanctions on national public finances has also hit the so-called periphery of Sudan – and especially the south – particularly hard. Sure, Khartoum now has access to some soft loans from China and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and, since 2003, sizeable oil revenue. But the reputational impact of US sanctions means that Sudanese public and private entities still generally have little access to long-term project finance lines from either non-US commercial banks or multilateral financial institutions.

Coupled with US sanctions on the financial and port systems, neither the Sudanese nor the US government are therefore currently able to lay-down quickly fresh ‘big ticket’ national infrastructural investment projects like railways, paved rural feeder roads, and river transportation, all of which would boost national statehood at this critical juncture in Sudan’s history; help ordinary Sudanese get their goods to market; and enhance labour mobility and national social cohesion. Indeed, many areas in Sudan currently function as de facto land-locked states, with all the associated challenges it entails for jump-starting economic and social development projects.

US sanctions are not just limiting the chances for economic advancement for millions of Sudanese: they jeopardize the wealth of future generations of Sudanese (and the lodestar of finance for south Sudan should it opt to secede in 2011).

Sudan’s oil sector remains denied access to the optimal enhanced oil recovery and associated water management technologies afforded by the longer experience and unrivalled R&D budgets of US oil companies, meaning that lots of Sudanese oil may be unrecoverable not so long away from now if American oil titans like Exxon don’t step in soon.

Ordinary Sudanese have also suffered severe material deprivation from the lack of equitable treatment from the IMF – a direct corollary of the US sanctions regime. Sudan’s last dime from the Fund came way back in 1985 (subsidised loans from its sister-institution, the World Bank, dried up in 1993), and the Sudanese government has paid back nearly US$1 billion to the Fund in late interest fines (not principal) over the past fifteen years; and that’s just for IMF debts incurred in the 1970s and early 1980s under the former government of the late President Nimeiri.

These repayments amount to a hefty anti-development tax on all Sudanese and, even with the effects of the ongoing global financial crisis, Sudan is still set to pay back a further US$10 million to the IMF in 2009, which could finance, for example, the building and staffing of fifteen maternity clinics in Darfur or pay school and university fees for one hundred and fifty thousand children in south Sudan; Liberia, in contrast, had paid back zilch when the Fund freed it from its debt arrears in early 2008.
Suffice to add that Sudanese will not see a whiff of the US$17 billion increase in lending to crisis-affected poor countries announced by the Fund at end-July; a double ignominy for ordinary Sudanese who have already effectively subsidised IMF crisis-related loans to their much richer counterparts in Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, and Iceland to name a few.

So, what’s in it for the President Obama administration to lift sanctions from Sudan? Big dividends.

It would give President Al-Bashir wiggle room to hasten changing Sudan to an equitable, democratic country, as specified by the landmark 2005 north-south Sudan peace agreement – the policy anchor of US government. No government can ever be expected to feel comfortable about embarking full speed towards whole scale political transformation when its back is against the wall - especially one with justifiable paranoia like Khartoum.

A conducive and fully supportive international diplomatic environment is key to allow Sudan’s political actors to both calmly search for an, as yet, elusive comprehensive peace settlement to Darfur and reach a number of critical milestones for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which are bunched and around the corner; demarcating the border between north and south Sudan, voter registration and thereafter general elections in April 2010, and the 2011 referendum for unity or independence for south Sudan and its accompanying modalities.

Removing the sanctions would help Sudan’s political institutions mature, too. The deafening criticism of Khartoum by Washington attached to US sanctions often crowds out civil society and government discourse on other important, but ‘normal’, policy issues. Agriculture reforms, for example. US private investment into south Sudan, thus far stifled by reputation risk concerns, would also surely grow strongly following the abolition of sanctions.

Predictably, General Gration’s brave call to lift US sanctions from Sudan has been met by weeping, wailing and gnashing of teeth by John Prendergast and John Norris of Enough!, Eric Reeves, Roger Winter and other leading lights in the US activist movement. They have quickly resorted to their default position: Khartoum only knows and responds to the diplomacy of the ‘stick’; and the more frequent the beatings and bigger the stick, the better, too.

The achievement of desired US policy outcomes in Sudan by using sanctions to pressure Khartoum into change is an urban myth, grounded in the legend of being the mine that bore gold: the CPA. In fact, the 1997 “Khartoum Declaration of Principles” first enshrined the concept of self determination for south Sudan by referenda. And it was negotiated and signed when Sudan was in a period of - not so – splendid isolation and malign neglect from the US and the mainstream international community.
Rather, Sudanese oil production, not US sanctions-induced pressure, was the prompter for the end of the north-south war and emergence of the CPA. Once oil production reached a critical mass in 2001, the ruling National Congress party quickly realized it could use oil revenue to build and cement patronage in the north, and the then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) knew likewise for its position in the south. It’s no coincidence that the most contentious sticking points of the CPA still revolve around oil even today.

The central role that the US government took in the Naivasha peace process that culminated in the CPA was, instead, an unexpected boon of the post-9/11 ‘with or against us’ world tour by the administration of President George W Bush; not only did the US find that President Al-Bashir’s government was with them in the so-called war on terror, but that they were long desperate to normalize relations with the United States, and end the war and make a permanent and just peace with the SPLM.
It is, moreover, difficult to see why John Prendergast, Jerry Fowler (chief executive of the Save Darfur Coalition) and others in the US activist movement believe the ability of US government to influence the policy calculus of Khartoum would be fatally comprised without brandishing the threat of additional sanctions or other instruments of pressure on Khartoum.
Nobody, least of all General Gration, is asking to reinvent the wheel.

Washington manages to engage and influence other countries constructively that have civil conflicts that are either longer or far worse (Uganda, Colombia, Pakistan (Kashmir), DRC, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia (Ogaden) Russia (Chechnya) without being armed to the teeth with the taser of sanctions; so why not the Sudanese government? America can walk and chew gum at the same time with Sudan. And now is that time with Sudan navigating unchartered waters.

Abolishing US sanctions would not mean the US government becoming mute suddenly on Darfur, CPA implementation, human rights or other matters of concern but, instead, just airing those concerns privately to Khartoum and, concurrently, Washington altering back to its standard, more appropriate diplomatic communications modus operandi: dialogue to resolve various snafus and reach key benchmarks set by Washington, rather than just tub-thumping with one eye on making tomorrow’s American news headlines.

Siren voices of activists warning that Khartoum will not keep its side of the bargain if the US government relaxes sanctions are pure mischief making. Not all, or even most, of the delays in implementing recent Sudanese peace deals in the south, east and west can be laid at the door of Khartoum – a bird can’t fly with one wing - and re-configuring a nation-state is never swift or bump-free.

US activists are also being economical with l’actualite by pointing to the reneging on peace agreements with south Sudan by predecessors of the current Sudanese government as ‘evidence’ that Khartoum has a long history of breaking its promises.

Would it be correct not to trust the genuine commitment of the present US administration to observing the Kyoto Protocol simply because President George W Bush refused to do so? No.

Indeed, there appears to be the distinct whiff of Orientalism in the US activists’ jaundiced view of President Al-Bashir’s government record in keeping promises, depicting Khartoum as a bunch of untrustworthy, thieving and conniving Arabs. Overall, moreover, the general stance of those in the United States who support keeping (or even tightening) US economic sanctions has been hewn from a stale caricature that exists in US policy, think-tanks, academician, activist and media circles.
This caricature has stereotyped and cookie-cut the resolution of the Darfur conflict, roll out of the CPA and other topical ‘Sudan challenges’ - to the point of absurdity - as a simple struggle either between “Arabs” and “ Black Africans”; the “Centre” and the “Periphery”; Moslems verses Christians; ancient verses modern; rich and the poor; nomads verses farmers; and fundamentalists against reformists.

Sudanese are all and none of the above. That is the true essence of Sudan.

Political space would open up quickly in the US if there was comprehensive peace for Darfur – so allowing the 2.5 million displaced Darfuris to return home if they choose. But that peace will remain elusive for as long as Darfur’s fractious rebel movement (numbering 21 at the last count) fail to agree on a common agenda for peace talks with Khartoum.

Equally important, Chadian President Idris Deby must step up outreach to politically accommodate (rather than trying to military annihilate) major rebel groups in Chad and make his rule less Zaghwacentric, creating a conducive environment to end the proxy Chad-Sudan war that holds the key for the complete pacification of Darfur.

Fortunately, nonetheless, the situation in Darfur on the ground and a major snag in the implementation of the CPA have ameliorated distinctly over the last few months, giving General Gration headroom to make the call to lift US sanctions the centrepiece of his Congressional testimony. Internally displaced Darfuris are returning home in ever greater numbers. The humanitarian situation in Darfur also remains stable, with Acting USAID head, Eric Gast, noting in his testimony that the “gaps have been addressed” following Khartoum’s expulsion of 13 international aid organisations in March 2009, and adding that “new projects are already underway” in Darfur by the super-sized four replacement international aid bodies admitted by Khartoum.

In short, nobody is dying of starvation in Darfur’s tragic and undignified shelters for the displaced.

Similarly, Hartford, Connecticut, had a higher monthly violent death toll in June than conflict-related killings in Darfur (just three in that month according to data from the international peacekeeping force), while internationally-supported peace talks between the Sudanese government and the militarily strongest part of Darfur’s fractious rebel movement are due to resume later this month in Qatar with a view to reaching a cessation of hostilities and inking a framework peace agreement. The ruling of international arbitrators in late July over the oil-reach town of Abyei, claimed both by the north and south, has also passed off peacefully (so far).

Six years of relentless, high-decibel opprobrium from the US at Khartoum over the Darfur conflict is more than enough, now that the humanitarian and security environments there are relatively secure. I don’t envy his task, but General Gration is right to try to get Congress, American activist and advocacy groups to face up to these facts on the ground in Darfur and shift Washington’s focus on “recovery” which, in turn, means lifting sanctions.

Sure, Khartoum can – and must - still do more to give General Gration the maximum political space he needs in Washington to push through with advocating the lifting/relaxation of US economic sanctions. For starters, it can speed up the return of USAID-funded assets to the organisation that were confiscated from its expelled partner NGOs and generally get out of the way of the international humanitarian effort in Darfur. Khartoum must also hasten the stack of outstanding visa approvals for staff of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Yet, in any case, lifting or relaxing the sanctions should not be about punishing or rewarding the government of President Al-Bashir. Rather, as General Gration noted astutely in his testimony, it is about recognizing the severe price ordinary Sudanese and the challenge of building a modern democratic, peaceful and prosperous nation-state both keep paying for the maintenance of the sanctions.

Playing catch-up in the global race for economic development and growth to lift millions out of acute poverty, and in turn lessen the potential for future conflict in Sudan, is hard enough: more so when isolated by sanctions from a quarter of the world economy and its powerhouse of innovation, technical transfers, corporate governance and general know-how (i.e. the United States).

There is also a glaring and inherent contradiction of maintaining US sanctions on federal Sudanese authorities now that the CPA is up and running; the peace agreement calls for a much larger, if more institutionalised, Sudanese state, which is clearly incompatible with sanctions that are targeted at flattening federal finances and continue to severely impede its role as the prime lead-agency for development and welfare.

Providing huge dollops of humanitarian aid as an interim panacea for this conundrum (aid money “yes”, development funds, “no”), as the previous administration of President George W Bush did, is ultimately not in the interest of ordinary Sudanese either (nor the American tax payer). Such financial inflows into Sudan have proved easily fungible, have encouraged rentierism in housing and other non-tradable sectors (housing rents in Nyala, capital of South Darfur, currently rival those of Manhattan – as they also do in Juba, the main town in southern Sudan), and have distorted local product and labour markets for the worse.
Thank heaven for General Gration – and his supportive boss, President Obama. It had already been way past time for the US government to acknowledge the elephant in the room vis-à-vis its policy approach to Sudan over the last twenty years: ordinary Sudanese don’t crave protection from the caricature of a predatory hooligan state – most of them never come into contact with it in any shape or form – but need protection instead from crushing poverty.

Crucially, the general realises that getting long-term security and stability in Sudan requires Washington to emphasise strengthening economic (rather than political) human rights, enshrined in the UN charter, for the Sudanese population, like the right of opportunities for economic advancement, adequate provision of vital public services and the right to a dignified economic life. In other words, rights which are all incompatible with the maintenance of US sanctions.

Ordinary Sudanese are not ‘tribalists’ 24 hours a day, and need to put food on the table, send their kids to school healthy and clean, and seek better paying jobs; put simply, they have the same life aspirations of you and me. Economic growth is the most effective anti-poverty reduction and conflict-elixir weapon known to humankind – as the examples of China and India have shown. The electrifying growth of the Sudanese economy over the last five years (much clipped this year on account of relatively weak oil prices) has indeed helped hundreds of thousands of Sudanese escape from poverty; street-side tissue box sellers in El Fasher, North Darfur, make the equivalent of US$12 per day – more than most low-ranking civil servants in much of Africa.

But hundreds of thousands of Sudanese still remain trapped in extreme poverty with little immediate hope of change for the better. Exiting from their economic predicament would be speeded massively if US sanctions were rolled back – starting even with just removing some implicit sanctions by Washington both taking Sudan off the terrorism list and supporting Sudan accessing IMF/World Bank financing.

Sanctions ‘101’, US Congress: collective economic punishment is never a smart way to win the hearts and minds of people. Sudan is not apartheid South Africa; sanctions have no support amongst ordinary Sudanese – they just feel their impact. So, help change Sudan into the country its citizens want it to become, and Americans wish it could be.

Don’t shoot the messenger or his message. It might be difficult to stomach or contemplate, but General Gration is certainly brave and right: lift US sanctions from Sudan, Congress, because the innocent of Darfur, south Sudan, and indeed all ordinary Sudanese, are victims of them, too.

The author has written and advised extensively on country risk on Sudan at The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dun & Bradstreet, and Fitchratings. He is also the former Middle East and Africa spokesperson for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington D.C. He was also the speechwriter for the Government of Sudan during the north-south Sudan peace talks. Currently, Ahmed Badawi is an advisor to the Government of National Unity, Sudan, and Chief Consultant to the Global Relations Centre, based in Khartoum.
- - -

From The Guardian CIF
Lift US sanctions on Sudan
By Ahmed Badawi
Wednesday 12 August 2009. Excerpt:
"...lifting sanctions should not be about punishing or rewarding the government of President Omar al-Bashir; collective economic punishment is never a smart way to win hearts and minds. Sudan is not apartheid South Africa – sanctions have no support among the local population, Darfur included.

So, help change Sudan into the country its citizens want it to become, and Americans wish it was. Lift US sanctions from Sudan, Congress – Gration is right, the innocent of Darfur, and all other ordinary Sudanese, are victims of them, too."
Profile

Lift US sanctions on Suan

Ahmed Badawi is a British and Sudanese national, has written and advised extensively on country risk on Sudan at The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dun & Bradstreet; and Fitchratings. He is also the former Middle East and Africa spokesperson for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington D.C. Currently, Ahmed Badawi is an advisor to the Government of National Unity, Sudan, and Chief Consultant to the Global Relations Centre, based in Khartoum.

ahmed.badawimalik@gmail.com

Further reading
Click on label here below to see related reports including Sudan Watch, August 11, 2009 - High Time to Lift Sanctions by Ibrahim Adam.