Showing posts with label Jan Pronk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jan Pronk. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 14, 2023

STATEMENT: The Friends of Sudan Group reiterate steadfast support for UNITAMS and SRSG Perthes

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: The Friends of Sudan Group includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union.


In the Group's June 7th statement copied here below, it reiterates its steadfast support for the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) to Sudan and Head of UNITAMS Dr Volker Perthes and their tireless work to assist the Sudanese people in their aspirations for a civilian transition, freedom, peace and justice. 


Incidentally, the 23 members of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) in Sudan are: Canada, Sweden, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Brazil, EU Delegation, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, US, UK, and Qatar, as well as UNAMID and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and UNICEF as the Secretariat.

Source: Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2018/05/group-of-friends-of-children-and-armed-conflict-caac-in-sudan/

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Published at Government Offices of Sweden website

Dated 07 June 2023 - full copy:


Friends of Sudan Group Statement


France, Germany, Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union, as members of the Friends of Sudan, express their deep concern about the ongoing violence and the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Sudan, including reports about violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as about widespread looting of humanitarian supplies.


We strongly urge the warring parties to stop the fighting and attacks on civilians, and agree to an effective and sustained ceasefire, to ensure safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law, and to work towards a return to the political process. We urgently call on the warring parties to adhere to their commitments agreed in the 11 May Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan and in the ceasefire of 20 May, and to return to the Jeddah dialogue to resolve issues around violations and reach a ceasefire that is respected fully. Humanitarian supplies and workers must be protected to ensure that assistance can reach people in need.


We support all international and regional efforts that work towards a cessation of hostilities and a resolution of this conflict. In this context, we would like to reiterate our steadfast support for the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Volker Perthes and their tireless work to assist the Sudanese people in their aspirations for a civilian transition, freedom, peace and justice.


We call on the conflict parties to heed to calls of the Sudanese people for freedom, peace and justice by resolving their differences peacefully leading to the restoration of the political dialogue.


View original: https://www.government.se/statements/2023/06/friends-of-sudan-group-statement/


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Report at SudanTribune.com

Dated Monday 12 June 2023 - full copy:

Friends of Sudan express support for UN special envoy

Friends of Sudan meets in Riyadh, on January 18, 2022 SPA

June 12, 2023 (KHARTOUM) – The Friends of Sudan group has voiced its unwavering support for Volker Perthes, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy and head of UNITAMS, while strongly denouncing the decision by the Sudanese government to declare him persona non grata.


The military-led government in Sudan made this declaration on June 8, shortly after the renewal of UNITAMS’ mandate for six months, disregarding its demand to replace him.


In a statement released on Monday, Dennis Kumetat, the Spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry for the Middle East and North Africa, representing his country and the Friends of Sudan, unequivocally condemned the Sudanese government’s action against the German diplomat.


“Since the outbreak of hostilities, the UN Special Envoy has been working tirelessly and energetically to campaign for ceasefires, protection of civilians, and humanitarian access to assist the affected local populations. We have full confidence in his ability to continue this crucial work,” Kumetat further stressed.


Perthes will continue to work on Sudan from Nairobi, where he has opened an office.


The statement follows a letter sent on June 9 by Sudan to the African Union, Ethiopia, and various UN specialized agencies, requesting that they refrain from engaging with Perthes. It should be noted that Sudan’s membership in the regional body has been suspended since the coup on October 25, 2021.


Additionally, France and the United States issued separate statements, offering their support to Perthes and condemning the decision of the military-led government in Khartoum.


The US State Department stated on May 27, “SRSG Perthes continues to have our confidence in implementing the UNITAMS mandate and in supporting the Sudanese people to achieve a peaceful and democratic future.”


Similarly, the French foreign ministry stated on June 9, “We commend the continued commitment and tireless work of Mr Volker Perthes and all UNITAMS teams to consolidate peace and support Sudan’s democratic transition, and more recently, to secure a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors.”


The Friends of Sudan group, established by the United States to support Sudan’s democratic transition, includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union.


View original: https://sudantribune.com/article274419/


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Monday, May 15, 2023

Jan Pronk: "Sudan? Europe is busy with itself"

NOTE from Sudan Watch Ed: This report was written in Dutch by Prof Jan Pronk of The Netherlands, UN Special Envoy to Sudan from 2004 to 2006. 

Google Translator enabled me to produce the following translation but it doesn't do justice to his excellent English, communication and writing skills. 

Hopefully, readers will make allowances for this version that's been stripped of the personality and character of a great humanitarian by a machine.

Jan Pronk (pictured) was UN Special Envoy to Sudan from 2004 to 2006.

Opinion editorial from NRC Netherlands - https://www.nrc.nl/

By JAN PRONK

Dated 05 May 2023 - full copy, translated from original Dutch version:

Jan Pronk: "Sudan? Europe is busy with itself"


Sudan Diplomatic pressure was minimal, economic sanctions were not forthcoming, the arms trade flourished. In the run-up to the civil war in Sudan, the international community has looked away, writes Jan Pronk

Sudanese refugees just across the border in Chad, near Koufroun.

Photo Gueipeur Denis Sassou / AFP)


Was to prevent the civil war in Sudan, which erupted last month? When conflicts arise mainly from deeper internal contradictions – ethnic, religious or economic – it is difficult to get a grip on them from the outside. We learned that lesson. International intervention consists mainly of humanitarian aid. 


And UN peacekeeping operations, if they take place at all, are given a limited mandate: protect victims and try to stabilize the situation so that conflict parties can seek a political solution themselves. But no matter how limited that ambition is compared to thirty years ago, the results are small. More and more countries in Africa and Asia are plagued by internal conflicts of violence. The number of victims and refugees is increasing alarmingly.


Sudan, too, has been hit by deep divisions since it gained independence in 1956. The civil war between North and South claimed hundreds of thousands of victims. He ended in 2012 with the declaration of South Sudan as an independent state. The genocide in Darfur, shortly after the beginning of this century, is not yet history. Throughout Sudan, North and South, ethnic conflicts continue to cause casualties. 


Throughout Sudan, North and South, ethnic conflicts continue to cause casualties. Contradictions between Islamic fundamentalists and others are becoming sharper. The distance between the population in the Nile Delta and beyond is increasing. Economic inequality is widening. Young people see less and less perspective.


But the battle between President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's army and the militias of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti) is mainly about power and control over the country's wealth. Other contradictions were subordinated to the interests of the army and paramilitaries. 


But while the underlying contradictions cannot be easily influenced from the outside, the outside world did have the opportunity to prevent the current brutal power struggle. That has not been done.


On horseback and by camel


When an uprising broke out in Darfur in 2003 against the regime in Khartoum, President Bashir, who had come to power in a military coup in 1990, tried to defeat the guerrillas by deploying militias of Arab tribes.


The army couldn't do it alone. Many soldiers were from Darfur themselves and unwilling to go all out. The militias did. They were given carte blanche and made no distinction between rebels and unarmed civilians.


The army cooperated with them by carrying out bombing raids. The population fled in panic and fell prey to pursuers on horseback and by camel. Villages were set on fire and wiped off the map. Immediately afterwards, the militias disappeared like snow in the sun, until another attack. Four hundred thousand people died.


Two million others fled to camps in Darfur and Chad, across the border. They were received by the UN and aid workers, but were not safe there.


Bashir and his predecessors had used the same tactic before, in the fight against the South. It was a tried and tested method and it cost Khartoum little. The militias were allowed to loot and loot at will. 


In Darfur they were known as the Janjaweed: 'Devils with a horse and a gun'. They did not need heavier weapons to kill women, children and unarmed elderly men. Large parts of Darfur were ethnically 'cleansed'.


Villages were set on fire and wiped off the map


The international uproar over the genocide was great. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan personally negotiated with Bashir in Khartoum and reached an agreement. The Janjaweed would be disarmed. But that didn't happen. The Security Council protested, but did not act. 


The killing continued. Negotiations between the government and the rebels resulted in a peace agreement, but that did not last. The army attacked villages where it suspected that the villagers were sheltering rebels, even though the inhabitants themselves adhered to the truce.


The international outrage over the actions of the Janjaweed and the army was not followed up. Bashir was summoned by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He didn't come.


If he visited another country, he was obliged to arrest him. That didn't happen. He visited Qatar, met the new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, who was content to shake his hand. 


The Security Council kept quiet so as not to jeopardize Bashir's agreement to South Sudan's coming independence. The regime got away with everything. So does the Janjaweed. Diplomatic pressure was minimal. There was no political pressure. Economic sanctions as well. The arms trade flourished. 


The Janjaweed were transformed into Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The former genocide perpetrators received support from the European Union to guard Sudan's borders and stop refugees who wanted to move to Europe via Chad and Libya. Brussels hypocrisy at its best.


Gulf states jump into the hole


In 2018, civilians revolted against the regime. For the first time in thirty there was a loud call for democracy. Bashir was jailed on charges of corruption — not war crimes.


The new ruler Burhan promised to cooperate in the formation of a civilian government. It came for a while, but was sent away two years later by the military and the RSF with combined forces. The Janjaweed-new-style resumed cooperation with the army.


It was agreed to integrate the militias into the army, but they now had so many weapons and money that they felt strong enough to resist. That was the beginning of this civil war.


The civilian population was defeated and slaughtered. The outside world had looked to the side for the umpteenth time. Foreigners were picked up in haste, as they were in Afghanistan, Rwanda and Vietnam. It stands in stark contrast to the EU's treatment of African, Arab and Asian refugees trying to escape war, oppression and genocide.


China, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are jumping into the gap left by Europe. The EU lacks a vision of Sudan and other countries in the region. Things are just as bad there. In Chad it was unsettled, in Ethiopia war was fought this year. Eritrea and Egypt are ruled by dictators.


Somalia is being held hostage by the al-Shabab terror group. In Uganda, repression of dissenters is on the rise. Eastern Congo and the Central African Republic are prey for warlords. Libya is falling apart.


Europe is busy with itself. The problems are indeed great. But those who look away from the problems across the border become problem owners. We already are.


View original: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/05/soedan-europa-heeft-het-druk-met-zichzelf-a4163865


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Wednesday, July 03, 2019

Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of Darfur, Sudan: Lynchpin of Arab Janjaweed Militia Recruitment

Sudanese Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur
NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is a photo of an influential Sudanese warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal plus a copy of a fascinating report by Human Rights Watch. The old report was reprinted on 7 June 2019 by the Editor of Gurtong at www.Gurtong.net who introduced it by saying "This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan".

I have not had time to look into the meaning of the reference numbers used in the report. The yellow highlighting is mine for my own reference and to help me recall reports logged here at Sudan Watch during the Darfur war when the internet was still wild, before the existence of Twitter and Instagram, when there were no maps of Darfur to be found anywhere online.

Note to self. Here is a reminder of what it was like blogging in those days, 16 years ago. This blog was hosted by Blogger.com, it was taken over by Google. In those days, Bloggers were in their thousands not millions, we accessed the internet using a dial-up modem. Here is the sound each of us heard while we sat in front of our computer screens waiting in anticipation of getting online: https://youtu.be/gsNaR6FRuO0 - and here: https://youtu.be/qfPMAoXEJ4Q
This photo and caption "The rebels started the war - Musa Hilal" is from a BBC News online report dated 14 November 2004 entitled "Janjweed 'leader' denies genocide". To read the BBC report click here:

HERE is the report from the Editor of Gurtong.net.

Useful Background To Crisis In Khartoum, Sudan.
This analytical report is an old publication of Human Rights that enlightens the path to the current crisis in Khartoum, Sudan (Ed, Gurtong).

"He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces".

Entrenching Impunity
Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur
[In Darfur] there are scattered tribes battling over meager resources. There is no organization, except for the rebels…. [The militias] have no hierarchy. The leadership of the tribe can be disputed and people are acting on their own at times, without the knowledge of the tribe.
--Dr. Abdul-Moniem Osman Mohammed Taha, head of the Sudan Human Rights Advisory Council7

Despite persistent Sudanese government characterization of the Darfur conflict as a “tribal conflict,” and repeated denials of state coordination of abusive militia groups, there is irrefutable evidence of a Sudanese government policy of systematic support for coordination of and impunity from prosecution granted to the “Janjaweed militias,” a policy that continues to this day.

The logic behind this policy is clear. Distrusting the armed forces, many of who were originally from Darfur, the Sudanese government recruited the “Janjaweed” militias as the main ground forces for the government’s counterinsurgency campaign in Darfur.8 

Although the government issued a general call to arms, recruitment was selective and based on ethnicity. Certain ethnic groups with historical grievances against those ethnic groups constituting the rebel movements or with strong interests in gaining access to land and other resources became the mainstay of the government’s militia force.9

To successfully recruit these groups, the Sudanese government provided incentives in the form of payment and access to loot, as well as promises of access to land and administrative power. Sudanese officials also identified key tribal leaders from the northern Riziegat to coordinate the recruitment: Sheikh Musa Hilal, a leader of the Um Jalul clan of the Mahamid, became the lynchpin for recruitment of militias in northern Darfur. Since June 2003, he has become emblematic of the role of the militia forces in the attacks on civilians and the impunity conferred upon them by the Sudanese government.

A. Musa Hilal: Lynchpin of Militia Recruitment
The worst atrocities are committed by the Um Jalul of Musa Hilal because historically they have tensions with the Fur and Zaghawa. They’re all camel herders, not cattle herders, and they have no respect for farmers, they have a superiority complex and they need their camels. When the war started, the Sudanese government asked Musa Hilal to be the leader of the Janjaweed.
--Neutral Arab nomadic leader from West Darfur10

Sheikh Musa Hilal has become internationally synonymous with the Janjaweed, the government-backed militias who have earned notoriety for their brutal attacks in Darfur over the past few years.11

His role in the crimes committed in Darfur and his current freedom within Sudan—flying in Sudanese military transport between his homes and wives in Khartoum and his base in Misteriya, North Darfur—illustrate the broader role and impunity of the militias throughout Darfur.

The Sudanese government has repeatedly stated that it cannot pursue individuals responsible for crimes in Darfur if the victims and witnesses are unable or unwilling to name them. Dr. Abdul Moniem Osman Taha, head of the government’s Advisory Council on Human Rights (and brother to Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha) told Human Rights Watch in October 2004, that “Even Pronk [Jan Pronk, Head of the U.N. Mission in Sudan] tells us it’s important to try the leaders. If the name of the leaders is mentioned by defendants or witnesses, we could do that. Until now, no one mentioned any names.”12 

This statement came months after six alleged militia leaders, including Musa Hilal, were named by the U.S. State Department in July 2004.13 

Scores of victims, witnesses of attacks, and even members of the Sudanese armed forces have named Hilal as the top commander for Janjaweed militias in North Darfur and elsewhere in Darfur. His Um Jalul tribesmen have played a prominent role among the attackers responsible for many atrocities across Darfur.14 

As of December 2005, Musa Hilal remains at liberty, free from any investigation or prosecution for his role in numerous attacks in Darfur.

Since 2003, Hilal has operated from his base in Misteriya, southwest of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, under the direction of the Sudanese army; his immediate superior is a Sudanese army officer named Lt. Col. Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said. Misteriya is now one of the largest militia training bases in the region, although initially it was merely a satellite settlement of the nomadic Um Jalul. Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Wahid functions as one of the main liaisons between the Janjaweed militias recruited and trained in Misteriya and the Sudanese army.15 

He is reported to be the commander of the militias known as the “border intelligence brigade” in Misteriya and Musa Hilal is the second in command.16

Some of the forces in Misteriya are known as Al Motaharik Al Khafif, Al Saria, Al Morea or the Mobile, Light, Quick and Horrible forces.17 

According to a former legal advisor to the brigade, Lt Col Abdul Wahid’s orders for the brigade come directly from the Sudanese army headquarters in Fashir.18

In a Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Hilal, he denied that he commanded any “military group.” He stated that his men are always under the command of the military and that he was merely a “coordinator.” 

Hilal told Human Rights Watch, “The training, the uniforms, the guns, they are the responsibility of the government.” Hilal said that he and his men were involved in what he called “joint patrols” in the area from Zalingei to Abata to Kutum (an area that extends from southwest of Jebel Marra north around Jebel Marra and includes much of central North Darfur), and that the Sudanese government had provided them with weapons for these patrols.19

The responsible army officials confirm that all of Hilal’s operations have been under the control of the army.20

Numerous community leaders from different parts of Darfur, interviewed independently by Human Rights Watch, said that Musa Hilal held a leadership role in the Tajamu al Arabi or Arab Gathering (or Coalition or Alliance) since the 1990s. 

He had close ties to Maj. Gen. Abdallah Safi el Nour, an Ireqat from Darfur and former air force pilot, who was the governor of North Darfur from 2000 to January 2002, and a federal minister in Khartoum in 2003-2004.21 

During Safi el Nour’s tenure as governor of North Darfur, tribal tensions increased dramatically due to perceptions that the Sudanese government was aligning itself with and arming the Arab militias.22

“Wali Safi al Nour, an army officer, is the one who gave Arabs the authority to devastate the farms,” a group of Fur and Tunjur community leaders from North Darfur told Human Rights Watch.23

The governor who followed Safi el Nour in North Darfur in 2002, Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan, an ethnic Berti from North Darfur and ruling party member, was concerned about the increasing tensions in Darfur. It was during Governor Ibrahim Suleiman’s tenure as chair of the North Darfur state security committee that Hilal was detained and sent to prison in Port Sudan.24 

At the time, local community leaders named Hilal in many complaints of clashes and incitement, and he was said to have been levying excessive fines and imposing corporal punishment on members of his own tribe.
On account of the complaints of his tribes people, he was removed as nazir or tribal leader by Ibrahim Suleiman and another person was put in his place.25 

During Hilal’s time in detention, attacks by Arab militias on other ethnic groups decreased. A Zaghawa tribal leader told Human Rights Watch, “While Musa Hilal was away from Darfur, the Janjaweed had fewer activities. They were still attacking, but not that much. When he returned, the burning of houses and villages started.”26

Hilal was released from detention after the SLA’s April 24, 2003 attack on Fashir; a few days after this attack, Governor Ibrahim Suleiman was removed from his post by President El Bashir. Upon returning to Darfur in June 2003, Hilal based himself in the Kebkabiya area and organized a meeting of the leaders of all the local Arab tribesmen, including the Awlad Rashid, Ireqat and Um Jalul.27

According to a person present at the Kebkabiya meeting, Musa Hilal ordered tribesmen to attack and burn non-Arab villages and loot livestock. He reportedly said, “The government is with us, so you have no accusations to fear.”28 

Some of the tribes refused; even some of his own Um Jalul tribesmen apparently refused to obey the orders. A community leader from Kebkabiya who knew Hilal in previous years said, “Musa Hilal compelled every Arab tribe member to participate, even those who refused. He acts as king of the Arabs, the guide of all. How does he force them to fight? He beats those who refuse and takes their animals, killing some of them.”29

The Kebkabiya meetings were a turning point in the government’s involvement with Musa Hilal—and with the Janajweed militias. “Guns flowed to them after that” said one local community leader.30

B. Musa Hilal’s Role in the Attacks in North Darfur
By July 2003, Musa Hilal’s militia base in Misteriya was established. Misteriya was not an army base—that was located in Kebkabiya. With the first Janjaweed forces mobilized, the Sudanese government launched a major ground offensive in North Darfur in mid-2003. A former soldier in the army who participated in these attacks noted the close coordination between Musa Hilal, other tribal militia leaders and the military prior to and during the attacks:

In Kebkabiya, at the Sudanese army camp, there were Janjaweed. It was actually a small group of thirteen leaders under the command of “Abu Ashreen.”31 

The Janjaweed troops used to stay in the vicinity of Kebkabiya, in Misteriya. Misteriya is a training camp for Janjaweed. Musa Hilal came more than twenty times to our camp in Kebkabiya while I was there. I saw him myself, with my own eyes, more than ten times. He always came with two cars, one for him and one for his guards. He had meetings with officers. Three or four days after each of his visits, we were attacking a place.

I don’t know how they were organizing and coordinating the troops, by phone or not, but on the day of an attack, hundreds of Janjaweed were coming to our camp in Kebkabiya, on horses and camels. We were asked to prepare our stuff too, to get ready and at some point we were ordered to get into our vehicles. 

We were never told that we were about to attack a village. We were always told that there were groups of Zaghawa or Fur militiamen operating where we were going and that we had to “finish them.” That is the expression that was used.32

Villages around Kebkabiya were among the first to be attacked by Musa Hilal’s men and government troops in the government’s first major campaign in July 2003. The same former soldier participated in the attacks. He said:

We were asked to clear the way and the area [the Eid en Nabak area east of Kebkabiya] for the Janjaweed to attack, burn, and loot the village. It was on July 5, 2003. That day, too, Antonovs came during the attack and dropped three bombs on the mountains near the village. People were running away. I saw seven villagers being killed. I saw three old guys captured by the Janjaweed and handed over to the commander of our army. They were later taken to Kebkabiya and put in jail. Some soldiers burned huts and buildings in the village along with the Janjaweed. Three hundred fifty soldiers participated in this attack. Only five of us refused to shoot or shot in the air. Three of the five were later arrested, court-martialed and sentenced to three years in jail. In Eid En Nabak that day, there were no SLA, only civilians.33

After destroying their villages and displacing the population around Kebkabiya, the forces moved north, towards the Zaghawa areas that were home to the SLA. In July and August 2003, large swathes of North Darfur, including villages in the Abu Gamra area between Kebkabiya and Karnoi and the Beré area north of Kutum, were attacked and burned in what was to be the start of a two-year campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed militia.

It is unclear whether Musa Hilal himself led the forces in the Abu Gamra attacks, but several local leaders interviewed independently, some of whom knew him personally, named him as one of the overall leaders of the militia forces in the area, and he is known to have operated in the area in later attacks. Sudanese forces attacked the town of Abu Gamra and its fifteen surrounding villages repeatedly during 2003-2004.
Human Rights Watch documented four major attacks on the area, and a number of smaller attacks. These major attacks took place in July-August 2003, December 2003 and January 2004, February-March 2004, and July-August 2004. More than three hundred people were killed in the attacks between May 2003 and August 2004.34 Witnesses noted that each large attack involved Antonov aircraft, helicopters, Janjaweed militias on horses and camels, and the Sudanese military in vehicles.

Some civilians living in Dar Zaghawa learned how to predict the bombing attacks and take refuge in caves or hand-dug shelters before the aircraft arrived. They listened to radio exchanges between the pilots on simple FM radios which picked up the radio frequencies used by the planes:

We heard the names of the [government army] pilots and conversations.… That is how we know some of the pilots. One was Egyptian, because of the way he spoke in clear Egyptian Arabic. One officer is Gadal in the army, because we heard him on the radio organizing the attacks. They called him Janabo Gadal or Officer Gadal. Also, Afaf Segel, who is a woman pilot from Sudan. She said things like “Nas Kornoi na dikim fatuur” which means “I am going to give breakfast to the peasant from Karnoi,” before Karnoi was bombed. Captain Khalid was another pilot. In their conversations on the radio they called us “Nuba, abid,” and said things like, “I am going to give those slaves a lesson they will not forget.”35

On February 9, 2004, after a massive government offensive forced almost one million people from their homes, including one hundred thousand Sudanese citizens into neighboring Chad, President El Bashir announced that the government had won the war.36 

The next day the Sudanese government agreed, in theory, to allow international organizations to have access to Darfur.37 

In order to rebut the government announcement of its defeat, the SLA moved its forces to West and South Darfur to open a new front.

The Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias moved into the areas of North Darfur that the SLA had partially vacated. According to government memoranda obtained by Human Rights Watch, this movement of government and Janjaweed forces into North Darfur appears to have been ordered to occupy the area and prevent an SLA return.38

Another government document from the same period specifically names Musa Hilal, and orders all security units to “allow the activities of the mujaheedin and the volunteers under the command of Sheikh Musa Hilal to proceed.…”39 

Setting up several new Janjaweed militia camps in North Darfur was done to deter return of the rebel movements and also of civilians expelled from their homes by Janjaweed and government forces’ attacks.
Musa Hilal was seen at various attacks in North Darfur in February and March 2004; he and his forces were apparently responsible for a large part of North Darfur. 

He himself was frequently transported by Sudanese government helicopters. Several witnesses identified him as a commander of the forces who attacked Tawila on February 27, 2004, and noted that he was brought there by helicopter. A man from Kebkabiya who overheard one of Hilal’s conversations prior to the Tawila attack said, “I heard them on Thurayas [satellite phone] with someone in Khartoum, to arrange the point where the plane should land to bring the required ammunition.”40

Another witness placed Musa Hilal at the scene of crimes in the Abu Leha area in March 2004.41 Refugee women from villages near Furawiya, in the far north of North Darfur, named Hilal as leader of the forces attacking their village, Omda Dabo, in early 2004.42 A forty-two-year-old Zaghawa man who was arrested and then tortured by Janjaweed militia members after a joint army-Janjaweed attack on Abu Leha in March 2004, told Human Rights Watch:

They hung me with hooks piercing my chest. They also burned me. I was arrested with thirty other men. They tied us together and interrogated us about animals. We said we did not know so they called us liars and shot and slaughtered some of [the men] in front of my eyes.… The biggest boss of the Janjaweed is Musa Hilal. I saw him before the events, but also when I was tortured. He came by helicopter with soldiers. He gives orders to both soldiers and Janjaweed.43

When Hilal was interviewed by Human Rights Watch in September 2004, he deferred responsibility for the attacks to the Sudanese armed forces, denying that he had any official military rank or responsibility beyond “mobilization” or recruitment of militias. He said, “I have not led military groups, I only asked our people to join. I am only a coordinator for the PDF, training, uniforms, guns are the responsibility of the military people.”44

C. Government-Militia Coordination
The pattern of joint army-militia attacks supported by intensive aerial bombardment demonstrated in North Darfur became standard as the conflict spread to other areas of Darfur. In many cases, villages were first heavily bombed, then the Janjaweed and army ground forces moved in, again with aerial support, to ensure the “cleaning up” of any remaining civilian presence.

In contrast to the Sudanese government’s depictions of the militia activity in Darfur as unorganized and lacking hierarchy, many of the tribal militias used in the government’s campaign were highly structured. Many of the nomadic fighters were led by the agid or war leader. Agids and tribal leaders were in regular contact with military officials or civilian administrators at the local level, either provincial commissioners or state governors. 

In South Darfur, for example, the governor reportedly met with tribal leaders and agids on an almost daily or weekly basis. Witnesses and observers from different ethnic groups told Human Rights Watch that the agid traditionally plays an important role in mobilizing and leading the fighters in battle, often carrying a red flag.45 

The agid and tribal leaders were also used for distribution of arms, and as liaisons between the militiamen and the government. A well-informed observer from a neutral Arab tribe told Human Rights Watch:
Every Arab tribe has an agid. The government contacted the agid and other leaders…. They get salaries and ammunition from the PDF office near the market. The agid are the real power to mobilize the Arabs. The hakama [women singers] are one of the dangerous tools…but the word is with the agid, he can mobilize the men.46

As described by an A.U. monitor who investigated numerous attacks in Darfur and spoke to militia leaders, the militia attacks were highly organized, with “echelons” of militia attacking in waves. Militia members on horses were often the first to attack, because of their speed and the fact that they presented a smaller target. Militiamen on camels followed in a second echelon.47

Joint government-militia offensives were well-coordinated. In North Darfur, for instance, Musa Hilal and other militia leaders met, discussed and planned offensives together with the Sudanese military prior to implementing the offensives. In the South Darfur “road clearing” offensive of December 2004 (see Section VI below), the Sudanese armed forces coordinated with the militias not only in carrying out the attacks but in the systematic sealing off of villages and the methodical looting and destruction that followed.

The looting was not random; it was clearly organized and premeditated. In many cases, it appears to have been organized by the military commander and conducted in a methodical way. The troops and Janjaweed used in attacks south of and around Kutum were told that they could keep their looted goods if they “fight well.”48 

Prior to attacking Anka, a town northeast of Kutum, the army commander ordered the militia men to enter the village first and burn everything, after taking “what you like.” The army followed and “collected chairs and beds.” Numerous witnesses, in North Darfur and other states, described seeing army troops and Janjaweed militiamen collecting furniture, other goods and livestock, and loading the items into trucks and on camels.49

A twenty-five-year-old former government soldier described the looting policy to Human Rights Watch, “You keep what you have taken. It applies to the officers too. One exception: the animals. The animals are given to Janjaweed nomads who keep them. Then they are sold.”50 

After the government soldiers and Janjaweed militia conducted fighting and looting operations, large army trucks would transport the looted livestock back to the Janjaweed camp, according to this former government soldier who was stationed in Kutum, North Darfur. He told Human Rights Watch that after destroying villages around Enciro, North Darfur, in June 2003, the Sudanese government commander ordered the militia to take the looted cattle and cows to Damrat Sheikh Abdel Bagi, a Janjaweed camp located less than twenty kilometers northeast of Kutum, and from there some of the livestock were distributed onward in trucks: one interviewee told us, “Big lorries from Omdurman arrived.… They loaded up with sheep from the base and took them away. Three times these lorries came… and transported camels and cows.”51

Several witnesses of attacks who hid in the vicinity also noted that in some cases, the army left after any initial fighting between the attackers and the SLA or self-defense groups was over, and the militia men were left to loot, plunder and then destroy the villages alone. In one such attack in South Darfur described to Human Rights Watch, the militia leaders “wore a red cloth over the left shoulder, no flag. Afterwards they showed a white flag and the fighting stopped.… After they showed the white flag and the army vehicles had left, the Janjaweed looted.”52

Thursday, May 06, 2010

South Sudan: Child-soldiers & SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army)

WARM THANKS to Saskia Baas for sending in the following article. Saskia is a PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam, completing a dissertation on armed opposition movements in Sudan and has done extensive field work in Sudan in 2008 - 2009, interviewing around 80 rebels. Names in the article are not the respondents’ real names.

Children who become soldiers
By Saskia Baas
April 27, 2010
Over the past few years, the use of children as soldiers in armed conflict has become a source of immense moral outrage among rights activists as well as the general public. In 2005, the UN Security Council officially condemned the use of child-soldiers by parties to armed conflict and organisations such as Unicef and Save the Children have launched big campaigns to raise awareness on the tragic fate of children who become soldiers during civil wars in Africa, Asia and South America. Horrendous stories have surfaced of children who were abducted, drugged and turned into killing machines during the bloody civil wars in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. These stories form a legitimate ground for wide condemnation, indeed.

However, although the “child-soldier” is often depicted as a helpless victim of the evildoings of other (adult) actors, this is a simplification that does not do justice to the complex reality of a civil war. During the civil war in South Sudan (1983-2005) the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen was common practice in the largest rebel movement: the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The stories of these children – many of whom are by now adults and youngsters – challenge the image of childsoldiers as helpless victims, with no choice or opinion of their own.

Meet Tricia, who joined the SPLA when she was ten years old. When the government army had killed her father, she decided she wanted to fight back: “I became angry. I walked to a town where the SPLA was stationed and I said to them that I want to be a soldier. I took training for two years. I was still small and I was struggling even to carry the gun.” After she completed her training, the army leadership decided she was too young to fight and sent her to a refugee camp in Kenya to go to school. But after a year, she walked back to Sudan to join the army again: “My heart didn’t want to stay in the school. I wanted to fight. Every day in the school, my mind was thinking about going back to the army. This was because of what happened to my father. I was still angry.”

Another soldier, Moses, joined the rebels’ side when he was twelve years old. His home area became very insecure as a result of the war. He explains that he joined the rebels after an attack on his village by the enemy: “When the enemy came, they were killing people and taking the women and cows. They put fire in the house. My father was killed and three men in my sister’s house. I was afraid, I ran away. In the forest, I found soldiers and I joined them.” Although the life of a soldier exposes children to extremely threatening circumstances, it is often overlooked that they were facing the same, or even worse threats in their home communities. Civil war creates extreme insecurities, and becoming a soldier can be a form of seeking relative protection.

Yet, life for children in the army was also harsh and dangerous. There was seldom enough food, and many soldiers died of hunger, malaria or diarrhoea. On the frontlines, soldiers saw their friends die in front of them and many got injured. Simon tells us how he got injured: “When I was sixteen, I got shot in my leg. It had to be amputated and I now use an artificial leg. After that, I could not go back to battle. I stayed in the liberated areas, but still in uniform.” Philip also got injured when he was sixteen “When we started to fight, I felt bad about it. The war made everything worse. People died, got hurt and fled. I got injured in my leg. I had to go to the hospital far from the battles. I had to stay behind in the barracks since then.”

In the SPLA, it was not common for young children to be sent to the frontlines to fight, although there were exceptions to that rule. Many children who wanted to become soldiers were turned down altogether and sent to refugee camps, like what happened to Tricia. Generally, children who were taken into the army were given lighter tasks in the barracks. Yet, some young soldiers recalled how eager they were to go to the frontlines, like Jacob: “I was twelve when I joined the SPLA. I had to join the army, because I needed to protect myself. After the training, I was feeling strong. But the commanders thought I was still too young to fight, so I had to stay in the barracks with them. When I was thirteen, I didn’t want to wait anymore, and they let me go to battle. They saw I was ready for it.”

When possible, the SPLA organised classes for its soldiers in the barracks, mainly during ceasefires. Children were also sent to refugee camps or to safe areas for periods of time to attend school. Daniel explains how he was selected for education: “I joined the SPLA when I was fourteen years old. Then, our commander came to the barracks and they said to me “you are still young, you go to school”. Twenty were selected like that. I went to Kenya and finished my primary and secondary school there.” While life in the ranks of the army was extremely challenging for children, the life they had left behind was often not much better. Those who remained civilians throughout the war were subjected to attacks by the army, disease and famine. In 2005, the SPLA signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government, putting an end to twenty years of a devastating civil war.

Directly after the peace, rights groups pressured the SPLA to release all soldiers who were then under the age of eighteen. Unicef committed itself to help them reintegrate into civilian life, and received funds to do so, but never managed to get projects going. None of the young soldiers ever received any form of support from Unicef. They had to depend on their families, like Daniel, who was sixteen when the peace was signed: “After the peace, I travelled to where my uncle lives. I was released from the army to go to school and I like it. I am in class 7 now. When I finish my education, I want to teach my people how to plant crops and how to take care of them. I don’t want a job in the army.”

Since the peace, the SPLA is an official army, and its remaining soldiers started receiving salaries. Tricia is now twenty-two years old and earning about $200 a month, which makes her more than well-off for Sudanese standards. She talks about her future: “I am now in the military intelligence. I also want to continue my education. I am going to ask for permission to go to school. But after I finish, I will come back to my job. I want to stay in the army. The army is my life.”

Jacob is now thirty years old, and stationed in South Sudan’s capital Juba where he is performing a civilian task. He hopes to find a way to continue his education, but this is difficult: “The problem is that I am too old for the regular schools here. I’ve been in the army for 16 years now. I am a soldier, and I feel that I have to be in the army. It is a job, somehow. All my experience is in the army. I won’t match in any other place. I belong in the army.” He is also now receiving a salary and is saving up for the dowry, as he is planning to get married and start a family.

The image of a child-soldier as a helpless victim who is abducted and forced, is based on only one part of reality and requires nuance. Although the image works well for those organisations seeking to raise funds for their projects, it does not provide room for children who became soldiers in an attempt to shape their destinies. Civil wars expose people to horrendous experiences and make children specifically vulnerable. Under these threatening circumstances, becoming a fighter may be a perfectly rational way to seek protection, even for children. However, that should not diminish our moral outrage. If anything, it should redirect our indignation towards states and leaders who instigate these wars, and those who look away and fail to act.

Related article on the SID forum: Forgotten… by Jan Pronk
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Forgotten ... the millions of homeless people in forgotten cities
From last month's archives here at Sudan Watch:
While Sudanese rebels refuse to face elections, click here for a reminder of millions of homeless people and children living in forgotten cities.

Millions of people are living in forgotten cities

Quote of the Year

"Thatched huts are upgraded into slums. Camp dwellers start exchanging belongings amongst themselves. Barter develops into markets. People try to make a living through prostitution and crime. Idleness fosters addiction to alcohol and drugs. Combatants come to hide themselves for a while within the camp and recruit youngsters for their militias. People in the camps start organizing themselves. The camps develop into cities, with an economy, a power structure and increasing violence.

Camps are cities in suspense. They suffer from shortages of water and sanitation, shaky food deliveries, oscillating relief assistance, despotic rulers, lawlessness and insecurity, both around the camp and inside."

-Professor Jan Pronk, October 2009
Note from Sudan Watch Editor: Professor Jan Pronk of The Netherlands is a Dutch politician and diplomat. From mid 2004 until the end of 2006 Professor Pronk lived in Khartoum, Sudan as the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Sudan, where he led the UN peace keeping operation (UNMIS) during a most dangerous time. Sadly, Professor Pronk was expelled from Sudan by the Sudanese government because of his blogging. He did so much to help the people of Sudan, risking his life and health in the process. I think the African Union and Sudanese government ought to make amends by awarding him a medal as a mark of respect and appreciation for the countless number of lives that he helped to save through his non-stop hard work, great courage and willingness to speak out. I often think of him and still miss his brilliant blog posts. See BBC News 22 October 2006 UN envoy ordered to leave Sudan and read more at Jan Pronk weblog and Wikipedia.

Monday, April 05, 2010

Reminder: Millions of homeless people in forgotten cities

While Sudanese rebels refuse to face elections, click here for a reminder of millions of homeless people and children living in forgotten cities.

Millions of people are living in forgotten cities

Quote of the Year
"Thatched huts are upgraded into slums. Camp dwellers start exchanging belongings amongst themselves. Barter develops into markets. People try to make a living through prostitution and crime. Idleness fosters addiction to alcohol and drugs. Combatants come to hide themselves for a while within the camp and recruit youngsters for their militias. People in the camps start organizing themselves. The camps develop into cities, with an economy, a power structure and increasing violence.

Camps are cities in suspense. They suffer from shortages of water and sanitation, shaky food deliveries, oscillating relief assistance, despotic rulers, lawlessness and insecurity, both around the camp and inside."

-Professor Jan Pronk, October 2009

Thursday, March 01, 2007

URGENT MESSAGE to European Union: AU still not paying its peace force in Sudan's Darfur

African Mission in Sudan

Please take a moment to think about the terrain and people pictured here below and wonder why African peacekeepers in Darfur are still having to wait months on end for their pay. After all that has been said and done about Darfur over the past four years, I find it sickening that nobody, not even the savedarfurcrowd (puke - see below) or Sudan and its neighbours, cares about the welfare of African peacekeepers in Darfur.

By now, there's no excuse, heads should roll. It's a scandal involving billions of taxpayers' euros and dollars. AU personnel in Darfur, far away from home and family for 6 months at a time, risk their health and lives to help the Sudanese and tens of thousands of aid workers. I say, without a shadow of a doubt, given the circumstances, AMIS personnel have been let down badly by everyone, including the people of Sudan, African Union and Arab League.

To add insult to injury (ie forced to work for free) AMIS have to endure hostile locals (see below) who don't understand AMIS' mandate. AMIS was permitted into Darfur to help protect the observers of a ceasefire agreement. The 10,000 UN peacekeepers in South Sudan are there through an historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by all sides. Darfur's Peace Agreement (DPA) has no such clause (long story). In Darfur there is no peace to keep. Darfur rebels and other Sudanese citizens started falling out and fighting each other before the DPA'S ink had dried.

From the outset of the rebellion, slick media-savvy rebels, some residing outside of Sudan in countries such as USA, Canada, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Chad, Eritrea (and many others) made extensive use of the world's press to pressure and engineer UN troops onside, which I believe is one of the reasons why Khartoum is against UN troops in Darfur - it would embolden the rebels and cause all sorts of mayhem, encouraging other lowlife opportunists. (See JEM. The International Crisis Group noted that JEM's president Mr Khalil Ibrahim "is a veteran Islamist and former state minister who sided with the breakaway (Popular Congress) in 2002 and went into exile in the Netherlands ... there is additionally evidence of some level of involvement of al-Qaeda with the Islamist JEM organisation")

The Darfur rebels have done everything within their power to manipulate the media, even going as far as to provoke attacks from Sudanese forces and janjaweed, blocking aid access in order to attract attention to denigrate Khartoum and AMIS and succeed in their coup. Imagine the nonsense and propaganda they've conveyed to masses of illiterate locals with no access to world news. Some of the first reports to come out of the Darfur on the rebellion quoted Sudanese people who, when translated, sounded very strange, flowery and exotic in their choice of words> It wasn't long before I noticed eyewitness accounts sounded strangely westernised, I wondered if they were primed by rebels. I think this is one of the reasons why Khartoum gets so up in the air over rape reports. Can you tell the difference between an unarmed Sudanese rebel and a Sudanese civilian? Or Sudanese forces and the Janjaweed? (See 14 Nov 2004 BBC report Frustration of Darfur 'observer')

Although AMIS does not have the mandate of a full protection force (long story, read this blog) millions of illiterate Darfurians will never know how lucky they've been to even have AMIS on the ground monitoring what's going on. Darfur is extremely dangerous. Reporters aren't allowed in many areas. Aid workers are restricted and need to remain neutral. Thank goodness AMIS is there to help, witness and document issues concerning all sides. Given today's communications technology, I feel confident they are in a position to share intelligence, blow the whistle and leak alerts. I say, why not hand out wind-up radios for Darfurians to tune in to BBC World Service Trust radio project in Darfur? I'd love to hear from anyone who has heard Darfur Salaam, does the signal reach Chad?

If necessary, AMIS' soldiers will shoot in self defence but are mandated to remain neutral. They are there to protect military observers monitoring a ceasefire agreement and IDP camps. Put yourself in their boots and imagine the difficulties and logistics of establishing bases in Darfur, a region the size of France or Jordan. Not to mention all the confusion, shuffling of paper, reports and translations. Take a look at the first photo here below. I couldn't do their job for all the tea in China. Could you? If so, would you expect to be paid, and on time? How would you manage your bills if you worked for no pay? What would you tell your family? Imagine the stress and worry, not to mention troop morale. (An aside: please see last line of Jan Pronk's blog entry 24 Feb 2007 conveying a heartfelt message to peacekeepers).

After the miles of reports I've read, covering the work carried out by hundreds of thousands of people worldwide to help Darfur with outside troops, writing this story is now making me cry. I was born into British military life. The British Army runs like clockwork. I've seen first hand how Canada and the US also take good care of their troops. No pay packet? Inconceivable! In a war zone with two young children to bring up, my mother would have hit the roof!

Hundreds of thousands of people around the world, many in positions of power and influence, follow daily news on Sudan but nobody cares enough to rectify this grossly unfair situation. The Holy Bible says it is wrong to withold the pay, even for a day, of hired workers. Professional soldiers deserve to be treated respectfully. Not paying them is a slap in their face and, I feel, sullies the reputation of EU funding. Just like you, AU soldiers have homes, families, food expenses and bills to pay. They are gainfully employed, not amateurs working for amusement or pin money.

Who knows what is really going on? Surely the UN chief of staff, pictured here below, is aware of the situation. Perhaps the African Union is starving its mission in Sudan (AMIS) of hard cash in order to secure UN funding, training and support or it regards peacekeepers' pay a low priority, or what? I can't think of another reason because this widely reported issue has gone on far too long. I find it hard to believe the EU is lying when it says it has paid the AU (see June 1, 2006: What's going on? AU Mission in Darfur costs $1 billion a year - SA troops in Darfur still waiting to be paid: EU said there was no delay in funding.

The EU gave birth to the AU, an historic initiative costing millions (maybe billions) of euros to empower Africans and enable them to provide African solutions for African problems. Drima, The Sudanese Thinker tells us about Sudan's diversity and identity crisis: Sudanese folk see their country as Afro-Arab, not African. I'm not aware of the Arab League coughing up funds for the African Union's mission in Darfur, are you? Sudan's President Bashir says of his country, "We're all Africans, we're all black - talk of Arabs killing blacks is a lie". (Also, see Feb 17 2007 Interview: Sudanese President Bashir)

Contrary to what you might have read, quality news reports from Africa tell us there is no shortage of African soldiers willing to serve on peacekeeping missions. African countries are saying they can't commit troops until they know all what's involved. I guess this could be made clear if the UN's chief receives a reply to his letter sent to Mr Bashir re a crucial phase of the new AU-UN hybrid force. (See Feb 16 2007: Sudan's Plan for Darfur - Letter from UN's Ban to Sudan's Bashir Jan 24 remains unanswered)

Please don't miss this copy of a Soldier of Africa blog entry by Werner, a South African soldier (and great blogger) currently serving in Darfur:
Feb 28 2007
Last night I went to Zamzam and took this photo of some of the sixty Egyptians who have finished their mission. Thirty three of them should have left on 05 December, but since they had not yet received their money they were forced to stay to wait for the money. According to my calculations the inability of the AU to pay these Military Observers has already resulted in the AU losing $252 450 and with the inclusion of the twenty seven Egyptian CIVPOL members who ended their mission days ago that amount has gone up sharply. Every day they stay here means the AU loses more money. It would make sense that to pay them on time would have resulted in a massive saving. Constantly the AU approaches especially EU countries for more funds and these countries just give, but maybe somebody should start asking some questions. The last time I was paid was three weeks ago when I was paid up to November 2006. If there is a legitimate problem with the AU paying us then why do they not inform us of the problem? The AU's constant silence leaves me with a list of unanswered questions that, if asked, will leave them squirming in their seats. The time is fast approaching that many of these questions have to be answered.
And one of the comments posted:
Anonymous said...
yes please we want our money...we do not like working for free if we give all that we can for this mission...
This rotten problem has irked me so much over the past three years (Kalma Camp is another), I am ceasing this blog in protest until I find news of the issue being resolved. My round-up of media reports and blog entries relating to ICC will have to wait. Sorry, I feel this is more important.

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Photo: An AMIS outpost in Darfur. There are more than 25 of these bases scattered over 8 sectors. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa)

Demonstration

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Photo: The people of El Fashier demonstrating against the UN taking over from AMIS. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa) Photo taken Jan 17, 2006, posted to Flickr Nov 27, 2006.

Protection

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Photo: Soldiers of AMIS being used to protect the force commander. Not that his life is in any danger. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa)

Maj Wolmarans

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Photo: Maj L. Wolmarans, the commanding officer at Mahla. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa) Photo taken Nov 22, 2006.

Priests on Tarmac

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Photo: The death of another member of AMIS. I did not take this photo. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa) Photo taken July 10, 2005.

Also, see Feb 17 2007 news report Sixth Rwandan peacekeeper dies in Darfur.

UN Chief of Staff

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Photo: UN Chief of Staff of the new hybrid force in Darfur reading a document. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa) Photo taken on Jan 7, 2007, posted to Flickr Jan 8 2007.
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As mentioned above, here is a copy of an email received from David Rubenstein, Save Darfur Coalition, Wed 19:15 GMT Feb 28 2007.
Dear Supporter,

New Goal, 10 Hours Left

Help us raise the $88,142 we need to reach our new $300,000 goal by midnight tonight.

Your gift will help us expand our crucial efforts - click here to donate now.

The commitment of the Save Darfur Coalition's supporters is truly inspiring.

We're 10 hours away from the midnight deadline and 3,595 people have already contributed $211,858 to our February fundraising campaign!

Thanks to them, we have exceeded our original $200,000 goal. Because there is so much more work to do, we now hope to achieve a new goal: $300,000 for Darfur by midnight tonight.

Can you help us get there? Click here to make your secure, tax-deductible gift now.

With your help, the Coalition is raising awareness of the crisis, putting our global leaders' feet to the fire to demand action, and bringing hope to the innocent people in Darfur in the process.

But we need to do more in order to stop the genocide and bring the killing, rape, mutilation and terror to an end.

And we need your help to make that possible.

Please consider making a secure, tax-deductible donation to help us expand our crucial advocacy efforts on behalf of the innocent men, women and children of Darfur. Click here to donate now.

This month marks the fourth anniversary of the start of the horrific violence in Darfur. Hundreds of thousands of innocent Darfurians have lost their lives, and millions more have been displaced from their homes.

The violence in Darfur will continue until enough of us decide to take a stand.

We need your help to ratchet our efforts up another notch and make this year the last year of this genocide.

There are only a few hours left before the deadline. Please click here now to make a secure, tax-deductible gift to help us expand our efforts to save Darfur.

Once you've made your gift, please consider forwarding this message to your family and friends and asking them to join you in making a last-minute gift to help end the genocide in Darfur.

Thank you again for helping us to bring hope to the innocent people of Darfur.

Best regards,

David Rubenstein
Save Darfur Coalition
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UN'S Pronk: Hidden forces undermining Sudanese president authority

Don't miss Wasil Ali's fascinating interview (Sudan Tribune 12 Feb 2007) with the former UN Secretary General envoy to Sudan, Jan Pronk of The Netherlands.
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Photo: I took this photo from the guard tower earlier today. As you can see the sky was still dusty. In the foreground one can see the coloured concrete platform from where the guard of honour take up position every morning to salute the Force Commander and any visiting VIP's. Feb 25 2007. (Photo/caption via Soldier of Africa)
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Stuck between a rock and a hard place

Mar 1 2007 SA News 24 report - 'No military solution in Darfur' - excerpt:
The African Union's chief administrator on Wednesday said the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region cannot be solved militarily, and urged all sides to adhere to a peace agreement.

AU Commission chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare lamented that only one Darfur rebel group has signed a peace accord reached in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006 aimed at ending the civil war.

"We have always been convinced that the problem does not have a military solution and that we must continue working to make all Sudanese - the government and rebel movements - adhere to the Abuja accord," Konare said at a news conference alongside Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim in Brazil.

"When we had to ask for UN troops, we asked, and we want it. But unfortunately, due to trust problems, we have not obtained this," Konare said.
See Feb 24 2007 AU says it does not have the capacity to end Darfur rebellion.
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See Feb 18 2007 news report - Sudan welcomes EU envoy for DDDC.
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Town Hall Meeting

UN Town Hall meeting in Sudan

Photo from Jan Pronk's Weblog along with this excerpt:
Since my departure from Sudan, having been declared persona non grata by the Government of Sudan, my deputy Mr. Taye Zerihoun, has taken over as Officer in Charge. Taye Zerihoun had been the Principal Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Sudan. In that capacity he had in particular dealt with political affairs. The second deputy, Manuel Aranda da Silva, will continue as well. He is dealing in particular with humanitarian affairs and fulfills at the same time the position of United Nations Resident Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan.

This picture has been taken at a so called Town Hall meeting attended by all staff of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, two weeks before my departure on 24 October.

From left to right: Taye Zerihoun, Jan Pronk, Manuel Aranda da Silva. Photo: Frederic Noy
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See Sep 29 2006 AP report - UN's Pronk calls for AU force to be extended indefinitely.
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Notable Quote

"To save Darfur, start studying history."

By Elliot Stoller, a student at OPRF High School, USA, 27 Feb 2007 via wednesdayjournalonline.com
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Are you a Sudanese living abroad?

Via Sudanese blogger BLACK KUSH:
Are you a Sudanese living abroad? Do you want to go home and serve your country?

The UNDP TOKTEN programme is the best for you. Let us turn the brain drain to brain gain. Your country needs you!
Good luck. Peace and love. Ingrid.

On guard