Sudan at crossroads as peace path remains complex. AUPSC's 1330th Communiqué on situation in Sudan

ON 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors. Read more.

From Independent Online (IOL) South Africa
By JESSICA UIRAS 
Dated Sunday 22 March 2026 - full copy:

Sudan at a Crossroads as the Path to Peace Remains Complex

A displaced Sudanese woman who left El-Fasher after its fall with others, walks amid the remains of a fire that broke out at a camp in Tawila on February 11, 2026. Image: AFP

On 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

The document reflects not only the gravity of the crisis but also the AU’s sustained effort to prevent state collapse, respond to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies, and reassert continental leadership in a conflict increasingly shaped by regional and global dynamics.

Read alongside earlier pronouncements in 2025, including the March press statement rejecting the establishment of a parallel government, and the July statement strongly condemning the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led ‘parallel government,’ the February 2026 communiqué demonstrates consistency in principle, but a heightened sense of urgency.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors.

The communiqué expresses deep concern over the continued armed conflict and describes an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. This language builds on the August 2025 communiqué, which had already raised alarm over famine conditions, particularly in El-Fasher.

By February 2026, the PSC’s concern had sharpened further. It explicitly highlights reported famine and starvation, demands unhindered humanitarian access, and calls for the protection of humanitarian workers.

The recurrence of El-Fasher in successive decisions suggests that earlier appeals for lifting sieges and allowing safe access corridors have not yielded sufficient compliance.

The humanitarian crisis is therefore no longer treated as a by-product of armed confrontation. The communiqué strongly condemns systematic killings, ethnic targeting, mass displacement and destruction of infrastructure by parties to the conflict, particularly the RSF in El-Fasher.

By grounding its condemnation in international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the PSC signals that accountability is not optional. It moves the conversation beyond ceasefire appeals to potential legal consequences.

A central and recurring position of the PSC has been that there is no viable and sustainable military solution to the conflict. This formulation appeared in August 2025 and was reiterated again in February 2026. The repetition is deliberate. It reflects frustration with a battlefield logic that continues to dominate the conduct of the warring parties.

The PSC once again calls for a humanitarian truce leading to an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue addressing both security and political dimensions of the crisis. What distinguishes the 1330th Communiqué, however, is its engagement with the Sudanese National Initiative for Peace presented in December 2025.

The PSC welcomes its components, including an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, disarmament, security sector reform, national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Crucially, it stresses that these elements must align with the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. Support for the initiative is therefore conditional on inclusivity and alignment with continental frameworks, with transitional arrangements that reflect the aspirations of the Sudanese people and enable a smooth return to constitutional order through elections.

The question of a ‘parallel government’ has remained a central concern since mid-2025. In March, the PSC categorically rejected such an entity. In July, it reiterated that AU member states and the international community should not recognise any parallel authority in Sudan. The February 2026 communiqué restates this rejection and calls upon member states and partners not to recognise the so-called parallel government.

This consistency reflects a clear normative boundary. The AU will not legitimise fragmentation or unconstitutional political structures emerging from armed groups. The defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity is presented not merely as a legal principle, but as a safeguard against de facto partition and long-term regional instability.

At the same time, the communiqué places increasing emphasis on the issue of external interference. In 2025, the PSC had already condemned external actors fuelling the conflict and called for measures to address such interference.

The February 2026 decision goes further by requesting the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties militarily, financially and politically, and to propose measures to contain them within three months.

This is one of the more operationally significant aspects of the communiqué. If implemented robustly, it could begin to disrupt the transnational networks that sustain the conflict and complicate prospects for peace.

The communiqué also emphasises the centrality of AU leadership in the peace process and welcomes coordination through the Quintet, comprising the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the European Union. This reflects recognition that multiple and sometimes competing mediation tracks risk fragmentation.

Earlier decisions had already called for the consolidation of peace frameworks under AU and IGAD leadership. The February 2026 communiqué reiterates the need to prevent overlap and ensure coherence. The emphasis on Sudanese ownership, combined with coordinated international engagement, illustrates an effort to balance sovereignty with pragmatic diplomacy in an increasingly crowded mediation landscape.

Beyond ceasefire and dialogue, the communiqué includes institutional measures aimed at restoring normative oversight and operational presence. It reiterates the request for a comprehensive human rights report by the AU Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, welcomes the deployment of a humanitarian assessment mission, stresses the urgent need to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Sudan, and reiterates the intention to undertake a PSC field mission.

These measures are designed to translate political commitments into institutional engagement on the ground, ensuring that AU involvement is not merely declaratory but tangible.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

The decisive factor, however, will be implementation. Will sanctions mechanisms effectively identify and constrain external spoilers? Will humanitarian corridors be secured in practice? Will the proposed inter-Sudanese dialogue be genuinely inclusive, reflecting the voices of civilian actors? Will the warring parties accept that military escalation cannot produce sustainable political outcomes?

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

* Jessica Uiras is a Peacebuilder from Namibia. This article was originally published at https://www.accord.org.za/

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

Independent Online, popularly known as IOL, is one of South Africa's leading news and information websites bringing millions of readers breaking news and updates on Politics, Current Affairs, Business, Lifestyle, Entertainment, Travel, Sport, Motoring and Technology

View original: https://iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/world/2026-03-22-sudan-at-a-crossroads-as-the-path-to-peace-remains-complex/

Further Reading

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 1330TH MEETING OF THE PSC HELD AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ON 12 FEBRUARY 2026 ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

Last Updated on Thursday 12 February 2026

https://aupaps.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1330th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-ministerial-level-on-12-february-2026-on-the-situation-in-sudan

PDF Version https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1330.1.comm-en1.pdf

BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies deadly Eid strike on key hospital in Darfur

The strike killed 64 people, including 13 children, two nurses and a doctor, according to the WHO head.

BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies carrying out hospital attack that killed 64 during Eid

The local rights organisation, which has documented atrocities by both the army and the RSF throughout the war, said the

AFP - Sunday 22 March 2026

'They beat us with whips': Sudan RSF detainees tell of horrors in El-Fasher

In the suffocating darkness of a sealed shipping container, every thud signalled to Ibrahim Noureldin that one more detainee ...

Radio Tamazuj - Sunday 22 March 2026

Kiir returns to Juba after South Africa visit

South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir returned to the capital, Juba, on Sunday evening after an eight-day visit to South Africa. In a statement issued after Kiir’s return to Juba, the president’s press secretary, Arek Aldo Ajou, said the visit followed up on the African Union C5+ engagement led by Ramaphosa and focused on advancing implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, preparations for elections, and strengthening bilateral relations.

Ends

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations 30th Oct 2025

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Wednesday 29 Oct 2025 - excerpt:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (30 October), the Security Council is expected to hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. 

It appears that the meeting had been previously scheduled for early November, in keeping with resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which called for the Council to be briefed every 120 days on “UN efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 

However, the UK (the penholder on the file), Denmark, and the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) requested that the date of the meeting be moved forward because of the dire situation in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. 

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher and Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of5 Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee are expected to brief in the open chamber. 

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra is expected to brief members via videoconference (VTC) in the closed consultations, while Fletcher may participate in the closed session as well.

A draft press statement proposed by the UK and the A3 Plus members, which expresses Council members’ concern about the violence in and around El Fasher, is under silence procedure until tomorrow morning.

Earlier this month, fighting escalated in El Fasher as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched an assault on the 6th Infantry Division headquarters of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), reportedly capturing it on 26 October and forcing SAF and allied troops to retreat to the western neighbourhoods of the city. 

The RSF subsequently seized large parts of El Fasher, effectively ending an 18-month-long siege and taking control of the SAF’s last stronghold in the Darfur region.

The civilian population has borne the brunt of the siege, with hospitals, schools, religious sites, and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) targeted indiscriminately and starvation reported in the city. 

In a 27 October press release, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) described reports of summary executions of civilians attempting to flee El Fasher, with indications of ethnic motivations for killings. It further cited reports of the killing of persons no longer participating in hostilities, including unarmed men accused of being SAF fighters. 

In a 24 October statement after a visit to Sudan, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Ted Chaiban said that 130,000 children in El Fasher are “trapped, cut off from food, water, and healthcare”, adding that women and children who have been able to flee the siege have faced harassment and attacks. 

Chaiban also described conditions in other parts of the country—where children continue to face malnutrition, violence, and exposure to diseases such as cholera—stressing that “Sudan is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis”.

Tomorrow, the briefers and Council members are expected to underscore the gravity of the crisis in Sudan, echoing concerns expressed in recent days by the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and other key international actors. 

The briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the effects of the fighting in El Fasher on the civilian population, including reports of summary executions. 

They are also expected to urge the parties to allow the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid into El Fasher, as well as other parts of Sudan affected by the conflict, and call on them to adhere to their responsibilities under international law, including with respect to the protection of civilians.

Concerns may also be raised tomorrow about the 21 October threat by RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to target planes or drones from neighbouring countries that the RSF believes are supporting the SAF. 

While Dagalo did not specify which states he was referencing, the RSF and its supporters have accused several countries in the region of backing the SAF. 

This statement was made on the same day that the RSF reportedly launched drone attacks in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, including on areas near the international airport, just a day before domestic flights were scheduled to resume for the first time since the outbreak of fighting in April 2023. These attacks reportedly continued over the following days.

Full story: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-12.php

Update:

WATCH recording of the full meeting, here:

https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166222

- at the bottom of the screen slide bar to 17:50 for start of meeting;
- click on settings wheel & audio to select preferred language & speed.

End

Sudanese people must pressure the African Union to do its job and not wait for the international community currently addressing 59 active conflicts

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Africa is a large rich continent comprising 54 countries. This is more than any other continent.

Sudan is an African country. Sudanese people are African. After more than twenty years since its inception during which time it has attracted billions of dollars of funding, aid and support, the African Union (aka AU) has failed Darfur, El Fasher and countless cities across Sudan and South Sudan.

In my view, after 22 years at Sudan Watch, the only way Sudanese people can help their people survive, save their homeland, natural riches and the creation of jobs, is to pressure the African Union into doing its job, demand a high standard of service, not settling for anything less than the best.

Leaders of the African Union need to be put under pressure to take immediate action or step aside for better qualified people to help and support Africans in Africa's war zones that the international community cannot quickly reach and is not welcomed or viewed as a long term solution.

_ _ _

Note:

"The international community is currently addressing 59 active conflicts across more than 35 countries, marking the highest level of global conflict since the end of the Second World War. This situation reflects a significant increase in violence and fragmentation, with the number of state-based armed conflicts reaching a record high in 2024."

Source: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

https://www.icrc.org/en/article/icrc-2024-upholding-humanity-conflict

End

Sudan is top of IRC's 2025 Emergency Watchlist: 30m people - over half of Sudan’s population - are in need

SUDAN: Statement by David Miliband
President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Press Release Khartoum, Sudan, Thursday 11 September 2025. Excerpts:

After visiting Sudan from 7-11th September, David Miliband said,

"Sudan is top of the IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist for good reason. 30 million people - over half of Sudan’s population - are in humanitarian need and this week I got to meet some of them in River Nile state. ...

"Like many of our clients, many of our 400 national staff are part of the largest displacement crisis in the world. The war, now in its third year, is a catastrophe of staggering proportions: the world’s largest hunger crisis, largest humanitarian crisis, largest displacement crisis, and yet one too often put in the “too difficult” box by global politics. The scale of suffering should jolt the conscience of the international community. Instead, this crisis is one of the most underfunded worldwide, and has been met by diplomatic stasis. ...

"The international community cannot continue to look away. Last year, of the 16,000 words uttered by the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the opening plenary of the UN General Assembly, the word “Sudan” was only mentioned 8 times. As we approach this year’s UNGA, Sudan must move from the margins of diplomatic discussion to the center of the agenda. That means unified pressure behind a single peace track, meaningful action to protect civilians and humanitarian access, and—critically—new, flexible funding to meet the scale of need. Sudanese civilians are paying the price of international inaction. The time to stand with them is now.

View full statement: https://www.rescue.org/press-release/sudan-statement-david-miliband-president-and-ceo-international-rescue-committee
_______

Careers
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) responds to the world's worst humanitarian crises. Its global staff of over 20,000 spans more than 40 countries and 133 nationalities.
https://careers.rescue.org/us/en

Jobs - Search All IRC Vacancies
https://careers.rescue.org/us/en/search-results

End