Sunday, May 10, 2026

The War the World Forgot: Why Aren’t We Talking About Sudan? Why Some Wars don’t Make Headlines

Article from The Rest Is Politics
By Alastair Campbell
Dated 23 April 2026 - full copy: 

The War the World Forgot: Why Aren’t We Talking About Sudan?

“It’s the worst war in the world right now,” said Alastair in his discussion with Rory in the main episode about the ongoing conflict in Sudan.


The scale of the deaths and displacement is “almost uniquely horrific” and yet, he said, “there is so little attention paid to it.” 


The conflict, which entered its fourth year this month, so rarely appears at the top of the news agenda that it is often called “the forgotten war”. 


For this newsletter, we interviewed Ashan Abeywardena, who works as an emergency response manager for the charity War Child in Sudan. We also spoke to top foreign correspondent Christina Lamb, who has been reporting on conflicts for 38 years - including Sudan - to understand what is happening in the country, and why it receives so little international attention. 


And finally… We had a call with actress Carey Mulligan, who campaigns for War Child and who visited a Sudanese refugee camp in Chad with the Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper in February. Alastair met her at an event on Monday and set up this interview.


Carey Mulligan in Chad in February 
with the Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper


What’s happening in Sudan?


Fighting between the Sudanese armed forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces began in April 2023. Since then at least 150,000 people have died and 15 million have been forced to flee their homes in the northeast African country. 


“We often blithely refer to Sudan as the world’s ‘biggest humanitarian crisis’ without thinking what that actually means,” Christina Lamb, the Sunday Times’s Chief Foreign Correspondent, who reported on the war from a refugee camp in Chad in February, explains. 


“It actually means women gang-raped when they head up a road, girls hiding terrified under branches, young people who once dreamt of going to university, forced to scrape a living gathering firewood,” she says.


There is no decisive victory or durable ceasefire in sight as both sides, and their international backers, “battle it out for control of the country and control of its resources such as gold and oil,” Lamb adds.


Abeywardena, from War Child, has just returned to the UK after spending four weeks in Darfur, in the west of Sudan. He had been visiting the charity’s partner organisations which are supporting children living through the war.


“We speak to kids who don’t really know any alternative and are just numb to the sound of conflict and war - and that’s a continuous state of being for them,” he says.


More than 30 million people in Sudan are currently in need of aid, including an estimated 15 million children. Yet desperately needed care provisions have been hard hit by international aid cuts.


Last year, according to a report by Humanitarian Action, only 39.5 percent of funding required for humanitarian responses in Sudan was actually made available. 


“It’s almost ignored by the international community,” Abeywardena says.


War Child does what it can with its local partners to create “places for children to come together, play, and really be children,” Abeywardena says, but it’s not enough.


The British actress Carey Mulligan, who has worked with War Child since 2014 and has visited the charity’s projects in Lebanon, Uganda, and the DRC among other countries, visited a Sudanese displacement camp in Chad in February.


She described witnessing a level of trauma unlike anything she had previously encountered. 


“There was one mother I met almost immediately who had managed to get across the border [into Chad from Sudan], but had lost her husband and her three children and didn't know if they had lived or not,” she said. 


Mulligan met other mothers who had been forced to flee with only some of their children. 


“They had seven children but crossed the border with two,” she said, or “had nine children but crossed with five” - and they often could not bear to explain what had happened to the others.


She described the way survivors spoke with euphemisms. Women would refer to having had a “difficult journey”, she said, which was often “unspoken code for sexual trauma”.


When there are so many severe and immediate threats to survival, just staying alive becomes a success story. 


As Mulligan put it: “Physical survival has become an acceptable outcome for children. If you walk out of a conflict with your limbs intact then that’s meeting some new level of acceptability. A child deserves to have a normal life.”


Both sides in the war, the RSF and the SAF, have been accused of committing war crimes, with widespread reports of rape, sexual assault and child abuse. 


One report released last month by Doctors Without Borders recorded more than 3,396 cases of sexual violence in 2024 and 2025. In South Darfur, 20 percent of victims were under 18, including 41 children under five.


Sexual violence, the report explains, is now “part of everyday life” in most parts of Sudan, both during fighting and in its aftermath, on the roads, in markets and in refugee camps. 


One woman quoted in the report described her attack: “They took us to an open area. The first man raped me twice, the second once, the third four times.”

Mulligan described how one mother she met told her that her seven-year-old daughter couldn’t sleep at night because she was so terrified of a man who had attacked her. 


“[There are] no practical steps there for a parent to take to help their child,” she said. “You're interrupting the building blocks of their brain, you're tying a hand behind their back if you don't offer mental health support to a child who's been through something like that.”


Recovery from the trauma of war is possible, both Abeywardena and Mulligan say, having witnessed it first hand in other conflicts War Child has worked in. 


“We've met countless children over the years who've had really catastrophic trauma and who have, through working with a partner and with mental health support, been able to recover to a degree where they can have agency and choose their life for themselves,” Mulligan says. 


“But it needs peace and sustainable peace for that to happen,” Abeywardena explains.


Why does the conflict receive so little international media attention? 


“In its fourth year, it’s almost an abandoned crisis overshadowed by other world events,” says Lamb. 


There are too many other crises, from Gaza and Ukraine to Iran, she explains, for Sudan to be able to hold international focus for long. 


“In 38 years of reporting I have never known a time like the last four years, or the last three months in particular,” she says. “I never imagined covering a major land war in Europe.”


Research suggests there are also economic and political variables which influence which conflicts get more coverage than others. 


report from the Reuters Institute released this month titled “Why Some Wars don’t Make Headlines” pointed to factors including the accessibility and safety for reporters, the nature of the conflict, and its perceived impact on readers’ lives. 


A 2025 analysis by Vision of Humanity found more than 1,600 articles for each civilian death in high income countries, compared to 17 in low-income countries. 


“Conflicts in regions with less economic influence are more likely to be overlooked, regardless of their severity or humanitarian consequences,” the report notes.


Relatively complex civil wars, like Sudan, also receive less coverage than wars between different countries, the report notes. 


Abeywardena finds it frustrating hearing the Sudan war described as “forgotten” in the wider media. He says: “It’s not forgotten by the millions of Sudanese who are affected.”


You can read Lamb’s piece about her experience reporting on Sudan here and more of her reporting here


View original: 

https://alastaircampbell.org/category/podcasts/the-rest-is-politics/


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Monday, April 06, 2026

Middle East Crisis: UN Security Council Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Posted Monday 6 April 2026 - full copy:


Middle East Crisis: Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz


Tomorrow morning (7 April) at 11 am EST, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution which strongly encourages states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.


It demands that Iran immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels and any attempt to impede transit passage or freedom of navigation in the Strait and further calls for the cessation of attacks against civilian infrastructure, including water infrastructure and desalination plants, as well as oil and gas installations. The draft text was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan.


Background

Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transits occur. The escalation follows the US-Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)


Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. Although Iran had initially signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”.


The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities. US President Donald Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Several allied countries—including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the UK—have taken a cautious approach, with some explicitly indicating that they would not participate in enforcement actions to reopen the Strait or provide airspace for such operations.


Regardless of differing approaches, reopening the Strait appears to be a strategic priority for many US allies. France has indicated that it is working with partners to explore a possible international mission to facilitate this objective once the intensity of military operations subsides, while the UK hosted talks on 2 April among 40 countries aimed at forming a coalition for this purpose.


Meanwhile, GCC countries and Jordan have strongly advocated for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region, including through the use of force. Since the escalation began on 28 February, they have faced sustained Iranian attacks targeting vessels, port infrastructure, and energy assets across the Gulf, which have disrupted maritime trade and energy flows and contributed to broader regional economic and supply chain instability.


Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The negotiations on the draft resolution were difficult. Bahrain circulated the zero draft of the text to Council members on 21 March and held multiple rounds of negotiations. Following five subsequent revisions, two silence breaks, and closed consultations on 1 April (held at France’s request), a sixth revised draft was put in blue today (6 April). The process involved intensive, high-level engagement, including meetings at the level of permanent representatives and sustained bilateral consultations between GCC countries and Council members, including at the level of foreign ministers.


Initially, the draft text was put in blue on 2 April for a vote on 3 April; however, persistent disagreements prompted Bahrain to delay the vote to continue deliberations, during which the text underwent significant amendments before being put in blue for a vote tomorrow.


During the negotiations, Council members broadly expressed concern about the escalating regional situation, underscored the unacceptability of attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and stressed the urgent need to address the crisis. However, divergences emerged regarding the appropriate approach and tools to address the crisis.


The initial draft text proposed by Bahrain invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and repress, neutralise, and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait, until such time as the Council decides otherwise. The text also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those who take actions to undermine the freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.


These provisions apparently proved problematic for several Council members, prompting efforts to streamline the text to enhance clarity and narrow its scope. It appears that concerns focused in particular on the reference to Chapter VII and the authorisation of the use of force, as well as the breadth of the mandate, including its nature, geographic scope, and open-ended duration. Positions diverged, with some European and like-minded members seeking clearer parameters and more precise drafting, while others, notably China and Russia, were more fundamentally critical of the initiative.


It appears that China and Russia expressed concerns about the invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that such authorisation could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits. They also raised concerns about the potential imposition of sanctions and maintained that the draft failed to address the root causes of the current crisis in the Middle East. In their view, the text risked exacerbating tensions rather than promoting de-escalation, and they urged Bahrain not to advance the initiative. These reservations led China and Russia to break silence twice.


Responding to these concerns, Bahrain removed the explicit reference to Chapter VII in the third revised draft. However, the authorisation for the use of force and a determination that Iran’s actions near and around the Strait of Hormuz constitute a threat to international peace and security were retained. China and Russia argued that this did not address their concerns, maintaining that the draft continued to legitimise the use of force without accounting for the underlying causes of the escalation. The current draft resolution in blue does not include an explicit reference to Chapter VII and retains the determination regarding Iran’s actions as threats to international peace and security.


Additionally, the reference to sanctions measures was amended based on proposals from Colombia and the UK. The current draft text in blue therefore expresses the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, as appropriate, against those who take actions that undermine the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.


France, supported by some other members, particularly Greece, also expressed concerns about the scope of the authorisation for the use of force, which, as France had argued, should be strictly limited to defensive purposes. The UK, among others, also sought clearer and more concise language to better define the scope of the authorisation.


In parallel to Bahrain’s text, it appears that France also prepared a draft resolution in March, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for wider discussion. Some elements of this text, as proposed by France during the negotiations on Bahrain’s draft, appear to have been incorporated into the current text in blue. This includes language urging de-escalation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; calling for a return to diplomacy; and welcoming ongoing efforts towards a durable peace in the region.


To address concerns raised by several members, the language on the authorisation underwent multiple iterations, with successive drafts introducing qualifiers to clarify its scope and parameters. This included stipulating that any action must be commensurate with the circumstances and undertaken with due regard for the safety of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; the latter edit was based on a proposal by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia). In the fourth revised draft, Bahrain apparently incorporated some suggestions, including narrowing the geographical scope to the Strait and its adjacent waters and introducing a time limit of at least six months from the resolution’s adoption, an issue apparently raised by the UK. While these changes were reflected in the first draft text put in blue on 2 April, some were omitted from the current version in blue following further revisions undertaken in an effort to reach common ground. Of these proposed provisions, only the text specifying that “any action must be commensurate with the circumstances” remains in the current draft in blue.


The proposed limitations on the nature of the mandate did not appear to satisfy some members. In addition to China and Russia, France, supported by Greece, also broke silence, reiterating its concerns. As a compromise, Bahrain ultimately amended the language to authorise member states to “use all defensive means necessary”, as suggested by France.


However, it appears that strong positions expressed by some members persisted, requiring continued deliberations. In the current text put in blue, Bahrain omitted the language on authorisation and instead incorporated elements drawn from the French draft, strongly encouraging states with an interest in the “use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz”.


Based on suggestions from Colombia and France, the draft text in blue also requests the participating states to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the activities they undertake related to this resolution are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and applicable international human rights law, and have due regard for the rights and freedoms of navigation of the ships of any third state. The amended draft text in blue further added language specifying that such measures should be undertaken with a view to urgently ensuring unhampered and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz.


The amended draft text in blue makes several references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including reaffirming the right of member states to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It further affirms that this resolution applies only to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and does not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of member states under international law, including UNCLOS, in any other context, underscoring in particular that it should not be regarded as establishing customary international law.


The draft resolution also introduces a reporting requirement, requesting the Secretary-General to provide to the Security Council a written report within seven days of the adoption of this resolution, and every 30 days thereafter, on any further attacks and provocations on merchant and commercial vessels, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms, by Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php


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Thursday, March 26, 2026

Sudan: UN Security Council Meeting 26 Mar 2026. Increased drone attacks spilling across Sudan borders

Report from What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday 26 March 2026 - excerpts:


Sudan: Meeting under “Any Other Business”


Today (Thursday 26 March) at 4:30 pm, Security Council members will discuss the situation in Sudan under “any other business” following the discussion on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in closed consultations. 


The UK (the penholder on the file) and Denmark, supported by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia), requested the meeting after a 20 March strike on a hospital in East Darfur state reportedly killed around 70 people. 


Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher are expected to brief. The UK may propose press elements on the meeting.  [...]


In a 24 March press release, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warned of a sharp increase this year in the use of drones to conduct airstrikes in the country, highlighting the devastating impact of relatively inexpensive, high-tech weapons in populated areas. It documented over 500 civilian deaths in such strikes between 1 January and 15 March, the majority of which occurred in the Kordofan region.


The press release also highlighted that expanding drone attacks are spilling across Sudan’s borders, raising concerns about further escalation with regional implications. It referred to incidents affecting the border towns of Tina in Sudan and Tiné in Chad following RSF ground offensives. 


On 16 March, around 20 people, including civilians, were reportedly killed and 60 others injured during an RSF ground offensive on Tina. On 18 March, a drone strike in Tiné reportedly launched from Sudan killed at least 24 civilians and injured around 70 others. 


Chad closed its border with Sudan in late February following fighting in Tiné between the RSF and pro-SAF fighters that resulted in the deaths of five Chadian soldiers. 


Following the recent cross-border strike in Tiné, Chadian authorities reportedly reinforced security along the border with Sudan and began the emergency relocation of refugees from border areas.  [...]


Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. 


Pekka Haavisto of Finland, who assumed his role as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan in late February, visited Port Sudan and Khartoum earlier this week. During the visit, he met with, among others, the SAF leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the finance minister and leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) faction Jibril Ibrahim. 


In a statement released yesterday (25 March), Haavisto underscored the importance of dialogue and de-escalation as essential steps towards a comprehensive ceasefire, as well as stressed the need to advance civilian protection and to explore confidence-building measures to create conditions for a meaningful political process. Haavisto further indicated that he would continue consultations in the coming weeks with a broad range of stakeholders across the region.


The US has been leading efforts, in coordination with the other Quad members—Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia—to facilitate a humanitarian truce. 


In his remarks at the 19 February Council meeting on the situation in Sudan, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos called for an immediate humanitarian truce, without preconditions, which he argued must guarantee sustained and unhindered humanitarian access across conflict lines and borders. 


He also noted that the US has been working with the Secretary-General’s office, DPPA, OCHA, and other UN entities to establish a UN mechanism to support implementation, coordination, and oversight of the truce and related humanitarian access commitments. [...]


On 19 February, the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned three RSF commanders for their involvement in atrocities in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. The UK and the European Union (EU) have also previously designated these same individuals. 


On 24 March, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee also designated four RSF commanders, including the group’s deputy commander Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo. 


On 9 March, the US Department of State designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It argued that the group uses violence against civilians to undermine conflict resolution efforts and advance its “violent Islamist ideology”, claiming that the group’s fighters have conducted “mass executions of civilians” and have received support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).


Read full report here: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/03/sudan-meeting-under-any-other-business-5.php


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