Security situation in Sudan's Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile state, repeated drone strikes targeted in El Obeid

From Security Council Report

What's In Blue 
Posted Tuesday 04 August 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

Tomorrow afternoon (5 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country, specifically in light of the ongoing violence in the Darfur and the Kordofan regions as well as in Blue Nile state. In requesting the meeting, these members highlighted the impact of the hostilities on civilians, including continued restrictions on humanitarian operations and attacks on civilian infrastructure that have disrupted essential services, impeded the delivery of medical care and humanitarian assistance, and further exacerbated humanitarian conditions. The anticipated briefer is Lisa Doughten, the Director of the Financing and Outreach Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The security situation in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, remains alarming. The city is a strategic gateway linking the capital, Khartoum, with the Greater Darfur region and serves as a critical logistical hub for humanitarian operations across Kordofan. Recent reports indicate a significant build-up of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied fighters around the city, accompanied by intensified drone strikes and shelling. OCHA has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites. These developments have prompted growing concern among regional and international actors, who have warned of the risk of widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and stressed the need for urgent action to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 25 June What’s in Blue story.)

Meanwhile, in late July, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a major ground offensive in North Kordofan and announced that it had recaptured the Al Sadarat highway and five key towns along the route, including Bara, Um Sayala, and Gebrat al-Sheikh, following two days of intense clashes with the RSF. The highway, which runs north of El Obeid and southwest towards Khartoum, had been a critical corridor for the RSF and, according to analysts, enabled the group to sustain pressure on El Obeid and constrain SAF operations across North Kordofan. The SAF’s recapture of the corridor restores an important supply and movement route, significantly improving its ability to reinforce positions around El Obeid. At tomorrow’s meeting, some Council members may seek Doughten’s assessment of what these developments could mean for humanitarian access.

At the same time, fighting has intensified on other fronts in North and West Darfur states. According to media reports, the RSF has increased drone strikes targeting the town of Tina in North Darfur, which borders Chad, as part of a broader offensive to capture the SAF’s remaining positions in Darfur, including Tina, Um Baru, and Karnoi. On 21 July, at least 21 civilians were reportedly killed and dozens injured when an RSF drone strike hit a vital water source in Tina. In a 23 July update, the international non-profit organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded 63 conflict-related fatalities across the Tina, Karnoi, and Um Baru localities since June, highlighting the intensification of fighting along Sudan’s border with Chad.

In a 3 August press release, OCHA noted that a 2 August drone strike in the village of Ghara al Zawiya in North Darfur state reportedly caused dozens of casualties, although the number of civilian casualties could not be independently verified. Media reports citing the Emergency Lawyers Group, a Sudanese human rights monitoring group, attributed the strike to the SAF, saying that it hit a traditional court session—during which people had gathered outdoors to attend hearings on local cases and disputes—and killed at least 35 people.

In Blue Nile state, the security and humanitarian situation deteriorated following the expansion of fighting around the town of Kurmuk and other areas along the Ethiopian border, reportedly displacing approximately 100,000 people across the state, many of whom have sought refuge in the capital, Ed Damazin. In early July, following intense clashes, the SAF retook control of Kurmuk from the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The RSF and the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction had captured Kurmuk in March, using the strategically located town as a base for operations in southern Blue Nile. The fighting has raised concerns over further regionalisation of the conflict, particularly amid allegations of external support to the RSF, including reports of a training and drone infrastructure facility linked to the group in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region and claims that Ethiopian territory has been used as a supply conduit for RSF operations.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Ed Damazin and other parts of Blue Nile state has continued to deteriorate, with heavy rainfall and flooding compounding the challenges faced by displaced populations. Thousands of people living in displacement sites and temporary shelters have been affected, with several shelters reportedly damaged or destroyed by flooding. Humanitarian actors have also raised concerns over the outbreak of disease amid pressure on already limited health, water, and sanitation services.

More broadly, the health crisis has continued to worsen across Sudan, with multiple disease outbreaks emerging amid the collapse of healthcare services, particularly in conflict-affected areas. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced a new wave of cholera, voicing particular concern about vulnerable populations, including in besieged areas such as El Obeid. In a 27 July press release, OCHA reported more than 2,000 suspected cholera cases and 170 related deaths since May, with the majority of cases recorded in the Kordofan region. OCHA has also noted that the WHO and Sudanese health authorities are responding to a growing dengue fever outbreak, with more than 1,000 cases and five related deaths reported in Blue Nile state in July, alongside more than 130 cases in South Kordofan state.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Doughten is likely to note that developments in Blue Nile, Darfur, and Kordofan underscore the devastating impact of attacks on civilian infrastructure—including healthcare facilities, water systems, and electricity networks—which have disrupted essential services and hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance. She may also highlight how the increasing use of drones and other advanced weaponry in the conflict is intensifying civilian suffering, with attacks increasingly affecting populated areas and critical infrastructure.

Doughten and several Council members are likely to reiterate calls for the cessation of hostilities and express support for efforts to achieve a humanitarian truce. They may raise broader protection concerns and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. Some members may also underline the need for a Council response amid the spiralling security and humanitarian situation. They might emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.

Doughten may also provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. She may call for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and stress the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $2.87 billion, was only 40.4 percent funded.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/sudan-closed-consultations-12.php

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UNSC Prog Aug 2026: South Sudan's UNMISS & Developments in Sudan's Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan

Denmark holds the presidency of the Security Council in August. Council members adopted the provisional programme of work for the month earlier today (3 August). Read more.

From What's In Blue 

Posted Mon 3 Aug 2026 - excerpts:

Security Council Programme of Work for August 2026

Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Sudan on 5 August. Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting on 31 July to discuss the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly developments in the Darfur, Blue Nile, and Kordofan regions. An OCHA official is expected to brief.

The Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in South Sudan and the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Briefings are expected from Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS Anita Kiki Gbeho, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) Major General (retired) George Aggrey Owinow, and a civil society representative.

Original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/security-council-programme-of-work-for-august-2026.php

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Inside The Secret Network Fuelling Sudan's War

From Lighthouse Reports
Co-published with EVIDENT and Sudan War Monitor
On 29 June 2026 - full copy:

INSIDE THE SECRET NETWORK FUELLING SUDAN'S WAR

Lighthouse Reports travelled to Eastern Libya to expose the UAE supported RSF network of military training camps that enabled them to continue their war in Sudan.

The shadowy role of the United Arab Emirates in fueling the war in Sudan – once a well kept secret – is now acknowledged as a key driver of Sudan’s disastrous, yearslong civil war.

Still, little is known about how the UAE co-opts regional governments to achieve its aims in Sudan.

Lighthouse Reports, Evident and Sudan War Monitor travelled to eastern Libya to reveal how the UAE network works on the ground. Through a combination of open source and on-the-ground reporting, the investigation sheds new light on one of the UAE’s most entrenched operations in their vast network of support to the RSF.

As the international community has failed to intervene in Emirati meddling, the UAE has meanwhile built a sprawling network of complex logistics, military bases, financing, and weapons trafficking routes to prop up the Rapid Support Forces and fuel their war efforts in Sudan.

METHODS

The investigations drew on a long term analysis of activity across TikTok, Facebook and Telegram. We reviewed thousands of posts and built an archive of more than 500 relevant clips showing convoy movements between Libya and Sudan, activity at key desert checkpoints and camps, and developments in the border triangle. We verified and connected this material through geolocation, analysis of uniforms, vehicles and other identifying symbols, and social-network analysis of accounts linked to the RSF, the Libyan National Army, and associated networks.

We complimented these efforts with analysis of high resolution commercial satellite imagery of specific sites. Using a custom processing workflow with publicly available Sentinel-2 data., we tracked changes in vehicle routes across remote stretches of the Sahara, helping us understand how smuggling and asset transfers developed in response to changing conditions on the ground. These findings informed reporting trips and interviews.

We worked with ⁨Conflict Insights Group, a public benefit research firm, that conducted analysis of telephones located at Camp 17. CIG used publicly available adtech data, which is information from cookies that users agree to sell to third party vendors when they visit a website or use a mobile application. The information includes movement data, language settings, and other details that users consent to selling to a third party vendor, which CIG purchased. CIG found evidence of at least two South American mercenaries at the site in the summer of 2025. One device located at Camp 17 was set to Colombian Spanish and visited the site from 11-12 June 2025. Another device was set to Argentinian Spanish, and used a military grade phone on 13 aug 2025.

This investigation received kind support from Maltego and IRBIS OSINT-platform.

STORYLINES

Our reporting, including interviews with LNA officers, RSF defectors, and Sudanese military sources, unveiled four previously unidentified RSF camps in Libya, contrary to claims by the RSF that they do not conduct troop training outside of Sudan and contrary to LNA insiders’ claims that the RSF operations in Libya were largely wound down by late 2025.

In Kufra, we embedded with the Libyan National Army in the border triangle area where we had been tracking RSF training and transit sites via social media analysis and heat maps of tracks from suspected RSF resupply convoys throughout the desert for months.

Keen to show us that they were combatting trafficking and had shut down any alleged flow of weapons into Sudan, Lieutenant Enheish Fattah of the LNA’s Subul Al Salaam brigade flatly denied that the LNA facilitated RSF activities in Libya.

“No, that’s all rumors. People are trying to create conflict between the Libyan and Sudanese armies,” Lieutenant Fattah said when questioned on 2025 clashes between the Sudanese Army and the LNA in the border region, in response to increasing frustration of the Sudanese Army and its backers in Egypt about LNA support for the RSF.

Interviews with eight RSF defectors still living in Libya, revealed the full scale of their operations there, which extend from small-scale training activity and transit points in Benghazi to more robust sites in the desert in the border triangle region. These sites include staging sites to prep weapons and modify vehicles for war, training sites where RSF soldiers say they trained alongside the LNA and UAE-contracted Colombian mercenaries, and convoys of trucks carrying fuel and alleged weapons from Libya back into Sudan.

Defectors told us that they were expected to return to Sudan to train their fellow RSF soldiers based on the training they received in Libya.

One defector who agreed to speak on camera to Evident, revealed the location of a previously unknown training camp located approximately 20 kilometers outside of Benghazi.

He described arriving in Libya and being sent to Benghazi through Kufra. Others, he said, were sent to a military camp in Jufra for training. Of his own time at the camp known to him and others in RSF as Camp 17, he told us “there are many here in Camp 17. They are in charge of cars, supplies, and ammo and oversee delivery of them.”

He said the RSF would bring “around 40 or 50, maybe up to 70 or 80” soldiers at a time to train in Camp 17. They would receive their training from LNA soldiers and Colombian contractors.

“RSF is mainly supported by the Emirates,” he told us, adding “but no one can speak up or ask.”

Libyan authorities failed to meaningfully engage with us on the reality of what is happening inside Libya or on their collaboration with the UAE to support the RSF. We traveled to Nairobi, Kenya to interview a spokesman for the RSF government, Tassis, who denied the claims revealed in our reporting.

While the scale of Sudan’s war is almost impossible to account for due to the lack of humanitarian access and the level of violence across the country, recent estimates put the death toll at nearly 400,000 people. 

Regional analysts insist that the level of support from the Emirates for the RSF has allowed violence, particularly in the Darfur region, to spiral out of control. We interviewed survivors from Khartoum and Darfur in Kufra and in Benghazi to understand the true impact of Emirati meddling on Sudanese civilians. 

They arrived in Libya after arduous journeys from Sudan – some traveling through Chad – often harassed by RSF soldiers and human smugglers throughout their journey.

“When we reached Libya, we had nothing left,” Fatima, a mother of four living in Kufra told us. “I have nothing left but my children and my honor.”

CO-PUBLICATIONS

Evident & Lighthouse Reports: 

Inside the Secret Network Fueling Sudan's War

Sudan War Monitor: 

Inside the RSF's Libya Supply Network

Credits: Julia Steers, Klaas van Dijken, Jack Sapoch, Bashar Deeb, Margot Gibbs, Tessa Pang, Wael Eskandar, AM, and many unnamed Sudanese journalists, Amel Guettatfi, Srdjan Stojiljkovic, Stacey Naggiar, Jennifer Smart, Kevin Clancy, Zach Toombs

View original: https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/inside-the-secret-network-fueling-sudans-war/

Hat tip: Dr Eric Reeves, Co-founder Team Zamzam Project, Responding to Famine and Aiding Victims of Sexual Violence in Darfur

linkedin.com/in/eric-reeves-01b6b16 (LinkedIn)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Personal)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Other)

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Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away." More.

From BBC News
By Barbara Plett Usher
Africa correspondent
Published Thursday 19 February 2026, 9am GMT - full copy:

Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS

A UN fact-finding mission has determined that evidence of atrocities carried out during the siege and takeover of the Sudanese city of el-Fasher points to genocide.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured el-Fasher, located in the western region of Darfur, at the end of October after an 18-month blockade.

It was one of the most brutal chapters in Sudan's nearly three-year civil war and triggered widespread international outrage.

This is the closest the UN has come to declaring that genocide is being carried out by RSF fighters in Darfur during the current conflict. The RSF has not commented on the report but has denied previous such accusations.

"The body of evidence we collected — including the prolonged siege, starvation and denial of humanitarian assistance, followed by mass killings, rape, torture and enforced disappearance, systematic humiliation and perpetrators' own declarations - leaves only one reasonable inference," said fact-finding mission expert Mona Rishmawi. "The RSF acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El-Fasher. These are the hallmarks of genocide."

The report concludes that at least three underlying acts of genocide were committed, including killing members of a protected ethnic group; causing serious bodily and mental harm; and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction in whole or in part.

Calling the findings "truly horrific", UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said she would take the report's conclusions to the UN Security Council on Thursday.

In a statement she said there must be international criminal investigations to ensure accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims, and an end to the arms flow feeding the conflict.

Sudan's civil war erupted in April 2023 out of a power struggle between the regular army and the RSF over how and whether the paramilitaries would integrate into the security forces. It evolved into a country-wide conflict fuelled by longstanding local grievances and ethnic divisions.

In the Darfur region, Arab militias that form the backbone of the RSF have targeted non-Arabs they see as enemies, using savage tactics also employed some 20 years ago. At that time, they massacred hundreds of thousands of Darfuris from indigenous African ethnic groups, employed by the country's then authoritarian leader Omar al-Bashir to put down local rebellions.

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS. Image caption, During the long siege of el-Fasher, this school where people were sheltering was shelled

The report says the city was deliberately starved and destroyed during the long siege, which systematically weakened the "targeted population" and left them defenceless against the extreme violence that followed.

"Thousands of persons, particularly the Zaghawa, were killed, raped or disappeared during three days of absolute horror," it says, as RSF troops failed to distinguish between Zaghawa civilians and the armed groups defending the city.

Investigators described RSF conduct in el-Fasher as an aggravation of earlier patterns but on a far more lethal scale, noting that this demonstrates the failure to prevent the atrocities despite clear warning signs. They say without prevention and accountability, the risk of "more genocidal acts remains serious and ongoing".

The mandate issued by the Human Rights Council in Geneva called on the investigative team to "identify, where possible" suspected perpetrators in a bid to ensure they are "held accountable".

The report names RSF Leader Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti) and spokesperson Lt Col Al-Fatih Al-Qurashi, citing the way they publicly claimed and celebrated the operation.

It notes that General Hemedti acknowledged some "violations" had occurred during the takeover of the city but that while he described el-Fasher as a "catastrophe", he justified the assault as necessary.

The RSF leader also issued instructions for his fighters not to harm civilians or kill prisoners, and he promised investigations. But investigators say the RSF did not respond to the mission's request to clarify the steps it had taken, or any other questions.

"The scale, coordination, and public endorsement of the operation by the senior Rapid Support Forces leadership point to a planned and organised operation executed through an established hierarchy and structure, rather than isolated acts," the UN mission said.

The report names one one notorious commander known as "Abu Lulu" who was arrested after viral footage of his brutality surfaced, but said the RSF had provided no information regarding any judicial proceedings.

It also says that despite their best efforts, the UN mission did not receive cooperation from Sudanese authorities. Yvette Cooper called obstructions "from both warring parties... shameful and unacceptable".

The mission's mandate did not include an investigation into the role of external actors who may be supporting the RSF.

But crucially the report notes that the RSF's military campaign was reinforced by foreign mercenaries equipped with "advanced weaponry and communications systems".

It says investigators are engaging with several states regarding "credible information" that they are involved and will report on this matter in the future.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is widely reported to be the main backer of the RSF, although it continues to forcefully deny this, despite extensive evidence from international investigations that the UN has previously described as credible.

Abu Dhabi's role came under increased scrutiny after the el-Fasher massacre, but there was no public pressure on the Emiratis from the UN, the US or the UK.

The investigators called on the international community to fully enforce the existing arms embargo on Darfur and expand it to the rest of the country; to prevent the transfer of weapons and other support to parties implicated in serious violations; to ensure accountability through targeted sanctions; to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court; and to consider the establishment of a judicial mechanism working in tandem with it.

Cooper said it was important that the fact-finding mission planned to conduct further investigations into reported breaches of the arms embargo and agreed that it should be extended and enforced.

She said she planned to highlight the systematic and widespread sexual violence which she calls "a war against women's bodies".

"Most important of all we need global action and pressure in pursuit of a ceasefire, and essential humanitarian access with support for survivors," she said.

The UN Security Council session is aimed at pushing for progress on a humanitarian truce, which has been elusive despite the enormous civilian suffering. The warring parties both frame the conflict as an existential battle and are able to continue fighting with increasingly sophisticated weapons supplied by their foreign backers.

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away."

More on this story

A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan

Published 13 November 2025

'Our job is only killing' - how Sudan's brutal militia carried out a massacre
Published 7 November 2025

'I saw them driving over injured people' - the terrifying escape from war in Sudan
Published 30 November 2025

Sudan's RSF trying to cover up mass killings in el-Fasher, researchers say
Published 16 December 2025

Sudanese city had 6,000 killed in three days, UN says
Published 5 days ago

View original: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqw74d81jqo

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