Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Saturday, July 19, 2025

Sudan's former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok says recent military gains won't end the country's conflict

HAMDOK, a 69-year-old former economist who now leads a civilian coalition from exile, called the idea that the conflict was drawing down “total nonsense.” The idea that reconstruction can begin in Khartoum while fighting rages elsewhere is “absolutely ridiculous,” he said.


“Any attempt at creating a government in Sudan today is fake. It is irrelevant,” he said, arguing that lasting peace can't be secured without addressing the root causes of the war. Read more.


From The Associated Press (AP)

By SAM METZ

North Africa reporter for AP

Dated 05 June 2025; 2:06 AM BST - full copy:


Former Prime Minister Hamdok says the military’s recent gains won’t end Sudan’s civil war


Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok speaks during a session of the summit to support Sudan, at the Grand Palais Ephemere in Paris on May 17, 2021. (AP Photo/Christophe Ena, Pool, File)


MARRAKECH, Morocco (AP) — Sudan’s former prime minister on Wednesday dismissed the military’s moves to form a new government as “fake,” saying its recent victories in recapturing the capital Khartoum and other territory will not end the country’s two-year civil war.


In a rare interview with The Associated Press, Abdalla Hamdok said no military victory, in Khartoum or elsewhere, could end the war that has killed tens of thousands and driven millions from their homes.


“Whether Khartoum is captured or not captured, it’s irrelevant,” Hamdok said on the sidelines of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s governance conference in Morocco. “There is no military solution to this. No side will be able to have outright victory.”


Hamdok became Sudan’s first civilian prime minister after decades of military rule in 2019, trying to lead a democratic transition. He resigned in January 2022 after a turbulent stretch in which he was ousted in a coup and briefly reinstated amid international pressure.


The following year, warring generals plunged the country into civil war. Sudan today bears the grim distinction of being home to some of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.


Fighting between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has left at least 24,000 dead, though many believe the true toll is far worse.


Both sides stand accused of war crimes.


The RSF, with roots in Darfur’s notorious Janjaweed militia, has been accused of carrying out genocide. The army is accused of unleashing chemical weapons and targeting civilians where they live.


The war has driven about 13 million people from their homes, including 4 million who have crossed into neighboring countries. Famine is setting in and cholera is sweeping through.


The military recaptured the Khartoum area from the RSF in March, as well as some surrounding territory. Army chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan has framed the advances as a major turning point in the conflict.


Last month, he appointed a new prime minister, Kamil al-Taib Idris, for the first time since the war began, tasked with forming a new government. But the fighting has continued. The RSF has regrouped in its stronghold in Darfur and made advances elsewhere, including in Kordofan.


Hamdok, a 69-year-old former economist who now leads a civilian coalition from exile, called the idea that the conflict was drawing down “total nonsense.” The idea that reconstruction can begin in Khartoum while fighting rages elsewhere is “absolutely ridiculous,” he said.


“Any attempt at creating a government in Sudan today is fake. It is irrelevant,” he said, arguing that lasting peace can’t be secured without addressing the root causes of the war.


Hamdok said a ceasefire and a credible process to restore democratic, civilian rule would need to confront Sudan’s deep inequalities, including uneven development, issues among different identity groups and questions about the role of religion in government.


“Trusting the soldiers to bring democracy is a false pretense,” he added.


Though rooted in longstanding divisions, the war has been supercharged by foreign powers accused of arming both sides.


Pro-democracy groups, including Hamdok’s Somoud coalition, have condemned atrocities committed by both the army and the RSF. Hamdok, however, has avoided accusing the United Arab Emirates of supplying weapons to the RSF, even amid international scrutiny and an investigation from a U.N. panel of experts.


On Wednesday, he rebuffed AP questions about weapons coming from the UAE. He said those who singled out the Gulf state while ignoring others accused of backing the army, including Iran, were “pushing a narrative.”


“What we would like to see is anybody who is supplying arms to any side to stop,” he said.


RELATED STORIES


Sudan's military accepts UN ceasefire proposal to let aid in




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Saturday, June 14, 2025

UN Security Council Meeting on Sudan 16 June 2025

From UN Security Council
What's In Blue 
Posted Thursday, 12 June 2025 - copy in full:

Sudan: Closed Consultations*


On Monday afternoon (16 June), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark, Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country. Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya is the anticipated briefer.*


More than two years since fighting erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the violence has evolved into a protracted armed conflict, resulting in widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, the destruction of critical infrastructure, severe food and water shortages, and severe violations of international humanitarian law. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate amid ongoing hostilities and the growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, which has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict.


Monday’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of escalating attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian personnel, and aid facilities. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since the beginning of this year, attacks on critical infrastructure such as power stations, water sub-stations, and oil refineries across the country have caused widespread electricity outages and severely disrupted access to essential rights and services, including safe drinking water, healthcare and food supplies. In early May, the RSF reportedly launched a series of drone strikes targeting key civilian and military infrastructure in Port Sudan—the country’s de facto administrative capital—and Kassala, cities which had until then remained largely insulated from the conflict. In mid-May, RSF drone strikes reportedly hit three power stations in the city of Omdurman, causing widespread electricity outages across Khartoum state. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast and 18 May What’s in Blue story.)


The security situation in El Fasher and the wider North Darfur region remains highly volatile. In mid-April, the RSF intensified its siege and attacks on the city through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties, the killing of aid workers, and mass displacement. According to the UN, on 29 May, a World Food Programme (WFP) facility in El Fasher reportedly came under repeated shelling by the RSF, causing significant damage to a critical humanitarian hub. On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A 3 June joint WFP/UNICEF press statement said that the aid convoy’s route had been shared in advance and that all parties on the ground had been informed of the convoy’s location. The statement called for an immediate investigation and for those responsible to be held accountable. At the time of writing, it is unclear who is responsible for the attack, for which the warring parties have blamed each other. On Monday, Msuya and some Council members might underscore the need to ensure accountability for such attacks and break the cycle of impunity.


Elsewhere in Sudan, hostilities have intensified in the Kordofan region, with the parties reportedly exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts, causing significant harm to civilians. On 30 May, the Eldaman International Hospital in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, was reportedly struck in a drone attack by the RSF, killing at least six health workers and injuring more than 15 others. In recent days, airstrikes have also reportedly targeted residential areas of El Obeid city, resulting in the injury of civilians.


At Monday’s meeting, Msuya is likely to describe how the conflict dynamics are impacting the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly in areas experiencing intense fighting. He may provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. According to OCHA’s latest humanitarian access snapshot, which was published on 4 June, access across Sudan remains severely constrained due to ongoing insecurity, bureaucratic obstacles, and mass displacement, particularly in South and West Kordofan and North Darfur states. In the Kordofan region, heavy fighting has blocked key humanitarian routes and disrupted supply chains, while shifting front lines and long distances from key logistics hubs, such as Port Sudan and the Adré crossing at the Chad-Sudan border, have severely hampered operations. Meanwhile, access in Khartoum remained challenging due to insecurity and bureaucratic restrictions, such as delays in processing travel permits and visas for aid workers.


As hostilities persist, Sudan’s health crisis has deepened, with the healthcare system collapsing, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 156 attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in 318 deaths and 273 injuries. Meanwhile, approximately 20.3 million people—over 40 percent of the country’s population—are in urgent need of health assistance, with more than two-thirds of Sudan’s states battling three or more disease outbreaks simultaneously.


The cholera outbreak that started in July 2024 has since spread to 92 localities across 13 of Sudan’s 18 states, infecting 74,000 people and causing 1,826 deaths. Since May, the WHO has reported a rapid increase in cholera cases in Khartoum state, with over 16,000 cases and 239 deaths documented. The WHO attributed the recent surge in cholera cases to poor water, sanitation and hygiene, caused by a shortage of safe water following attacks on major power plants and water sources. Estimates suggest that approximately $40 million is needed to rehabilitate water infrastructure in Khartoum state. (For more information, see our 12 March What’s in Blue story.)


According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as at 28 May, there were approximately 10.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, a decrease of 13 percent compared to the country’s highest-ever recorded population of IDPs early this year. The IOM attributed this reduction to increased return movements, particularly to Khartoum, Sennar, and Al Jazirah states. Since April 2023, more than four million people have sought refuge in Sudan’s neighbouring countries. Returnees continue to face critical humanitarian needs, with limited access to basic services and persistent protection risks. For instance, recent media reports have indicated the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance in areas of return.


In a 10 June statement following his visit to Khartoum, the WFP’s Sudan representative, Laurent Bukera, announced that the WFP has re-established its presence in the area with the opening of an office in Omdurman. He noted that, with people returning to conflict-affected areas like Khartoum, pressure on overstretched resources will intensify. He underlined the urgent need to restore basic services and accelerate recovery through coordinated efforts with local authorities, national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and humanitarian partners.


On Monday, Msuya is likely to underscore the urgent need to act to alleviate the suffering of millions in Sudan. He may call on the international community to scale up its humanitarian response to match the scale and urgency of the crisis. He might also underline the need for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and highlight the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $4.16 billion, was only approximately 14percent funded.


Council members may reiterate key points from their press statement, agreed earlier this evening (12 June), which was authored by the UK. The statement recalled resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher and called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher. In their statement, Council members condemned the 2 June attack on the WFP/UNICEF humanitarian convoy and the 29 May shelling by the RSF that damaged a WFP facility in El Fasher. They also expressed deep concern over the impact of the conflict on humanitarian operations, including reports of air attacks by the RSF in Port Sudan, Kassala and Khartoum. The statement reiterated that deliberate attacks against humanitarian personnel, their premises, and assets may constitute war crimes and called on the parties to abide by their commitments under the 11 May 2023 Jeddah Declaration as well as by their obligations under international law.

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**Post-script (13 June, 3:45 pm EST): After the publication of this story, the meeting was pushed from Friday (13 June) to Monday (16 June), due to the scheduling of an emergency meeting on Iran on Friday afternoon. The story was amended to reflect the change in timing as well as the briefer; while Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher was expected to brief on Friday, the briefer expected for Monday is Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-closed-consultations-7.php

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NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor


Plumpy’Nut - A ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)


A peanut product called Plumpy’Nut could come to the aid of starving people, especially children, across the globe.


Severe acute malnutrition has traditionally been treated with therapeutic milk and required hospitalisation. Unlike milk, Plumpy’Nut can be administered at home and without medical supervision.


Plumpy’Nut has a two-year shelf life and requires no water, preparation, or refrigeration. Its ease of use has made mass treatment of malnutrition in famine situations more efficient than in the past.

Image: Plumpy'Nut, a ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)

Read more at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumpy%27nut


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Monday, April 14, 2025

The London Conference on Sudan 15th April 2025

Presidential Palace Khartoum 2012 by the author

Sudan - can the UK's "progressive realism" help?

Sir Nick Kay

Former Ambassador


April 11, 2025

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis and one of its most dangerous, complex, bloody wars gets a moment in the spotlight in London on 15 April. Foreign ministers and senior officials from international organisations will meet at Lancaster House to discuss Sudan. After two years of conflict, the UK is taking a diplomatic initiative that many believe long overdue given its historical ties and current responsibility at the United Nations Security Council to hold the pen on Sudan resolutions.


But is the conference likely to lead to anything positive for the Sudanese people? 


Expectations are understandably low. The de facto Sudanese authorities led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have criticised the UK for not inviting them to the conference. They object strongly to the UAE being invited because they consider it an ally of the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and therefore a party to the conflict. On the ground both the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have pledged to continue the war until they achieve complete victory. No impartial observer thinks that possible. As the war drags on, Sudan suffers from political polarisation, fragmentation and continued external meddling.


It's too easy to look the other way and too easy to think this is just a messy, protracted struggle that will continue inconclusively. But the immediate future may not be a continuation of the last two years. 


Red warning lights are flashing. Sudan’s neighbour South Sudan is teetering on the brink of civil war and the Sudanese conflict is playing its part in destabilising South Sudan and vice versa. Other neighbouring countries are also vulnerable to fall-out from Sudan: Chad in particular. With any expansion of war in the region, the humanitarian consequences and political risks of spiralling conflict magnify. Within Sudan itself the increased presence of Islamist extremists, armed militia and potentially international terror groups is another flashing light. Geopolitical tensions - already existing - may escalate. The Sudan Armed Forces have been ostracised by western powers and have entered agreements with Russia and Iran in their search for arms. Both countries see establishing a presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast as a prize. But such a move would be highly provocative for others, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.


Over the last two years efforts to broker ceasefires have failed, only limited progress has been made on improving humanitarian access and efforts to bring about a comprehensive political settlement between the various actors - the two military forces, political parties, armed movements and civil society actors - have all led to nought. Many have tried, including the UN, AU, IGAD, the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey but none has succeeded. These “track 1” efforts have been complemented by multiple “track 2” initiatives led by NGOs and peace foundations. But so far the willingness to give as well as take in any negotiation is sorely missing.

Proposals


Absent political will by the protagonists and their external backers, what can be achieved in London? 


Limited but important steps can be agreed in three areas: the humanitarian response, political process and international cooperation. 


On the humanitarian front, the key challenges remain both funding and access. In April 2024 at a conference in Paris, donors made generous pledges totalling USD $2 billion. Much of that has yet to be disbursed. London is not a pledging conference, but should be the opportunity for partners to live up to their past commitments and renew their determination to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance for the 11 million Sudanese forced to flee their homes— food, shelter, medicines and healthcare at a minimum. The challenges for humanitarians are enormous: Sudan’s domestic political and ethnic complexity compounded by the regional tensions with and between Sudan’s neighbours necessitate an enhanced international aid effort coordinated by a senior UN figure. 


A political process remains the missing element and in London agreement may be possible on how to deal with the most immediate challenge as well as on the essential elements for a future process. Since the SAF now control the capital Khartoum again, it is likely they will press ahead with their own political roadmap and appoint a civilian government subordinate to the military to take forward a transition towards eventual restoration of democracy. 


How should the international community respond to this - reject, ignore, embrace, or shape it? Given the risk of Sudan being partitioned into two warring regions - Darfur and the South controlled by the RSF and the North, East and centre being controlled by the SAF - no SAF-imposed roadmap is going to be the final word. Not only will it not include the RSF and its supporters, but also many of the political actors who supported the 2019 revolution, which overthrew General Bashir’s military rule, will have nothing to do with the SAF roadmap. So the challenge for the international community is to try to work within the new political reality on a temporary and tentative basis. The aim should be to shape the SAF’s actions in order to move towards a credible inclusive political transition. The London conference could agree criteria by which such a political process will be judged. Key questions will be: how inclusive is the process and what genuine efforts are made to ensure inclusiveness of all Sudan; how are civil and political rights protected; how will security, justice and reconciliation be achieved; what are the criteria for selection of members of a transitional administration; what real authority will the administration have over economic and budgetary affairs; what are the provisions and realistic timetable for an all-inclusive Sudanese national dialogue? Above all, how firmly enshrined is the commitment to full democratic and civilian rule in Sudan, for which Sudanese men, women and youth struggled and died over the years? 


These are difficult questions that have defied easy answers since 2019. Helping Sudanese actors address them will require substantial and coordinated international action. 


The third way the London conference could contribute is by setting out agreed principles and a framework for the international community. The Sudan crisis is of such a complexity and international nature that it requires a creative and collaborative approach. The conference could propose that an international panel of mediators be appointed, led by the African Union but comprising additional senior figures from beyond Africa. Rank is important and ideally the panel would be at former head of state or government level and mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. The panel’s focus should be on advancing a comprehensive political settlement. Early consultation with the SAF, RSF and Sudanese civil and political actors about the terms of reference will be essential. The conference could agree who should take forward this consultation and a time frame.


Conclusion

Foreign Secretary David Lammy convened the conference after seeing at first hand the devastating impact of the war on Sudanese women and children on the Chad-Sudan border. Just because the Sudan war is complicated and far from our TV screens, we cannot in all conscience ignore it. This is a moment to put the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine of “progressive realism” into action.


 [These are the personal views of the author and do not represent the views of any organisation with which he is associated.]

CMI — Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation 

Diplomats without Borders 


View original: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sudan-can-uks-progressive-realism-help-sir-nick-kay-nc3be/

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Related 


Sudan Watch - 19 Nov 2010

British Ambassador in Khartoum Nicholas Kay is blogging the drama and scale of the change taking place in Sudan

The British government's Foreign & Commonwealth Office, commonly called the Foreign Office or the FCO, has started a blog about the work of the British Ambassador to Sudan. The blog is authored by Nicholas Kay CMG, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Sudan. Mr Kay (pictured below) arrived in Khartoum to take up his role as HM Ambassador to Sudan on 29 May 2010. Here is a copy of his first two blog posts followed by several related reports.

Full story: https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/11/british-ambassador-in-khartoum-nicholas.html

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Sir Nicholas Kay KCMG
British Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan 2010 to 2012
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/nicholas-kay

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