Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.

Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 

Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 

On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.

In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.

The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)

On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.

While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.

Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.

Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.

In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.

Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.

In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.

During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.

Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.

Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.

A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.

Download Complete Forecast: PDF

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php

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Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Dated Mon 4 Aug 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This afternoon (4 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the recent escalation of violence in North Darfur state and the Kordofan region. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk are expected to brief.

Ahead of the meeting, Russia apparently objected to having an official from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) brief on Sudan, arguing that the office lacks the mandate to brief the Council on the issue. However, Denmark and the UK countered this argument, noting OHCHR’s strong presence in Port Sudan, as well as its access to nationwide networks and to parties to the conflict. They also argued that the Council should be able to draw on all relevant information to inform its work and cited precedents of briefings from OHCHR officials to the Council on other situations.

At this afternoon’s meeting, Lamamra is expected to provide an overview of the grave security situation in the country, amid spiralling and unabated violence. In recent months, North Darfur state and the Kordofan region have witnessed an alarming escalation in hostilities, with large numbers of civilians bearing the brunt of the fighting. Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. The fighting has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. (For background and more information, see our 26 June What’s in Blue story.)

The Kordofan region has become a key flashpoint in the ongoing conflict due to its strategic importance as a crossroads linking the country from east to west and north to south. Control of the region is critical to shaping the balance of power in Sudan’s civil war. El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and a focal point of fighting, remains the SAF’s westernmost stronghold after it broke the RSF’s siege in February. The SAF reportedly uses El-Obeid as a base for launching airstrikes into Darfur and for preventing RSF advances towards Khartoum. Recent media reports have indicated an RSF mobilisation aimed at seizing El-Obeid.

In a 17 July statement, OHCHR noted that it had verified the killing of at least 60 civilians by the RSF in the Bara locality of North Kordofan since 10 July. Civil society groups have reported significantly higher figures, with some estimates placing the death toll at up to 300. The OHCHR statement added that at least 23 civilians were reportedly killed and over 30 injured in airstrikes carried out by the SAF on two villages in West Kordofan state between 10 and 14 July. Additionally, on 17 July, a SAF airstrike in the Bara locality killed at least 11 civilians.

In the same statement, Türk warned that a continued escalation of hostilities would worsen the already dire humanitarian situation and heighten risks to civilians. He urged those with influence to prevent such an escalation and to ensure that both parties uphold their obligations under international law, including to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Türk reiterated his call on the warring parties to ensure safe, sustained, and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, including through humanitarian pauses. He stressed that alleged violations must be independently investigated and those responsible held accountable. This afternoon, the briefers and several Council members are likely to reiterate these messages.

Today’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. Kamil Eltayeb Idris—who has been appointed as Sudan’s prime minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council—has continued appointing members to a recently established 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. Meanwhile, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of rival armed and political groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states—announced in late July the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. The structure includes a 15-member presidential council headed by the RSF’s leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with Hilu serving as vice president and Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as prime minister.

Several regional and international interlocutors have denounced the RSF’s decision to establish a parallel governing authority, warning that it risks entrenching Sudan’s political fragmentation, and have underscored the importance of upholding the country’s territorial integrity. In a 29 July press statement, members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) rejected the creation of the so-called “parallel government” and stressed that the AU only recognises the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government, until consensual arrangements are reached to restore constitutional order.

Sudan has on multiple occasions expressed its desire to be readmitted to the AU, after having been suspended in the wake of the October 2021 military takeover. The AUPSC convened earlier today to consider the situation in Sudan, under the rotating presidency for the month of August of Algeria (an elected UN Security Council member in 2024-25).

Lamamra most recently briefed Council members in closed consultations on 27 June, providing an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan. He apparently underscored the urgent need for a united and coordinated approach to address the crisis through immediate and concrete action. It seems that Lamamra also shared insights from the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels a day earlier (26 June). The next round of the consultative meeting is expected to be held in Addis Ababa, although the date has yet to be determined.

At a tri-partite meeting in Baghdad in May, the leaders of the UN, AU, and the League of Arab States (LAS) agreed to maintain regular contact to better coordinate peace efforts in Sudan. The AU Chairperson’s special representative to Sudan, Mohamed Belaiche, visited Port Sudan last week, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan and Idris. (For more information, see our 18 May and 26 June What’s in Blue stories.)

In recent months, the US has appeared to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. In early June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the Sudan conflict in Washington DC with the ambassadors to the US of the other Quad countries, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US had also planned to host a high-level meeting of Quad foreign ministers on 29 July; however, according to media reports, the meeting was postponed indefinitely due to disagreements between Egypt and the UAE—who are said to support opposing sides in the conflict—over the language of a proposed joint statement. There have also been reports that the US rejected an Egyptian request to include representatives of Sudan’s government in the meeting. Separately, the Sudan conflict has featured in recent bilateral discussions between senior US officials and key interlocutors, including Egypt and Qatar.

Security Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement, authored by the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and the UK, that responds to the announcement made by the RSF-led Tasis alliance establishing a parallel governing authority. The draft press statement was open for comments until this morning. At the time of writing, members were awaiting a revised version of the text.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/sudan-closed-consultations-8.php

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The London Conference on Sudan 15th April 2025

Presidential Palace Khartoum 2012 by the author

Sudan - can the UK's "progressive realism" help?

Sir Nick Kay

Former Ambassador

April 11, 2025

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis and one of its most dangerous, complex, bloody wars gets a moment in the spotlight in London on 15 April. Foreign ministers and senior officials from international organisations will meet at Lancaster House to discuss Sudan. After two years of conflict, the UK is taking a diplomatic initiative that many believe long overdue given its historical ties and current responsibility at the United Nations Security Council to hold the pen on Sudan resolutions.

But is the conference likely to lead to anything positive for the Sudanese people? 

Expectations are understandably low. The de facto Sudanese authorities led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have criticised the UK for not inviting them to the conference. They object strongly to the UAE being invited because they consider it an ally of the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and therefore a party to the conflict. On the ground both the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have pledged to continue the war until they achieve complete victory. No impartial observer thinks that possible. As the war drags on, Sudan suffers from political polarisation, fragmentation and continued external meddling.

It's too easy to look the other way and too easy to think this is just a messy, protracted struggle that will continue inconclusively. But the immediate future may not be a continuation of the last two years. 

Red warning lights are flashing. Sudan’s neighbour South Sudan is teetering on the brink of civil war and the Sudanese conflict is playing its part in destabilising South Sudan and vice versa. Other neighbouring countries are also vulnerable to fall-out from Sudan: Chad in particular. With any expansion of war in the region, the humanitarian consequences and political risks of spiralling conflict magnify. Within Sudan itself the increased presence of Islamist extremists, armed militia and potentially international terror groups is another flashing light. Geopolitical tensions - already existing - may escalate. The Sudan Armed Forces have been ostracised by western powers and have entered agreements with Russia and Iran in their search for arms. Both countries see establishing a presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast as a prize. But such a move would be highly provocative for others, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Over the last two years efforts to broker ceasefires have failed, only limited progress has been made on improving humanitarian access and efforts to bring about a comprehensive political settlement between the various actors - the two military forces, political parties, armed movements and civil society actors - have all led to nought. Many have tried, including the UN, AU, IGAD, the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey but none has succeeded. These “track 1” efforts have been complemented by multiple “track 2” initiatives led by NGOs and peace foundations. But so far the willingness to give as well as take in any negotiation is sorely missing.

Proposals

Absent political will by the protagonists and their external backers, what can be achieved in London? 

Limited but important steps can be agreed in three areas: the humanitarian response, political process and international cooperation. 

On the humanitarian front, the key challenges remain both funding and access. In April 2024 at a conference in Paris, donors made generous pledges totalling USD $2 billion. Much of that has yet to be disbursed. London is not a pledging conference, but should be the opportunity for partners to live up to their past commitments and renew their determination to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance for the 11 million Sudanese forced to flee their homes— food, shelter, medicines and healthcare at a minimum. The challenges for humanitarians are enormous: Sudan’s domestic political and ethnic complexity compounded by the regional tensions with and between Sudan’s neighbours necessitate an enhanced international aid effort coordinated by a senior UN figure. 

A political process remains the missing element and in London agreement may be possible on how to deal with the most immediate challenge as well as on the essential elements for a future process. Since the SAF now control the capital Khartoum again, it is likely they will press ahead with their own political roadmap and appoint a civilian government subordinate to the military to take forward a transition towards eventual restoration of democracy. 

How should the international community respond to this - reject, ignore, embrace, or shape it? Given the risk of Sudan being partitioned into two warring regions - Darfur and the South controlled by the RSF and the North, East and centre being controlled by the SAF - no SAF-imposed roadmap is going to be the final word. Not only will it not include the RSF and its supporters, but also many of the political actors who supported the 2019 revolution, which overthrew General Bashir’s military rule, will have nothing to do with the SAF roadmap. So the challenge for the international community is to try to work within the new political reality on a temporary and tentative basis. The aim should be to shape the SAF’s actions in order to move towards a credible inclusive political transition. The London conference could agree criteria by which such a political process will be judged. Key questions will be: how inclusive is the process and what genuine efforts are made to ensure inclusiveness of all Sudan; how are civil and political rights protected; how will security, justice and reconciliation be achieved; what are the criteria for selection of members of a transitional administration; what real authority will the administration have over economic and budgetary affairs; what are the provisions and realistic timetable for an all-inclusive Sudanese national dialogue? Above all, how firmly enshrined is the commitment to full democratic and civilian rule in Sudan, for which Sudanese men, women and youth struggled and died over the years? 

These are difficult questions that have defied easy answers since 2019. Helping Sudanese actors address them will require substantial and coordinated international action. 

The third way the London conference could contribute is by setting out agreed principles and a framework for the international community. The Sudan crisis is of such a complexity and international nature that it requires a creative and collaborative approach. The conference could propose that an international panel of mediators be appointed, led by the African Union but comprising additional senior figures from beyond Africa. Rank is important and ideally the panel would be at former head of state or government level and mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. The panel’s focus should be on advancing a comprehensive political settlement. Early consultation with the SAF, RSF and Sudanese civil and political actors about the terms of reference will be essential. The conference could agree who should take forward this consultation and a time frame.

Conclusion

Foreign Secretary David Lammy convened the conference after seeing at first hand the devastating impact of the war on Sudanese women and children on the Chad-Sudan border. Just because the Sudan war is complicated and far from our TV screens, we cannot in all conscience ignore it. This is a moment to put the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine of “progressive realism” into action.

 [These are the personal views of the author and do not represent the views of any organisation with which he is associated.]

CMI — Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation 

Diplomats without Borders 

View original: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sudan-can-uks-progressive-realism-help-sir-nick-kay-nc3be/

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Related 

Sudan Watch - 19 Nov 2010

British Ambassador in Khartoum Nicholas Kay is blogging the drama and scale of the change taking place in Sudan

The British government's Foreign & Commonwealth Office, commonly called the Foreign Office or the FCO, has started a blog about the work of the British Ambassador to Sudan. The blog is authored by Nicholas Kay CMG, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Sudan. Mr Kay (pictured below) arrived in Khartoum to take up his role as HM Ambassador to Sudan on 29 May 2010. Here is a copy of his first two blog posts followed by several related reports.

Full story: https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/11/british-ambassador-in-khartoum-nicholas.html

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Sir Nicholas Kay KCMG
British Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan 2010 to 2012
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/nicholas-kay

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