Sudan: Open Briefing at UN Security Council - The UK is penholder on Sudan and Council president for Feb

"In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations. ...

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft." Read more.

From What's In Blue 
Posted Wednesday 18 February 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Sudan. The UK, the penholder on Sudan and Council president for February, has elevated the meeting to ministerial level, with its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper, expected to chair. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. The Council will also hear from a civil society representative, who will address the situation of women in the context of the conflict in Sudan, including the high incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Sudan as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

DiCarlo is expected to provide an overview of the security situation as the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April, amid a dangerous phase marked by intensified hostilities with increasing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened governance structures, exacerbating civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity. The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors reportedly providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, resulting in regional spillover and proxy dynamics. In this regard, reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring states as transit routes for weapons and supplies have raised alarm about the risk of further regional destabilisation. Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to voice concerns about the trajectory of these perilous trends. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the ongoing violence and reiterate calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, reports from the UN and other entities have documented grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) by parties to the conflict. In this context, several Council members are expected to urge compliance with IHL and IHRL obligations, while highlighting broader protection concerns, including widespread CRSV. They may also underscore the need to ensure accountability for such violations. (For more information, see our 8 February What’s in Blue story.)

On 13 February, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in late October 2025 that resulted in the seizure of El Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. According to the report, the documented patterns indicate that the RSF and allied Arab militias conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in the city. OHCHR monitoring suggested that the RSF and allied militias committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, launching indiscriminate attacks, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) requested the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM) to conduct an urgent inquiry into alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher following the seizure of the city by the RSF. The findings of the inquiry are expected to be released tomorrow.

Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. Tomorrow, several Council members are expected to voice support for mediation efforts, with some emphasising the importance of complementarity and coordination among such initiatives.

UN mediation efforts have been led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, who had regularly briefed Council members during closed consultations on Sudan. Media reports suggest that Lamamra will finish his role by the end of the month. He had been scheduled to brief during consultations following tomorrow’s briefing, but it appears that the consultations are not expected to take place and that Lamamra is not slated to brief.

During a donor conference held on 3 February in Washington DC, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos reportedly announced that a document outlining a peace plan had been agreed among the Quad members—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—aimed at securing a humanitarian truce and opening safe corridors for relief efforts. In a 14 February interview with Foreign Policy, Boulos said that, alongside the Quad, the US has been engaging with several regional countries on the initiative. He added that the US intends to bring the plan to the Security Council with the aim of adopting a resolution.

On 12 February, the Quintet group—comprised of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—released a joint statement which called for the immediate halting of any further military escalation and urged all concerned sides to support efforts towards a humanitarian truce and the delivery of life-saving assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, has continued to seek support for his proposal to end the conflict (which he presented during the Council’s 22 December 2025 briefing on Sudan), including during recent visits to Switzerland and Germany. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from areas under its control. Sudan has also continued efforts to secure readmission to the AU following its suspension after the October 2021 military takeover. In a communiqué adopted following a 12 February AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) ministerial meeting on Sudan, the AUPSC welcomed Sudan’s 22 December 2025 proposal as well as efforts led by the Quintet.

At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for insecurity and violence in Sudan. Yesterday (17 February), the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) proposed the designation of four RSF commanders under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. Since the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has not yet been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the UK circulated the proposal under a no-objection procedure until 24 February. (There is an understanding that respective presidents of the Council will handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs until the chairs have been appointed.) At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may highlight this measure and underline the need to consider expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur, considering the evolving conflict dynamics across other regions of the country. Several Council members—including the African members, China, and Russia—have opposed this proposal, which some other members have raised in the context of discussions on the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, most recently in September 2025.

Tomorrow, Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. She may emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and CRSV.

She may describe how intensifying hostilities are exacerbating risks to civilians, fuelling displacement and humanitarian needs, and shrinking humanitarian space while making operations increasingly dangerous for aid workers. The conflict has been marked by frequent attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as humanitarian assets, personnel, and convoys. Recent OCHA press releases have highlighted a sharp increase in deadly drone strikes across the Kordofan region, resulting in civilian casualties and further deepening the humanitarian crisis. In this context, Wosornu and several Council members are likely to stress the urgent imperative of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure and condemn their deliberate targeting.

Wosornu is also expected to reiterate calls for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and underscore the need for increased and flexible funding to sustain life-saving operations amid rising needs. She may also highlight ongoing efforts by OCHA and its partners to deliver assistance despite acute operational challenges. In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations.

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft.

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https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/sudan-briefing-7.php

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Reuters Exclusive: Pakistan nears $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons, jets to Sudan, sources say

The deal includes attack aircraft and drones, sources say. Jets and drones could revive Sudan army's fortunes. Pakistan's weapons industry is on the rise. It was a "done deal", said Aamir Masood, a retired Pakistani air marshal who continues to be briefed on air force matters. Read full story.

From Reuters

By Saad Sayeed and Mubasher Bukhari

Published Friday 09 January 2026 1:35 PM GMT 

Updated 09 January 2026 - full copy:

Exclusive: Pakistan nears $1.5 billion deal to supply weapons, jets to Sudan, sources say

Pakistan Air Force's JF-17 Thunder jets fly past during the sea phase of Pakistan Navy's Multinational Exercise AMAN-23, in the North Arabian Sea near Karachi, Pakistan, February 13, 2023

Summary

• Deal includes attack aircraft and drones, sources say
• Jets and drones could revive Sudan army's fortunes
• Pakistan's weapons industry is on the rise

ISLAMABAD, Jan 9 (Reuters) - Pakistan is in the final phases of striking a $1.5-billion deal to supply weapons and jets to Sudan, a former top air force official and three sources said, promising a major boost for Sudan's army, battling the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

Their conflict has stoked the world's worst humanitarian crisis for more than 2-1/2 years, drawing in myriad foreign interests, and threatening to fragment the strategic Red Sea country, a major gold producer.

The deal with Pakistan encompasses 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones for scouting and kamikaze attacks, and advanced air defence systems, said two of the three sources with knowledge of the matter, who all sought anonymity.

It was a "done deal", said Aamir Masood, a retired Pakistani air marshal who continues to be briefed on air force matters.

Besides the Karakoram-8 jets, it includes Super Mushshak training aircraft, and perhaps some coveted JF-17 fighters developed jointly with China and produced in Pakistan, he added, without giving figures or a delivery schedule.

Pakistan's military and its defence ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

A spokesman for Sudan’s army did not immediately respond to a message requesting comment.

Assistance from Pakistan, especially drones and jets, could help Sudan's army regain the air supremacy it had towards the start of its war with the RSF, which has increasingly used drones to gain territory, eroding the army's position.

Sudan's army accuses the RSF of being supplied by the United Arab Emirates, which has denied supplying weapons.

POSSIBILITY OF SAUDI BACKING

The sources did not say how the deal was being funded but Masood said it was possible the finances would come from Saudi Arabia.

"Saudi Arabia may favour and support all the favourable regimes in Gulf for procurement of Pakistani military equipment and training," he said.

One of the sources said the Saudis brokered the deal but added there was no indication they were paying for the weapons. Another source said Saudi was not providing funds.

Reuters has reported that Islamabad is in talks with Riyadh for a defence deal that could be worth between $2 billion and $4 billion.

Masood said the weapons for Sudan could be included in such an agreement, without confirming discussions with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi government media office did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are part of the U.S.-led quad grouping of nations that has tried to push Sudan's army and the RSF towards peace talks.

On recent visits, Sudan's army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan requested Saudi assistance in the war, according to Sudanese and Egyptian sources.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are embroiled in a major feud sparked by recent events in Yemen.

The two most powerful countries in the Gulf have sharp differences on a range of volatile Middle East issues, from geopolitics to oil output.

Their difference burst into the open with an advance of UAE-backed southern Yemeni separatists in early December that brought them into conflict with Saudi-backed forces.

PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE AMBITIONS

The deal is another feather in the cap for Pakistan's growing defence sector, which has drawn growing interest and investment, particularly since its jets were deployed in a conflict with India last year.

Last month, Islamabad struck a weapons deal worth more than $4 billion with the Libyan National Army, officials said, for one of the South Asian nation's largest arms sales, which includes JF-17 fighter jets and training aircraft.

Pakistan has also held talks with Bangladesh on a defence deal that could includes the Super Mushshak training jets and JF-17s, as ties improve ties with Dhaka.

The government sees Pakistan's burgeoning industry as a catalyst to secure long-term economic stability.

Pakistan is now in a $7-billion IMF programme, following a short-term deal to avert a sovereign default in 2023. It won IMF support after Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies provided financial and deposit rollovers.

Reporting by Saad Sayeed in Islamabad and Mubasher Bukhari in Lahore; Additional reporting by Ariba Shahid, Khalid Abdelaziz and Ahmed Shalaby; Editing by Clarence Fernandez

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

View original:  https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pakistan-nears-15-billion-deal-supply-weapons-jets-sudan-sources-say-2026-01-09/

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Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.

Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 

Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 

On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.

In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.

The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)

On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.

While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.

Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.

Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.

In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.

Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.

In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.

During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.

Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.

Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.

A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.

Download Complete Forecast: PDF

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php

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