Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.

Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 

Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 

On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.

In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.

The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)

On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.

While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.

Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.

Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.

In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.

Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.

In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.

During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.

Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.

Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.

A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.

Download Complete Forecast: PDF

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php

End

Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Dated Mon 4 Aug 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This afternoon (4 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the recent escalation of violence in North Darfur state and the Kordofan region. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk are expected to brief.

Ahead of the meeting, Russia apparently objected to having an official from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) brief on Sudan, arguing that the office lacks the mandate to brief the Council on the issue. However, Denmark and the UK countered this argument, noting OHCHR’s strong presence in Port Sudan, as well as its access to nationwide networks and to parties to the conflict. They also argued that the Council should be able to draw on all relevant information to inform its work and cited precedents of briefings from OHCHR officials to the Council on other situations.

At this afternoon’s meeting, Lamamra is expected to provide an overview of the grave security situation in the country, amid spiralling and unabated violence. In recent months, North Darfur state and the Kordofan region have witnessed an alarming escalation in hostilities, with large numbers of civilians bearing the brunt of the fighting. Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. The fighting has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. (For background and more information, see our 26 June What’s in Blue story.)

The Kordofan region has become a key flashpoint in the ongoing conflict due to its strategic importance as a crossroads linking the country from east to west and north to south. Control of the region is critical to shaping the balance of power in Sudan’s civil war. El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and a focal point of fighting, remains the SAF’s westernmost stronghold after it broke the RSF’s siege in February. The SAF reportedly uses El-Obeid as a base for launching airstrikes into Darfur and for preventing RSF advances towards Khartoum. Recent media reports have indicated an RSF mobilisation aimed at seizing El-Obeid.

In a 17 July statement, OHCHR noted that it had verified the killing of at least 60 civilians by the RSF in the Bara locality of North Kordofan since 10 July. Civil society groups have reported significantly higher figures, with some estimates placing the death toll at up to 300. The OHCHR statement added that at least 23 civilians were reportedly killed and over 30 injured in airstrikes carried out by the SAF on two villages in West Kordofan state between 10 and 14 July. Additionally, on 17 July, a SAF airstrike in the Bara locality killed at least 11 civilians.

In the same statement, Türk warned that a continued escalation of hostilities would worsen the already dire humanitarian situation and heighten risks to civilians. He urged those with influence to prevent such an escalation and to ensure that both parties uphold their obligations under international law, including to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Türk reiterated his call on the warring parties to ensure safe, sustained, and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, including through humanitarian pauses. He stressed that alleged violations must be independently investigated and those responsible held accountable. This afternoon, the briefers and several Council members are likely to reiterate these messages.

Today’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. Kamil Eltayeb Idris—who has been appointed as Sudan’s prime minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council—has continued appointing members to a recently established 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. Meanwhile, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of rival armed and political groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states—announced in late July the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. The structure includes a 15-member presidential council headed by the RSF’s leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with Hilu serving as vice president and Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as prime minister.

Several regional and international interlocutors have denounced the RSF’s decision to establish a parallel governing authority, warning that it risks entrenching Sudan’s political fragmentation, and have underscored the importance of upholding the country’s territorial integrity. In a 29 July press statement, members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) rejected the creation of the so-called “parallel government” and stressed that the AU only recognises the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government, until consensual arrangements are reached to restore constitutional order.

Sudan has on multiple occasions expressed its desire to be readmitted to the AU, after having been suspended in the wake of the October 2021 military takeover. The AUPSC convened earlier today to consider the situation in Sudan, under the rotating presidency for the month of August of Algeria (an elected UN Security Council member in 2024-25).

Lamamra most recently briefed Council members in closed consultations on 27 June, providing an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan. He apparently underscored the urgent need for a united and coordinated approach to address the crisis through immediate and concrete action. It seems that Lamamra also shared insights from the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels a day earlier (26 June). The next round of the consultative meeting is expected to be held in Addis Ababa, although the date has yet to be determined.

At a tri-partite meeting in Baghdad in May, the leaders of the UN, AU, and the League of Arab States (LAS) agreed to maintain regular contact to better coordinate peace efforts in Sudan. The AU Chairperson’s special representative to Sudan, Mohamed Belaiche, visited Port Sudan last week, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan and Idris. (For more information, see our 18 May and 26 June What’s in Blue stories.)

In recent months, the US has appeared to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. In early June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the Sudan conflict in Washington DC with the ambassadors to the US of the other Quad countries, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US had also planned to host a high-level meeting of Quad foreign ministers on 29 July; however, according to media reports, the meeting was postponed indefinitely due to disagreements between Egypt and the UAE—who are said to support opposing sides in the conflict—over the language of a proposed joint statement. There have also been reports that the US rejected an Egyptian request to include representatives of Sudan’s government in the meeting. Separately, the Sudan conflict has featured in recent bilateral discussions between senior US officials and key interlocutors, including Egypt and Qatar.

Security Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement, authored by the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and the UK, that responds to the announcement made by the RSF-led Tasis alliance establishing a parallel governing authority. The draft press statement was open for comments until this morning. At the time of writing, members were awaiting a revised version of the text.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/sudan-closed-consultations-8.php

End

Sudan: It's time for civilians to claim control of govt

"Strong statements from, among others, African heads of state and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have stressed that the future of Sudan lies with civilian leadership. But there’s no practical plan to make this happen. 

It falls to Sudan’s civilians to set the agenda. The civilian parties have the legitimacy to claim what is theirs — the government — and demand recognition, funds, and the authority to convene. 

It’s bold, better than the worn-out options on the international table, and could change the political landscape. The U.S. should change its nickel-and-dime policies towards Sudan and put its weight behind civilian institutions of state, independent of the warring parties.

If the Sudanese state is to be saved, Sudanese cannot count on the lethargic junior diplomats assigned to their case. Sudan’s civilian democrats need to seize the initiative themselves. The only card they have to play is their legitimacy. They need to play it now, before they get trapped in pointless talking shops.

The chance to be seized is speaking for the state. When al-Burhan’s delegation signed the Jeddah ceasefire, they did so as SAF—i.e. as a warring party co-equal with the RSF. They didn’t sign as the Government of Sudan. This means no one is representing the state.

The civilians could declare an interim government right away. That’s more than a symbolic act. They could take charge of the financial institutions of the state and bring material leverage to the table." Read more.

Analysis at ResponsibleStatecraft,org
Written by Alex de Waal
Dated Tuesday 06 June 2023 - full copy:

Sudan is bleeding to death and current triage is useless

Stop with the stale remedies. It’s time for civilians to claim control of the government, and for foreign powers to back them up.

Sudan is bleeding to death and its state failure is approaching the point of no return. The question is bigger than a civil war, more than a humanitarian calamity — it’s whether there can be any life in the Sudanese state for the coming decades.

Yet diplomats at the U.S. State Department, Saudi Arabia, the African Union and the United Nations still treat Sudan as a containable conflict susceptible to a package of off-the-shelf inducements and castigations. They are producing yesterday’s treatments for yesterday’s ailments — which didn’t succeed then and have zero chance today.

The formulae of ceasefires and humanitarian aid simply don’t do justice to the reality of state collapse in a country of 45 million people.

Strong statements from, among others, African heads of state and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have stressed that the future of Sudan lies with civilian leadership. But there’s no practical plan to make this happen.

It falls to Sudan’s civilians to set the agenda. The civilian parties have the legitimacy to claim what is theirs — the government — and demand recognition, funds, and the authority to convene. It’s bold, better than the worn-out options on the international table, and could change the political landscape. The U.S. should change its nickel-and-dime policies towards Sudan and put its weight behind civilian institutions of state, independent of the warring parties.

Sudan’s most recent war erupted on April 15, pitting the Sudan Armed Forces, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, against his erstwhile deputy and head of the Rapid Support Forces, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti. Seven weeks of intense combat in the national capital Khartoum have seen hundreds dead, massive damage to the infrastructure of the city, the emptying of that city of most of its middle class, and an escalating humanitarian crisis. The 100,000 who have fled abroad — thus far mostly to Egypt, to South Sudan and Chad — are but a small harbinger of what is to come as the national economy collapses. In the crisis before the crisis, there were already 13 million people — almost one third of the population — in need of food assistance to meet basic needs. That number is climbing by almost one million every week.

Ten days of intense U.S.-Saudi pressure on the two warring parties produced little. In talks in the Saudi city of Jeddah, the SAF and RSF signed a seven-day ceasefire that began on May 22, and which was renewed for a further five days. The stated rationale was to enable humanitarian aid to get in. The truce was partly respected — mostly because the two sides couldn’t sustain high-intensity combat. Last week, the mediators publicly castigated the warring parties for their failures and made it clear that their effort had run its course. At the time of writing, the war is set to escalate. The SAF appears set on a big offensive to drive the RSF out of its strongholds in Khartoum, while the RSF is mobilizing to attack other cities.

The U.S. announced targeted sanctions on four business conglomerates linked to the belligerents, two on each side. This included the main Hemedti family business, al-Gunaid Multi-Activities Company, and the sprawling Defense Industry System, run by the SAF. The sanctions could either be read as a sign that Washington is finally getting tough, or as a gesture of despair. Either way, sanctions will have an impact only with the cooperation of the generals’ foreign business partners, especially the United Arab Emirates, which buys most of Hemedti’s gold. Sudan’s generals have decades of experience in sanctions-busting. Both sides have links to Russia, which isn’t in favor of the war, but is viscerally opposed to American sanctions.

Sanctions are a tool, not a solution. Until the mediators have fastened onto a strategy, they are only a means of punishing people we don’t like.

The mediators in Jeddah faced three main problems. Most important, Hemedti and al-Burhan each hoped to land a knockout military blow on the other and didn’t want to forgo that chance. Second, the SAF side is a fractious coalition of army and paramilitary units and Islamists, united in opposition to Hemedti’s RSF, but not much more. The SAF delegates to the Jeddah meetings didn’t have the authority to make concessions on a ceasefire, and still less over any political issues.

Most important is that the battlefield is only the tactical arena. The strategic contest is financial — which side will have the resources to expand and consolidate their fighting coalition and to obtain the war material they need. The Sudanese call it “political finance.” Any mediation strategy that doesn’t revolve around political finance is a waste of time.

If Jeddah was the triage station before the emergency room, the duty doctors didn’t diagnose the patient before setting to work.

Much store was put in a meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on May 27, in large part because the 15 members met at heads-of-state level. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was in the chair. He and several others, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, called for the setting up of a panel of high-level facilitators — implying current or former heads of state — to deal with the crisis. This would have allowed the AU to seize the initiative, in part because others would have deferred to the seniority of the panel members.

The AU has no material leverage over the warring parties. What it has is the legitimacy that derives from its principles and the fact that all the major powers — including China and Russia — will defer to an African consensus position, if articulated by a credible African leader. It knows exactly how to do this.* [*Sudan Watch Ed: full copy below incase hyperlink breaks].

There were positive elements in the AU PSC communiqué; for example, its stress on the need for a humanitarian response that maintains and restores basic services such as electricity and telecommunications.

But the key decision at the summit was to maintain the status quo. The same actors will focus on the same agenda as before. The chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki, kept his own chef de cabinet, Mohamed el-Hacan Lebatt, as special envoy to Sudan — a post he will supposedly fill alongside his other assignments, which already include the Democratic Republic of Congo and Libya. Opinions are divided over Lebatt’s record since he was given the Sudan file four years ago. He insists that he is personally responsible for the August 2019 Constitutional Declaration and every other triumph. With remarkable unanimity, Sudanese actors condemn him as vain, biased, and inept. Democratic activists say he hijacked their revolution to side with the military.

Meanwhile, UN Secretary General António Guterres is sticking with his Special Representative, Volker Perthes — in part because SAF said they wanted him out, and Guterres didn’t want to be seen to be caving to pressure. And, reportedly, Faki didn’t want Guterres to appoint a new envoy — such as a former foreign minister — who would outrank his own staffer.

Sudanese blame Lebatt and Perthes for the failures that led to the crisis. Whether this assessment is fair or not is beside the point. A basic precept of conflict resolution is that the mediator shouldn’t be a problem, and the AU and UN are violating that.

In short, the AU-UN diagnosis of Sudan’s affliction hasn’t changed. The AU’s “roadmap” is a carousel of consultations with Sudanese parties and neighboring countries. It has working groups on security (headed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), humanitarian issues (headed by the UN), and the political process (under the AU). In short: nothing new, nothing commensurate with the stakes.

If the Sudanese state is to be saved, Sudanese cannot count on the lethargic junior diplomats assigned to their case. Sudan’s civilian democrats need to seize the initiative themselves. The only card they have to play is their legitimacy. They need to play it now, before they get trapped in pointless talking shops.

The chance to be seized is speaking for the state. When al-Burhan’s delegation signed the Jeddah ceasefire, they did so as SAF—i.e. as a warring party co-equal with the RSF. They didn’t sign as the Government of Sudan. This means no one is representing the state.

The civilians could declare an interim government right away. That’s more than a symbolic act. They could take charge of the financial institutions of the state and bring material leverage to the table.

Similar things have happened elsewhere. In Libya, for example, the central bank remained independent of the warring militias, receiving dollars from the sale of oil and paying salaries across the country. Sudan’s independent banking institutions would need technical, diplomatic and financial support from the U.S. and other donors. This would be a test of Washington’s seriousness in halting state collapse and supporting democracy.

Sudan needs bold thinking commensurate with the scale of its crisis. The ideas are there. What’s lacking is leadership to make those ideas real.

IMAGE Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan stands among troops,in an unknown location, in this picture released on May 30, 2023. Sudanese Armed Forces/Handout via REUTERS THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY. MANDATORY CREDIT

View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/06/06/without-bold-new-diplomatic-approaches-sudans-state-will-collapse/

- - -

*It knows exactly how to do this 

ANALYSIS at ResponsibleStatecraft.org

Written by Alex de Waal

Published 20 April 2023 - here is a full copy incase in future the link breaks:

Sudan is tearing itself apart and Washington lost its capacity to help

The truth is that no one was doing the basics of multilateral diplomacy to prevent the bloody power struggle we’re witnessing today.

Sudan is tearing itself apart, and Washington is watching, seemingly unable to do anything to stop the carnage. America’s diplomats lament that the U.S. has lost leverage. The truth is that no one is doing the basics of multilateral diplomacy — coordinating disparate actors.

Two Sudanese warlords are intent on destroying one another, and in the process are destroying the nation’s capital Khartoum. A city of more than seven million people is wracked by street fighting. Two rival armed forces — the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), a passable imitation of a professional army, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary of comparable size and combat capacity — are battling for control.

It’s a simple power struggle between two generals. Abdel Fattah al Burhan is the chairman of the Sovereignty Council and de facto president. He commands the SAF and has the support of most of what Sudanese call the “deep state” — the network of crony capitalist companies entangled with the army, intelligence, and Islamist networks. Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Hamdan Dagolo is the leader of the RSF and sits atop a transnational conglomerate that includes gold mining and export, supply of mercenaries to neighboring countries, and other business interests, including a partnership with Russia’s Wagner Group.

The two men collaborated in the 2019 overthrow of long-standing military kleptocrat President Omar al-Bashir when a non-violent popular uprising led by an alliance called the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) made his rule untenable. The soldiers cooperated to thwart the democratic movement. But each wanted to rule Sudan. 

The fighting in Khartoum came as no surprise to close observers. 

A complicated international mediation process had adopted a “Framework Agreement” and was winding its way towards finalizing a document that would bring a civilian prime minister and resolving the question of security sector reform. The crux of this was whether Hemedti would agree for the RSF to be integrated under SAF command in two years, or whether he could retain them as a separate force for ten years—long enough for him to make a bid for power at some future date.

Any mediator knows that the most dangerous moment in a peace process is the last moment, and the most explosive issues are the security issues.

The Sudanese mediation involved no fewer than seven diplomatic actors. The “tripartite” of the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an eight-country regional grouping, convened the talks involving the FFC and the military. The “tripartite” was supported by the “quad”, consisting of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 

With all those diplomatic eyes on the ball, why wasn’t the conflict stopped before it erupted to such devastating effect?

The answer is, it was a low-level diplomatic traffic jam. All the actors were going in different directions. No one wanted what has now transpired — but no one was coordinating the signaling to prevent it from happening. 

Sudan is no stranger to wars, and diplomats have experience in preventing them. It’s salutary to compare other instances when diplomats averted all-out war.

In April 2011, just two months before South Sudan’s scheduled independence day, fighting erupted in Abyei, a disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan. Each side blamed the other for firing the first shots, and the Sudan Armed Forces launched a military operation that drove out the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the army of the south) and burned and looted Abyei town. The South’s independence was in peril.

Aware of the perils of the separation process, the African Union had set up a High Level Panel of three former presidents — Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdulsalami Abubaker of Nigeria, and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi. In turn, the United Nations and western governments deployed experienced diplomats with a sharp political sense.

When Abyei exploded, a joint delegation of AU Panel, UN representative (Haile Menkerios) and the U.S. Special Envoy (Princeton Lyman) intervened with both sides, insisting on de-escalation. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi called an emergency summit and, when the negotiations stalled on the question of security, he offered to dispatch a brigade of peacekeepers, provided it was mandated by the UN Security Council. 

The Sudanese Government had confidence in Ethiopia’s neutrality and in the effectiveness of its peacekeepers but distrusted the western countries. The U.S. secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, personally assured the Sudanese assistant president, Nafie Ali Nafie, that — contrary to normal procedure for UN peacekeepers — the mandate and specifics of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei would be exactly as agreed in the agreement in Addis Ababa. The peacekeepers were dispatched. War was avoided.

A year later, fighting erupted on the border between the Sudan and newly independent South Sudan at a nearby place called Heglig. Again, all-out war threatened. Guided by the AU Panel under its Chairperson Thabo Mbeki, the African Union immediately convened its Peace and Security Council and issued a communiqué, setting out a roadmap for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts — and all the underlying disputes that had led to the crisis. 

While the PSC’s communiqués don’t have the same legal standing as UN Security Council resolutions, a united African position, coordinated with the UN and the U.S., and outreach to Russia, China and the Arab League, created the formula for the UN to act. At a time when the Security Council was paralyzed by U.S.-Russian sparring over Syria, it unanimously adopted resolution 2046, copied almost word-for-word from the PSC’s communiqué. 

Mbeki’s panel, working with the UN and the U.S., then facilitated the negotiations that led to the two countries signing a raft of cooperation agreements.

It wasn’t a question of trust or leverage. Al-Bashir was paranoid, and no U.S. official could even speak with him after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him. The key was diplomatic tradecraft.

As well as frequent meetings and phone calls, Mbeki wrote often to the Sudanese leaders, precisely framing the issues, principles and proposed steps. Formal correspondence is often underrated. But it can challenge often-impulsive military men to respond with equal thoughtfulness—helping to restrain their worst impulses.

That kind of coordination now seems like a dream. The current AU Chairperson, Moussa Faki, has undermined his own institutions. On the Ethiopia war, for example, he and his High Representative, General Olusegun Obasanjo, kept the mediation as their own personal initiative, cutting out the PSC and thwarting any discussion at the UN Security Council. 

The UN’s representative in Khartoum, Volker Perthes, is a technocrat without the political savvy of his predecessor. A decade ago, U.S. Special Envoy Lyman was in regular — sometimes daily — contact with Secretary Clinton and then-Senator John Kerry (at the time, Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Sudan at key moments) and could get them to intervene at crucial moments. The Biden Administration has deployed no one of remotely comparable stature to the region for more than a year.

The Trump Administration delegated its policy to the Horn of Africa to its main Middle Eastern allies — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. After the peaceful uprising in Sudan in April 2019, it worked with the Saudis and Emiratis to help secure the deal between the FFC and the generals that led to a civilian-led government. 

But the idea that the Saudis and Emiratis wanted democracy in Sudan was wishful thinking. Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi wanted a junior version of himself in power in Khartoum, and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu got what he wanted from General al-Burhan — recognition of Israel, in return for which the U.S. finally lifted Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terror.

For the Biden Administration, Sudan was never such a sufficient priority that it would push its Middle Eastern allies to support democracy in that country. Eighteen months ago, al-Burhan and Hemedti launched a joint coup, sweeping the civilian leaders into prison. The two generals were confident that their backers in the region would overrule any strong U.S. reaction. They were right. After a brief period of diplomatic activism, U.S. policy reverted to a low-wattage policy of “stability,” and that meant dealing with the de facto strongmen. Washington supported the “tripartite” mediation to restore the democratic transition, but it was little more than a box-ticking exercise.

Each of the outside power brokers has its own preferences. Egypt backs al-Burhan. The UAE leans towards Hemedti. But none of them want a war that will cause millions of refugees, destroy their investments and cause mayhem in their backyard. Russia has ties to the RSF but it has a bigger stake in keeping Egypt onside. Ten years ago, China and the U.S. agreed that they had complementary interests in Sudan, and that reality should not have changed.

There’s no doubt that the U.S. has lost a lot of leverage over the last decade. What’s tragic is that it seems to have rationed its diplomacy as well, and left Africa adrift.

Alex de Waal served as an advisor to the AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan, 2009-2013.

View original: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/04/20/sudan-is-tearing-itself-apart-and-washington-lost-its-capacity-to-help/

[Ends]