Grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan. CRSV in Darfur could be crimes against humanity

From What's In Blue 
Dated Thursday 25 June 2026 - excerpts:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (26 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. [...]

Colombia, in its capacity as Council president for June and in the absence of a Chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to deliver a statement on the work of the Committee. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Pekka Haavisto will brief in the closed consultations. [...]

Over the past several weeks, regional and international interlocutors have expressed alarm over the escalating situation in El Obeid, drawing comparisons with the RSF’s October 2025 offensive and subsequent takeover of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. That offensive was accompanied by widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including reports of mass killings, summary executions, abductions, arbitrary detention, and other abuses against civilians. 

In an 18 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that an imminent offensive on El Obeid “risked fresh commission of serious international crimes and deepening the catastrophic impact on an already beleaguered civilian population”. [...]

In recent weeks, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites.

Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). In this regard, there may be reference to the 23 June report published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which documents patterns and trends of CRSV in Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023 to mid-April this year, including links to conflict dynamics. The report noted that CRSV has been perpetrated in conjunction with systematic and coordinated attacks against civilians as a tactic of war, including as retaliation against individuals perceived to be affiliated with opposing parties and as part of ethnically motivated attacks. It found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that some acts of sexual violence committed in Darfur, in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, may amount to crimes against humanity. [...]

Tomorrow, Sulieman and several Council members are likely to highlight the devastating impact of the conflict on children, particularly in light of the escalating hostilities in and around El Obeid. They are expected to express deep concern about the continued perpetration of grave violations against children in Sudan. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; abductions; and the denial of humanitarian access.) The Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 16 June and covering developments in 2025, verified 1,889 grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan.

During the closed consultations, Haavisto is expected to provide an update on ongoing initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with the Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. Between 3 and 5 June, the Quintet—comprising the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—held consultations in Addis Ababa with a broad spectrum of Sudanese political and civilian stakeholders. 

A press release issued after the meetings noted that discussions focused on possible pathways towards the establishment of a preparatory committee for an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. The latest discussions built on the Quintet’s initial engagement with a group of Sudanese civilian actors on the sidelines of the international Sudan conference held in Berlin on 15 April. 

On 7 June, Haavisto visited Sudan, where he met with SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and several other senior Sudanese officials. He also held discussions with political figures, women civil society leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and the UN Country Team. This was his second visit to Sudan following his appointment on 24 February. According to a UN readout, Haavisto’s discussions focused on UN-led efforts to promote de-escalation and confidence-building measures among the parties. During his meeting with Burhan, he also discussed the Quintet’s recent consultations in Addis Ababa and efforts to advance an inclusive political process.

On 19 June, Haavisto held a telephone conversation with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, during which he underscored the urgent need to de-escalate the situation in and around El Obeid and avoid any actions that could further exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation. In a briefing earlier today (25 June), Haavisto said that he plans to visit Kenya, Chad, South Sudan, and Uganda in the coming weeks as part of his ongoing regional outreach. He expressed hope that the Quad group—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—could help secure a humanitarian truce. In his assessment of the conflict dynamics, he noted that both sides still appear to believe that military gains remain achievable. At the same time, he underscored that regional actors, including Gulf countries, are increasingly rejecting the notion of a military solution.

Haavisto also met with US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos on 23 June. According to a post by Boulos on X, the two discussed the Quintet’s ongoing efforts to advance an inclusive, Sudanese-led civilian political dialogue, as well as ways to ensure unhindered humanitarian access for the UN and its humanitarian partners. Boulos further noted that he will participate in tomorrow’s Council meeting, during which he intends to emphasise the need for international support for a humanitarian truce, a pathway towards a permanent ceasefire, and an inclusive Sudanese-led political dialogue and civilian-led transition.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-13.php

Ends

Sudan at crossroads as peace path remains complex. AUPSC's 1330th Communiqué on situation in Sudan

ON 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors. Read more.

From Independent Online (IOL) South Africa
By JESSICA UIRAS 
Dated Sunday 22 March 2026 - full copy:

Sudan at a Crossroads as the Path to Peace Remains Complex

A displaced Sudanese woman who left El-Fasher after its fall with others, walks amid the remains of a fire that broke out at a camp in Tawila on February 11, 2026. Image: AFP

On 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

The document reflects not only the gravity of the crisis but also the AU’s sustained effort to prevent state collapse, respond to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies, and reassert continental leadership in a conflict increasingly shaped by regional and global dynamics.

Read alongside earlier pronouncements in 2025, including the March press statement rejecting the establishment of a parallel government, and the July statement strongly condemning the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led ‘parallel government,’ the February 2026 communiqué demonstrates consistency in principle, but a heightened sense of urgency.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors.

The communiqué expresses deep concern over the continued armed conflict and describes an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. This language builds on the August 2025 communiqué, which had already raised alarm over famine conditions, particularly in El-Fasher.

By February 2026, the PSC’s concern had sharpened further. It explicitly highlights reported famine and starvation, demands unhindered humanitarian access, and calls for the protection of humanitarian workers.

The recurrence of El-Fasher in successive decisions suggests that earlier appeals for lifting sieges and allowing safe access corridors have not yielded sufficient compliance.

The humanitarian crisis is therefore no longer treated as a by-product of armed confrontation. The communiqué strongly condemns systematic killings, ethnic targeting, mass displacement and destruction of infrastructure by parties to the conflict, particularly the RSF in El-Fasher.

By grounding its condemnation in international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the PSC signals that accountability is not optional. It moves the conversation beyond ceasefire appeals to potential legal consequences.

A central and recurring position of the PSC has been that there is no viable and sustainable military solution to the conflict. This formulation appeared in August 2025 and was reiterated again in February 2026. The repetition is deliberate. It reflects frustration with a battlefield logic that continues to dominate the conduct of the warring parties.

The PSC once again calls for a humanitarian truce leading to an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue addressing both security and political dimensions of the crisis. What distinguishes the 1330th Communiqué, however, is its engagement with the Sudanese National Initiative for Peace presented in December 2025.

The PSC welcomes its components, including an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, disarmament, security sector reform, national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Crucially, it stresses that these elements must align with the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. Support for the initiative is therefore conditional on inclusivity and alignment with continental frameworks, with transitional arrangements that reflect the aspirations of the Sudanese people and enable a smooth return to constitutional order through elections.

The question of a ‘parallel government’ has remained a central concern since mid-2025. In March, the PSC categorically rejected such an entity. In July, it reiterated that AU member states and the international community should not recognise any parallel authority in Sudan. The February 2026 communiqué restates this rejection and calls upon member states and partners not to recognise the so-called parallel government.

This consistency reflects a clear normative boundary. The AU will not legitimise fragmentation or unconstitutional political structures emerging from armed groups. The defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity is presented not merely as a legal principle, but as a safeguard against de facto partition and long-term regional instability.

At the same time, the communiqué places increasing emphasis on the issue of external interference. In 2025, the PSC had already condemned external actors fuelling the conflict and called for measures to address such interference.

The February 2026 decision goes further by requesting the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties militarily, financially and politically, and to propose measures to contain them within three months.

This is one of the more operationally significant aspects of the communiqué. If implemented robustly, it could begin to disrupt the transnational networks that sustain the conflict and complicate prospects for peace.

The communiqué also emphasises the centrality of AU leadership in the peace process and welcomes coordination through the Quintet, comprising the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the European Union. This reflects recognition that multiple and sometimes competing mediation tracks risk fragmentation.

Earlier decisions had already called for the consolidation of peace frameworks under AU and IGAD leadership. The February 2026 communiqué reiterates the need to prevent overlap and ensure coherence. The emphasis on Sudanese ownership, combined with coordinated international engagement, illustrates an effort to balance sovereignty with pragmatic diplomacy in an increasingly crowded mediation landscape.

Beyond ceasefire and dialogue, the communiqué includes institutional measures aimed at restoring normative oversight and operational presence. It reiterates the request for a comprehensive human rights report by the AU Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, welcomes the deployment of a humanitarian assessment mission, stresses the urgent need to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Sudan, and reiterates the intention to undertake a PSC field mission.

These measures are designed to translate political commitments into institutional engagement on the ground, ensuring that AU involvement is not merely declaratory but tangible.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

The decisive factor, however, will be implementation. Will sanctions mechanisms effectively identify and constrain external spoilers? Will humanitarian corridors be secured in practice? Will the proposed inter-Sudanese dialogue be genuinely inclusive, reflecting the voices of civilian actors? Will the warring parties accept that military escalation cannot produce sustainable political outcomes?

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

* Jessica Uiras is a Peacebuilder from Namibia. This article was originally published at https://www.accord.org.za/

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

Independent Online, popularly known as IOL, is one of South Africa's leading news and information websites bringing millions of readers breaking news and updates on Politics, Current Affairs, Business, Lifestyle, Entertainment, Travel, Sport, Motoring and Technology

View original: https://iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/world/2026-03-22-sudan-at-a-crossroads-as-the-path-to-peace-remains-complex/

Further Reading

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 1330TH MEETING OF THE PSC HELD AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ON 12 FEBRUARY 2026 ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

Last Updated on Thursday 12 February 2026

https://aupaps.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1330th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-ministerial-level-on-12-february-2026-on-the-situation-in-sudan

PDF Version https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1330.1.comm-en1.pdf

BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies deadly Eid strike on key hospital in Darfur

The strike killed 64 people, including 13 children, two nurses and a doctor, according to the WHO head.

BBC - Sunday 22 March 2026

Sudan army denies carrying out hospital attack that killed 64 during Eid

The local rights organisation, which has documented atrocities by both the army and the RSF throughout the war, said the

AFP - Sunday 22 March 2026

'They beat us with whips': Sudan RSF detainees tell of horrors in El-Fasher

In the suffocating darkness of a sealed shipping container, every thud signalled to Ibrahim Noureldin that one more detainee ...

Radio Tamazuj - Sunday 22 March 2026

Kiir returns to Juba after South Africa visit

South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir returned to the capital, Juba, on Sunday evening after an eight-day visit to South Africa. In a statement issued after Kiir’s return to Juba, the president’s press secretary, Arek Aldo Ajou, said the visit followed up on the African Union C5+ engagement led by Ramaphosa and focused on advancing implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, preparations for elections, and strengthening bilateral relations.

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Sudan: Briefing and Consultations 30th Oct 2025

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Wednesday 29 Oct 2025 - excerpt:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (30 October), the Security Council is expected to hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. 

It appears that the meeting had been previously scheduled for early November, in keeping with resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which called for the Council to be briefed every 120 days on “UN efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 

However, the UK (the penholder on the file), Denmark, and the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) requested that the date of the meeting be moved forward because of the dire situation in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. 

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher and Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of5 Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee are expected to brief in the open chamber. 

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra is expected to brief members via videoconference (VTC) in the closed consultations, while Fletcher may participate in the closed session as well.

A draft press statement proposed by the UK and the A3 Plus members, which expresses Council members’ concern about the violence in and around El Fasher, is under silence procedure until tomorrow morning.

Earlier this month, fighting escalated in El Fasher as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched an assault on the 6th Infantry Division headquarters of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), reportedly capturing it on 26 October and forcing SAF and allied troops to retreat to the western neighbourhoods of the city. 

The RSF subsequently seized large parts of El Fasher, effectively ending an 18-month-long siege and taking control of the SAF’s last stronghold in the Darfur region.

The civilian population has borne the brunt of the siege, with hospitals, schools, religious sites, and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) targeted indiscriminately and starvation reported in the city. 

In a 27 October press release, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) described reports of summary executions of civilians attempting to flee El Fasher, with indications of ethnic motivations for killings. It further cited reports of the killing of persons no longer participating in hostilities, including unarmed men accused of being SAF fighters. 

In a 24 October statement after a visit to Sudan, UNICEF Deputy Executive Director Ted Chaiban said that 130,000 children in El Fasher are “trapped, cut off from food, water, and healthcare”, adding that women and children who have been able to flee the siege have faced harassment and attacks. 

Chaiban also described conditions in other parts of the country—where children continue to face malnutrition, violence, and exposure to diseases such as cholera—stressing that “Sudan is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis”.

Tomorrow, the briefers and Council members are expected to underscore the gravity of the crisis in Sudan, echoing concerns expressed in recent days by the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and other key international actors. 

The briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the effects of the fighting in El Fasher on the civilian population, including reports of summary executions. 

They are also expected to urge the parties to allow the unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid into El Fasher, as well as other parts of Sudan affected by the conflict, and call on them to adhere to their responsibilities under international law, including with respect to the protection of civilians.

Concerns may also be raised tomorrow about the 21 October threat by RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to target planes or drones from neighbouring countries that the RSF believes are supporting the SAF. 

While Dagalo did not specify which states he was referencing, the RSF and its supporters have accused several countries in the region of backing the SAF. 

This statement was made on the same day that the RSF reportedly launched drone attacks in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, including on areas near the international airport, just a day before domestic flights were scheduled to resume for the first time since the outbreak of fighting in April 2023. These attacks reportedly continued over the following days.

Full story: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-12.php

Update:

WATCH recording of the full meeting, here:

https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166222

- at the bottom of the screen slide bar to 17:50 for start of meeting;
- click on settings wheel & audio to select preferred language & speed.

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