Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

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Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting 

Live broadcast by UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

End

Sudan: UN Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on 29 July 2024 at request of UK

THE Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra convened delegations from the warring parties—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—in Geneva between 11 and 19 July to hold discussions in “proximity format”, supported by a UN integrated technical team. He aimed to discuss issues relating to measures to ensure the distribution of humanitarian assistance and options for the protection of civilians across Sudan. Lamamra is expected to provide an update to UN Security Council members tomorrow (July 29) on the ongoing efforts aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis. Read more in a report by What's In Blue copied in full here below. 

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Related reports

#US-led #Sudan #ceasefire talks in #Switzerland 14 Aug 2024 is Sudan's last chance to save itself and its people. The US is $35 trillion in debt. #ElonMusk posted at X yesterday: "America is headed for bankruptcy fyi".
Read more at: https://t.co/2bRxub7NZb#famine #Darfur… https://t.co/5r07zq8v1f

— SUDAN WATCH (@SudanWatchBlog) July 27, 2024

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From What's In Blue* at securitycouncilreport.org
Dated Sunday, 28 July 2024. Full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

Tomorrow morning (29 July), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan, at the request of the UK (the penholder on the file). The anticipated briefers are Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and OCHA’s Director of the Financing and Partnerships Division Lisa Doughten. Council members may consider issuing press elements following tomorrow’s meeting.

Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing efforts aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis. The Personal Envoy convened delegations from the warring parties—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—in Geneva between 11 and 19 July to hold discussions in “proximity format”, supported by a UN integrated technical team. He aimed to discuss issues relating to measures to ensure the distribution of humanitarian assistance and options for the protection of civilians across Sudan. In a press release issued at the end of the discussions, Lamamra said that his team held around 20 sessions with the parties’ delegations, including technical and plenary meetings, in the context of their respective mandates. He noted that, during these engagements, the delegations expressed their positions on key issues of concern, thereby deepening mutual understanding. Lamamra described the discussions as an “encouraging initial step in a longer and complex process” and welcomed the commitments announced by “one of the two parties” to enhance humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians.

At the end of proximity talks, the RSF reportedly sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General, outlining commitments it has made, including to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries in coordination with the RSF-affiliated Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), to strengthen civilian protection measures, and to facilitate the safe passage of individuals and supplies. Media reports quoted Salwa Adam Benya, Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner and the head of the SAF delegation, as saying in a statement that the proximity talks offered a “promising foundation” for addressing the humanitarian crisis in the country and expressed Sudan’s commitment to cooperate with the UN “within existing national humanitarian policies”. Regarding the protection of civilians issue, however, she stressed the importance of implementing the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, signed by the warring parties on 11 May 2023.

Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the second consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted by Djibouti on 24 July. Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the US, and Saudi Arabia. The first consultative meeting was convened by the LAS in Cairo on 12 June. (For background and more information, see our 17 June What’s in Blue story.)

The Special Envoy is also likely to expand on the details of the Mediators Planning Retreat on Sudan hosted by Djibouti on 25 and 26 July, which was initially proposed by Lamamra. The meeting brought together representatives from 32 regional and international stakeholders, including the Security Council’s permanent members (P5) and its African members (Algeria, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone), Sudan’s neighbouring countries, several Gulf countries, as well as the AU, the EU, IGAD, the LAS, and the UN. A press release issued following the meeting, among other matters, stressed the importance of integrating lessons learned to inform decision-making processes and strengthening coordination and adapting strategies to respond to dynamic realities on the ground, based on:

• support for all current and future efforts to sustain high-level peace engagements;
• a commitment to cooperate on initiatives aimed at restoring peace and stability in the country and the region; and
• shared and differentiated responsibilities of existing multilateral coordination mechanisms and the recognition of their continued role and comparative advantages.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Lamamra and some members might also refer to the recent US statement inviting the Sudanese warring parties to participate in ceasefire talks to begin on 14 August in Switzerland, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia. The statement notes that the talks will include the AU, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UN as observers. The talks aim to reach an agreement on a nationwide cessation of violence and to develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure implementation of any agreement. The US-Saudi facilitated talks in Jeddah were indefinitely suspended after two rounds of discussions, the last of which was held in November 2023 with the participation of a joint representative of the AU and IGAD, due to the failure of the warring parties to implement their commitments. (For background, see the Sudan brief in our June 2023 Monthly Forecast and 15 November 2023 What’s in Blue story.)

Council members might also reiterate some of the points contained in their 12 July press statement, including welcoming Lamamra’s convening of the Geneva proximity talks. Some members might be interested in hearing the Personal Envoy’s assessment of the Sudanese parties’ positions and the prospects for de-escalation and further dialogue. They may also wish to learn more details about Lamamra’s engagements with key regional and international interlocutors as part of the recent mediation talks and his efforts to coordinate the different peace initiatives, as well as have a frank exchange on the way forward. Some members may also be interested in hearing his assessment of the parties’ commitments and the potential for them to be translated into concrete actions on the ground.

Doughten is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in the country in light of evolving security developments. According to a 4 July OCHA flash update, the escalation of fighting in south-western Sennar state in late June has displaced more than 136,000 people, many of whom might be experiencing secondary or tertiary displacement. In a 19 July press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that fighting in Sennar has severely affected the operations of the World Food Programme (WFP) across the region, including in White Nile, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Gedaref states. He reported that the hostilities have cut off key supply routes for food and fuel into Sennar. In addition, Haq noted that the route from Port Sudan to the city of Kosti through Sennar has been blocked, cutting off vital aid to hundreds of thousands of people, including many at risk of famine in the Kordofans and Darfur.

Doughten and several members are also expected to reiterate concerns about the dire food insecurity situation in the country. According to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report on Sudan, released on 27 June, 25.6 million people across Sudan are expected to face acute levels of food insecurity—described by the IPC as crisis level conditions or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)—between June and September. Of this total, 755,000 people are expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) in ten states, including Greater Darfur, South and North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum. During this period, 14 areas in nine states are expected to face a risk of famine, according to the report.

Doughten is also likely to stress the importance of ensuring full and rapid humanitarian access through all modalities—including cross-line (across conflict lines within Sudan) and cross-border (across Sudan’s borders with some of the neighbouring countries), particularly in light of the disruptions caused by heavy rains and floods in some areas. A 23 July OCHA press release said that the Tine border crossing at the Chad-Sudan border—used by UN agencies and partners to conduct humanitarian operations—as well as many other routes in the southern part of Sudan remain inaccessible to due to flooding.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Sudan (Darfur)

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/07/sudan-closed-consultations-3.php

*About What's In Blue

When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed in blue. What's In Blue is a series of insights on evolving Security Council actions designed to help interested UN readers keep up with what might soon be "in blue".

END 

Biggest hunger crisis is unfolding in Sudan: How the US and its Gulf partners are enabling mass starvation

A SUPERB article by Sudan Africa expert Alex de Waal entitled 'Sudan’s Manmade Famine - How the United States and Its Gulf Partners Are Enabling Mass Starvation' 17 June 2024 is copied in full here. Excerpts:

"The biggest hunger crisis in the world is unfolding in Sudan, and it is manmade. As of now, more than half of Sudan's 45 million people urgently need humanitarian assistance. 

The time to act is running out. Iran and Russia are already complicating the geopolitics of the war, and the unfolding famine will generate even greater chaos. But for now, there is still a chance to avert the worst outcome. 

With pressure from Washington, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could take the lead on getting food aid where it needs to go. If they do not, MBS and MBZ may forever be associated with the starvation of an entire generation of Sudanese children.

Encouragingly, the growing resolve for prosecuting the starvation of civilians as a war crime suggests that international officials and world leaders may finally be prepared to hold perpetrators to account. 

In his June 11 announcement, Khan, the ICC chief prosecutor, said that he was gathering evidence of “repeated, expanding, and continuous” attacks against the civilian population in Darfur. 

Although he did not specifically mention starvation crimes, he is well aware of who is committing them and how. 

The wheels of justice turn slowly, but it is time that the men who inflict Sudan’s hunger crises are put on notice. If the ICC moves, the world should line up in support." Read the full story below from Foreign Affairs.

Cartoon: By Omar Dafalla / Radio Dabanga

Source: Hospital and camp hit in lethal North Darfur fighting

09 June 2024, El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan

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From Foreign Affairs 
By ALEX DE WAAL

Dated Monday, 17 June 2024. Here is a full copy:

Sudan’s Manmade Famine

How the United States and Its Gulf Partners Are Enabling Mass Starvation

A Sudanese Armed Forces soldier near Khartoum, Sudan, April 2024 

El Tayeb Siddig / Reuters

The biggest hunger crisis in the world is unfolding in Sudan, and it is manmade. As of now, more than half of the country’s 45 million people urgently need humanitarian assistance. In May, the United Nations warned that 18 million Sudanese are “acutely hungry” including 3.6 million children who are “acutely malnourished.” The western region of Darfur, where the threat is greatest, is nearly cut off from humanitarian aid. According to one projection, as much as five percent of Sudan’s population could die of starvation by the end of the year.

This dire situation is not the result of a bad harvest or climate-induced food scarcity. It is the direct consequence of actions by both sides of Sudan’s terrible civil war. Since April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces, headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, have been locked in a devastating conflict with the Rapid Support Forces, a heavily armed paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti. As the two former allies struggle for supremacy, both have deliberately used starvation tactics to advance their war aims. The RSF fighters operate like human locusts, stripping cities and countryside bare of all movable resources. Heirs of the infamous Janjaweed militia—the ethnic Arab fighters who inflicted massacre and starvation in Darfur between 2003 and 2005, leaving over 150,000 civilians dead—they use this plunder to sustain their war machine. The SAF, which is the dominant power in the United Nations-recognized government of Sudan, has blocked humanitarian aid to the vast areas of the country under RSF control.

In May, for the first time, Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court said he was investigating alleged starvation crimes by a party to an armed conflict. The ICC prosecutor requested international arrest warrants against top Israeli officials for the crime of “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” in the Gaza Strip, citing substantial evidence of the deprivation of food, fuel, and water; threats to aid workers; and the drastic restriction of the flow of humanitarian aid in Israel’s eight-month campaign there. If the court approves the warrants, it could create an important precedent for Sudan, where even greater numbers are being subjected to these same tactics—and where ICC jurisdiction still runs, pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution in 2005. On June 11, Khan announced that he was stepping up an urgent investigation of war crimes in Sudan.

So far, however, international aid officials show no appetite for calling out the men who have been systematically starving Sudan’s children. Some may argue that external players need to avoid finger pointing, because it is the same generals who need to be persuaded to allow aid in. This is misguided. Neither side is likely to relent on its own: starvation is cheap and effective, and without strong international pressure, the leaders expect to get away with it. In fact, the keys to opening the country to aid likely lie in the hands of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the two biggest regional powers vying for influence in the Horn of Africa. 

It is urgent, then, for the United States and its Western allies not only to call out Sudan’s terrifying hunger crisis for what it is—an intentional aim of the warring parties—but also to push the Gulf powers that have clout to force the two sides to end the tactics that are driving it. It may be too late to stop the descent into famine, but swift action to enforce aid distribution could at least avert the most catastrophic outcomes.

HUNGER GAMES

The war in Sudan began in April 2023, when Hemedti turned on Burhan, his erstwhile partner in Sudan’s then-ruling military junta. Eighteen months earlier, the two military bosses had thrown out Sudan’s civilian government and taken joint control of the government, but the alliance had broken down and Hemedti, with his RSF, attempted to seize power. The result was a vicious armed struggle that quickly ignited an RSF campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur and that continues today. At present, the RSF controls much of the country west of the Nile and the SAF territories to the east; Khartoum remains a battleground. The RSF is notorious for massacre, looting, and rape; the SAF for aerial bombardment of civilian areas. RSF forces are currently closing in on the last SAF garrison in Darfur, in the city of El Fasher, threatening catastrophe. In the second week of June, they attacked and closed the last remaining hospital there.

That this war would create a food crisis should have been foreseeable. Even before the fighting broke out, international aid organizations were predicting that one-third of Sudan’s population would need humanitarian assistance in 2023. There were still several million people displaced from the war in Darfur 20 years ago, and many others were suffering because of a deepening economic crisis provoked by the secession of oil-rich South Sudan in 2011. Now, with war engulfing the entire country, each of the pillars of the national food economy has fallen or is about to fall.

Last year’s harvest on big commercial farms was meager, reduced by lack of loans, fuel, and fertilizer. On top of this, in November, the RSF overran the breadbasket region of El Gezira, south of the capital, ransacking farms, food mills, and the region’s agricultural university. 

Smallholder farmers have been driven from their homes, their animals stolen, their markets now deserted. Most livestock herds are now owned by merchant-soldier cartels—either stolen or bought from desperate herders at fire-sale prices—which monopolize the lucrative export trade. Shipments of wheat from Ukraine that used to feed Sudan’s cities have also ground to a halt because the government cannot pay. And the urban economy has collapsed, driving at least a million middle-class Sudanese to take refuge abroad.

Deliveries of food aid that normally sustain the country’s displaced population, who were living in camps that have become shanty cities around Darfuri towns, have also disappeared. In a few weeks, the onset of the rainy season will add further challenges. In previous years, the World Food Program could stockpile supplies in hard-to-reach areas. But this year, when roads to hard-hit rural areas become slow or even impassable, there will be no reserves to draw on. El-Geneina in Darfur is farther from a seaport than any other African city, and even in peaceful times it can take weeks for trucks to reach it. Now, it could be completely cut off.

Both militaries have embraced starvation as a weapon of war. In the last few months alone, the RSF has driven as many as a million Darfuris from their homes, many of whom are taking refuge either in the besieged city of El Fasher or the Jebel Marra mountains, which are controlled by an independent rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Army. There are no resources to sustain these refugees. Already, Hemedti’s forces have taken control of El Fasher’s water reservoir, threatening to cut off its water supply, and ransacked its last remaining hospital. Meanwhile, the SAF is playing a more duplicitous game. It has made sure that the food crisis in the areas of eastern Sudan it controls is less severe: these regions are close to Port Sudan, the country’s hub for imports, and the SAF wants these people fed. Yet it is willing to let those in RSF-controlled areas go hungry and even to block international efforts to address the crisis.

Take one of the standard international measures of famine, known as Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, known as the IPC. Serving as a kind of humanitarian high court, the IPC’s famine review committee is due to assess the Sudanese situation soon. But Sudan’s IPC working group is controlled by the UN-recognized government—and the SAF has a vested interest in avoiding a formal declaration of famine in Darfur because that would increase pressure to permit the flow of aid to RSF-controlled areas. The IPC’s recent figures appear to indicate that 750,000 people are in a “catastrophic” food situation. But most independent humanitarian experts believe the situation is considerably worse—that there is likely already famine in several areas.

Even in the opening weeks of the war, the U.S. Agency for International Development had warned of a looming crisis in Sudan’s camps for displaced people: in the colored maps the agency uses as an early warning system for famine, it shifted the camps’ designation from yellow, meaning “stressed,” to red, meaning “emergency.” In fact, in one of these camps—Zamzam, near El Fasher—local humanitarian workers now report that children are dying daily from hunger and infection. Overall, 90 percent of the most at-risk people are in Darfur and other RSF-controlled areas. Comparing Sudan’s national food stocks with the nutritional needs of the population, the Clingendael Institute in The Hague warned last month that as much as five percent of the population—2.5 million people—could perish before the end of the year.

THE CHEAPEST WEAPON

One of the cruelest ironies of Sudan’s food emergency is that the suffering of the country’s children seems to benefit both warring parties. In the west, Hemedti rules a hungry land—but his commanders are prospering, and his fighters are fed. Those who are starving are the Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa ethnic groups that the RSF has targeted for ethnic cleansing—or on whose lands Hemedti’s fighters have taken everything that can be stolen or eaten. Such is the scale of destruction of farms, flour mills, markets, and hospitals that it has poisoned the RSF’s reputation among much of the population. Now, the RSF is prepared to ransom food aid itself, demanding high fees from merchants and aid agencies, in dollars, for every truck it allows through. That puts aid givers in a quandary: How much should they subsidize the perpetrators of starvation in order to feed their victims?

The Sudanese army, meanwhile, believes that by forcing starvation in RSF areas it can destroy the group’s base. Deprived of resources, the theory goes, the nomadic fighters who form Hemedti’s core forces will become restive and turn against him. Thus, the SAF has used its authority as the internationally recognized government to prohibit the UN from transporting aid shipments both from the east—from the zones it controls across the battle lines to Darfur—and from the west, across the Chadian border directly into RSF-held territory. The only exception it has allowed is a single corridor to El Fasher, but that has become inoperable because of the intense RSF offensive. A full-scale battle for El Fasher would likely mean mass civilian casualties and starvation.

Displaced women and children near El Fasher, Sudan, January 2024 

Mohamed Zakaria / MSF / Reuters

Veteran aid workers recognize these strategies from Sudan’s previous wars. In the 1980s and 1990s, Khartoum tried to starve out southern Sudan, and then enticed desperate factions of the rebels to turn on their comrades-in-arms with offers of cash and license to loot. Their aim was to gain control of depopulated oil-rich regions in the south, and their campaigns ultimately killed at least a million people. Even today, the generals who led those efforts regret that international humanitarian aid prevented them from taking that war of starvation to its logical conclusion. Instead, as they see it, deliveries of food relief became a Trojan horse for secession: aid kept the rebellion alive, aid workers became sympathizers with the rebel cause, and the result was an independent South Sudan in 2011.

High-ranking members of the SAF are not going to repeat the error now, when the stakes are even higher. Back then, the southern rebels were far away from Khartoum. Now, the capital is on the frontlines of conflict: Hemedti’s forces almost overran the city last year and are still dug in there. Undefeated, the RSF is surely planning a new offensive.

ARABIAN INDIFFERENCE

Despite pervasive signs of crisis, international efforts to limit the famine have made little headway. Within weeks of the start of the war last year, the United States and Saudi Arabia convened cease-fire talks between commanders from the SAF and RSF in Jeddah. The meeting did not stop the fighting, but the two sides did sign a Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan—solemnly promising the safe delivery of humanitarian aid, restoration of essential services, and protection of civilians in the ongoing conflict. Since then, however, both sides have ignored the declaration, and other mediation initiatives have been no more successful. In February, the UN made an emergency appeal for $2.7 billion for Sudan, but it has raised a paltry 15 percent of that goal.

There is a more important reason why the Sudan talks have continually failed to get off the ground. Until now, the two Gulf leaders that have the power to jointly bring Burhan and Hemedti to the table have failed to seriously engage with the crisis. These are Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, and the United Arab Emirates’ President Mohammed bin Zayed, known as MBZ. The Saudis hosted the talks—but MBS did not want the UAE to participate. The UAE does not want the Saudis to influence a deal—or get the credit for it.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have clout to jointly force an end to the starvation tactics.

There’s a tangled history here. Nine years ago, when the two Gulf kingdoms launched their war against the Houthis in Yemen, they enlisted the SAF to fight in their anti-Houthi coalition; Burhan was the leader of that SAF contingent. But at the same time, Hemedti provided RSF fighters under private contracts to both the Saudis and the Emiratis. And Hemedti’s family business, al-Junaid, became an important supplier of gold to the UAE. Today, there are indications that the UAE is arming and funding the RSF—charges that Abu Dhabi has unconvincingly denied. And Saudi Arabia, with its links to Burhan, has permitted Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to support the SAF, including with weapons, and has blocked other peace initiatives. This kind of meddling on both sides means that any progress on a cease-fire will require joint action by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

With no end to the war in sight, other external actors have added fuel to the fire. Late last year Iran sent drones to SAF as part of an effort to revive its links with Sudan’s Islamists, who support the SAF. In May, Russia took steps toward a deal with the SAF for a naval facility in Port Sudan—and with its Wagner paramilitary group still closely linked to the RSF, Russia now has stakes in both warring camps. At the end of May, when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Burhan to press him to attend renewed peace talks in Jeddah, Burhan swiftly declined. Instead, he sent his deputy, Malik Agar, for meetings in Russia to finalize a set of cooperation agreements—the central deal being Russian arms in return for the Red Sea base. The Jeddah talks that were supposed to produce a comprehensive peace are clearly dead.

For MBS and MBZ, Sudan is a small dial in their astrolabe. As the United States plays a lesser role in regional security, the two Gulf powers have tried both cooperation and competition in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Somalia as well as Sudan. The geopolitical stakes surrounding the Red Sea are high: it is the sea-lane linking Europe and Asia, and planned railroads from the Mediterranean to the Gulf will be a central link in an envisioned India‒Middle East‒Europe economic corridor. Israel’s war in Gaza has shaken up the region and required the Gulf kingdoms to walk a tightrope between Israel and the United States on one side, and Iran and its clients and proxies on the other. With all this demanding Emirati and Saudi attention, the war and famine in Sudan have been left to fester.

WHAT THE WORLD MUST DO

Sudanese generals have fought wars of starvation for decades, including in Darfur. When I testified as an expert witness at the first case of an alleged Janjaweed militiaman tried for war crimes at the International Criminal Court two years ago, my testimony emphasized this tactic as a crucial background factor. In the present war, the belligerents are using the strategy in their struggle for the entire country, putting even greater numbers at risk. This looming tragedy is all the more cruel given that many lives could be saved simply by enforcing the delivery of aid to those in most need.

Encouragingly, the growing resolve for prosecuting the starvation of civilians as a war crime suggests that international officials and world leaders may finally be prepared to hold perpetrators to account. In his June 11 announcement, Khan, the ICC chief prosecutor, said that he was gathering evidence of “repeated, expanding, and continuous” attacks against the civilian population in Darfur. Although he did not specifically mention starvation crimes, he is well aware of who is committing them and how. The wheels of justice turn slowly, but it is time that the men who inflict Sudan’s hunger crises are put on notice. If the ICC moves, the world should line up in support.

An abandoned army tank near Khartoum, Sudan, April 2024 

El Tayeb Siddig / Reuters

Even if the ICC decides to issue formal arrest warrants, however, it may well be too late to prevent tens of thousands of children in Sudan and neighboring Kordofan from dying of hunger. More immediate solutions are urgently needed. During the 1980s famine in Ethiopia, Bob Geldof, the Irish singer who organized Live Aid, appealed to a global public to “feed the world.” At the time, Ethiopia’s communist government was waging a war of starvation against rebels in Eritrea and Tigray. Pressed to follow U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s maxim that a starving child knows no politics, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ultimately instructed Ethiopia to permit discreet U.S-organized aid deliveries across the battle lines.

Today, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed have an opportunity to exert similar leverage. The two men can choose to save lives, stabilize their countries’ strategic perimeter, and prevent what could become significant reputational damage for both countries. An agreement between the two Gulf countries would do only so much; peace will require Sudanese follow-through. But any kind of pact between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would at least open the door to real negotiations, starting with urgent famine relief.

The time to act is running out. Iran and Russia are already complicating the geopolitics of the war, and the unfolding famine will generate even greater chaos. But for now, there is still a chance to avert the worst outcome. With pressure from Washington, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could take the lead on getting food aid where it needs to go. If they do not, MBS and MBZ may forever be associated with the starvation of an entire generation of Sudanese children.

ALEX DE WAAL is Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation.

Original: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/sudan/sudans-manmade-famine

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