Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians. VIDEO: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

Video of full meeting:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting

Result of voting: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

See live broadcast courtesy of UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

End

UN Security Council Darfur Sudan meeting 23 June

NOTE from Sudan Watch Ed: The UN Security Council members are holding closed consultations on Sudan today. The UK, the penholder on Sudan, requested the meeting. Violence in Darfur will be a key focus of the meeting.

Incidentally, I saw or heard in a report or video former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo recently saying something like this: 

“The international community is like a unicorn, everyone knows what a unicorn looks like but in reality it doesn’t exist.”

My point is, it would be refreshing to see Africans putting pressure on the African Union to excel and make Africa proud. The West is busy countering Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a very large country in eastern Europe. 

Read more. Beige highlighting is mine for easy future reference.

Report at What's In Blue - securitycouncilreport.org

Published Thursday 22 June 2023 - here is a full copy:

Sudan: Consultations

Tomorrow afternoon (23 June) Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Sudan. It seems that the inter-communal violence in Darfur will be a key focus of the meeting. The UK, the penholder on Sudan, requested the meeting. Edem Wosornu, the Director of OCHA’s Operations and Advocacy Division, is expected to brief.

Sudan has been grappling with the devastating consequences of fighting that erupted on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s military leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. 

A 13 June Humanitarian Update estimated that at least 866 people had been killed and 6,000 injured in Darfur since the outbreak of hostilities. However, casualty rates may be much higher at this point, with some reports indicating that 1,100 people have died in the West Darfur capital of El Geneina alone since April. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicates that approximately 1.965 million people have been displaced within Sudan and over 531,566 people have fled the country since 15 April.

The escalating violence in Darfur has been marked by inter-communal fighting, with Arab militias supporting the RSF and targeting non-Arab groups in Darfur. The inter-ethnic component of the fighting has raised alarm among several Council members. Some members appear to be concerned about the potential for inter-communal fighting to spin out of control, recalling the conflict in Darfur in the 2000s that claimed the lives of over 300,000 people.

Since mid-April, the fighting has been particularly severe in West Darfur, leading to high levels of insecurity and grim humanitarian effects. In addition to high casualty rates, more than 280,000 people have been displaced in West Darfur, with roughly 150,000 crossing the border into Chad to escape the violence. Civilians have reportedly been targeted as they make their way to the Chadian border. Media reports have indicated that the SAF has not protected civilians targeted by the RSF and allied militias. OCHA reported in its 13 June update that hospitals and electrical stations are not functional in El Geneina. 

Amidst the spiking inter-communal fighting, West Darfur governor Khamis Abakkar was abducted and killed on 14 June, shortly after accusing the RSF and affiliated militia of atrocities in El Geneina during a television interview.  It has been reported that the RSF was responsible for the assassination, although it has denied the allegation.

Several UN officials have continued to speak out against the violence. On 13 June, Special Representative and head of UNITAMS Volker Perthes released a statement in which he expressed his alarm at the situation in El Geneina, referring to an “emerging pattern of large-scale attacks against civilians based on their ethnic identities, allegedly committed by Arab militias and some armed men in Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s uniform”. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths released a statement on 15 June in which he observed, “Darfur is spiraling into a humanitarian calamity.”  

Remarking on the inter-communal violence in the region, he added that the world could not allow a repeat of “the ethnic tensions that stoked the deadly conflict there 20 years ago”. On 19 June, Secretary-General António Guterres called the situations in Darfur and Khartoum “catastrophic”, underscoring his concern about reports of gender-based and sexual violence and asserting that “[t]argeted attacks against civilians based on their ethnic identities could amount to crimes against humanity”.

In tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to condemn the violence in Sudan and emphasise the need for a ceasefire and for unfettered humanitarian access. Some members may raise concerns about reports of sexual violence in the conflict. 

There may also be questions about command-and-control issues in relation to RSF operations in Darfur; in this regard, members may be interested in knowing the degree to which Arab militias are operating on their own initiative as opposed to fighting in coordination with the RSF.  

Members may also be interested in OCHA’s perspective on allegations that the SAF is failing to protect civilians in Darfur. Another concern that may be raised is the regional implications of the fighting in Sudan; regarding the fighting in West Darfur, members may want to learn more about the humanitarian and security effects of the influx of refugees from West Darfur into Chad.

Some Council members may also express concerns about how the UN can most effectively manage the significant operational challenges facing the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), and the difficult relations between the Sudanese government and Special Representative Volker Perthes. When Perthes briefed the Council on 23 May, he announced that “the hostilities compelled us to temporarily relocate many of our staff to Port Sudan and outside Sudan”.  On 8 June, the government of Sudan declared Perthes “persona non grata”, which prompted UN Secretary-General António Guterres to recall, through his spokesman, that “the doctrine of persona non grata is not applicable to or in respect of United Nations personnel and its invocation is contrary to the obligations of states under the Charter of the United Nations”.

While the meeting will focus largely on the humanitarian situation, some members may emphasise the need to exert the leverage on the parties to find a resolution to the conflict.  Various mediation initiatives have failed to gain meaningful traction, including those led by the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Saudi Arabia and US. The Sudanese military has been critical of both the AU and IGAD processes. In a BBC radio interview on 4 June, Malik Agar, the deputy chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, declared that “Sudan is not part of the African Union’s initiative”, noting its suspension from the AU, which occurred following the October 2021 coup. Regarding the IGAD initiative, the Sudanese government issued a statement on 15 June rejecting the sub-regional body’s decision to appoint Kenya to succeed South Sudan in leading the mediation, accusing Kenya of adopting “the positions of the rebel Rapid Support Forces”.  Although the Saudi-US facilitated talks have resulted in several short-term humanitarian ceasefires, these have by and large failed to hold.

Council members have been following the deteriorating situation in Sudan closely since the outbreak of fighting in mid-April, although difficult dynamics continue to hamper the Council’s approach to Sudan. When the Council renewed the mandate of UNITAMS in early June, it did not include references to the recent developments in the country, as some members—including China, Russia, and the A3 (Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique)—apparently opposed adding new language to the draft resolution concerning the humanitarian, political, or security situations in Sudan. In lieu of including such language in the resolution, Council members issued a press statement that condemned the looting of humanitarian aid and attacks on civilians, while emphasising the need for a permanent ceasefire and a resumption of the process towards democracy in Sudan. While the penholder had originally proposed a presidential statement, it was converted to a press statement—an informal outcome with less political clout—after some members expressed reservations about the format of the outcome.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Sudan, Sudan (Darfur)

Original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/06/sudan-consultations-2.php

[Ends]

UN chief Guterres: “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century”

Stand with Africa: Guterres

Meanwhile, UN chief António Guterres noted that cooperation and solidarity to advance the continent’s future is more needed than ever.

“I look forward to African governments continuing to seize the opportunities presented by the continent’s natural, human, and entrepreneurial richness, by working to increase private investment and raise resources at home,” he said in his message for Africa Day.

The annual commemoration May celebrates the founding of the Organization of African Union, the African Union precursor, on 25 May 1963.

The Secretary-General urged the international community to stand with Africa as multiple rises – from COVID-19 to climate and conflict – continue to cause great suffering there.

He further stated that African countries are underrepresented in global governance institutions, such as the UN Security Council, and denied the debt relief and concessional funding they need.

“Africa deserves peace, justice and international solidarity,” he said.  “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century.” 

Read full story at UN News report 25 May 2023:

Security Council urged to step up on financing for AU peace operations

https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137047

[Ends]

UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa: Financing of AU-led peace support operations

THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. 

Report at What's In Blue

Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):

Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa

Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa. 

Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May. 

The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).

Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007. 

Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent. 

Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.

The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)

The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.

The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million. 

Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.

Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February. 

The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.

In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.

One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions. 

This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.

In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.

The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission. 

As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. 

Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements. 

Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php

[Ends]

UN Human Rights Council votes on monitoring of rights abuses in Sudan: 18 Yes; 15 No; 14 Abstain.

🔴BREAKING

The @UN Human Rights Council decided that the mandate of the designated Expert on #Sudan should include detailed monitoring & documentation of all alleged human rights violations & abuses since 25 October 2021 including those arising directly from the current conflict pic.twitter.com/tFh2ezJhto

— UN Human Rights Council (@UN_HRC) May 11, 2023

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: I watched this meeting while it was streamed live and was shocked by the poor attitudes and unprofessional behaviour (mainly by women) of most attendees. The audio was so low I could barely hear what some countries were saying. Camera panned in on a woman mindlessly chewing gum, oblivious to her surroundings, head down low while using her mobile phone. Many acted indifferent and bored like they didn't want to be there. The majority seemed too young and immature to appreciate what they were doing there or understand the magnitude of why they were there.

The live streamed audio was left on during breaks in the meeting that was held in tandem with the one on Sudan at the UN Security Council in New York along with an AU meeting on same day. Forgetting themselves and the cameras, groups chatted loudly and laughed like hyenas, women cackled loudly aloud, they all sounded like happy guests at an enjoyable wedding party. It was disgusting to see and hear.

South Africa's speech on why it was abstaining felt like a kick in the teeth and to crown it all not one African country voted for the detailed monitoring of human rights abuses in Sudan.

All attendees from what I saw (except Finland, a woman who gave a professional performance and heartfelt speech) should be sacked and have their expenses unpaid for bad performance. I can't imagine the cost of that meeting. Also, whoever was in charge of conveying audio translations onto the live stream should be investigated because it seemed apparent political games were in play. It felt like the onlookers and taxpayers footing the bill for humanitarian crises were treated as inconsequential fools. The Chairman was excellent, came across loud and clear. A translation of China's speech was whispered so low it was impossible to hear.

Not long after, news emerged of a war of words between the US and South Africa because South Africa is providing military equipment and weapons to Russia to help decimate Ukraine where unspeakable horrors are occurring.

From what I can gather, and I was shocked to learn of this now for the first time: South Africa has supported Russia ever since Russia supported South Africa during apartheid.

Note that some of the first African Union peacekeeping soldiers in Sudan at a most dangerous time in Darfur were from South Africa's excellent SANDF [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_National_Defence_Force ]. Now I'm wondering if that is why, after much arm twisting Sudan's President Bashir allowed peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur at that time.

I'm hopping mad at everything right now.

Photo source: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/12/goede-vrienden-arresteer-je-niet-toch-a4164533:You don't arrest good friends. Nevertheless? The debate in South Africa If Putin wants to go to the BRICS summit, South Africa must pick him up. But that's just not possible, says Africa editor Jamila Meischke.

[Ends]

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: A UN research report 26 April 2023 copied below for future reference caught my eye because of this paragraph:

"Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform."

So I searched for UNSG report 30 April 2023 and found a page here listing latest statements. What a coincidence and a disappointing one too: instead of it providing news of progress made regarding the African Union (AU) and the financing of AU Peace Support Operations, it says:

United Nations Secretary-General

30 April 2023 New York

Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan    

Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General

In light of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Sudan, the Secretary-General is sending the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, to the region immediately.  

The scale and speed of what is unfolding is unprecedented in Sudan. We are extremely concerned by the immediate as well as long-term impact on all people in Sudan, and the broader region.  

We once again urge all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, allow safe passage for civilians fleeing areas of hostilities, respect humanitarian workers and assets, facilitate relief operations, and respect medical personnel, transport and facilities.

View original: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-04-30/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-sudan%C2%A0-%C2%A0%C2%A0

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Research Report from Security Council Report.org

Dated 26 April 2023 - full copy:

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

To read the full report, please download the PDF here.

The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.  

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognising the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.  

In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members, but was never put to a vote because of one permanent member’s strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU’s development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023. 

There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOs since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.  

The Council asked that the Secretary-General’s April 2023 report include “recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources”.  It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.   

In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.  

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php

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