Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians. VIDEO: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

Video of full meeting:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting

Result of voting: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

See live broadcast courtesy of UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

End

SpaceX is advertising a position for growth manager of its Starlink Internet service in Sub-Saharan Africa

ACCORDING to the following article, SpaceX is advertising a job vacancy for a manager to boost Starlink growth in Africa. The role will be based in Nairobi, Kenya, from where the growth manager will report to a team at Starlink’s Hawthorne, California headquarters. It would prioritise applicants with a current right to work in Kenya. Also:

"Starlink’s estimated rollout date in South Africa has remained “unknown”, whereas the service has already been available in Kenya for four months. Six other Sub-Saharan African countries — Benin, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia — have also launched Starlink. In addition, the company has given estimated rollout dates for the vast majority of the other countries in the region before the end of 2024. Aside from South Africa, the only four countries that don’t yet have a planned launch date are Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, and South Sudan". 

Read more in report from MyBroadband - mybroadband.co.za/news/
By Hanno Labuschagne
Dated Monday, 20 November 2023 - here is a copy in full:

SpaceX hiring manager to boost Starlink growth in Africa

SpaceX is advertising a position for growth manager of its Starlink Internet service in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The role — first reported by Space in Africa — is open for applications on the Greenhouse recruitment website.

SpaceX explained that it was looking for someone to join the Starlink Growth team, which is responsible for launching, growing, and improving the service.

The successful candidate will be accountable for Starlink’s growth and success in the region, identifying and removing barriers to growth, championing user experience, and driving initiatives to accelerate adoption.

The role will be based in Nairobi, Kenya, from where the growth manager will report to a team at Starlink’s Hawthorne, California headquarters.

The growth manager’s responsibilities will entail the following:

• Own growth of active consumer subscriber base in the region, identifying blockers and prioritising levers for growth
• Set vision, develop strategy, and manage a budget around consumer growth initiative strategies, and tactics to meet company goals in the region
• Deeply understand the customer experience in a country, elevating insights to drive localised improvements
• Develop dashboards to track progress, drive improvements to growth and operational metrics, work with the operations team to create forecasts, and communicate to the broader Starlink team and senior leadership
• Engage with local partners to drive efforts catered to the market, understand what’s working and what’s not, and drive continuous improvement
• Champion key strategic consumer-focused projects end-to-end by collaborating and working cross-functionally with Operations, Engineering, Marketing, Sales, and Support teams

The basic qualifications required to be considered for the position include a Bachelor’s degree, five or more years of experience in consulting or project management, and three or more years of experience in Excel and SQL.

In addition, SpaceX demands two or more years of leading in interdisciplinary projects. The candidate must also have residency and work authorisation in Africa.

Skyline of Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya

Other preferred skills and experience that will benefit applicants include:

• Bachelor’s degree in business, supply chain, management information systems, computer science, engineering, or economics disciplines
• 8+ years of relevant work experience in go-to-market, growth, international operations, consulting, software, Internet, and/or media industries, or early-stage companies
• Proven ability to work independently in a fast-paced environment
• Experience leading complex operational and strategic initiatives
• Demonstrated track record of cross-functional stakeholder management and leadership through influence
• Distinctive project management, problem-solving, and analysis skills, combined with business judgment and top communication skills
• Experience working in broadband Internet or other consumer product industries
• Master’s degree in management, engineering, or supply chain

SpaceX added it would prioritise applicants with a current right to work in Kenya.

They must also be willing to travel approximately 50% of the time and work extended hours and over weekends as needed.

It also stressed it does not have regional offices everywhere in the world and the candidate might not work from a SpaceX office.

No clarity on South African rollout

Many tech companies operate their Sub-Saharan Africa offices out of South Africa because the country is among the most well-developed on the continent.

However, Starlink’s estimated rollout date in South Africa has remained “unknown”, whereas the service has already been available in Kenya for four months.

Six other Sub-Saharan African countries — Benin, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zambia — have also launched Starlink.

In addition, the company has given estimated rollout dates for the vast majority of the other countries in the region before the end of 2024.

Aside from South Africa, the only four countries that don’t yet have a planned launch date are Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, and South Sudan.

SpaceX’s enterprise director Phillip van Essen previously told Mining Weekly that the company prioritised countries that made it easy to get approval for Starlink.

It is possible that the role of the growth manager could include expanding the service into countries where Starlink has not passed the necessary legal hurdles.

In South Africa, Starlink requires an electronic communications services (ECS) licence to sell its service directly to customers.

It would also need an electronic communications network services (ECNS) licence to roll out ground stations to improve the service’s performance.

Starlink Gateway on Unalaska

To acquire these licences, the Electronic Communications Act determines that SpaceX — or its local subsidiary or partner — must be 30% owned by historically disadvantaged groups — including black people, women, youth, or disabled people.

Complicating matters further is that the licence will have to be acquired “second hand” from a willing seller, as South Africa’s telecoms regulator — Icasa — is not currently accepting applications for new licences.

It recently emerged that even government-owned fibre network operator Broadband Infraco cannot apply for an ECS  licence.

Icasa has not explained why it has not published a new invitation to apply for these licences in more than a decade.

Alternatively, SpaceX could work with a local partner that already meets the requirements.

However, this could make its subscription more expensive as the partner would have to take a cut to make such an arrangement financially sensible.

Although several companies have already confirmed distribution agreements with SpaceX, they have shied away from mentioning availability in South Africa in the near future.

Despite no official local rollout, over 4,000 South Africans are using imported Starlink kits with a regional or global roaming subscription to access the Internet.

Two Internet service providers (ISPs) that specialise in importing and managing Starlink on behalf of end-users — Starsat Africa and IcasaSePush — recently reduced their subscription prices substantially.

View original: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/broadband/515921-spacex-hiring-manager-to-boost-starlink-growth-in-africa.html

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