Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

View video:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting 

Live broadcast by UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

End

Sudan: UN Security Council closed consultations may discuss measures to support protection of civilians

TOMORROW'S UN Security Council briefing and consultations "may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC [protection of civilians] as well as assess existing strategies. 

In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. 

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan." 

Read more from What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday, 27 October 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (28 October), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the consultations.

Eighteen months into the conflict, hostilities continue unabated as the warring parties engage in a protracted war of attrition. Over the past several weeks, fighting intensified across multiple front lines as the rainy season subsided. In September, there was a severe escalation in El Fasher—the capital of North Darfur state, which has been under siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since May—after the RSF launched a coordinated attack on the city, followed by intensive shelling and airstrikes from both sides, resulting in civilian casualties. On 26 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive in Khartoum and surrounding areas in a bid to besiege areas under RSF control, making significant advances in the ensuing days. In addition, the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces (a coalition of armed movements from Darfur) engaged in fighting with the RSF on several front lines in North and West Darfur states. In the past few weeks, the SAF has reportedly been able to make strategic advances in Sennar and Al Jazira states. Media reports indicate that, on 24 October, the RSF launched a retaliatory attack on villages in East Al Jazira, following the defection to the SAF of Abu Aqla Kikal, a prominent RSF commander. While some sources report that the attack killed about 50 people, others suggest that the death toll could be much higher. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and listen to our 4 September podcast episode.)

Tomorrow, Guterres and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across the country and stress the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Guterres is likely to highlight that the conflict has resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Sudan and has had destabilising effects on the region. On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. The report describes an alarming intensification of intercommunal and identity-based violence and highlights a significant increase in human rights violations and abuses in areas under the control of both warring parties. It outlines the widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks carried out by the warring parties in residential neighbourhoods and sites sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres and several Council members are likely to emphasise the crucial need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and medical and humanitarian personnel.

Guterres is likely to focus on the recommendations outlined in his report under three broad headings: intensifying diplomacy towards ending the fighting, changing the behaviour of the warring parties, and supporting broader protection measures. The report highlights an urgent need for a renewed diplomatic push, including through the “personal involvement” of some heads of state, to ensure that the warring parties uphold their legal obligations. It calls on the warring parties and relevant stakeholders to pursue scalable, locally negotiated ceasefires and other measures to reduce violence, protect civilians, and prevent the spread of conflict. It strongly recommends that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The report calls for an immediate cessation of the direct or indirect flow of weapons and ammunitions into Sudan, which continue to fuel the conflict. Highlighting the need to monitor violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, the report underlines the importance of supporting and cooperating with regional and international independent investigation bodies. It further calls on the international community to provide technical and financial support to Sudanese civil society organisations and community-based initiatives.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan. Some Council members are apparently exploring options for a possible deployment of an African Union (AU)-led mission and how the mission could be supported in the context of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). The Secretary-General’s report acknowledges these calls but notes that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. However, it expresses the UN Secretariat’s readiness to engage with the Council and relevant stakeholders on “operational modalities”, including localised efforts feasible under the current conditions that can contribute to effectively reducing violence and protecting civilians.

Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing regional and international initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis, his engagement with key regional and international interlocutors, and his efforts to coordinate different peace initiatives. With the mediation efforts, not having achieved any breakthrough as yet, members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps, including strategies for enhancing cooperation among stakeholders and addressing the underlying issues hindering the peace process. Tomorrow’s closed consultations may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC as well as assess existing strategies.

On 3 October, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members undertook a field mission to Port Sudan to engage with senior officials from the Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders. In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AUPSC members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Wosornu is likely to highlight the spiralling humanitarian situation in the country, especially food insecurity, and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid across Sudan. She and several Council members are likely to reiterate the critical need to ensure full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and criticise impediments to such access. They may also call on the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorisation for the use of the Adre crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for humanitarian operations, which was initially authorised on 15 August for a three-month period.

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. While expressing appreciation for assurances of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities, they underlined the need to operationalise these commitments. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan.

Earlier this month, during negotiations on a draft press statement proposed by the UK (the penholder on Sudan), Russia apparently requested the removal of the phrase “administrative or other impediments”, arguing that it suggests that Port Sudan authorities are creating artificial barriers for aid delivery and distribution. Some members, such as France, however, contended that several obstacles remain to the delivery of aid. Continuing disagreements among members led the penholder to withdraw the draft text after four revised drafts. (For background on Council dynamics regarding the issue of humanitarian access, see the brief on Sudan in our October Monthly Forecast and 13 June What’s in Blue story.)

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-9.php

End

Sudan: UN Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on 29 July 2024 at request of UK

THE Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra convened delegations from the warring parties—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—in Geneva between 11 and 19 July to hold discussions in “proximity format”, supported by a UN integrated technical team. He aimed to discuss issues relating to measures to ensure the distribution of humanitarian assistance and options for the protection of civilians across Sudan. Lamamra is expected to provide an update to UN Security Council members tomorrow (July 29) on the ongoing efforts aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis. Read more in a report by What's In Blue copied in full here below. 

_________________________

Related reports

#US-led #Sudan #ceasefire talks in #Switzerland 14 Aug 2024 is Sudan's last chance to save itself and its people. The US is $35 trillion in debt. #ElonMusk posted at X yesterday: "America is headed for bankruptcy fyi".
Read more at: https://t.co/2bRxub7NZb#famine #Darfur… https://t.co/5r07zq8v1f

— SUDAN WATCH (@SudanWatchBlog) July 27, 2024

______

From What's In Blue* at securitycouncilreport.org
Dated Sunday, 28 July 2024. Full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

Tomorrow morning (29 July), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan, at the request of the UK (the penholder on the file). The anticipated briefers are Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and OCHA’s Director of the Financing and Partnerships Division Lisa Doughten. Council members may consider issuing press elements following tomorrow’s meeting.

Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing efforts aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis. The Personal Envoy convened delegations from the warring parties—the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—in Geneva between 11 and 19 July to hold discussions in “proximity format”, supported by a UN integrated technical team. He aimed to discuss issues relating to measures to ensure the distribution of humanitarian assistance and options for the protection of civilians across Sudan. In a press release issued at the end of the discussions, Lamamra said that his team held around 20 sessions with the parties’ delegations, including technical and plenary meetings, in the context of their respective mandates. He noted that, during these engagements, the delegations expressed their positions on key issues of concern, thereby deepening mutual understanding. Lamamra described the discussions as an “encouraging initial step in a longer and complex process” and welcomed the commitments announced by “one of the two parties” to enhance humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians.

At the end of proximity talks, the RSF reportedly sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General, outlining commitments it has made, including to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries in coordination with the RSF-affiliated Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), to strengthen civilian protection measures, and to facilitate the safe passage of individuals and supplies. Media reports quoted Salwa Adam Benya, Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commissioner and the head of the SAF delegation, as saying in a statement that the proximity talks offered a “promising foundation” for addressing the humanitarian crisis in the country and expressed Sudan’s commitment to cooperate with the UN “within existing national humanitarian policies”. Regarding the protection of civilians issue, however, she stressed the importance of implementing the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, signed by the warring parties on 11 May 2023.

Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the second consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted by Djibouti on 24 July. Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the US, and Saudi Arabia. The first consultative meeting was convened by the LAS in Cairo on 12 June. (For background and more information, see our 17 June What’s in Blue story.)

The Special Envoy is also likely to expand on the details of the Mediators Planning Retreat on Sudan hosted by Djibouti on 25 and 26 July, which was initially proposed by Lamamra. The meeting brought together representatives from 32 regional and international stakeholders, including the Security Council’s permanent members (P5) and its African members (Algeria, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone), Sudan’s neighbouring countries, several Gulf countries, as well as the AU, the EU, IGAD, the LAS, and the UN. A press release issued following the meeting, among other matters, stressed the importance of integrating lessons learned to inform decision-making processes and strengthening coordination and adapting strategies to respond to dynamic realities on the ground, based on:

• support for all current and future efforts to sustain high-level peace engagements;
• a commitment to cooperate on initiatives aimed at restoring peace and stability in the country and the region; and
• shared and differentiated responsibilities of existing multilateral coordination mechanisms and the recognition of their continued role and comparative advantages.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Lamamra and some members might also refer to the recent US statement inviting the Sudanese warring parties to participate in ceasefire talks to begin on 14 August in Switzerland, co-hosted by Saudi Arabia. The statement notes that the talks will include the AU, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UN as observers. The talks aim to reach an agreement on a nationwide cessation of violence and to develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure implementation of any agreement. The US-Saudi facilitated talks in Jeddah were indefinitely suspended after two rounds of discussions, the last of which was held in November 2023 with the participation of a joint representative of the AU and IGAD, due to the failure of the warring parties to implement their commitments. (For background, see the Sudan brief in our June 2023 Monthly Forecast and 15 November 2023 What’s in Blue story.)

Council members might also reiterate some of the points contained in their 12 July press statement, including welcoming Lamamra’s convening of the Geneva proximity talks. Some members might be interested in hearing the Personal Envoy’s assessment of the Sudanese parties’ positions and the prospects for de-escalation and further dialogue. They may also wish to learn more details about Lamamra’s engagements with key regional and international interlocutors as part of the recent mediation talks and his efforts to coordinate the different peace initiatives, as well as have a frank exchange on the way forward. Some members may also be interested in hearing his assessment of the parties’ commitments and the potential for them to be translated into concrete actions on the ground.

Doughten is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in the country in light of evolving security developments. According to a 4 July OCHA flash update, the escalation of fighting in south-western Sennar state in late June has displaced more than 136,000 people, many of whom might be experiencing secondary or tertiary displacement. In a 19 July press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Farhan Haq said that fighting in Sennar has severely affected the operations of the World Food Programme (WFP) across the region, including in White Nile, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Gedaref states. He reported that the hostilities have cut off key supply routes for food and fuel into Sennar. In addition, Haq noted that the route from Port Sudan to the city of Kosti through Sennar has been blocked, cutting off vital aid to hundreds of thousands of people, including many at risk of famine in the Kordofans and Darfur.

Doughten and several members are also expected to reiterate concerns about the dire food insecurity situation in the country. According to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report on Sudan, released on 27 June, 25.6 million people across Sudan are expected to face acute levels of food insecurity—described by the IPC as crisis level conditions or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above)—between June and September. Of this total, 755,000 people are expected to face catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) in ten states, including Greater Darfur, South and North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum. During this period, 14 areas in nine states are expected to face a risk of famine, according to the report.

Doughten is also likely to stress the importance of ensuring full and rapid humanitarian access through all modalities—including cross-line (across conflict lines within Sudan) and cross-border (across Sudan’s borders with some of the neighbouring countries), particularly in light of the disruptions caused by heavy rains and floods in some areas. A 23 July OCHA press release said that the Tine border crossing at the Chad-Sudan border—used by UN agencies and partners to conduct humanitarian operations—as well as many other routes in the southern part of Sudan remain inaccessible to due to flooding.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Sudan (Darfur)

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/07/sudan-closed-consultations-3.php

*About What's In Blue

When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed in blue. What's In Blue is a series of insights on evolving Security Council actions designed to help interested UN readers keep up with what might soon be "in blue".

END 

Sudan: SIM card frenzy in Port Sudan amid blackouts. Map of Internet availability and connectivity in Sudan

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: I am contributing to this map by adding notes such as those below. I exchanged emails with Sudanese people this week  in Khartoum and South Kordofan. Both are in the yellow part of the map. The map shows internet availability and network connection in Sudan as at 20 Feb 2024. Green - Network available . Yellow - Network blackout.

Credit: map and caption Anas Yassin

Map showing Internet availability and network connection in Sudan 20/Feb/2024 . Green - Network available . Yellow - Network blackout 

#keepeyesonsudan

Today, I exchanged emails with a Sudanese person in Gedaref State, Sudan who says, "Yes we were out of network service for many days, but it's back now. The internet is somehow difficult to access in Gedaref, there is only one telecommnications company (Sudatel) that works, besides the heavy load of data, but the situation is stable. It doesn't work in many Gedaref State localities. However, it's good in downtown and other localities which are 50 kilometres from Gedaref town. Also, Sennar and Aj Jazira State and Blue Nile are blackout. But in some areas like Central Darfur they're using Starlink satellite network. I am in Gedaref and had a visitor today from Sennar who said there is no activation of telecommunications in Sennar." 

Also, I asked "are you using a Sudatel SIM card? I've just read this report (below) and wondered if it is possible to get those SIM cards (like the ones in report) to the yellow area of the map showing internet blackout, would they work? The answer was, "Yes, I am using a Sudatel SIM card".

I asked "is electricity supply stable in Gedaref, Aj Jazirah State, Sennar and Blue Nile?" The answer says, "It's not stable in Gedaref State about 80%, I don't know about Aj Jazira State and Blue Nile, but it's not stable in Sennar."

A few days ago, someone in London commented to me they'd spoken to people in Omdurman (15 min drive from Khartoum) via WhatsApp, the people had to visit souk Libya's market for WiFi. The voice call was clear. The person in London received more calls over past week from same person, and used a phone to transfer funds to the caller in Sudan by using Bankak. 

So, going by the above: 

• internet connectivity in Khartoum does work but is patchy;
• a place in Omburdman is OK if one can visit a WiFi spot;
• a place in South Kordofan was found to be OK;
• Sennar and Blue Nile are still in blackout; 
• network doesn't work in many Gedaref State localities;
• in Aj Jazirah State there is no network, it's still in blackout;
• 50 miles from Gedaref town there are downtown areas and localities where connectivity is good;
• in some parts of Central Darfur, Starlink is being used;
• electricity is not stable 80% of time in Gederaf State; don't know about Aj Jazirah State;
• electricity is not stable in Sennar.

My next step is to search for news on Sennar, Blue Nile, Gedaref State localities, Central Darfur to learn how people in those areas are managing in blackout and find out if anyone has received/sent a voice call/text/voicemail.

Meanwhile, if anyone affected by telecoms problems in Sudan, and the cost of running a phone, is reading this and can add further details - no matter how small - please email or post at X #keepeyesonsudan.

Going by what I have gathered so far, the telecoms situation in Sudan is extremely alarming and worrying for those living in the yellow part of the map. How are they getting news, help, food, water, meds, electricity? It's like they have been thrown back into the Stone Age. It is totally unacceptable.

___

My comment posted at the map

Thanks for posting this visual. What is the source of the data? Does it include all telecoms/TV/landline telephony/mobile comms telcos/internet connectivity? A few days ago I received messages via LinkedIn from reliable sources inside Khartoum itself and in South Kordofan. If the map is accurate, maybe there's a tiny minority in the orange sections who have access to Starlink or something that is not available to the majority. If the orange section shows areas suffering a near total blackout, I am shocked and surprised there has not been a loud outcry. Are you currently located in White Nile? If so, are you and the folks you know in White Nile in total blackout? White Nile is in orange section. 

_______________________________

Report from Radio Tamazuj - Port Sudan
Dated Tuesday 20 February 2024 - here is a copy in full:

Sudani SIM card frenzy in Port Sudan amid service cuts

Hundreds of Sudanese citizens flocked to the Sudani Telecommunications Company headquarters in Port Sudan to get their hands on the company’s special communication SIM cards. This surge in demand follows weeks of complete communication service interruption in Sudan, a result of the ongoing war in the country.

Speaking to Radio Tamazuj Monday, Haired Abdel Salam, a Sudanese citizen, said: “I’ve been attempting to acquire a Sudani SIM for four days now. It’s not about getting a new SIM; rather, I’m trying to restore my old one.” He expressed difficulty in accessing the service due to the large crowds.

Mohammed Mustafa also recounted his visit to Sudani Communications Services, stating, “I needed to obtain a SIM card for the first time because of the communication outage. However, I was taken aback by the overwhelming number of people waiting for the service.” He noted the high cost of the service, even when attempting to acquire it from outside the company premises.

Meanwhile, the Executive Director of the Sudanese Telecommunications Company (Sudani), Engineer Majdi Mohammed Abdullah, stated that over the past five months, despite the loss of the billing system, the company has persevered in its efforts to provide services without charge. Emphasizing the importance of sustaining operations despite the incurred losses, Abdullah highlighted the commitment to continue working despite the challenges faced by the company.

In recent months, Sudan has experienced a complete halt in telecommunications services, impacting both communication and internet services. This situation has raised concerns, particularly with the interruption of essential banking services that citizens rely on, given the wartime conditions. Additionally, various other services dependent on the internet in Sudan have been affected.

View original: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/sudani-sim-card-frenzy-at-port-sudan-amidst-service-cuts

_____________________________

UPDATE by Sudan Watch Editor on 25 Feb 2024, added the following:

Sudan Watch - February 12, 2024

NetBlocks: Major internet disruption in Chad, severed fibre optic cable supplying Chad from Cameroon

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2024/02/netblocks-major-internet-disruption-in.html

___

Sudan Watch - February 10, 2024

URGENT MESSAGE to Sir Tim Berners-Lee: The internet belongs to everyone including the Sudanese

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2024/02/urgent-message-to-sir-tim-berners-lee.html

___

Sudan Watch - February 08, 2024

Sudan hit by internet blackout as conflict continues

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2024/02/sudan-hit-by-internet-blackout-as.html

___

Sudan Watch - April 23, 2023

Sudan almost completely disconnected from Internet

Just 2% of all Internet users in Sudan have web connectivity at present

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2023/04/sudan-almost-completely-disconnected.html

___

Sudan Watch - June 24, 2019

Sudan internet shutdown has a projected cost of more than $1 billion, and will continue for three months

NetBlocks, an organization that tracks Internet freedom around the world, described the blackout as a “near-total restriction on the flow of information in and out of Sudan for a significant portion of the population.”

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/06/sudan-internet-shutdown-has-projected.html

___

END