Inside The Secret Network Fuelling Sudan's War

From Lighthouse Reports
Co-published with EVIDENT and Sudan War Monitor
On 29 June 2026 - full copy:

INSIDE THE SECRET NETWORK FUELLING SUDAN'S WAR

Lighthouse Reports travelled to Eastern Libya to expose the UAE supported RSF network of military training camps that enabled them to continue their war in Sudan.

The shadowy role of the United Arab Emirates in fueling the war in Sudan – once a well kept secret – is now acknowledged as a key driver of Sudan’s disastrous, yearslong civil war.

Still, little is known about how the UAE co-opts regional governments to achieve its aims in Sudan.

Lighthouse Reports, Evident and Sudan War Monitor travelled to eastern Libya to reveal how the UAE network works on the ground. Through a combination of open source and on-the-ground reporting, the investigation sheds new light on one of the UAE’s most entrenched operations in their vast network of support to the RSF.

As the international community has failed to intervene in Emirati meddling, the UAE has meanwhile built a sprawling network of complex logistics, military bases, financing, and weapons trafficking routes to prop up the Rapid Support Forces and fuel their war efforts in Sudan.

METHODS

The investigations drew on a long term analysis of activity across TikTok, Facebook and Telegram. We reviewed thousands of posts and built an archive of more than 500 relevant clips showing convoy movements between Libya and Sudan, activity at key desert checkpoints and camps, and developments in the border triangle. We verified and connected this material through geolocation, analysis of uniforms, vehicles and other identifying symbols, and social-network analysis of accounts linked to the RSF, the Libyan National Army, and associated networks.

We complimented these efforts with analysis of high resolution commercial satellite imagery of specific sites. Using a custom processing workflow with publicly available Sentinel-2 data., we tracked changes in vehicle routes across remote stretches of the Sahara, helping us understand how smuggling and asset transfers developed in response to changing conditions on the ground. These findings informed reporting trips and interviews.

We worked with ⁨Conflict Insights Group, a public benefit research firm, that conducted analysis of telephones located at Camp 17. CIG used publicly available adtech data, which is information from cookies that users agree to sell to third party vendors when they visit a website or use a mobile application. The information includes movement data, language settings, and other details that users consent to selling to a third party vendor, which CIG purchased. CIG found evidence of at least two South American mercenaries at the site in the summer of 2025. One device located at Camp 17 was set to Colombian Spanish and visited the site from 11-12 June 2025. Another device was set to Argentinian Spanish, and used a military grade phone on 13 aug 2025.

This investigation received kind support from Maltego and IRBIS OSINT-platform.

STORYLINES

Our reporting, including interviews with LNA officers, RSF defectors, and Sudanese military sources, unveiled four previously unidentified RSF camps in Libya, contrary to claims by the RSF that they do not conduct troop training outside of Sudan and contrary to LNA insiders’ claims that the RSF operations in Libya were largely wound down by late 2025.

In Kufra, we embedded with the Libyan National Army in the border triangle area where we had been tracking RSF training and transit sites via social media analysis and heat maps of tracks from suspected RSF resupply convoys throughout the desert for months.

Keen to show us that they were combatting trafficking and had shut down any alleged flow of weapons into Sudan, Lieutenant Enheish Fattah of the LNA’s Subul Al Salaam brigade flatly denied that the LNA facilitated RSF activities in Libya.

“No, that’s all rumors. People are trying to create conflict between the Libyan and Sudanese armies,” Lieutenant Fattah said when questioned on 2025 clashes between the Sudanese Army and the LNA in the border region, in response to increasing frustration of the Sudanese Army and its backers in Egypt about LNA support for the RSF.

Interviews with eight RSF defectors still living in Libya, revealed the full scale of their operations there, which extend from small-scale training activity and transit points in Benghazi to more robust sites in the desert in the border triangle region. These sites include staging sites to prep weapons and modify vehicles for war, training sites where RSF soldiers say they trained alongside the LNA and UAE-contracted Colombian mercenaries, and convoys of trucks carrying fuel and alleged weapons from Libya back into Sudan.

Defectors told us that they were expected to return to Sudan to train their fellow RSF soldiers based on the training they received in Libya.

One defector who agreed to speak on camera to Evident, revealed the location of a previously unknown training camp located approximately 20 kilometers outside of Benghazi.

He described arriving in Libya and being sent to Benghazi through Kufra. Others, he said, were sent to a military camp in Jufra for training. Of his own time at the camp known to him and others in RSF as Camp 17, he told us “there are many here in Camp 17. They are in charge of cars, supplies, and ammo and oversee delivery of them.”

He said the RSF would bring “around 40 or 50, maybe up to 70 or 80” soldiers at a time to train in Camp 17. They would receive their training from LNA soldiers and Colombian contractors.

“RSF is mainly supported by the Emirates,” he told us, adding “but no one can speak up or ask.”

Libyan authorities failed to meaningfully engage with us on the reality of what is happening inside Libya or on their collaboration with the UAE to support the RSF. We traveled to Nairobi, Kenya to interview a spokesman for the RSF government, Tassis, who denied the claims revealed in our reporting.

While the scale of Sudan’s war is almost impossible to account for due to the lack of humanitarian access and the level of violence across the country, recent estimates put the death toll at nearly 400,000 people. 

Regional analysts insist that the level of support from the Emirates for the RSF has allowed violence, particularly in the Darfur region, to spiral out of control. We interviewed survivors from Khartoum and Darfur in Kufra and in Benghazi to understand the true impact of Emirati meddling on Sudanese civilians. 

They arrived in Libya after arduous journeys from Sudan – some traveling through Chad – often harassed by RSF soldiers and human smugglers throughout their journey.

“When we reached Libya, we had nothing left,” Fatima, a mother of four living in Kufra told us. “I have nothing left but my children and my honor.”

CO-PUBLICATIONS

Evident & Lighthouse Reports: 

Inside the Secret Network Fueling Sudan's War

Sudan War Monitor: 

Inside the RSF's Libya Supply Network

Credits: Julia Steers, Klaas van Dijken, Jack Sapoch, Bashar Deeb, Margot Gibbs, Tessa Pang, Wael Eskandar, AM, and many unnamed Sudanese journalists, Amel Guettatfi, Srdjan Stojiljkovic, Stacey Naggiar, Jennifer Smart, Kevin Clancy, Zach Toombs

View original: https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/inside-the-secret-network-fueling-sudans-war/

Hat tip: Dr Eric Reeves, Co-founder Team Zamzam Project, Responding to Famine and Aiding Victims of Sexual Violence in Darfur

linkedin.com/in/eric-reeves-01b6b16 (LinkedIn)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Personal)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Other)

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Middle East Crisis: UN Security Council Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Posted Monday 6 April 2026 - full copy:

Middle East Crisis: Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Tomorrow morning (7 April) at 11 am EST, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution which strongly encourages states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.

It demands that Iran immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels and any attempt to impede transit passage or freedom of navigation in the Strait and further calls for the cessation of attacks against civilian infrastructure, including water infrastructure and desalination plants, as well as oil and gas installations. The draft text was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan.

Background

Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transits occur. The escalation follows the US-Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)

Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. Although Iran had initially signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”.

The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities. US President Donald Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Several allied countries—including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the UK—have taken a cautious approach, with some explicitly indicating that they would not participate in enforcement actions to reopen the Strait or provide airspace for such operations.

Regardless of differing approaches, reopening the Strait appears to be a strategic priority for many US allies. France has indicated that it is working with partners to explore a possible international mission to facilitate this objective once the intensity of military operations subsides, while the UK hosted talks on 2 April among 40 countries aimed at forming a coalition for this purpose.

Meanwhile, GCC countries and Jordan have strongly advocated for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region, including through the use of force. Since the escalation began on 28 February, they have faced sustained Iranian attacks targeting vessels, port infrastructure, and energy assets across the Gulf, which have disrupted maritime trade and energy flows and contributed to broader regional economic and supply chain instability.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The negotiations on the draft resolution were difficult. Bahrain circulated the zero draft of the text to Council members on 21 March and held multiple rounds of negotiations. Following five subsequent revisions, two silence breaks, and closed consultations on 1 April (held at France’s request), a sixth revised draft was put in blue today (6 April). The process involved intensive, high-level engagement, including meetings at the level of permanent representatives and sustained bilateral consultations between GCC countries and Council members, including at the level of foreign ministers.

Initially, the draft text was put in blue on 2 April for a vote on 3 April; however, persistent disagreements prompted Bahrain to delay the vote to continue deliberations, during which the text underwent significant amendments before being put in blue for a vote tomorrow.

During the negotiations, Council members broadly expressed concern about the escalating regional situation, underscored the unacceptability of attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and stressed the urgent need to address the crisis. However, divergences emerged regarding the appropriate approach and tools to address the crisis.

The initial draft text proposed by Bahrain invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and repress, neutralise, and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait, until such time as the Council decides otherwise. The text also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those who take actions to undermine the freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These provisions apparently proved problematic for several Council members, prompting efforts to streamline the text to enhance clarity and narrow its scope. It appears that concerns focused in particular on the reference to Chapter VII and the authorisation of the use of force, as well as the breadth of the mandate, including its nature, geographic scope, and open-ended duration. Positions diverged, with some European and like-minded members seeking clearer parameters and more precise drafting, while others, notably China and Russia, were more fundamentally critical of the initiative.

It appears that China and Russia expressed concerns about the invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that such authorisation could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits. They also raised concerns about the potential imposition of sanctions and maintained that the draft failed to address the root causes of the current crisis in the Middle East. In their view, the text risked exacerbating tensions rather than promoting de-escalation, and they urged Bahrain not to advance the initiative. These reservations led China and Russia to break silence twice.

Responding to these concerns, Bahrain removed the explicit reference to Chapter VII in the third revised draft. However, the authorisation for the use of force and a determination that Iran’s actions near and around the Strait of Hormuz constitute a threat to international peace and security were retained. China and Russia argued that this did not address their concerns, maintaining that the draft continued to legitimise the use of force without accounting for the underlying causes of the escalation. The current draft resolution in blue does not include an explicit reference to Chapter VII and retains the determination regarding Iran’s actions as threats to international peace and security.

Additionally, the reference to sanctions measures was amended based on proposals from Colombia and the UK. The current draft text in blue therefore expresses the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, as appropriate, against those who take actions that undermine the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

France, supported by some other members, particularly Greece, also expressed concerns about the scope of the authorisation for the use of force, which, as France had argued, should be strictly limited to defensive purposes. The UK, among others, also sought clearer and more concise language to better define the scope of the authorisation.

In parallel to Bahrain’s text, it appears that France also prepared a draft resolution in March, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for wider discussion. Some elements of this text, as proposed by France during the negotiations on Bahrain’s draft, appear to have been incorporated into the current text in blue. This includes language urging de-escalation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; calling for a return to diplomacy; and welcoming ongoing efforts towards a durable peace in the region.

To address concerns raised by several members, the language on the authorisation underwent multiple iterations, with successive drafts introducing qualifiers to clarify its scope and parameters. This included stipulating that any action must be commensurate with the circumstances and undertaken with due regard for the safety of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; the latter edit was based on a proposal by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia). In the fourth revised draft, Bahrain apparently incorporated some suggestions, including narrowing the geographical scope to the Strait and its adjacent waters and introducing a time limit of at least six months from the resolution’s adoption, an issue apparently raised by the UK. While these changes were reflected in the first draft text put in blue on 2 April, some were omitted from the current version in blue following further revisions undertaken in an effort to reach common ground. Of these proposed provisions, only the text specifying that “any action must be commensurate with the circumstances” remains in the current draft in blue.

The proposed limitations on the nature of the mandate did not appear to satisfy some members. In addition to China and Russia, France, supported by Greece, also broke silence, reiterating its concerns. As a compromise, Bahrain ultimately amended the language to authorise member states to “use all defensive means necessary”, as suggested by France.

However, it appears that strong positions expressed by some members persisted, requiring continued deliberations. In the current text put in blue, Bahrain omitted the language on authorisation and instead incorporated elements drawn from the French draft, strongly encouraging states with an interest in the “use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz”.

Based on suggestions from Colombia and France, the draft text in blue also requests the participating states to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the activities they undertake related to this resolution are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and applicable international human rights law, and have due regard for the rights and freedoms of navigation of the ships of any third state. The amended draft text in blue further added language specifying that such measures should be undertaken with a view to urgently ensuring unhampered and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The amended draft text in blue makes several references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including reaffirming the right of member states to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It further affirms that this resolution applies only to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and does not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of member states under international law, including UNCLOS, in any other context, underscoring in particular that it should not be regarded as establishing customary international law.

The draft resolution also introduces a reporting requirement, requesting the Secretary-General to provide to the Security Council a written report within seven days of the adoption of this resolution, and every 30 days thereafter, on any further attacks and provocations on merchant and commercial vessels, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms, by Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php

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Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away." More.

From BBC News
By Barbara Plett Usher
Africa correspondent
Published Thursday 19 February 2026, 9am GMT - full copy:

Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS

A UN fact-finding mission has determined that evidence of atrocities carried out during the siege and takeover of the Sudanese city of el-Fasher points to genocide.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured el-Fasher, located in the western region of Darfur, at the end of October after an 18-month blockade.

It was one of the most brutal chapters in Sudan's nearly three-year civil war and triggered widespread international outrage.

This is the closest the UN has come to declaring that genocide is being carried out by RSF fighters in Darfur during the current conflict. The RSF has not commented on the report but has denied previous such accusations.

"The body of evidence we collected — including the prolonged siege, starvation and denial of humanitarian assistance, followed by mass killings, rape, torture and enforced disappearance, systematic humiliation and perpetrators' own declarations - leaves only one reasonable inference," said fact-finding mission expert Mona Rishmawi. "The RSF acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El-Fasher. These are the hallmarks of genocide."

The report concludes that at least three underlying acts of genocide were committed, including killing members of a protected ethnic group; causing serious bodily and mental harm; and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction in whole or in part.

Calling the findings "truly horrific", UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said she would take the report's conclusions to the UN Security Council on Thursday.

In a statement she said there must be international criminal investigations to ensure accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims, and an end to the arms flow feeding the conflict.

Sudan's civil war erupted in April 2023 out of a power struggle between the regular army and the RSF over how and whether the paramilitaries would integrate into the security forces. It evolved into a country-wide conflict fuelled by longstanding local grievances and ethnic divisions.

In the Darfur region, Arab militias that form the backbone of the RSF have targeted non-Arabs they see as enemies, using savage tactics also employed some 20 years ago. At that time, they massacred hundreds of thousands of Darfuris from indigenous African ethnic groups, employed by the country's then authoritarian leader Omar al-Bashir to put down local rebellions.

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS. Image caption, During the long siege of el-Fasher, this school where people were sheltering was shelled

The report says the city was deliberately starved and destroyed during the long siege, which systematically weakened the "targeted population" and left them defenceless against the extreme violence that followed.

"Thousands of persons, particularly the Zaghawa, were killed, raped or disappeared during three days of absolute horror," it says, as RSF troops failed to distinguish between Zaghawa civilians and the armed groups defending the city.

Investigators described RSF conduct in el-Fasher as an aggravation of earlier patterns but on a far more lethal scale, noting that this demonstrates the failure to prevent the atrocities despite clear warning signs. They say without prevention and accountability, the risk of "more genocidal acts remains serious and ongoing".

The mandate issued by the Human Rights Council in Geneva called on the investigative team to "identify, where possible" suspected perpetrators in a bid to ensure they are "held accountable".

The report names RSF Leader Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti) and spokesperson Lt Col Al-Fatih Al-Qurashi, citing the way they publicly claimed and celebrated the operation.

It notes that General Hemedti acknowledged some "violations" had occurred during the takeover of the city but that while he described el-Fasher as a "catastrophe", he justified the assault as necessary.

The RSF leader also issued instructions for his fighters not to harm civilians or kill prisoners, and he promised investigations. But investigators say the RSF did not respond to the mission's request to clarify the steps it had taken, or any other questions.

"The scale, coordination, and public endorsement of the operation by the senior Rapid Support Forces leadership point to a planned and organised operation executed through an established hierarchy and structure, rather than isolated acts," the UN mission said.

The report names one one notorious commander known as "Abu Lulu" who was arrested after viral footage of his brutality surfaced, but said the RSF had provided no information regarding any judicial proceedings.

It also says that despite their best efforts, the UN mission did not receive cooperation from Sudanese authorities. Yvette Cooper called obstructions "from both warring parties... shameful and unacceptable".

The mission's mandate did not include an investigation into the role of external actors who may be supporting the RSF.

But crucially the report notes that the RSF's military campaign was reinforced by foreign mercenaries equipped with "advanced weaponry and communications systems".

It says investigators are engaging with several states regarding "credible information" that they are involved and will report on this matter in the future.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is widely reported to be the main backer of the RSF, although it continues to forcefully deny this, despite extensive evidence from international investigations that the UN has previously described as credible.

Abu Dhabi's role came under increased scrutiny after the el-Fasher massacre, but there was no public pressure on the Emiratis from the UN, the US or the UK.

The investigators called on the international community to fully enforce the existing arms embargo on Darfur and expand it to the rest of the country; to prevent the transfer of weapons and other support to parties implicated in serious violations; to ensure accountability through targeted sanctions; to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court; and to consider the establishment of a judicial mechanism working in tandem with it.

Cooper said it was important that the fact-finding mission planned to conduct further investigations into reported breaches of the arms embargo and agreed that it should be extended and enforced.

She said she planned to highlight the systematic and widespread sexual violence which she calls "a war against women's bodies".

"Most important of all we need global action and pressure in pursuit of a ceasefire, and essential humanitarian access with support for survivors," she said.

The UN Security Council session is aimed at pushing for progress on a humanitarian truce, which has been elusive despite the enormous civilian suffering. The warring parties both frame the conflict as an existential battle and are able to continue fighting with increasingly sophisticated weapons supplied by their foreign backers.

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away."

More on this story

A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan

Published 13 November 2025

'Our job is only killing' - how Sudan's brutal militia carried out a massacre
Published 7 November 2025

'I saw them driving over injured people' - the terrifying escape from war in Sudan
Published 30 November 2025

Sudan's RSF trying to cover up mass killings in el-Fasher, researchers say
Published 16 December 2025

Sudanese city had 6,000 killed in three days, UN says
Published 5 days ago

View original: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqw74d81jqo

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