Middle East Crisis: UN Security Council Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Posted Monday 6 April 2026 - full copy:

Middle East Crisis: Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Tomorrow morning (7 April) at 11 am EST, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution which strongly encourages states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.

It demands that Iran immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels and any attempt to impede transit passage or freedom of navigation in the Strait and further calls for the cessation of attacks against civilian infrastructure, including water infrastructure and desalination plants, as well as oil and gas installations. The draft text was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan.

Background

Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transits occur. The escalation follows the US-Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)

Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. Although Iran had initially signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”.

The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities. US President Donald Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Several allied countries—including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the UK—have taken a cautious approach, with some explicitly indicating that they would not participate in enforcement actions to reopen the Strait or provide airspace for such operations.

Regardless of differing approaches, reopening the Strait appears to be a strategic priority for many US allies. France has indicated that it is working with partners to explore a possible international mission to facilitate this objective once the intensity of military operations subsides, while the UK hosted talks on 2 April among 40 countries aimed at forming a coalition for this purpose.

Meanwhile, GCC countries and Jordan have strongly advocated for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region, including through the use of force. Since the escalation began on 28 February, they have faced sustained Iranian attacks targeting vessels, port infrastructure, and energy assets across the Gulf, which have disrupted maritime trade and energy flows and contributed to broader regional economic and supply chain instability.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The negotiations on the draft resolution were difficult. Bahrain circulated the zero draft of the text to Council members on 21 March and held multiple rounds of negotiations. Following five subsequent revisions, two silence breaks, and closed consultations on 1 April (held at France’s request), a sixth revised draft was put in blue today (6 April). The process involved intensive, high-level engagement, including meetings at the level of permanent representatives and sustained bilateral consultations between GCC countries and Council members, including at the level of foreign ministers.

Initially, the draft text was put in blue on 2 April for a vote on 3 April; however, persistent disagreements prompted Bahrain to delay the vote to continue deliberations, during which the text underwent significant amendments before being put in blue for a vote tomorrow.

During the negotiations, Council members broadly expressed concern about the escalating regional situation, underscored the unacceptability of attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and stressed the urgent need to address the crisis. However, divergences emerged regarding the appropriate approach and tools to address the crisis.

The initial draft text proposed by Bahrain invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and repress, neutralise, and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait, until such time as the Council decides otherwise. The text also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those who take actions to undermine the freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These provisions apparently proved problematic for several Council members, prompting efforts to streamline the text to enhance clarity and narrow its scope. It appears that concerns focused in particular on the reference to Chapter VII and the authorisation of the use of force, as well as the breadth of the mandate, including its nature, geographic scope, and open-ended duration. Positions diverged, with some European and like-minded members seeking clearer parameters and more precise drafting, while others, notably China and Russia, were more fundamentally critical of the initiative.

It appears that China and Russia expressed concerns about the invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that such authorisation could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits. They also raised concerns about the potential imposition of sanctions and maintained that the draft failed to address the root causes of the current crisis in the Middle East. In their view, the text risked exacerbating tensions rather than promoting de-escalation, and they urged Bahrain not to advance the initiative. These reservations led China and Russia to break silence twice.

Responding to these concerns, Bahrain removed the explicit reference to Chapter VII in the third revised draft. However, the authorisation for the use of force and a determination that Iran’s actions near and around the Strait of Hormuz constitute a threat to international peace and security were retained. China and Russia argued that this did not address their concerns, maintaining that the draft continued to legitimise the use of force without accounting for the underlying causes of the escalation. The current draft resolution in blue does not include an explicit reference to Chapter VII and retains the determination regarding Iran’s actions as threats to international peace and security.

Additionally, the reference to sanctions measures was amended based on proposals from Colombia and the UK. The current draft text in blue therefore expresses the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, as appropriate, against those who take actions that undermine the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

France, supported by some other members, particularly Greece, also expressed concerns about the scope of the authorisation for the use of force, which, as France had argued, should be strictly limited to defensive purposes. The UK, among others, also sought clearer and more concise language to better define the scope of the authorisation.

In parallel to Bahrain’s text, it appears that France also prepared a draft resolution in March, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for wider discussion. Some elements of this text, as proposed by France during the negotiations on Bahrain’s draft, appear to have been incorporated into the current text in blue. This includes language urging de-escalation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; calling for a return to diplomacy; and welcoming ongoing efforts towards a durable peace in the region.

To address concerns raised by several members, the language on the authorisation underwent multiple iterations, with successive drafts introducing qualifiers to clarify its scope and parameters. This included stipulating that any action must be commensurate with the circumstances and undertaken with due regard for the safety of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; the latter edit was based on a proposal by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia). In the fourth revised draft, Bahrain apparently incorporated some suggestions, including narrowing the geographical scope to the Strait and its adjacent waters and introducing a time limit of at least six months from the resolution’s adoption, an issue apparently raised by the UK. While these changes were reflected in the first draft text put in blue on 2 April, some were omitted from the current version in blue following further revisions undertaken in an effort to reach common ground. Of these proposed provisions, only the text specifying that “any action must be commensurate with the circumstances” remains in the current draft in blue.

The proposed limitations on the nature of the mandate did not appear to satisfy some members. In addition to China and Russia, France, supported by Greece, also broke silence, reiterating its concerns. As a compromise, Bahrain ultimately amended the language to authorise member states to “use all defensive means necessary”, as suggested by France.

However, it appears that strong positions expressed by some members persisted, requiring continued deliberations. In the current text put in blue, Bahrain omitted the language on authorisation and instead incorporated elements drawn from the French draft, strongly encouraging states with an interest in the “use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz”.

Based on suggestions from Colombia and France, the draft text in blue also requests the participating states to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the activities they undertake related to this resolution are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and applicable international human rights law, and have due regard for the rights and freedoms of navigation of the ships of any third state. The amended draft text in blue further added language specifying that such measures should be undertaken with a view to urgently ensuring unhampered and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The amended draft text in blue makes several references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including reaffirming the right of member states to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It further affirms that this resolution applies only to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and does not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of member states under international law, including UNCLOS, in any other context, underscoring in particular that it should not be regarded as establishing customary international law.

The draft resolution also introduces a reporting requirement, requesting the Secretary-General to provide to the Security Council a written report within seven days of the adoption of this resolution, and every 30 days thereafter, on any further attacks and provocations on merchant and commercial vessels, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms, by Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php

Ends

Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away." More.

From BBC News
By Barbara Plett Usher
Africa correspondent
Published Thursday 19 February 2026, 9am GMT - full copy:

Sudan atrocities are 'hallmarks of genocide', UN says

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS

A UN fact-finding mission has determined that evidence of atrocities carried out during the siege and takeover of the Sudanese city of el-Fasher points to genocide.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured el-Fasher, located in the western region of Darfur, at the end of October after an 18-month blockade.

It was one of the most brutal chapters in Sudan's nearly three-year civil war and triggered widespread international outrage.

This is the closest the UN has come to declaring that genocide is being carried out by RSF fighters in Darfur during the current conflict. The RSF has not commented on the report but has denied previous such accusations.

"The body of evidence we collected — including the prolonged siege, starvation and denial of humanitarian assistance, followed by mass killings, rape, torture and enforced disappearance, systematic humiliation and perpetrators' own declarations - leaves only one reasonable inference," said fact-finding mission expert Mona Rishmawi. "The RSF acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El-Fasher. These are the hallmarks of genocide."

The report concludes that at least three underlying acts of genocide were committed, including killing members of a protected ethnic group; causing serious bodily and mental harm; and deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction in whole or in part.

Calling the findings "truly horrific", UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said she would take the report's conclusions to the UN Security Council on Thursday.

In a statement she said there must be international criminal investigations to ensure accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims, and an end to the arms flow feeding the conflict.

Sudan's civil war erupted in April 2023 out of a power struggle between the regular army and the RSF over how and whether the paramilitaries would integrate into the security forces. It evolved into a country-wide conflict fuelled by longstanding local grievances and ethnic divisions.

In the Darfur region, Arab militias that form the backbone of the RSF have targeted non-Arabs they see as enemies, using savage tactics also employed some 20 years ago. At that time, they massacred hundreds of thousands of Darfuris from indigenous African ethnic groups, employed by the country's then authoritarian leader Omar al-Bashir to put down local rebellions.

IMAGE SOURCE, REUTERS. Image caption, During the long siege of el-Fasher, this school where people were sheltering was shelled

The report says the city was deliberately starved and destroyed during the long siege, which systematically weakened the "targeted population" and left them defenceless against the extreme violence that followed.

"Thousands of persons, particularly the Zaghawa, were killed, raped or disappeared during three days of absolute horror," it says, as RSF troops failed to distinguish between Zaghawa civilians and the armed groups defending the city.

Investigators described RSF conduct in el-Fasher as an aggravation of earlier patterns but on a far more lethal scale, noting that this demonstrates the failure to prevent the atrocities despite clear warning signs. They say without prevention and accountability, the risk of "more genocidal acts remains serious and ongoing".

The mandate issued by the Human Rights Council in Geneva called on the investigative team to "identify, where possible" suspected perpetrators in a bid to ensure they are "held accountable".

The report names RSF Leader Lt Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti) and spokesperson Lt Col Al-Fatih Al-Qurashi, citing the way they publicly claimed and celebrated the operation.

It notes that General Hemedti acknowledged some "violations" had occurred during the takeover of the city but that while he described el-Fasher as a "catastrophe", he justified the assault as necessary.

The RSF leader also issued instructions for his fighters not to harm civilians or kill prisoners, and he promised investigations. But investigators say the RSF did not respond to the mission's request to clarify the steps it had taken, or any other questions.

"The scale, coordination, and public endorsement of the operation by the senior Rapid Support Forces leadership point to a planned and organised operation executed through an established hierarchy and structure, rather than isolated acts," the UN mission said.

The report names one one notorious commander known as "Abu Lulu" who was arrested after viral footage of his brutality surfaced, but said the RSF had provided no information regarding any judicial proceedings.

It also says that despite their best efforts, the UN mission did not receive cooperation from Sudanese authorities. Yvette Cooper called obstructions "from both warring parties... shameful and unacceptable".

The mission's mandate did not include an investigation into the role of external actors who may be supporting the RSF.

But crucially the report notes that the RSF's military campaign was reinforced by foreign mercenaries equipped with "advanced weaponry and communications systems".

It says investigators are engaging with several states regarding "credible information" that they are involved and will report on this matter in the future.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is widely reported to be the main backer of the RSF, although it continues to forcefully deny this, despite extensive evidence from international investigations that the UN has previously described as credible.

Abu Dhabi's role came under increased scrutiny after the el-Fasher massacre, but there was no public pressure on the Emiratis from the UN, the US or the UK.

The investigators called on the international community to fully enforce the existing arms embargo on Darfur and expand it to the rest of the country; to prevent the transfer of weapons and other support to parties implicated in serious violations; to ensure accountability through targeted sanctions; to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Court; and to consider the establishment of a judicial mechanism working in tandem with it.

Cooper said it was important that the fact-finding mission planned to conduct further investigations into reported breaches of the arms embargo and agreed that it should be extended and enforced.

She said she planned to highlight the systematic and widespread sexual violence which she calls "a war against women's bodies".

"Most important of all we need global action and pressure in pursuit of a ceasefire, and essential humanitarian access with support for survivors," she said.

The UN Security Council session is aimed at pushing for progress on a humanitarian truce, which has been elusive despite the enormous civilian suffering. The warring parties both frame the conflict as an existential battle and are able to continue fighting with increasingly sophisticated weapons supplied by their foreign backers.

"The world is still failing the people of Sudan," Cooper said. "When the stories started to emerge about the horrors of el-Fasher it should have been a turning point, but the violence is continuing. Today, in the Security Council, the UK as President will make sure the world does not look away."

More on this story

A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan

Published 13 November 2025

'Our job is only killing' - how Sudan's brutal militia carried out a massacre
Published 7 November 2025

'I saw them driving over injured people' - the terrifying escape from war in Sudan
Published 30 November 2025

Sudan's RSF trying to cover up mass killings in el-Fasher, researchers say
Published 16 December 2025

Sudanese city had 6,000 killed in three days, UN says
Published 5 days ago

View original: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpqw74d81jqo

Ends

Sudan: Open Briefing at UN Security Council - The UK is penholder on Sudan and Council president for Feb

"In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations. ...

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft." Read more.

From What's In Blue 
Posted Wednesday 18 February 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Sudan. The UK, the penholder on Sudan and Council president for February, has elevated the meeting to ministerial level, with its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper, expected to chair. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. The Council will also hear from a civil society representative, who will address the situation of women in the context of the conflict in Sudan, including the high incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Sudan as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

DiCarlo is expected to provide an overview of the security situation as the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April, amid a dangerous phase marked by intensified hostilities with increasing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened governance structures, exacerbating civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity. The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors reportedly providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, resulting in regional spillover and proxy dynamics. In this regard, reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring states as transit routes for weapons and supplies have raised alarm about the risk of further regional destabilisation. Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to voice concerns about the trajectory of these perilous trends. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the ongoing violence and reiterate calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, reports from the UN and other entities have documented grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) by parties to the conflict. In this context, several Council members are expected to urge compliance with IHL and IHRL obligations, while highlighting broader protection concerns, including widespread CRSV. They may also underscore the need to ensure accountability for such violations. (For more information, see our 8 February What’s in Blue story.)

On 13 February, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in late October 2025 that resulted in the seizure of El Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. According to the report, the documented patterns indicate that the RSF and allied Arab militias conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in the city. OHCHR monitoring suggested that the RSF and allied militias committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, launching indiscriminate attacks, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) requested the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM) to conduct an urgent inquiry into alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher following the seizure of the city by the RSF. The findings of the inquiry are expected to be released tomorrow.

Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. Tomorrow, several Council members are expected to voice support for mediation efforts, with some emphasising the importance of complementarity and coordination among such initiatives.

UN mediation efforts have been led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, who had regularly briefed Council members during closed consultations on Sudan. Media reports suggest that Lamamra will finish his role by the end of the month. He had been scheduled to brief during consultations following tomorrow’s briefing, but it appears that the consultations are not expected to take place and that Lamamra is not slated to brief.

During a donor conference held on 3 February in Washington DC, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos reportedly announced that a document outlining a peace plan had been agreed among the Quad members—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—aimed at securing a humanitarian truce and opening safe corridors for relief efforts. In a 14 February interview with Foreign Policy, Boulos said that, alongside the Quad, the US has been engaging with several regional countries on the initiative. He added that the US intends to bring the plan to the Security Council with the aim of adopting a resolution.

On 12 February, the Quintet group—comprised of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—released a joint statement which called for the immediate halting of any further military escalation and urged all concerned sides to support efforts towards a humanitarian truce and the delivery of life-saving assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, has continued to seek support for his proposal to end the conflict (which he presented during the Council’s 22 December 2025 briefing on Sudan), including during recent visits to Switzerland and Germany. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from areas under its control. Sudan has also continued efforts to secure readmission to the AU following its suspension after the October 2021 military takeover. In a communiqué adopted following a 12 February AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) ministerial meeting on Sudan, the AUPSC welcomed Sudan’s 22 December 2025 proposal as well as efforts led by the Quintet.

At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for insecurity and violence in Sudan. Yesterday (17 February), the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) proposed the designation of four RSF commanders under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. Since the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has not yet been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the UK circulated the proposal under a no-objection procedure until 24 February. (There is an understanding that respective presidents of the Council will handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs until the chairs have been appointed.) At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may highlight this measure and underline the need to consider expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur, considering the evolving conflict dynamics across other regions of the country. Several Council members—including the African members, China, and Russia—have opposed this proposal, which some other members have raised in the context of discussions on the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, most recently in September 2025.

Tomorrow, Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. She may emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and CRSV.

She may describe how intensifying hostilities are exacerbating risks to civilians, fuelling displacement and humanitarian needs, and shrinking humanitarian space while making operations increasingly dangerous for aid workers. The conflict has been marked by frequent attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as humanitarian assets, personnel, and convoys. Recent OCHA press releases have highlighted a sharp increase in deadly drone strikes across the Kordofan region, resulting in civilian casualties and further deepening the humanitarian crisis. In this context, Wosornu and several Council members are likely to stress the urgent imperative of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure and condemn their deliberate targeting.

Wosornu is also expected to reiterate calls for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and underscore the need for increased and flexible funding to sustain life-saving operations amid rising needs. She may also highlight ongoing efforts by OCHA and its partners to deliver assistance despite acute operational challenges. In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations.

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/sudan-briefing-7.php

Ends