Sudan's former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok says recent military gains won't end the country's conflict

HAMDOK, a 69-year-old former economist who now leads a civilian coalition from exile, called the idea that the conflict was drawing down “total nonsense.” The idea that reconstruction can begin in Khartoum while fighting rages elsewhere is “absolutely ridiculous,” he said.

“Any attempt at creating a government in Sudan today is fake. It is irrelevant,” he said, arguing that lasting peace can't be secured without addressing the root causes of the war. Read more.

From The Associated Press (AP)

By SAM METZ

North Africa reporter for AP

Dated 05 June 2025; 2:06 AM BST - full copy:

Former Prime Minister Hamdok says the military’s recent gains won’t end Sudan’s civil war

Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok speaks during a session of the summit to support Sudan, at the Grand Palais Ephemere in Paris on May 17, 2021. (AP Photo/Christophe Ena, Pool, File)

MARRAKECH, Morocco (AP) — Sudan’s former prime minister on Wednesday dismissed the military’s moves to form a new government as “fake,” saying its recent victories in recapturing the capital Khartoum and other territory will not end the country’s two-year civil war.

In a rare interview with The Associated Press, Abdalla Hamdok said no military victory, in Khartoum or elsewhere, could end the war that has killed tens of thousands and driven millions from their homes.

“Whether Khartoum is captured or not captured, it’s irrelevant,” Hamdok said on the sidelines of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s governance conference in Morocco. “There is no military solution to this. No side will be able to have outright victory.”

Hamdok became Sudan’s first civilian prime minister after decades of military rule in 2019, trying to lead a democratic transition. He resigned in January 2022 after a turbulent stretch in which he was ousted in a coup and briefly reinstated amid international pressure.

The following year, warring generals plunged the country into civil war. Sudan today bears the grim distinction of being home to some of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

Fighting between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has left at least 24,000 dead, though many believe the true toll is far worse.

Both sides stand accused of war crimes.

The RSF, with roots in Darfur’s notorious Janjaweed militia, has been accused of carrying out genocide. The army is accused of unleashing chemical weapons and targeting civilians where they live.

The war has driven about 13 million people from their homes, including 4 million who have crossed into neighboring countries. Famine is setting in and cholera is sweeping through.

The military recaptured the Khartoum area from the RSF in March, as well as some surrounding territory. Army chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan has framed the advances as a major turning point in the conflict.

Last month, he appointed a new prime minister, Kamil al-Taib Idris, for the first time since the war began, tasked with forming a new government. But the fighting has continued. The RSF has regrouped in its stronghold in Darfur and made advances elsewhere, including in Kordofan.

Hamdok, a 69-year-old former economist who now leads a civilian coalition from exile, called the idea that the conflict was drawing down “total nonsense.” The idea that reconstruction can begin in Khartoum while fighting rages elsewhere is “absolutely ridiculous,” he said.

“Any attempt at creating a government in Sudan today is fake. It is irrelevant,” he said, arguing that lasting peace can’t be secured without addressing the root causes of the war.

Hamdok said a ceasefire and a credible process to restore democratic, civilian rule would need to confront Sudan’s deep inequalities, including uneven development, issues among different identity groups and questions about the role of religion in government.

“Trusting the soldiers to bring democracy is a false pretense,” he added.

Though rooted in longstanding divisions, the war has been supercharged by foreign powers accused of arming both sides.

Pro-democracy groups, including Hamdok’s Somoud coalition, have condemned atrocities committed by both the army and the RSF. Hamdok, however, has avoided accusing the United Arab Emirates of supplying weapons to the RSF, even amid international scrutiny and an investigation from a U.N. panel of experts.

On Wednesday, he rebuffed AP questions about weapons coming from the UAE. He said those who singled out the Gulf state while ignoring others accused of backing the army, including Iran, were “pushing a narrative.”

“What we would like to see is anybody who is supplying arms to any side to stop,” he said.

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Sudan: UNSC Report - July 2025 Monthly Forecast

UN Security Council Report
July 2025 Monthly Forecast 
Dated 30 June 2025 - full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In July, the Security Council is expected to receive the semi-annual briefing on the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) activities related to the situation in Darfur. ICC Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan is expected to brief.

Background and Key Recent Developments

More than 17 years after the Council’s ICC referral on the situation in Darfur, through resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, the first trial opened on 5 April 2022 with the case of  Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”). Abd-Al-Rahman, reportedly a former leader of the Janjaweed militia, is accused of 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed between August 2003 and approximately April 2004 in Darfur. The ICC concluded the trial in December 2024, and a decision is expected later this year. (For more information, see our 27 January What’s in Blue story.)

Four arrest warrants issued by the ICC remain outstanding—against former Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir; former Sudanese Minister of State for the Interior Ahmad Muhammad Harun; former Sudanese Minister of National Defence Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein; and former Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain. Pursuant to resolution 1593 and the ICCs’ subsequent orders, Sudan remains under an obligation to surrender the four remaining suspects to the Court. According to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), following the outbreak of fighting in April 2023, Bashir, Hussein, and Harun—who had all been in custody in Kober prison in Khartoum—were released. Subsequently, media reports accused Harun of mobilising supporters of the former Bashir regime to fight alongside the army in Khartoum and other parts of Sudan.

According to the ICC Prosecutor’s most recent report, submitted to the Security Council on 16 January pursuant to resolution 1593, the OTP has gathered sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe that a wide range of crimes under the Rome Statute have been—and continue to be—committed in Darfur, in the context of the ongoing conflict in Sudan that began in April 2023. These include killings, pillaging, attacks against internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations, gender-based crimes, and crimes against and affecting children. (Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.) Furthermore, the OTP has continued to preserve evidence and information regarding alleged crimes committed by the Sudanese warring parties in North Darfur.

In his 27 January briefing to the Security Council, ICC Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan highlighted that the pattern of crimes, the perpetrators, and the targeted groups in the context of the ongoing conflict in Sudan closely resemble those from the 2003 conflict, which prompted the Council’s initial referral of the situation to the ICC. Khan emphasised the need to close the impunity gap and called for greater accountability. He expressed concern over widespread allegations regarding the targeting of women and girls, including reports of gender-based crimes. Khan confirmed that the OTP is taking steps to submit applications for arrest warrants in connection with crimes allegedly committed in West Darfur, while stressing that such applications will only be filed once the OTP is satisfied that there is a realistic prospect of conviction. He also underscored the importance of transferring Ahmad Harun to the ICC, noting its potential impact given the clear connection between Harun’s case and the recently concluded trial of Ali Kushayb.

In her remarks during the 53rd session of the Human Rights Council, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide ad interim Virginia Gamba said that the Sudanese warring parties in the current conflict have committed serious human rights violations and that the risk of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Sudan remains very high. She noted that continued and targeted attacks against certain ethnic groups, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, remain of particular concern. Gamba highlighted that the RSF and allied Arab militias continue to conduct ethnically motivated attacks against the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur groups.

In a 16 May statement, ICC Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan announced that he would temporarily step aside while the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services conducts an investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct, which he has denied. In his absence, the OTP confirmed that Deputy Prosecutors Nazhat Shameem Khan and Mame Mandiaye Niang have assumed leadership responsibilities.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A day earlier (1 June), a separate attack, reportedly attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), struck a busy market in Al Koma, killing 15 civilians and injuring dozens more. In a 4 June press release, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for prompt and impartial investigations into both incidents, along with meaningful steps to ensure accountability. It also urged all parties to the conflict to take concrete measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to facilitate safe and unimpeded humanitarian access in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

In a 17 June press release, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan warned that the civil war is intensifying, with devastating consequences for civilians caught in the conflict. The FFM reported the increased use of heavy weaponry in populated areas, with hospitals and medical facilities coming under siege, and a sharp rise in sexual and gender-based violence. It described the situation as “a grave human rights and protection emergency.” In El Fasher, civilians have been assaulted, detained, and killed, while villages have been attacked, burned, and looted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). 

During one RSF assault from 10 to 13 April, more than 100 civilians were reportedly killed. 

The FFM called on the international community to impose an arms embargo and to take concrete steps to ensure accountability for those responsible for serious human rights violations.

Key Issues and Options

An underlying issue for the Security Council remains how to effectively promote justice and accountability for both past atrocities committed in Darfur and the ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law being perpetrated by Sudan’s warring parties across the country. 

Broadly, the continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians remain a major concern for Council members in the context of the current conflict. The failure to ensure accountability for crimes committed over the past two decades has contributed to the recurrence of violence and impunity in the current conflict.

A key challenge for the Council is how to strengthen cooperation between the ICC and relevant Sudanese authorities, as well as third states and international and regional organisations. This includes facilitating the execution of outstanding arrest warrants, supporting the ICC’s ongoing investigations, and enabling the safe collection and transmission of evidence. A pressing concern in this regard is the documentation, preservation, and analysis of evidence in a highly insecure and fragmented environment. 

The volatile political and security situation in Sudan and in some neighbouring countries has created numerous obstacles for the ICC, including the disruption of planned deployments, limited access to sources of information, and difficulties in maintaining contact with witnesses. Khan’s 16 January report also points to significant resource constraints faced by the OTP, which continue to adversely affect its ability to pursue investigations and carry out its mandate in relation to the situation in Darfur.

Amid growing political sensitivities and divisions among states regarding the ICC’s work, an issue for the Council is how to ensure the Court receives the necessary political backing and resources to advance its mandate, uphold accountability, and help break the cycle of impunity. In addition to the regular briefing in July, Council members supportive of the ICC’s work in Sudan could consider holding a joint press stakeout in connection with the meeting to publicly reaffirm their commitment to justice and accountability.

Council members could also consider inviting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to brief on the broader human rights situation in Sudan. Additionally, members may wish to invite the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, who visited Sudan from 13 to 17 April, to share insights into the scale and nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the protection needs of affected populations. (For more information, see the Sudan brief in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast.)

Council Dynamics

The Council is divided on the work of the ICC. Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK are states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. These members have expressed strong support for the ICC’s efforts, including the conclusion of Ali Kushayb’s trial, and have commended the OTP for its continued pursuit of accountability for crimes committed in Darfur. Several have also endorsed the Prosecutor’s announcement of imminent applications for new arrest warrants linked to the current conflict in Sudan and called on the Sudanese authorities to enhance cooperation with the ICC.

On the other hand, Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, and the US are not states parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute and have expressed scepticism or outright criticism of the ICC’s role. Russia has been particularly vocal, accusing the Court of selective justice and political bias. Russia’s negative view of the ICC hardened following the Court’s announcement on 17 March 2023 that it had issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for allegedly committing the war crime of “unlawful deportation” and “unlawful transfer” of children from Ukraine to Russia.

During the Council’s 27 January briefing, Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Somalia underlined the importance of the principle of complementarity and supported Sudan’s judicial sovereignty. Algeria and Somalia also highlighted the need to revitalise Sudanese national justice institutions and to explore existing legal frameworks to administer justice, including African frameworks.

While the US has traditionally supported the ICC’s efforts concerning Sudan, it criticised the ICC for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes linked to Israel’s military actions in Gaza since at least 8 October 2023. 

In response, on 6 February, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC and Khan. On 5 June, the US also sanctioned four individuals serving as ICC judges for their roles in authorising investigations into US personnel in Afghanistan and issuing arrest warrants for Israeli officials.

Several Council members, supportive of the ICC’s work on Darfur, have expressed concern over efforts to undermine the Court’s independence, including through the use of sanctions and political pressure. These members have condemned any attempts to intimidate the OTP, warning that such measures could hinder the Court’s ability to carry out its mandate not only in Sudan but also in other jurisdictions.

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Sudan: UN Security Council will hold an open briefing followed by closed consultations on Fri 27 June 2025

Report from UN Security Council

What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday, 26 June 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (27 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. 

The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 

Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. 

The chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), is expected to brief the Council on the committee’s work. 

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the closed consultations.

Pobee is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating security situation in Sudan. 

In June, the conflict witnessed shifting front lines and intensified fighting across several regions. Fierce battles continued in the Kordofan region, as both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to consolidate territorial gains, exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts and inflicting significant harm on civilians.

The situation in El Fasher and other parts of North Darfur state continues to be highly volatile. El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has been under siege by the RSF since May 2024. 

In a 20 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted that, on 15 June, the RSF launched a renewed assault on the city following months of increased fighter mobilisation across Darfur, including the recruitment of children. He added that the operation aimed at capturing El Fasher, which involved a ground offensive, mirrored the RSF’s April attack on the nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, widespread sexual violence, and a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 18 May and 12 June What’s in Blue stories.)

Pobee may also address the regional dimensions of Sudan’s conflict. 

On 10 June, the SAF accused forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), of supporting RSF attacks on its positions along the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan—an allegation that the LNA has denied. 

After the SAF’s withdrawal from the tri-border zone on 11 June, the RSF claimed control over this strategic area, enabling it  to secure a supply line from Libya and advance towards the Nile Valley and Northern State, both of which are considered SAF strongholds. 

The conflict has also spilled into Abyei and South Sudan, escalating local tensions, displacing civilians, and worsening insecurity. 

Meanwhile, media reports indicate that the SAF has relocated warplanes to Eritrea amid increasing RSF drone strikes. (For more information, see our 18 March What’s in Blue story.)

In a 24 June press statement, Council members condemned the 20 June attack by “suspected Sudanese armed elements” on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeepers patrolling near the Central African Republic (CAR)-Sudan border. 

The incident resulted in the death of a Zambian peacekeeper. 

In their statement, Council members expressed concern about the impact of the crisis in Sudan, particularly in border areas, including RSF incursions into the CAR’s territory and its coordination with local armed groups.

Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across Sudan and reiterate their calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 

They may also discuss the destabilising impact of the conflict in Sudan on the region, including the influx of refugees to neighbouring countries.

Speakers are likely to stress the urgent need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as medical and humanitarian personnel, while condemning the deliberate targeting of these individuals and facilities. 

Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence, and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. 

Some may highlight the 21 June attack on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan, which reportedly killed more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. At the time of writing, it was unclear who was responsible for the attack.

In a separate development, the US has accused the Sudanese government of using chemical weapons in 2024, in violation of the country’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and announced on 22 May the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. The Sudanese government has denied these allegations.

Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. 

On 19 May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader, appointed Kamil Eltayeb Idris as Prime Minister. In a 20 May statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed hope that the appointment would serve as a first step towards inclusive consultations and the formation of a broad-based technocratic government. 

After assuming office, Idris dissolved the existing cabinet and, on 19 June, announced plans to appoint a 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. On 24 June, he named the ministers of defence and interior. 

However, the dissolution of the previous cabinet has sparked divisions among groups allied with the SAF, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, who argue that the move violates the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which provided for the allocation of cabinet positions and other political appointments to its signatories under a power-sharing framework.

During the closed consultations, Lamamra is expected to provide an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. 

On 2 June, the Personal Envoy held consultations in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, reportedly focusing on the need for coordinated international efforts to secure a ceasefire and advance an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue. He also spoke with Idris on 4 June—their first interaction since the prime minister’s appointment. 

As mediation efforts have yet to yield a breakthrough, Council members may wish to hear Lamamra’s assessment of recent political developments, prospects for de-escalation, and potential next steps, including the status of anticipated technical-level proximity talks. This may include strategies to enhance cooperation among stakeholders—particularly regional and sub-regional organisations—and to address the underlying challenges impeding the peace process. (For more information on recent mediation efforts, see our 18 May What’s in Blue story.)

On 3 June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the conflict in Sudan with the Quad ambassadors to the US (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 

According to a press release issued after the meeting, Landau acknowledged that the conflict in Sudan poses a threat to shared regional interests and underscored the importance of the Quad working collectively to persuade the warring parties to cease hostilities and pursue a negotiated settlement.

Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels today (26 June). 

Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the UK, the US, and Saudi Arabia.

Sudan’s civilian space remains fragmented, as evidenced by recent exchanges between different coalitions over Lamamra’s mediation efforts. 

Media reports suggest that a group of Sudanese politicians, activists, and diplomats sent a letter to Guterres on 13 June, accusing Lamamra of failing to establish a viable peace process and of aligning closely with the SAF’s narrative, and therefore calling for his replacement. 

By contrast, a different group of Sudanese political and civil society actors has reportedly expressed support for Lamamra and cautioned against efforts to undermine the mediation process.

Tomorrow, some Council members may reiterate their call on member states to refrain from external interference in Sudan, which they believe is exacerbating conflict and instability, and to instead support mediation efforts for a durable peace. They may call for strict compliance with the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime.

The appointment of the Panel of Experts assisting the committee, whose mandate was most recently extended through resolution 2772 of 17 February, remains stalled due to holds placed by some Council members. Some members may call for the urgent resolution of this impasse to ensure effective monitoring and implementation of the sanctions regime.

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