Showing posts with label 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. Show all posts

Saturday, August 30, 2025

Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:


Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.


Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 


Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.


On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 


On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.


In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.


The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)


On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.


While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.


Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.


Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.


Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.


Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.


Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.


In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.


Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.


In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.


During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.


The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.


Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.


Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.


A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.


The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.


Download Complete Forecast: PDF


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php


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Thursday, June 26, 2025

Sudan: UN Security Council will hold an open briefing followed by closed consultations on Fri 27 June 2025

Report from UN Security Council

What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday, 26 June 2025 - full copy:


Sudan: Briefing and Consultations


Tomorrow morning (27 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan


The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 


Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. 


The chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), is expected to brief the Council on the committee’s work. 


Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the closed consultations.


Pobee is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating security situation in Sudan. 


In June, the conflict witnessed shifting front lines and intensified fighting across several regions. Fierce battles continued in the Kordofan region, as both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to consolidate territorial gains, exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts and inflicting significant harm on civilians.


The situation in El Fasher and other parts of North Darfur state continues to be highly volatile. El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has been under siege by the RSF since May 2024. 


In a 20 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted that, on 15 June, the RSF launched a renewed assault on the city following months of increased fighter mobilisation across Darfur, including the recruitment of children. He added that the operation aimed at capturing El Fasher, which involved a ground offensive, mirrored the RSF’s April attack on the nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, widespread sexual violence, and a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 18 May and 12 June What’s in Blue stories.)


Pobee may also address the regional dimensions of Sudan’s conflict. 


On 10 June, the SAF accused forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), of supporting RSF attacks on its positions along the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan—an allegation that the LNA has denied


After the SAF’s withdrawal from the tri-border zone on 11 June, the RSF claimed control over this strategic area, enabling it  to secure a supply line from Libya and advance towards the Nile Valley and Northern State, both of which are considered SAF strongholds. 


The conflict has also spilled into Abyei and South Sudan, escalating local tensions, displacing civilians, and worsening insecurity. 


Meanwhile, media reports indicate that the SAF has relocated warplanes to Eritrea amid increasing RSF drone strikes. (For more information, see our 18 March What’s in Blue story.)


In a 24 June press statement, Council members condemned the 20 June attack by “suspected Sudanese armed elements” on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeepers patrolling near the Central African Republic (CAR)-Sudan border. 


The incident resulted in the death of a Zambian peacekeeper. 


In their statement, Council members expressed concern about the impact of the crisis in Sudan, particularly in border areas, including RSF incursions into the CAR’s territory and its coordination with local armed groups.


Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across Sudan and reiterate their calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 


They may also discuss the destabilising impact of the conflict in Sudan on the region, including the influx of refugees to neighbouring countries.


Speakers are likely to stress the urgent need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as medical and humanitarian personnel, while condemning the deliberate targeting of these individuals and facilities. 


Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence, and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. 


Some may highlight the 21 June attack on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan, which reportedly killed more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. At the time of writing, it was unclear who was responsible for the attack.


In a separate development, the US has accused the Sudanese government of using chemical weapons in 2024, in violation of the country’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and announced on 22 May the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. The Sudanese government has denied these allegations.


Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. 


On 19 May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader, appointed Kamil Eltayeb Idris as Prime Minister. In a 20 May statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed hope that the appointment would serve as a first step towards inclusive consultations and the formation of a broad-based technocratic government. 


After assuming office, Idris dissolved the existing cabinet and, on 19 June, announced plans to appoint a 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. On 24 June, he named the ministers of defence and interior. 


However, the dissolution of the previous cabinet has sparked divisions among groups allied with the SAF, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, who argue that the move violates the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which provided for the allocation of cabinet positions and other political appointments to its signatories under a power-sharing framework.


During the closed consultations, Lamamra is expected to provide an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. 


On 2 June, the Personal Envoy held consultations in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, reportedly focusing on the need for coordinated international efforts to secure a ceasefire and advance an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue. He also spoke with Idris on 4 June—their first interaction since the prime minister’s appointment. 


As mediation efforts have yet to yield a breakthrough, Council members may wish to hear Lamamra’s assessment of recent political developments, prospects for de-escalation, and potential next steps, including the status of anticipated technical-level proximity talks. This may include strategies to enhance cooperation among stakeholders—particularly regional and sub-regional organisations—and to address the underlying challenges impeding the peace process. (For more information on recent mediation efforts, see our 18 May What’s in Blue story.)


On 3 June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the conflict in Sudan with the Quad ambassadors to the US (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 


According to a press release issued after the meeting, Landau acknowledged that the conflict in Sudan poses a threat to shared regional interests and underscored the importance of the Quad working collectively to persuade the warring parties to cease hostilities and pursue a negotiated settlement.


Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels today (26 June). 


Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the UK, the US, and Saudi Arabia.


Sudan’s civilian space remains fragmented, as evidenced by recent exchanges between different coalitions over Lamamra’s mediation efforts. 


Media reports suggest that a group of Sudanese politicians, activists, and diplomats sent a letter to Guterres on 13 June, accusing Lamamra of failing to establish a viable peace process and of aligning closely with the SAF’s narrative, and therefore calling for his replacement. 


By contrast, a different group of Sudanese political and civil society actors has reportedly expressed support for Lamamra and cautioned against efforts to undermine the mediation process.


Tomorrow, some Council members may reiterate their call on member states to refrain from external interference in Sudan, which they believe is exacerbating conflict and instability, and to instead support mediation efforts for a durable peace. They may call for strict compliance with the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime.


The appointment of the Panel of Experts assisting the committee, whose mandate was most recently extended through resolution 2772 of 17 February, remains stalled due to holds placed by some Council members. Some members may call for the urgent resolution of this impasse to ensure effective monitoring and implementation of the sanctions regime.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-11.php

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Thursday, January 16, 2025

US Treasury sanctions SAF leader Burhan, SAF weapons supplier Abdalla, and RSF leader Hemeti

"AS a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked." Read the full story in breaking news, just in:


From The Sentry

Dated Thursday 16 Jan 2025, 21:09 GMT. Full copy:


US Sanctions Sudan’s Armed Forces Commander Burhan


January 16, 2025 (Washington DC) - Today, the US imposed sanctions on Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), citing actions including “indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure, attacks on schools, markets, and hospitals, and extrajudicial executions.”
 
The new sanctions designations by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) follow the designation of the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (known as “Hemedti”), and an official designation of genocide taking place in Sudan.

  

John Prendergast, co-founder of The Sentry, said: "Having recently sanctioned the leader of the paramilitary RSF, General Hemedti, it was critical that the US also sanction the leader of the Sudanese army, as they have both overseen massive human rights violations and deep-seated corruption.  In the end, when the death tolls are tallied, General Burhan may be responsible for more deaths than anyone in Sudan due to his obstruction of humanitarian aid as a famine has unfolded. Now the European Union, UK and others concerned about Sudan's plight should follow the US lead and impose sanctions on Hemedti and Burhan as well."

  

Brian Adeba, Senior Advisor at The Sentry, said: “The sanctioning of the leader of the Sudan Armed Forces is a significant move in the right direction. Sadly, as atrocities committed by the Sudan Armed Forces continue in offensives in central Sudan now, it is a stark reminder that such errant military leaders are still at work committing mass murder. This action should cajole the international community to activate international mechanisms designed to hold war criminals accountable as well as doubling efforts to bring the war in Sudan to a quick end to protect civilian lives.”

  

In addition, OFAC also sanctioned one company and one individual involved in weapons procurement in the Sudan conflict.

  

Read the US Department of Treasury’s sanctions announcement: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789
  

For media inquiries, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, gh@thesentry.org

  

About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption.”)

The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts. Learn more at: https://TheSentry.org

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