Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.

Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 

Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 

On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.

In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.

The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)

On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.

While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.

Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.

Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.

In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.

Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.

In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.

During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.

Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.

Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.

A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.

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View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php

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Understanding the Sudanese Civil War. Muslim Brotherhood is to blame. Janjaweed's home is Darfur

"The first thing [Sudanese] Pastor Kuku says when I ask him about the situation [in Sudan] is that the Muslim Brotherhood is to blame. “As far as they are concerned, they must be in control,” he says. “No one is allowed to govern the country while they are around — the country will be ruined, or they rule it… They feel that anyone else who might rule are infidels.” 

The Brotherhood is an Islamic organization active in many countries. It supported the old dictator al-Bashir, and now supports his successor al-Burhan. The trouble is, Kuku says, the Brotherhood does not feel any sense of patriotism or belonging to Sudan. Their loyalty is to the Brotherhood. If they can rule Sudan, good — if not, let it be destroyed. If Sudan is ruined, they can move on. That’s their perspective.

The Janjaweed, which is currently occupying the capital Khartoum, isn’t any better. The Janjaweed just want to loot and pillage, in Kuku’s view. They don’t feel that they will get to keep Khartoum, so they want to destroy it out of envy and spite". Read more.

From The Stream
By PETER ROWDEN 
Dated 24 November 2023 - here is a copy in full:

Understanding the Sudanese Civil War

Flickr/Steve Evans/CC BY-NC 2.0

Wars are too quickly forgotten. A conflict starts and the whole world watches. When it drags on with no resolution, the world moves on — especially if there is no ideological battle being fought, or if another, fresher conflict grabs our attention.

Such is the case with Sudan. The world may be ready to let the violence there fade into the background, seeing it as another Yemen or Somalia, a place of perpetual violence better left ignored. But the people of Sudan, including the large Christian minority in the country, cannot move on.

Civil war has been raging in Sudan for over six months now. The cost in human lives is mind-boggling. An October 15 UN report reveals that perhaps as many as 9,000 people have been killed, 5.6 million have been displaced, 25 million are in need of humanitarian aid, and 19 million children have been unable to attend school.

On October 31, I sat down with a Sudanese Pastor, Younan Kuku, to talk about the situation. Pastor Kuku hails from the Nuba mountains on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. He currently lives in another Arab country where he pastors a church of Sudanese refugees and expatriates.

The Background of the Conflict

Sudan is a diverse country. Dozens of tribes speak dozens of languages and adhere to a mixture of religions — Muslim, Christian, and traditional animism. Some tribes have Arabian ethnic origins, speak Arabic as their mother-tongue, and consider themselves Arabs. Many of them live the traditional Arab lifestyle of nomadic pastoralism.

Oher tribes speak a variety of African languages and identify as African. Many are settled farmers who do not want nomadic pastoralists roaming over their lands. These differences — “Arab” vs. “African,” Muslim vs. Christian, agriculturalist vs. pastoralist — are the roots of the ethnic, religious, and economic conflicts that have beset the country for decades.

For thirty years, Sudan was ruled by the dictator Omar al-Bashir, an Islamic extremist from an Arab tribe who wanted to impose Sharia law throughout the country. He adopted a policy of ethnic cleansing with the aim of turning Sudan into an Arab Muslim nation. For this the southern part of the country, which was predominantly “African” and Christian/animist/syncretistic, seceded in 2011 to become the world’s newest independent nation, South Sudan.

Three other regions are controlled by rebel groups and have dreams of succession or overthrowing the government in Khartoum, but are not strong enough. They reside in the vast Darfur region in the west of the country, the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State on the southern border, and Blue Nile State in the southeast.

In the Darfur region, al-Bashir used an Arab militia group called the Janjaweed to carry out his genocidal plans while avoiding implication in the crimes. Eventually, the Janjaweed was made official and integrated into the Sudanese military government as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

In 2019, a popular uprising unseated al-Bashir. He ended up in jail, and Sudan ostensibly began the transition to democracy. However, many of al-Bashir’s people remained in place in the government and the military.

In 2021 the military initiated another coup, overthrowing the civilian transitional government leadership. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan became the leader of the country. Burhan’s grip on Sudan was not strong, so he kept up the pretense of a transition to civilian rule. He left al-Bashir in jail, perhaps partly because al-Burhan would rather be in change than second fiddle.

For more than a year, the country was consumed with pro-democracy protests demanding that al-Burhan step down.

In April 2023 the leader of the RSF/Janjaweed, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (usually referred to as simply “Hemedti”), took advantage of al-Burhan’s unpopularity and the overall instability, and attempted to overthrow him. He portrayed himself as the true champion of the Sudanese people — despite the fact that it was he who oversaw many of the atrocities in the past Darfur conflicts.

The two men are now fighting over control of the country, but as far as most Sudanese people are concerned, both are villains.

“No Sense of Belonging”

The first thing Pastor Kuku says when I ask him about the situation is that the Muslim Brotherhood is to blame.

“As far as they are concerned, they must be in control,” he says. “No one is allowed to govern the country while they are around — the country will be ruined, or they rule it… They feel that anyone else who might rule are infidels.”

The Brotherhood is an Islamic organization active in many countries. It supported the old dictator al-Bashir, and now supports his successor al-Burhan.

The trouble is, Kuku says, the Brotherhood does not feel any sense of patriotism or belonging to Sudan. Their loyalty is to the Brotherhood. If they can rule Sudan, good — if not, let it be destroyed. If Sudan is ruined, they can move on. That’s their perspective.

The Janjaweed, which is currently occupying the capital Khartoum, isn’t any better. The Janjaweed just want to loot and pillage, in Kuku’s view. They don’t feel that they will get to keep Khartoum, so they want to destroy it out of envy and spite.

Khartoum

As a result, there are not many residents left in Khartoum proper, Kuku says — the city is mostly empty. However, people remain in the poorer urban areas on the edges of Khartoum proper, such as Omdurman and El-Haj Yousif. Residents of those areas don’t have the resources even to leave. Many of them came to Khartoum in the first place fleeing Darfur and other war torn areas of the country.

There is no real government in Khartoum. In the days of Omar Bashir, at least there was a government, Kuku says. “Now everything is ruined.”

I can see why any leadership at all would seem preferable to the current state of things. A video recently circulated in the Sudanese community that showed an iconic skyscraper in the capital burning. Khartoum does not have many skyscrapers, and I was shocked to see it destroyed — it had been perhaps the most impressive part of the skyline when I visited the city in 2022, a symbol of progress and development. Now it’s gone, and Khartoum is on its way to becoming a dystopian waste.

If the Janjaweed retains any control in Sudan, it will most likely be in its home turf of Darfur.

Darfur

“There many voices saying that Darfur must secede,” Kuku says.

In fact, people in Darfur have wanted to secede for a long time. The Janjaweed will support that idea, Kuku predicts, so that they can be left in charge of Darfur, and give the rest of Sudan to the al-Burhan and the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, the atrocities committed by the Janjaweed were part of the reason that many people in Darfur wanted to secede in the first place. If the Janjaweed takes over Darfur, the region could be left in the hands of a government just as genocidal as al-Bashir’s. The African tribes in Darfur want independence from Sudan, but not like this.

“I think it will happen,” says Kuku.

Nuba Mountains

Meanwhile, the rebels in the Nuba mountains don’t want to get involved in the war at all, because they consider both sides their enemies — and if they side with one side, the other side would punish them if it won.

So they are staying out of the conflict as much as possible. However, they are seizing the opportunity to re-take control of their own region, while the Sudanese military is otherwise occupied. The Nuba Mountains has its own functioning autonomous government. They have been thinking about independence for a long time. Kuku thinks that if Darfur secedes, the Nuba Mountains will ask for independence as well. But if there is any sort of peace compromise, they will be patient and hope for a better situation under the new government.

The Christian Community

Meanwhile, the Christian community scattered throughout the country is caught in the middle of the war. Both sides of the conflict are Islamic extremists. Kuku thinks that if the conflict resolves in any sort of compromise or peace agreement between the factions, there is hope that Christians may experience a little relief. But if the country is simply divided between Hemedti and al-Burhan, it could become very hard for the Christians in the new regimes.

Unfortunately, Christians don’t have much say in what happens to the country. They are left to make the best of it.

As reported here previously, the Christian community in the city of Wad Madani has been active in taking care of people flooding in from the capital. The situation remains very hard in Wad Madani because of the huge number of displaced people. People are sleeping in the schools, under trees, and beside houses, Kuku says.

The situation in the northern city of Atbara is similar.

The route for aid to reach the suffering people in Wad Madani and Atbara is through the Muslim Brotherhood in Port Sudan. Kuku indicates that although there is corruption, it is possible for some aid to actually reach them, especially if it is designated for the churches and not for the government. But not nearly enough aid is being sent.

The Future of Sudan

Most people in Sudan are Muslims, but they are not extremists and do not agree with the Brotherhood. The majority adhere to Sufism, a charismatic or mystical form of Islam that many Islamic extremists consider heretical. Syncretism and Muslims-in-name-only are also common.

Many people in Sudan, especially young people from the capital, want the Sudan to remain united. The younger generation wants change, and they want democracy, but they do not want the country to fall apart.

But politicians have other loyalties and think differently, Kuku says. The Sudanese people don’t want the Muslim Brotherhood to rule the country, nor the military. They want a civilian government. But the military won’t allow it.

“As far as I’m concerned, if Sudan remained one country it would be strong,” says Kuku.

I mentioned to him that on October 26, the RSF/Janjaweed and the military resumed peace talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

“It won’t succeed,” says Kuku simply.

Neither side is serious about peace right now. The military leaders only understand the language of threats, Kuku thinks. If a more powerful military forced them to stop tearing the country apart, they would listen. But mere admonitions of peace won’t do anything. Both sides are treating the war like a game.

Please continue to pray for Sudan, especially our Christian brothers and sisters there.

 

Peter Rowden is a friend of The Stream living in the Middle East.

View original: https://stream.org/understanding-the-sudanese-civil-war/

______________________________

Postscript from Sudan Watch Editor 

Notes to self:

Which countries call the Muslim Brotherhood a “terrorist organisation”? To date, the countries that have labelled the MB as a “terrorist organisation” are: Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. 

Who are the Muslim Brotherhood? The MB is the oldest political Islamist group in the Arab world. It is not allowed to operate as an official political party in some Arab countries.

Who are the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood? The supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is Mohamed Badie, who is currently in prison, having been sentenced to a number of life in prison and death sentences for a variety of charges.

Why do Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dislike the Muslim Brotherhood? In 2013, Saudi rulers threw their weight behind Egypt’s brutal crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood supporters. In March 2014, the kingdom designated the Muslim Brotherhood a “terrorist” group.

Source: Al Jazeera (2017)
_____

From Wikipedia the free encyclopedia - Muslim Brotherhood:

The Society of the Muslim Brothers better known as the Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar and schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928.^[23] Al-Banna's teachings spread far beyond Egypt, influencing today various Islamist movements from charitable organizations to political parties.^[24]

Sudan
Further information: National Islamic Front, National Congress Party (Sudan), and Islamism in Sudan

Until the election of Hamas in Gaza, Sudan was the one country where the Brotherhood was most successful in gaining power, its members making up a large part of the government officialdom following the 1989 coup d'état by General Omar al-Bashir.^{[citation needed]} However, the Sudanese government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated National Islamic Front (NIF) has come under considerable criticism for its human rights policies, links to terrorist groups, and war in southern Sudan and Darfur.^{[citation needed]}

ENDS