Showing posts with label WFP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WFP. Show all posts

Saturday, August 30, 2025

Sudan: Security Council Sep 2025 Monthly Forecast

THE UN Security Council is to vote on draft resolution to extend Sudan sanctions regime which expires on 12 September. 

Meanwhile, in Kordofan continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. 

In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma. 

Escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and there are frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.

Read more in Security Council Report from What’s in Blue

September 2025 Monthly Forecast 

Posted Friday, 29 August 2025 - here is a full copy:


Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the Sudan sanctions regime, which expires on 12 September.

The mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee expires on 12 March 2026.


Key Recent Developments

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, the fighting has centred around North Darfur state and the Kordofan region, witnessing an alarming escalation in hostilities. 


Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting, which has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.


On 11 August, at least 57 civilians were killed when the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, besieged by the RSF since May 2024, and the Abu Shouk IDP camp. 


On 16 August, Abu Shouk was hit by RSF artillery fire, killing at least 31 people, including seven children. These attacks follow months of intensified shelling, drone strikes, and blockade tactics that have cut off escape routes and trapped civilians inside the city. The other IDP camp adjoining El Fasher, Zamzam camp, was seized by the RSF in mid-April, resulting in hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to nearby areas, mostly to Tawila, a town in North Darfur state.


In late July, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of armed and political groups—announced the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. In a 13 August press statement, Council members rejected this announcement and expressed concern that it threatens Sudan’s unity and risks further fragmentation. Members reiterated that priority should be given to resuming talks towards a lasting ceasefire and creating conditions for re-establishing a credible and inclusive political transition towards a democratically elected national government following a civilian-led transitional period, in line with the principles of national ownership.


The US appears to be trying to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. It had planned to host a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—on 29 July, but according to media reports, the meeting has been indefinitely postponed. (For more information, see our 26 June and 4 August What’s in Blue stories.)


On 11 August, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos met with the SAF’s leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in Zurich. This meeting, reportedly facilitated by Qatar, was the highest-level US-Sudan engagement since US President Donald Trump assumed office earlier this year. Media reports suggest that both sides discussed a peace plan proposed by the US for a comprehensive ceasefire and expanded humanitarian access. At the time of writing, neither side had issued any official readout of the meeting.


While humanitarian conditions in Sudan continue to deteriorate, access remains severely constrained in areas of active fighting, leaving civilians trapped in dire conditions and resorting to desperate coping strategies, including eating animal feed and food waste. According to the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), access remained particularly restricted in North Darfur state, Greater Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains regions. In Kordofan, continued fighting along key supply routes has severely disrupted the delivery of essential goods and humanitarian assistance, aggravating economic hardship, driving displacement, and further worsening the humanitarian situation. In El Fasher, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been unable to deliver food by road for over a year, as all access routes remain blocked. On 20 August, a WFP convoy of 16 trucks carrying life-saving food was hit by a drone strike near Al Malit in North Darfur, destroying three trucks. This marked the second attack in three months on humanitarian convoys in the area, following the 2 June attack on a joint WFP-UNICEF convoy in Al Koma.


Human Rights-Related Developments

Between 27 and 31 July, Radhouane Nouicer, the UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, visited Port Sudan, where he met with Sudanese officials, UN representatives, humanitarian partners, and civil society organisations to assess the human rights situation amid the ongoing conflict. In a press release issued following the visit, Nouicer expressed grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights conditions, noting that escalating hostilities have made daily survival a constant struggle for civilians. He highlighted reports of extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, and underlined the need for sustained commitments to justice, accountability, and inclusive governance. Nouicer urged the international community to enforce the arms embargo, support local peacebuilding initiatives, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access.


Women, Peace and Security

On 19 August, Ikhlass Ahmed, founder and coordinator of the civil society organisation Darfur Advocacy Group, briefed the Council at the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). She underscored that CRSV has become a defining feature of the war in Sudan. While noting that CRSV is being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, Ahmed stressed that the RSF is “committing these violations in an organised, widespread and systematic manner”, particularly targeting women and girls based on their ethnicity. She also underscored that impunity has emboldened the SAF to commit sexual violence.


Ahmed noted that support for victims of CRSV in Sudan is “nowhere close to meeting the overwhelming needs” of survivors, amid a lack of emergency contraception, prophylaxis and safe abortion services. She also highlighted frequent attacks on health providers and facilities, including clinics providing reproductive health care and emergency response to survivors, as well as the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian access by warring parties.


Ahmed called on the Council to demand that all conflict parties fully comply with resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which called for an immediate halt to the fighting and demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher. In the absence of a ceasefire, she stressed the criticality of the protection of civilians and of ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Ahmed also called on the Council to demand an immediate end to CRSV by all conflict parties and to condemn the targeting of women human rights defenders and frontline workers.


Key Issues and Options

An immediate issue for the Council is the extension of the Sudan sanctions regime (targeted sanctions and the arms embargo). Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime, amid reports of continuous supply and use of foreign weapons and mercenaries in the Darfur region, is a major issue in this regard. As well, ensuring accountability for violations of international humanitarian, human rights law, and other atrocities remains a paramount issue. One option for the Council members is to extend the sanctions regime for one year.


In light of apparent violations of the sanctions regime and the evolving political and security dynamics in Sudan and the wider region, Council members could consider requesting the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment to assess the underlying drivers of instability. Such an assessment could also identify how the Council’s existing tools might be better adapted to respond effectively to the situation.


Although the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 March 2026 through resolution 2772 of 17 February, members have not been able to agree on its composition. In late February, the Secretary-General proposed five experts to serve on the Panel, but some Council members subsequently placed holds on the appointments. As a result, the Panel has not yet been constituted and is unable to carry out its work, including the submission of the interim report, due on 12 August, and the quarterly updates mandated by resolution 2772.


In this respect, one option for Council members is to convene an informal meeting of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss ways of breaking the impasse in appointing the Panel. Another option would be to address the matter at the Council level, rather than in a subsidiary body level, with members discussing it in either closed consultations or under “any other business”.


During the negotiations in September, some Council members may wish to have a substantive discussion about the sanctions measures, including, but not limited to, enlarging the geographical scope of the measures to the other parts of the country, expanding the designation criteria, and listing more individuals and entities under the current regime. As part of this discussion, some members may raise the issue of aligning the mandate of the sanctions regime with that of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.


The overarching issue for the Council is how to bring an end to the ongoing fighting and support efforts towards a sustainable ceasefire across Sudan and a civilian-led political transition. The continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians, civilian and humanitarian infrastructure, remain a major concern for Council members. As well, with hostilities continuing, mediation efforts have consistently failed to achieve any meaningful breakthroughs. Council members could consider holding an informal interactive dialogue with key regional and international stakeholders—including representatives of regional and sub-regional organisations and states involved in mediation efforts—to explore ways to leverage their comparative advantages and harmonise their efforts in support of a coherent political strategy to the crisis.


Council Dynamics

Council members recognise that external interference has fuelled conflict and instability in Sudan and have urged all states to refrain from such actions, support efforts for a durable peace, comply with their obligations under international law, and implement relevant Council resolutions on sanctions in Darfur. Members, however, have diverging views on the utility of the sanctions regime. Several have stressed the importance of maintaining the measures in light of ongoing violence in Darfur and the Panel of Experts’ role in monitoring the humanitarian and security situation and identifying violations. Russia has argued that sanctions have failed to stabilise the region, pointing to the continued flow of weapons into Darfur. In their explanation of vote on resolution 2772, the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) called for a “principled approach” that advances a resolution to the crisis, while ensuring that Council-imposed measures remain balanced and constructive.


Council members also have diverging views on how to adapt the Council’s tools to the evolving security situation in the country. Some, such as France, have advocated expanding the geographical scope of sanctions beyond Darfur to other conflict-affected parts of the country. Other members have also expressed support for the application of targeted measures against individuals responsible for atrocities and sanctions violations. However, the “A3 plus” members, China, and Russia, have opposed expanding the scope of the sanctions regime. Russia, in particular, has stated that it considers “unacceptable even any hint of extending the sanctions regime beyond Darfur”.


A recurrent issue in recent negotiations on the Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts has been the duration of the mandates. The “A3 plus” members, China, Pakistan, and Russia, have supported shorter renewals, arguing that aligning the duration of both mandates would avoid a situation where the Panel’s reporting period extends beyond that of the sanctions regime itself. These members argued that such an arrangement effectively prejudges the extension of the regime, while noting that this alignment is consistent with the Council’s practice in other sanctions regimes. In their explanation of votes, following the adoption of resolution 2772, “A3 plus members” and China indicated that they anticipate a thorough discussion on this issue when the sanctions regime comes up for renewal in September. On the other hand, the penholder and like-minded members have favoured longer mandates to ensure continuity and predictability in the panel’s reporting.


The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions.


Download Complete Forecast: PDF


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-09/sudan-37.php


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Tuesday, July 01, 2025

Sudan: UNSC Report - July 2025 Monthly Forecast

UN Security Council Report
July 2025 Monthly Forecast 
Dated 30 June 2025 - full copy:

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In July, the Security Council is expected to receive the semi-annual briefing on the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) activities related to the situation in Darfur. ICC Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan is expected to brief.


Background and Key Recent Developments

More than 17 years after the Council’s ICC referral on the situation in Darfur, through resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, the first trial opened on 5 April 2022 with the case of  Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”). Abd-Al-Rahman, reportedly a former leader of the Janjaweed militia, is accused of 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed between August 2003 and approximately April 2004 in Darfur. The ICC concluded the trial in December 2024, and a decision is expected later this year. (For more information, see our 27 January What’s in Blue story.)


Four arrest warrants issued by the ICC remain outstanding—against former Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir; former Sudanese Minister of State for the Interior Ahmad Muhammad Harun; former Sudanese Minister of National Defence Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein; and former Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain. Pursuant to resolution 1593 and the ICCs’ subsequent orders, Sudan remains under an obligation to surrender the four remaining suspects to the Court. According to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), following the outbreak of fighting in April 2023, Bashir, Hussein, and Harun—who had all been in custody in Kober prison in Khartoum—were released. Subsequently, media reports accused Harun of mobilising supporters of the former Bashir regime to fight alongside the army in Khartoum and other parts of Sudan.


According to the ICC Prosecutor’s most recent report, submitted to the Security Council on 16 January pursuant to resolution 1593, the OTP has gathered sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe that a wide range of crimes under the Rome Statute have been—and continue to be—committed in Darfur, in the context of the ongoing conflict in Sudan that began in April 2023. These include killings, pillaging, attacks against internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations, gender-based crimes, and crimes against and affecting children. (Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.) Furthermore, the OTP has continued to preserve evidence and information regarding alleged crimes committed by the Sudanese warring parties in North Darfur.


In his 27 January briefing to the Security Council, ICC Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan highlighted that the pattern of crimes, the perpetrators, and the targeted groups in the context of the ongoing conflict in Sudan closely resemble those from the 2003 conflict, which prompted the Council’s initial referral of the situation to the ICC. Khan emphasised the need to close the impunity gap and called for greater accountability. He expressed concern over widespread allegations regarding the targeting of women and girls, including reports of gender-based crimes. Khan confirmed that the OTP is taking steps to submit applications for arrest warrants in connection with crimes allegedly committed in West Darfur, while stressing that such applications will only be filed once the OTP is satisfied that there is a realistic prospect of conviction. He also underscored the importance of transferring Ahmad Harun to the ICC, noting its potential impact given the clear connection between Harun’s case and the recently concluded trial of Ali Kushayb.


In her remarks during the 53rd session of the Human Rights Council, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide ad interim Virginia Gamba said that the Sudanese warring parties in the current conflict have committed serious human rights violations and that the risk of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Sudan remains very high. She noted that continued and targeted attacks against certain ethnic groups, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, remain of particular concern. Gamba highlighted that the RSF and allied Arab militias continue to conduct ethnically motivated attacks against the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur groups.


In a 16 May statement, ICC Prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan announced that he would temporarily step aside while the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services conducts an investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct, which he has denied. In his absence, the OTP confirmed that Deputy Prosecutors Nazhat Shameem Khan and Mame Mandiaye Niang have assumed leadership responsibilities.


Human Rights-Related Developments

On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A day earlier (1 June), a separate attack, reportedly attributed to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), struck a busy market in Al Koma, killing 15 civilians and injuring dozens more. In a 4 June press release, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called for prompt and impartial investigations into both incidents, along with meaningful steps to ensure accountability. It also urged all parties to the conflict to take concrete measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to facilitate safe and unimpeded humanitarian access in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law.


In a 17 June press release, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan warned that the civil war is intensifying, with devastating consequences for civilians caught in the conflict. The FFM reported the increased use of heavy weaponry in populated areas, with hospitals and medical facilities coming under siege, and a sharp rise in sexual and gender-based violence. It described the situation as “a grave human rights and protection emergency.” In El Fasher, civilians have been assaulted, detained, and killed, while villages have been attacked, burned, and looted by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). 


During one RSF assault from 10 to 13 April, more than 100 civilians were reportedly killed. 


The FFM called on the international community to impose an arms embargo and to take concrete steps to ensure accountability for those responsible for serious human rights violations.


Key Issues and Options

An underlying issue for the Security Council remains how to effectively promote justice and accountability for both past atrocities committed in Darfur and the ongoing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law being perpetrated by Sudan’s warring parties across the country. 


Broadly, the continued violence, insecurity, and targeted attacks against civilians remain a major concern for Council members in the context of the current conflict. The failure to ensure accountability for crimes committed over the past two decades has contributed to the recurrence of violence and impunity in the current conflict.


A key challenge for the Council is how to strengthen cooperation between the ICC and relevant Sudanese authorities, as well as third states and international and regional organisations. This includes facilitating the execution of outstanding arrest warrants, supporting the ICC’s ongoing investigations, and enabling the safe collection and transmission of evidence. A pressing concern in this regard is the documentation, preservation, and analysis of evidence in a highly insecure and fragmented environment. 


The volatile political and security situation in Sudan and in some neighbouring countries has created numerous obstacles for the ICC, including the disruption of planned deployments, limited access to sources of information, and difficulties in maintaining contact with witnesses. Khan’s 16 January report also points to significant resource constraints faced by the OTP, which continue to adversely affect its ability to pursue investigations and carry out its mandate in relation to the situation in Darfur.


Amid growing political sensitivities and divisions among states regarding the ICC’s work, an issue for the Council is how to ensure the Court receives the necessary political backing and resources to advance its mandate, uphold accountability, and help break the cycle of impunity. In addition to the regular briefing in July, Council members supportive of the ICC’s work in Sudan could consider holding a joint press stakeout in connection with the meeting to publicly reaffirm their commitment to justice and accountability.


Council members could also consider inviting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to brief on the broader human rights situation in Sudan. Additionally, members may wish to invite the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, who visited Sudan from 13 to 17 April, to share insights into the scale and nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the protection needs of affected populations. (For more information, see the Sudan brief in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast.)


Council Dynamics

The Council is divided on the work of the ICC. Denmark, France, Greece, Guyana, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and the UK are states parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. These members have expressed strong support for the ICC’s efforts, including the conclusion of Ali Kushayb’s trial, and have commended the OTP for its continued pursuit of accountability for crimes committed in Darfur. Several have also endorsed the Prosecutor’s announcement of imminent applications for new arrest warrants linked to the current conflict in Sudan and called on the Sudanese authorities to enhance cooperation with the ICC.


On the other hand, Algeria, China, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, and the US are not states parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute and have expressed scepticism or outright criticism of the ICC’s role. Russia has been particularly vocal, accusing the Court of selective justice and political bias. Russia’s negative view of the ICC hardened following the Court’s announcement on 17 March 2023 that it had issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for allegedly committing the war crime of “unlawful deportation” and “unlawful transfer” of children from Ukraine to Russia.


During the Council’s 27 January briefing, Algeria, China, Pakistan, and Somalia underlined the importance of the principle of complementarity and supported Sudan’s judicial sovereignty. Algeria and Somalia also highlighted the need to revitalise Sudanese national justice institutions and to explore existing legal frameworks to administer justice, including African frameworks.


While the US has traditionally supported the ICC’s efforts concerning Sudan, it criticised the ICC for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes linked to Israel’s military actions in Gaza since at least 8 October 2023. 


In response, on 6 February, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC and Khan. On 5 June, the US also sanctioned four individuals serving as ICC judges for their roles in authorising investigations into US personnel in Afghanistan and issuing arrest warrants for Israeli officials.


Several Council members, supportive of the ICC’s work on Darfur, have expressed concern over efforts to undermine the Court’s independence, including through the use of sanctions and political pressure. These members have condemned any attempts to intimidate the OTP, warning that such measures could hinder the Court’s ability to carry out its mandate not only in Sudan but also in other jurisdictions.


Download Complete Forecast: PDF


View original:  https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/sudan-36.php


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Saturday, June 14, 2025

UN Security Council Meeting on Sudan 16 June 2025

From UN Security Council
What's In Blue 
Posted Thursday, 12 June 2025 - copy in full:

Sudan: Closed Consultations*


On Monday afternoon (16 June), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark, Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country. Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya is the anticipated briefer.*


More than two years since fighting erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the violence has evolved into a protracted armed conflict, resulting in widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, the destruction of critical infrastructure, severe food and water shortages, and severe violations of international humanitarian law. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate amid ongoing hostilities and the growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, which has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict.


Monday’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of escalating attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian personnel, and aid facilities. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since the beginning of this year, attacks on critical infrastructure such as power stations, water sub-stations, and oil refineries across the country have caused widespread electricity outages and severely disrupted access to essential rights and services, including safe drinking water, healthcare and food supplies. In early May, the RSF reportedly launched a series of drone strikes targeting key civilian and military infrastructure in Port Sudan—the country’s de facto administrative capital—and Kassala, cities which had until then remained largely insulated from the conflict. In mid-May, RSF drone strikes reportedly hit three power stations in the city of Omdurman, causing widespread electricity outages across Khartoum state. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast and 18 May What’s in Blue story.)


The security situation in El Fasher and the wider North Darfur region remains highly volatile. In mid-April, the RSF intensified its siege and attacks on the city through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties, the killing of aid workers, and mass displacement. According to the UN, on 29 May, a World Food Programme (WFP) facility in El Fasher reportedly came under repeated shelling by the RSF, causing significant damage to a critical humanitarian hub. On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A 3 June joint WFP/UNICEF press statement said that the aid convoy’s route had been shared in advance and that all parties on the ground had been informed of the convoy’s location. The statement called for an immediate investigation and for those responsible to be held accountable. At the time of writing, it is unclear who is responsible for the attack, for which the warring parties have blamed each other. On Monday, Msuya and some Council members might underscore the need to ensure accountability for such attacks and break the cycle of impunity.


Elsewhere in Sudan, hostilities have intensified in the Kordofan region, with the parties reportedly exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts, causing significant harm to civilians. On 30 May, the Eldaman International Hospital in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, was reportedly struck in a drone attack by the RSF, killing at least six health workers and injuring more than 15 others. In recent days, airstrikes have also reportedly targeted residential areas of El Obeid city, resulting in the injury of civilians.


At Monday’s meeting, Msuya is likely to describe how the conflict dynamics are impacting the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly in areas experiencing intense fighting. He may provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. According to OCHA’s latest humanitarian access snapshot, which was published on 4 June, access across Sudan remains severely constrained due to ongoing insecurity, bureaucratic obstacles, and mass displacement, particularly in South and West Kordofan and North Darfur states. In the Kordofan region, heavy fighting has blocked key humanitarian routes and disrupted supply chains, while shifting front lines and long distances from key logistics hubs, such as Port Sudan and the Adré crossing at the Chad-Sudan border, have severely hampered operations. Meanwhile, access in Khartoum remained challenging due to insecurity and bureaucratic restrictions, such as delays in processing travel permits and visas for aid workers.


As hostilities persist, Sudan’s health crisis has deepened, with the healthcare system collapsing, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 156 attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in 318 deaths and 273 injuries. Meanwhile, approximately 20.3 million people—over 40 percent of the country’s population—are in urgent need of health assistance, with more than two-thirds of Sudan’s states battling three or more disease outbreaks simultaneously.


The cholera outbreak that started in July 2024 has since spread to 92 localities across 13 of Sudan’s 18 states, infecting 74,000 people and causing 1,826 deaths. Since May, the WHO has reported a rapid increase in cholera cases in Khartoum state, with over 16,000 cases and 239 deaths documented. The WHO attributed the recent surge in cholera cases to poor water, sanitation and hygiene, caused by a shortage of safe water following attacks on major power plants and water sources. Estimates suggest that approximately $40 million is needed to rehabilitate water infrastructure in Khartoum state. (For more information, see our 12 March What’s in Blue story.)


According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as at 28 May, there were approximately 10.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, a decrease of 13 percent compared to the country’s highest-ever recorded population of IDPs early this year. The IOM attributed this reduction to increased return movements, particularly to Khartoum, Sennar, and Al Jazirah states. Since April 2023, more than four million people have sought refuge in Sudan’s neighbouring countries. Returnees continue to face critical humanitarian needs, with limited access to basic services and persistent protection risks. For instance, recent media reports have indicated the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance in areas of return.


In a 10 June statement following his visit to Khartoum, the WFP’s Sudan representative, Laurent Bukera, announced that the WFP has re-established its presence in the area with the opening of an office in Omdurman. He noted that, with people returning to conflict-affected areas like Khartoum, pressure on overstretched resources will intensify. He underlined the urgent need to restore basic services and accelerate recovery through coordinated efforts with local authorities, national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and humanitarian partners.


On Monday, Msuya is likely to underscore the urgent need to act to alleviate the suffering of millions in Sudan. He may call on the international community to scale up its humanitarian response to match the scale and urgency of the crisis. He might also underline the need for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and highlight the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $4.16 billion, was only approximately 14percent funded.


Council members may reiterate key points from their press statement, agreed earlier this evening (12 June), which was authored by the UK. The statement recalled resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher and called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher. In their statement, Council members condemned the 2 June attack on the WFP/UNICEF humanitarian convoy and the 29 May shelling by the RSF that damaged a WFP facility in El Fasher. They also expressed deep concern over the impact of the conflict on humanitarian operations, including reports of air attacks by the RSF in Port Sudan, Kassala and Khartoum. The statement reiterated that deliberate attacks against humanitarian personnel, their premises, and assets may constitute war crimes and called on the parties to abide by their commitments under the 11 May 2023 Jeddah Declaration as well as by their obligations under international law.

________________________________________________________________


**Post-script (13 June, 3:45 pm EST): After the publication of this story, the meeting was pushed from Friday (13 June) to Monday (16 June), due to the scheduling of an emergency meeting on Iran on Friday afternoon. The story was amended to reflect the change in timing as well as the briefer; while Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher was expected to brief on Friday, the briefer expected for Monday is Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-closed-consultations-7.php

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NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor


Plumpy’Nut - A ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)


A peanut product called Plumpy’Nut could come to the aid of starving people, especially children, across the globe.


Severe acute malnutrition has traditionally been treated with therapeutic milk and required hospitalisation. Unlike milk, Plumpy’Nut can be administered at home and without medical supervision.


Plumpy’Nut has a two-year shelf life and requires no water, preparation, or refrigeration. Its ease of use has made mass treatment of malnutrition in famine situations more efficient than in the past.

Image: Plumpy'Nut, a ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)

Read more at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumpy%27nut


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