Showing posts with label AU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AU. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 01, 2025

UNSC October 2025 Monthly Forecast: Security Council & wider UN structure, focus on UN-AU cooperation, peace & security in Africa, UNOAU

Note, for the whole month of October 2025 Russia will hold the presidency of the UN Security Council. 


"Russia plans to organise one signature event, an open debate on the 80th anniversary of the UN under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item. The meeting will be held on UN Day (24 October), which marks the entry into force of the UN Charter. Secretary-General António Guterres is expected to brief." 


Read more from Security Council Report What’s In Blue, and download complete Monthly Forecast PDF here below containing a section titled "The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question". 


What’s In Blue

Dated Tuesday 30 September 2025 - excerpt:


October 2025 Monthly Forecast 


SECURITY COUNCIL AND WIDER UN STRUCTURE

UN-AU Cooperation


Expected Council Action

In October, the Council is expected to hold a briefing on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, focusing on the African Union (AU). Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) Parfait Onanga-Anyanga is the anticipated briefer. Onanga-Anyanga is expected to present the Secretary-General’s annual report on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the UNOAU, during the meeting.


Full report: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/un-au-cooperation-5.php


Download complete Monthly Forecast: PDF

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What’s In Blue

Dated Wednesday 01 October 2025 - excerpt:


Security Council Programme of Work for October 2025

The 19th annual joint consultative meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) will be held on 17 October. The annual meeting rotates between New York and Addis Ababa, the home of the AU headquarters. This year, the meeting will be held in Addis Ababa, and it will be preceded by the tenth informal joint seminar of the Security Council and the AUPSC, which is set to take place on 16 October. […]

Other issues, including Iran (non-proliferation) and Sudan, could be raised during the month depending on developments.”


Full report:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/security-council-programme-of-work-for-october-2025.php

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Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
What’s In Blue
Dated Wednesday 01 October 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations


This afternoon (1 October), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the current escalation of violence in El Fasher in North Darfur state; ongoing efforts to secure a humanitarian pause; and recent diplomatic engagements on Sudan, including during the General Assembly’s high-level week. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are expected to brief.


Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, there has been an alarming escalation in hostilities in the fighting, which has centred around El Fasher and the Kordofan region. The growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict. A 29 September Washington Post article reported that the RSF now possess anti-aircraft weapons, drones, and surface-to-air missiles. A report published on the same day by the Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale School of Public Health identified at least 43 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) near the RSF-controlled Nyala airport in South Darfur and 36 launchers.


Regional and international initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan have continued, but a meaningful breakthrough remains elusive, as the positions of both Sudanese warring parties and key member states have become entrenched. In recent weeks, the US has sought to reinvigorate peace-making efforts through the convening of the “Quad” countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to explore ways of generating new momentum. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.)


On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the Quad countries issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to allow the rapid delivery of assistance across Sudan, with the aim of paving the way for a permanent ceasefire. The statement proposed that an inclusive and transparent transition process be launched and concluded within nine months, leading to the establishment of an independent, civilian-led government with broad-based legitimacy and accountability. The ministers committed to press all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and ensure humanitarian assistance reaches those in need; promote conditions that ensure the security of the broader Red Sea region; counter transnational security threats from terrorist and extremist organisations; and deny space to destabilising regional and domestic actors.


In a 29 September press briefing in New York, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos described ongoing discussions on the humanitarian situation in Sudan. He noted extensive engagements with organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and said that the US is working closely with both the RSF and SAF to facilitate urgent aid delivery to El Fasher, with plans to extend assistance to Kordofan and other affected areas. Boulos also recently held discussions with Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, which focused on the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the situation in Sudan featured in his exchanges with regional and international stakeholders, including with African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf during a September visit to Addis Ababa.


On 24 September, the Quad countries convened at ministerial level on the margins of the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, continuing their discussions on ways to restore peace and security in Sudan.


That day, the AU, the European Union (EU), France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with regional and international stakeholders to address the situation in Sudan and coordinate efforts towards de-escalation and the protection of civilians. The statement issued following the meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire and called on them to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of civilians.


In September, Lamamra undertook a regional tour aimed at advancing peace efforts with the Sudanese parties and relevant interlocutors. In Nairobi, Kenya, he held consultations with independent civilian representatives as well as delegations from the RSF-aligned “Tasis” alliance and the Civil Democratic Alliance of the Revolution’s Forces (“Sumoud”), which emerged earlier this year following a split from the “Taqaddum” coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In a post on X, Lamamra underscored his commitment to engage actors all across the spectrum, irrespective of their political affiliations, to foster consensus on the way forward. He also held a meeting with Kenyan President William Ruto, during which Lamamra reportedly provided an update on his recent peace engagements and discussed ways to intensify efforts to end the conflict.


Lamamra subsequently travelled to Port Sudan, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Transitional Prime Minister Kamil Eltayeb Idris and members of his cabinet. According to a 17 September press briefing by Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric, Lamamra also engaged with civilian political actors, women’s groups, and members of the diplomatic corps. Dujarric said that this visit was part of efforts to “lay the complex groundwork necessary to support an inclusive peace process” capable of delivering a sustainable solution. This afternoon, Council members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps in the mediation process and of ways to address the underlying issues hindering peace efforts.


At the meeting, Msuya is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in light of the evolving security developments and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid. The situation is particularly grave in El Fasher, where more than 260,000 civilians—including 130,000 children—remain trapped, according to UN estimates. Civilians in the area are facing growing risks of sexual violence, forced recruitment, and arbitrary detention. As conditions deteriorate, people have resorted to desperate measures, such as eating animal feed and food waste.


Satellite imagery published by Yale’s HRL shows that, since May, the RSF has been constructing a massive earthen berm encircling El Fasher, which now stretches more than 68 kilometres, leaving only a narrow three- to four-kilometre gap. Civilians continue to face daily threats from shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks. On 19 September, one of the deadliest incidents in recent months occurred when a mosque near the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) was struck by a drone reportedly belonging to the RSF, killing more than 70 people, including at least 11 children.


In a 29 September statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan Denise Brown called for the lifting of the siege on El Fasher, an end to indiscriminate attacks, and clear orders to fighters to prevent sexual violence and ethnically motivated attacks. She also emphasised the need to guarantee safe passage for civilians wishing to leave the city through open, secure, and accessible routes, while ensuring that those who remain are protected and have access to food, water, and other essential supplies.


Msuya might elaborate on Fletcher’s recent engagements with the Sudanese warring parties. On 24 September, he met with Idris to discuss the expansion of humanitarian access and the UN’s presence in Sudan, including efforts to move pre-positioned aid supplies in El Fasher. The following day, he spoke with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, expressing grave concern about the humanitarian crisis in El Fasher and stressing the urgent need to protect civilians, halt the fighting, and ensure safe humanitarian access. At today’s meeting, Council members may be interested in Msuya’s assessment about the prospects for securing humanitarian pauses in El Fasher and expanding humanitarian access into the area.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-closed-consultations-9.php


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Friday, September 12, 2025

Sudan is top of IRC's 2025 Emergency Watchlist: 30m people - over half of Sudan’s population - are in need

SUDAN: Statement by David Miliband
President and CEO of the International Rescue Committee (IRC)
Press Release Khartoum, Sudan, Thursday 11 September 2025. Excerpts:

After visiting Sudan from 7-11th September, David Miliband said,

"Sudan is top of the IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist for good reason. 30 million people - over half of Sudan’s population - are in humanitarian need and this week I got to meet some of them in River Nile state. ...

"Like many of our clients, many of our 400 national staff are part of the largest displacement crisis in the world. The war, now in its third year, is a catastrophe of staggering proportions: the world’s largest hunger crisis, largest humanitarian crisis, largest displacement crisis, and yet one too often put in the “too difficult” box by global politics. The scale of suffering should jolt the conscience of the international community. Instead, this crisis is one of the most underfunded worldwide, and has been met by diplomatic stasis. ...

"The international community cannot continue to look away. Last year, of the 16,000 words uttered by the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the opening plenary of the UN General Assembly, the word “Sudan” was only mentioned 8 times. As we approach this year’s UNGA, Sudan must move from the margins of diplomatic discussion to the center of the agenda. That means unified pressure behind a single peace track, meaningful action to protect civilians and humanitarian access, and—critically—new, flexible funding to meet the scale of need. Sudanese civilians are paying the price of international inaction. The time to stand with them is now.

View full statement: https://www.rescue.org/press-release/sudan-statement-david-miliband-president-and-ceo-international-rescue-committee
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Careers
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https://careers.rescue.org/us/en

Jobs - Search All IRC Vacancies
https://careers.rescue.org/us/en/search-results

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Saturday, August 16, 2025

South Sudan: UNSC Briefing and Consultations

THE security situation has remained tense since clashes erupted in March. 


The South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) has continued operations, including ground offensive and aerial bombardments against opposition-held areas and other armed groups, including in the Greater Upper Nile and Greater Equatoria regions. 


The ceasefire agreed to in the revitalised agreement has effectively collapsed, with force unification stalled amid ongoing SSPDF offensives, as well as defections to and recruitment by the SSPDF. 


Intercommunal violence has further aggravated insecurity, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, according to the Secretary-General’s report.


At Monday’s meeting, several Council members are expected to raise the country’s dire humanitarian situation, including rising food insecurity. 


These challenges have been compounded by flooding and a collapsing healthcare system amid a severe cholera outbreak


The country also continues to grapple with the adverse humanitarian, security, and economic effects of the ongoing fighting in Sudan and the resulting influx of refugees and South Sudanese returnees.


Impediments to humanitarian access, including attacks on humanitarian workers and looting of humanitarian assets, are another matter of concern for Council members.


Read more in Security Council Report
By What's In Blue 
Dated Friday 15 August 2025
South Sudan: Briefing and Consultations


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Tuesday, August 05, 2025

Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Dated Mon 4 Aug 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations


This afternoon (4 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the recent escalation of violence in North Darfur state and the Kordofan region. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk are expected to brief.


Ahead of the meeting, Russia apparently objected to having an official from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) brief on Sudan, arguing that the office lacks the mandate to brief the Council on the issue. However, Denmark and the UK countered this argument, noting OHCHR’s strong presence in Port Sudan, as well as its access to nationwide networks and to parties to the conflict. They also argued that the Council should be able to draw on all relevant information to inform its work and cited precedents of briefings from OHCHR officials to the Council on other situations.


At this afternoon’s meeting, Lamamra is expected to provide an overview of the grave security situation in the country, amid spiralling and unabated violence. In recent months, North Darfur state and the Kordofan region have witnessed an alarming escalation in hostilities, with large numbers of civilians bearing the brunt of the fighting. Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. The fighting has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. (For background and more information, see our 26 June What’s in Blue story.)


The Kordofan region has become a key flashpoint in the ongoing conflict due to its strategic importance as a crossroads linking the country from east to west and north to south. Control of the region is critical to shaping the balance of power in Sudan’s civil war. El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and a focal point of fighting, remains the SAF’s westernmost stronghold after it broke the RSF’s siege in February. The SAF reportedly uses El-Obeid as a base for launching airstrikes into Darfur and for preventing RSF advances towards Khartoum. Recent media reports have indicated an RSF mobilisation aimed at seizing El-Obeid.


In a 17 July statement, OHCHR noted that it had verified the killing of at least 60 civilians by the RSF in the Bara locality of North Kordofan since 10 July. Civil society groups have reported significantly higher figures, with some estimates placing the death toll at up to 300. The OHCHR statement added that at least 23 civilians were reportedly killed and over 30 injured in airstrikes carried out by the SAF on two villages in West Kordofan state between 10 and 14 July. Additionally, on 17 July, a SAF airstrike in the Bara locality killed at least 11 civilians.


In the same statement, Türk warned that a continued escalation of hostilities would worsen the already dire humanitarian situation and heighten risks to civilians. He urged those with influence to prevent such an escalation and to ensure that both parties uphold their obligations under international law, including to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Türk reiterated his call on the warring parties to ensure safe, sustained, and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, including through humanitarian pauses. He stressed that alleged violations must be independently investigated and those responsible held accountable. This afternoon, the briefers and several Council members are likely to reiterate these messages.


Today’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. Kamil Eltayeb Idris—who has been appointed as Sudan’s prime minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council—has continued appointing members to a recently established 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. Meanwhile, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of rival armed and political groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states—announced in late July the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. The structure includes a 15-member presidential council headed by the RSF’s leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with Hilu serving as vice president and Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as prime minister.


Several regional and international interlocutors have denounced the RSF’s decision to establish a parallel governing authority, warning that it risks entrenching Sudan’s political fragmentation, and have underscored the importance of upholding the country’s territorial integrity. In a 29 July press statement, members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) rejected the creation of the so-called “parallel government” and stressed that the AU only recognises the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government, until consensual arrangements are reached to restore constitutional order.


Sudan has on multiple occasions expressed its desire to be readmitted to the AU, after having been suspended in the wake of the October 2021 military takeover. The AUPSC convened earlier today to consider the situation in Sudan, under the rotating presidency for the month of August of Algeria (an elected UN Security Council member in 2024-25).


Lamamra most recently briefed Council members in closed consultations on 27 June, providing an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan. He apparently underscored the urgent need for a united and coordinated approach to address the crisis through immediate and concrete action. It seems that Lamamra also shared insights from the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels a day earlier (26 June). The next round of the consultative meeting is expected to be held in Addis Ababa, although the date has yet to be determined.


At a tri-partite meeting in Baghdad in May, the leaders of the UN, AU, and the League of Arab States (LAS) agreed to maintain regular contact to better coordinate peace efforts in Sudan. The AU Chairperson’s special representative to Sudan, Mohamed Belaiche, visited Port Sudan last week, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan and Idris. (For more information, see our 18 May and 26 June What’s in Blue stories.)


In recent months, the US has appeared to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. In early June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the Sudan conflict in Washington DC with the ambassadors to the US of the other Quad countries, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US had also planned to host a high-level meeting of Quad foreign ministers on 29 July; however, according to media reports, the meeting was postponed indefinitely due to disagreements between Egypt and the UAE—who are said to support opposing sides in the conflict—over the language of a proposed joint statement. There have also been reports that the US rejected an Egyptian request to include representatives of Sudan’s government in the meeting. Separately, the Sudan conflict has featured in recent bilateral discussions between senior US officials and key interlocutors, including Egypt and Qatar.


Security Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement, authored by the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and the UK, that responds to the announcement made by the RSF-led Tasis alliance establishing a parallel governing authority. The draft press statement was open for comments until this morning. At the time of writing, members were awaiting a revised version of the text.


View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/sudan-closed-consultations-8.php


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Monday, April 14, 2025

The London Conference on Sudan 15th April 2025

Presidential Palace Khartoum 2012 by the author

Sudan - can the UK's "progressive realism" help?

Sir Nick Kay

Former Ambassador


April 11, 2025

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis and one of its most dangerous, complex, bloody wars gets a moment in the spotlight in London on 15 April. Foreign ministers and senior officials from international organisations will meet at Lancaster House to discuss Sudan. After two years of conflict, the UK is taking a diplomatic initiative that many believe long overdue given its historical ties and current responsibility at the United Nations Security Council to hold the pen on Sudan resolutions.


But is the conference likely to lead to anything positive for the Sudanese people? 


Expectations are understandably low. The de facto Sudanese authorities led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have criticised the UK for not inviting them to the conference. They object strongly to the UAE being invited because they consider it an ally of the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and therefore a party to the conflict. On the ground both the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have pledged to continue the war until they achieve complete victory. No impartial observer thinks that possible. As the war drags on, Sudan suffers from political polarisation, fragmentation and continued external meddling.


It's too easy to look the other way and too easy to think this is just a messy, protracted struggle that will continue inconclusively. But the immediate future may not be a continuation of the last two years. 


Red warning lights are flashing. Sudan’s neighbour South Sudan is teetering on the brink of civil war and the Sudanese conflict is playing its part in destabilising South Sudan and vice versa. Other neighbouring countries are also vulnerable to fall-out from Sudan: Chad in particular. With any expansion of war in the region, the humanitarian consequences and political risks of spiralling conflict magnify. Within Sudan itself the increased presence of Islamist extremists, armed militia and potentially international terror groups is another flashing light. Geopolitical tensions - already existing - may escalate. The Sudan Armed Forces have been ostracised by western powers and have entered agreements with Russia and Iran in their search for arms. Both countries see establishing a presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast as a prize. But such a move would be highly provocative for others, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.


Over the last two years efforts to broker ceasefires have failed, only limited progress has been made on improving humanitarian access and efforts to bring about a comprehensive political settlement between the various actors - the two military forces, political parties, armed movements and civil society actors - have all led to nought. Many have tried, including the UN, AU, IGAD, the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey but none has succeeded. These “track 1” efforts have been complemented by multiple “track 2” initiatives led by NGOs and peace foundations. But so far the willingness to give as well as take in any negotiation is sorely missing.

Proposals


Absent political will by the protagonists and their external backers, what can be achieved in London? 


Limited but important steps can be agreed in three areas: the humanitarian response, political process and international cooperation. 


On the humanitarian front, the key challenges remain both funding and access. In April 2024 at a conference in Paris, donors made generous pledges totalling USD $2 billion. Much of that has yet to be disbursed. London is not a pledging conference, but should be the opportunity for partners to live up to their past commitments and renew their determination to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance for the 11 million Sudanese forced to flee their homes— food, shelter, medicines and healthcare at a minimum. The challenges for humanitarians are enormous: Sudan’s domestic political and ethnic complexity compounded by the regional tensions with and between Sudan’s neighbours necessitate an enhanced international aid effort coordinated by a senior UN figure. 


A political process remains the missing element and in London agreement may be possible on how to deal with the most immediate challenge as well as on the essential elements for a future process. Since the SAF now control the capital Khartoum again, it is likely they will press ahead with their own political roadmap and appoint a civilian government subordinate to the military to take forward a transition towards eventual restoration of democracy. 


How should the international community respond to this - reject, ignore, embrace, or shape it? Given the risk of Sudan being partitioned into two warring regions - Darfur and the South controlled by the RSF and the North, East and centre being controlled by the SAF - no SAF-imposed roadmap is going to be the final word. Not only will it not include the RSF and its supporters, but also many of the political actors who supported the 2019 revolution, which overthrew General Bashir’s military rule, will have nothing to do with the SAF roadmap. So the challenge for the international community is to try to work within the new political reality on a temporary and tentative basis. The aim should be to shape the SAF’s actions in order to move towards a credible inclusive political transition. The London conference could agree criteria by which such a political process will be judged. Key questions will be: how inclusive is the process and what genuine efforts are made to ensure inclusiveness of all Sudan; how are civil and political rights protected; how will security, justice and reconciliation be achieved; what are the criteria for selection of members of a transitional administration; what real authority will the administration have over economic and budgetary affairs; what are the provisions and realistic timetable for an all-inclusive Sudanese national dialogue? Above all, how firmly enshrined is the commitment to full democratic and civilian rule in Sudan, for which Sudanese men, women and youth struggled and died over the years? 


These are difficult questions that have defied easy answers since 2019. Helping Sudanese actors address them will require substantial and coordinated international action. 


The third way the London conference could contribute is by setting out agreed principles and a framework for the international community. The Sudan crisis is of such a complexity and international nature that it requires a creative and collaborative approach. The conference could propose that an international panel of mediators be appointed, led by the African Union but comprising additional senior figures from beyond Africa. Rank is important and ideally the panel would be at former head of state or government level and mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. The panel’s focus should be on advancing a comprehensive political settlement. Early consultation with the SAF, RSF and Sudanese civil and political actors about the terms of reference will be essential. The conference could agree who should take forward this consultation and a time frame.


Conclusion

Foreign Secretary David Lammy convened the conference after seeing at first hand the devastating impact of the war on Sudanese women and children on the Chad-Sudan border. Just because the Sudan war is complicated and far from our TV screens, we cannot in all conscience ignore it. This is a moment to put the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine of “progressive realism” into action.


 [These are the personal views of the author and do not represent the views of any organisation with which he is associated.]

CMI — Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation 

Diplomats without Borders 


View original: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sudan-can-uks-progressive-realism-help-sir-nick-kay-nc3be/

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Related 


Sudan Watch - 19 Nov 2010

British Ambassador in Khartoum Nicholas Kay is blogging the drama and scale of the change taking place in Sudan

The British government's Foreign & Commonwealth Office, commonly called the Foreign Office or the FCO, has started a blog about the work of the British Ambassador to Sudan. The blog is authored by Nicholas Kay CMG, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Sudan. Mr Kay (pictured below) arrived in Khartoum to take up his role as HM Ambassador to Sudan on 29 May 2010. Here is a copy of his first two blog posts followed by several related reports.

Full story: https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/11/british-ambassador-in-khartoum-nicholas.html

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Sir Nicholas Kay KCMG
British Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan 2010 to 2012
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/nicholas-kay

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