Sudan: UK has circulated a draft UN resolution calling for an immediate end of hostilities ahead of Ramadan

"THE UK has circulated a draft UN resolution calling for an immediate end of hostilities in Sudan ahead of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. 

The British draft resolution expresses ‘grave concern over the spreading violence and the catastrophic and deteriorating humanitarian situation’. 

With Ramadan expected to begin around Sunday, depending on the sighting of the new moon, the council is expected to vote quickly on the resolution, probably on Friday. 

The latest draft on a Sudan ceasefire was circulated on the same day the head of the UN food agency warned that the Sudan conflict “risks triggering the world’s largest hunger crisis” as global attention is focused on the Israel-Hamas war. 

The proposed UN resolution calls on all parties to remove obstructions and allow “full, rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access” including across Sudan’s borders and across conflict lines.

The draft also urges strengthened co-ordination of several regional and international efforts “to facilitate an end to the conflict and to restore a lasting inclusive civilian-led democratic transition.” 

The US is negotiating on its own proposed Gaza resolution with the latest draft calling for a “ceasefire of roughly six weeks in Gaza together with the release of all hostages” as soon as Israel and Hamas agree. The draft makes no mention of Ramadan."  Read more.

From The Irish News

By Edith M Lederer, Associated Press

Dated Thursday, March 07, 2024 at 3:36AM GMT

UN resolution calling for end to hostilities in Sudan ahead of Ramadan

The British draft resolution expresses ‘grave concern over the spreading violence and the catastrophic and deteriorating humanitarian situation’.

Full story: https://www.irishnews.com/news/world/un-resolution-calling-for-end-to-hostilities-in-sudan-ahead-of-ramadan-4EQJ622VTNJ5ZHTECA4OWM3DF4/

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Related 

From Sudan Tribune - undated, here is a copy in full: 

Fikra for Studies and Development urges Security Council to endorse UK draft resolution for ceasefire in Sudan

Fikra for Studies and Development welcomes the UK draft resolution submitted to the UN Security Council calling for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan. We hope that the Security Council will adopt this resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and that it will include clear and effective enforcement, implementation, and monitoring mechanisms to ensure its application on the ground.

The resolution should emphasize the need to adhere to the principles of the Jeddah Declaration for the Protection of Civilians, signed by the warring parties on May 11, 2023. It should also reaffirm the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principle adopted by the UN in 2005, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the cessation of violations against Sudanese civilians, especially in Darfur, Khartoum, and Al Gezira states.

If adopted by the Security Council and successfully implemented, this resolution will pave the way for a permanent ceasefire, opening the door for a rational political process to end the civil war that has been ongoing in Sudan since April 15, 2023.

Fikra for Studies and Development calls on the members of the Security Council to vote to pass this resolution. We also call on the African Union, the Arab League, and IGAD to support this resolution by urgently contacting all members of the Security Council and encourage them to vote in favor of this resolution. We further call on the five permanent members of the Security Council not to use their veto power to block the passage of this resolution.

We reiterate our call to the UN and its humanitarian agencies to declare a state of severe famine of phase 5 at the national level in Sudan and to address the humanitarian situation accordingly.

The current situation in Sudan represents the largest humanitarian catastrophe of our time, in terms of the number of displaced and refugee people, the widespread famine, the severe food shortages, and the horrors faced by the Sudanese people due to the ongoing war. The international community must act now effectively to stop this ongoing suffering.

View original: https://sudantribune.com/article282996/

END

Sudan: A European-led tripartite meeting in Addis discusses arms embargo on Sudan & Article Seven, ignoring the position of both sides of the conflict

THIS report published in Arabic was kindly sent in to Sudan Watch by a Sudanese reader living and working in the UK over the past twenty years. Here is a copy in full, translated from Arabic by Google translate.

From sudanakhbar.com
By Radio Dabanga Arabic
Dated Friday, 9 February 2024

A European-led tripartite meeting in Addis Ababa discusses the arms embargo on Sudan, the imposition of Article Seven, and ignoring the position of both sides of the conflict - Sudan News

The Darfur Bar Association and the African Centre for Peace and Justice meet with a joint delegation with representatives of the European Union Mission Badis Ayaya

At the request of the Darfur Bar Association and the African Centre for Peace and Justice, a joint delegation met with representatives of the European Union Delegation in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, this morning, February 8, 2024, and the meeting was devoted to consultation on the situation in Sudan and with a focus on stopping the war and the humanitarian situation.

The Army and RSF are not qualified to discuss post-war issues

Mr. Saleh Mahmoud, Chairman of the Darfur Bar Association, described the humanitarian situation as aggravated and worrying, not only in Darfur, but in the whole of Sudan, given the number of people affected, which the most modest statistics indicate exceeds 10 million people.

In an interview with Radio Dabanga, Mr. Saleh Mahmoud pointed out that the meeting also touched on gross violations of human rights and international law and the continued commission of heinous crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The meeting also touched on the future of the political process after the cessation of the war, as the Darfur Bar Association and the African Center for Peace and Justice confirmed that there is currently no government in Sudan representing all Sudanese to discuss the post-war situation, stressing that the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (Janjaweed Foundation) are not qualified to discuss the situation of Sudan and negotiate that indicates the return of the situation to what it was before the war.

Sudan arms embargo

On ways to stop the war, Mr. Saleh Mahmoud stressed that the discussion touched on the activation of all measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and various international treaties. He pointed to the importance of taking measures related to banning the import of weapons flowing into Sudan as a priority, not dealing with the parties to the war and not for the purpose of negotiations to return them to the position of power again, given that the task of determining how and who will govern Sudan is a task for the Sudanese people.

Mr. Saleh Mahmoud stated that they explained to the representatives of the European Union Mission the possibility of delivering humanitarian aid in a shorter way through Chadian territory for the people of the Darfur region in order to avoid the difficulties facing its flow through the port of Port Sudan as well as to the rest of the affected areas in Sudan. We asked them to think together about ways to deliver aid in the presence of the old state institution that is tainted by corruption that could hinder the delivery of this aid or sell it in the markets to those affected.

Exceeding the consent of the parties to the war

Mr. Saleh Mahmoud warned that the passage of aid in areas controlled by the army or the Rapid Support Forces threatens the possibility of reaching those who deserve it. Mr. Saleh Mahmoud stressed that they called for activating international humanitarian law, especially the articles that allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to those affected without obtaining the consent of the force controlling the ground, whether it is rapid support or armed forces, and the international community and regional institutions in delivering aid should not be subject to the will of the warring parties that do not represent the Sudanese people.

Calling for a greater role for the African Peace and Security Council

Regarding the speech addressed by the African Center for Justice and Peace to the African Peace and Security Council, Musaed Mohamed Ali, director of the center, confirmed in an interview with Radio Dabanga that the message is mainly aimed at stopping the war as a top priority. The letter called on the Peace and Security Council and the African Union to play its role and exert greater efforts to stop the war and stop hostilities in Sudan as soon as possible. In the short term, the letter called on the council to work towards a swift cessation of hostilities to allow the passage of humanitarian aid to those affected who have been displaced inside Souda.

View original: https://www.sudanakhbar.com/1483595

END

Sudan: Towards intervention?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Although some parts of this article are inaccurate and misleading, particularly about ICC v Bashir (no time to correct it) it is documented here to lay the groundwork for understanding future posts regarding the birth of Sudan's civilian-led government.   

Article at Al-Ahram online

Written by Asmaa Al-Husseini 
Published Tuesday 04 July 2023 - here is a full copy:

Sudan: Towards intervention?

As Sudan’s warring parties refuse to compromise foreign intervention looms ever closer, writes Asmaa Al-Husseini

The Sudan war has been raging for three months with no realistic prospects for a peaceful resolution. Initiatives to halt the bloodshed have all failed and the warring sides - the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) - continue to target civilians who are subjected to air strikes, looting, sabotage, and intimidation, circumstances that have created an opening for international and regional intervention.

 

In recent weeks, the international community has indicated it is unwilling to remain a passive spectator as the conflict in Sudan not only continues but expands. Several international and regional players have hinted that they may resort to more stringent measures to halt the fighting which has spread to Kordofan, Darfur, and other regions, and assumed a growing ethnic and tribal dimension.

 

There are growing fears the conflict may become a civil or regional war, and in recent weeks Darfur has witnessed horrific atrocities which some international officials classify as war crimes.

 

Sudanese officials have called for the intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a commission to investigate these crimes. Mona Arko Minawi, the governor of Darfur, Darfur lawyers, and other groups have described events in the western region as genocide.

 

The atrocities, taking place away from media coverage amid the interruption of essential services and communication, evoke memories of the war in Darfur between 2003 and 2018 which resulted in the ICC indicting president Omar Al-Bashir and other regime leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. They resulted in Sudan being subject to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing UN and African forces to be deployed to the region.

 

The SAF and RSF have turned down several ceasefires proposed in Jeddah by the US and Saudi Arabia as well as initiatives put forward by the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

 

The SAF rejected AU mediation on the grounds that the organisation had suspended Sudan’s membership following what it deemed a coup when, on 25 October 2021, the army dissolved its partnership with civilian forces. The SAF has also declined IGAD mediation, claiming that Kenya, the leader of the initiative, has sided with the RSF, providing its members with shelter. The army has said statements by Kenyan President William Ruto and his foreign minister constitute interference in Sudan’s internal affairs and undermine its sovereignty and requested that South Sudan take the lead in the Quartet for mediation, replacing Kenya.

 

The IGAD initiative had proposed a direct meeting between SAF leader Abdel-Fattah Al-Borhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in an attempt to forge a lasting solution to the crisis. The initiative also recommended a dialogue between Sudan’s civil forces and the opening of humanitarian corridors.

 

Malik Agar, the new deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, has visited several regional countries as well as Moscow, seeking assistance and mediation. The move may be interpreted as an attempt to alleviate US, European, African, and Saudi pressures, though the step is unlikely to achieve the changes desired by the Sudanese army.

 

The army is perturbed that the RSF is being treated as an equal partner in the proposed initiatives. The SAF describes the RSF as a rebel force and as the vanguard of a foreign invasion, alluding to the RSF’s use of fighters from neighbouring African countries.

 

The SAF has welcomed Turkey’s involvement in mediation efforts. Media outlets aligned with the army have expressed optimism that Turkey will provide support, just as it did to the Libyan government in Tripoli.

 

During its latest session, the African Peace and Security Council endorsed the IGAD initiative. IGAD’s plan calls for the demilitarisation of Khartoum, an unconditional cessation of hostilities and the initiation of a comprehensive political process. While stressing that a political solution is the only exit from the current impasse, the 15-member-State Council warned that violators of international human rights laws in Sudan would be held accountable for their actions.

 

IGAD has proposed a 50 km buffer zone around Khartoum and the deployment of African forces to safeguard key institutions in the capital, with the police and security forces responsible for securing key public facilities. Agar dismissed the proposals as an occupation rather than a solution to the crisis. He emphasised his government’s opposition to any initiative that does not respect Sudanese sovereignty.

 

Following SAF and RSF responses to the Jeddah initiative, the US has indicated it will adopt stricter measures to stop the war in Sudan. The European Union is also speaking about imposing sanctions against parties involved in the conflict.

 

Some observers anticipate international intervention — involving a collaboration between Western powers, the African Union, and IGAD — under Chapter VII if the warring factions do not heed calls for peace. Others believe Russia and China may veto such intervention unless it is mediated by the African Union given that the Sudan war threatens regional security and international interests, including those of Moscow and Beijing.

 

Meanwhile, Sudan’s civil forces are busy holding meetings of their own to launch initiatives and form a unified civil front to end the war and restore the country to a democratic course.

 

Al-Baqir Al-Afif, a Sudanese writer and representative of the Civil Front to Stop the War and Restore Democracy, told Al-Ahram Weekly a unified front could help fill the void and prevent armed groups from determining Sudan’s future in the absence of a strong civil force. To this end, steps are being taken to convene a meeting that includes political parties, trade unions, professional federations, resistance committees, civil society organisations and public figures in Sudan with the goal of agreeing a declaration of principles.

 

“There are proposals to create a representative committee to join international initiatives aimed at ending the war and kickstarting the political track. Some have suggested the formation of a shadow government or a government in exile,” he said.

 

“Having a group representing the civilian voice in Sudan is crucial. It will help convey the Sudanese people’s point of view to the world and be part of these international initiatives, which must also be unified.”

 

The priority is to end the war and the bloodshed and brutal massacres in Khartoum and Darfur, added Al-Afif. Regional and international communities should collaborate to exert pressure to stop the conflict and establish mechanisms to effectively monitor the ceasefire. It is also essential to provide urgent relief to those affected by the war, including displaced persons, refugees and those stranded at crossings.

 

It is also essential to engage civilians in future peace negotiations to ensure a democratic transition led by civil forces, he said.

 

Major General Kamal Ismail, head of the Sudanese National Alliance and leader of the Forces for Freedom and Change, told the Weekly meetings to unify Sudan’s civil forces have already taken place in an attempt to restore stability and advance a democratic civil path.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 July, 2023 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

View original:  https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/504119.aspx

[Ends]

UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa: Financing of AU-led peace support operations

THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. 

Report at What's In Blue

Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):

Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa

Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa. 

Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May. 

The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).

Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007. 

Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent. 

Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.

The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)

The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.

The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million. 

Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.

Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February. 

The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.

In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.

One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions. 

This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.

In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.

The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission. 

As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. 

Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements. 

Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php

[Ends]

FULL TEXT: Resolution 1593 (2005) adopted by the UN Security Council at its meeting on 31 March 2005

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Further to the ICC Prosecutor's two statements on Darfur, Sudan (see below) given to the UN Security Council at a meeting of the Council held in New York on Monday 17 January 2022, here below, for easy reference, is a copy of Resolution 1593 (2005) adopted by the Council at its meeting on 31 March 2005.

Links to a copy of the document in downloadable pdf format and available in several languages can be found at the end of this post. I have used yellow to highlight para 8 referenced in the Prosecutor's 34th report dated 17 January 2022 and in the Council's Resolution 1593 (2005).

Sudan Watch Wed 19 Jan 2022: 

Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to Resolution 1593 (2005) https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2022/01/statement-of-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa.html

Sudan Watch Thu 20 Jan 2022: 

FULL TEXT: ICC 34th report pursuant to para 8 of UNSC resolution 1593 (2005), 17 January 2022 https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2022/01/full-text-icc-34th-report-pursuant-to.html

_______________

United Nations

Security Council 

Distr.: General 31 March 2005

Resolution 1593 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005

The Security Council,

Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60),

Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and encouraging States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims,

Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute,

Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

3. Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity;

4. Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur;

5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long- lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary;

6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State;

7. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

8. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

_______________

Source: United Nations.org

View the original document in downloadable pdf format here:

English

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf

Arabic

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/71/PDF/N0529271.pdf

中文

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/72/PDF/N0529272.pdf

Francais

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/74/PDF/N0529274.pdf

Русский

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/75/PDF/N0529275.pdf

Espanol

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/76/PDF/N0529276.pdf

Sudan: Ongoing turf war in Sudan - China, Russia reject calls for freeze on UN pullout from Sudan

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: I have just read the the executive summary of the Sentry’s paper entitled Loan Wolves [https://thesentry.org/reports/loan-wolves/].

The last sentence, regarding Sudan, states that: 

“The country’s current military leaders and the new civilian government must therefore expose corrupt actors and hold them accountable while implementing strict measures to limit their influence”

In my view the whole paper is crazy. I shan’t be reprinting it here at Sudan Watch. Makes me wonder what John Prendergast & Co are smoking over there in the Sentry.

Despite some gaps and errors, essential reading: “The Ongoing Turf War in Sudan: Violent clashes between elements of Sudan’s security forces threaten the country’s progress toward democracy,” by Samuel Ramani, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://t.co/45xFBQ9q2F pic.twitter.com/R3i3iQc8X2

— Eric Reeves (@sudanreeves) February 21, 2020

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: Eric Reeves’ tweet 21 Feb 2020 (above) links to a 20 Feb 2020 article at Carnegie Endowment.org by Samuel Ramani entitled The Ongoing Turf War in Sudan [https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/81119]. The article is a really good read. Upon reading the line, “Russia’s opposition to a UN peacekeeping presence in Darfur indirectly strengthens the RSF’s influence in that region” I followed its link to a 15 June 2019 news report by AFP entitled China, Russia reject calls for freeze on UN pullout from Sudan [https://www.thenational.ae/world/africa/china-russia-reject-calls-for-freeze-on-un-pullout-from-sudan-1.874526]. 

The article made me think of PM Hamdok’s filmed interview in Germany with Ms Aya Ibrahim of Deutsche Welle at the Munich Security Conference 17 Feb 2020 entitled Hamdok: 'Anyone who committed atrocities must be tried' [https://www.msn.com/en-za/news/other/sudans-pm-hamdok-anyone-who-committed-atrocities-must-be-tried/ar-BB105Y0Y] in which he talked about wanting the UN in the whole of Sudan under Chapter VI (note, not Chapter VII). 

Then it dawned on me: Chapter VI would free up PM Hamdok and his and Sudan's worldwide supporters to work in Sudan’s best interests and stop Russia and China vetoing votes on Sudan at UN Security Council. 

And, if needed, the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) has 5,200 troops ready to be deployed anywhere (Sudan Watch, 27 June 2019 - Eastern Africa Standby Force EASF is watching Sudan closely, playing an advisory role, ready to deploy if situation turns genocidal https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/06/eastern-africa-standby-force-easf-is.html)

Samuel Ramani is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, England, UK. Follow him on Twitter @samramani2 [https://twitter.com/SamRamani2]

- - -

FURTHER READING

Russia’s secretive military operations on the rise in Africa

Article by and from AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY

Dated 14 August 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russias-secretive-military-operations.html