Note, the tweet was posted at 8:59 PM on Wednesday 12 July 2023.Ahead of briefing to #UNSC on the situation in #Darfur, #ICC Prosecutor @KarimKhanQC met w/ @DicarloRosemary, @UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.@UN an essential partner for the #ICC in delivering for victims of atrocity crimes globally. pic.twitter.com/Hw3WCVgNGS
— Int'l Criminal Court (@IntlCrimCourt) July 12, 2023
Briefing on Cooperation between the UN and the League of Arab States
Tomorrow morning (8 June) the Security Council will convene for a briefing on cooperation between the UN and the League of Arab States (LAS).
The meeting, which is one of the signature events of the June Council Presidency of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), will be chaired by Khalifa Shaheen Almarar, Minister of State at the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; LAS Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit; and Dr. Omnia El Omrani, who was the Youth Envoy for the President of the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 27), held in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2022.
It appears that Egypt (on behalf of the Arab Group at the UN) will participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
Strengthening partnerships and cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations—as envisioned in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter—has become an increasingly prominent theme for the Security Council.
The Council has held annual consultative meetings with the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) since 2007 and has received regular briefings from the EU since 2010.
It has also held debates and briefings on cooperation with several other bodies, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
In the past decade, LAS representatives have addressed the Council on several occasions, not least due to the proliferation of conflicts in the Arab world.
In recent years, Arab Council members have featured meetings on the UN-LAS relationship as signature events of their presidencies, including Kuwait in June 2019, Tunisia in January 2021, and the UAE in March 2022. Presidential statements focusing on the relationship between the two organisations were the outcome of these three meetings.
The UAE has circulated a concept note in preparation for tomorrow’s meeting, indicating that the briefing is an opportunity to explore expanding joint efforts to address the interrelated peace, security, and humanitarian challenges facing the Arab region. It poses several questions to help guide the discussion, including:
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are expected to underscore the contributions of regional organisations to international peace and security. They may reflect on how the UN and the LAS can work together more effectively across the “peace continuum”, ranging from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding. Building on themes discussed in the concept note, members may also speak about cooperation between the UN and the LAS in promoting the rights of women and youth in the region.
In this regard, some may emphasise the importance of implementing the 2022 “Arab Declaration to Combat All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls”, including through partnership with UN Women. They might also offer their views on the “Arab Strategy on Youth, Peace and Security”, which is expected to be launched later this year and has been developed with assistance from the UN Liaison Office to the LAS, which was established in 2019 in Cairo. Some members may talk about efforts to combat terrorism in the Arab world, including the Arab regional counter-terrorism strategy adopted in March 2022.
There could also be discussion of the adverse effects of climate change in the region and how to address them. It appears that this issue may be a focus of El Omrani’s briefing. The Council has also recognised the negative impact of climate change and other environmental factors in resolutions on one peace operation in the Middle East, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In resolution 2682 of 30 May, which most recently renewed UNAMI’s mandate for one year, the Council called on the mission to advise, support, and assist the Iraqi government in facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on several issues, including the “adverse impacts of climate change in particular those contributing to desertification and drought, resilience building, infrastructure, public health, and refugees”.
There is also likely to be discussion at tomorrow’s meeting of how the UN and the LAS can more effectively address security and humanitarian challenges in several country situations on the Security Council’s agenda. During the 32nd summit of the LAS in Jeddah on 19 May, the participants referred to several of these situations when they issued the “Jeddah Declaration”, which:
Council members have traditionally held contrasting views about how to approach many of the peace and security challenges in the Arab world. This is illustrated by the frequent vetoes cast over the years by the US and Russia on resolutions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Syria, respectively. In recent months, while some Council members—such as Russia and the UAE—have supported efforts to normalise relations with Syria, others, including the UK and the US, have remained sceptical.
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THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”.
Report at What's In Blue
Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):
Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa
Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa.
Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May.
The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).
Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007.
Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent.
Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.
The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)
The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)
At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.
The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million.
Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.
Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February.
The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.
In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.
One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions.
This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.
In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.
The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission.
As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.
Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements.
Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.
View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php
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