Sudan at crossroads as peace path remains complex. AUPSC's 1330th Communiqué on situation in Sudan

ON 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors. Read more.

From Independent Online (IOL) South Africa
By JESSICA UIRAS 
Dated Sunday 22 March 2026 - full copy:

Sudan at a Crossroads as the Path to Peace Remains Complex

A displaced Sudanese woman who left El-Fasher after its fall with others, walks amid the remains of a fire that broke out at a camp in Tawila on February 11, 2026. Image: AFP

On 12 February 2026, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the ministerial level, adopted its 1330th Communiqué on the situation in Sudan.

The document reflects not only the gravity of the crisis but also the AU’s sustained effort to prevent state collapse, respond to one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies, and reassert continental leadership in a conflict increasingly shaped by regional and global dynamics.

Read alongside earlier pronouncements in 2025, including the March press statement rejecting the establishment of a parallel government, and the July statement strongly condemning the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led ‘parallel government,’ the February 2026 communiqué demonstrates consistency in principle, but a heightened sense of urgency.

Sudan is no longer framed as facing only a political impasse. It is confronting a systemic breakdown across governance, security and humanitarian sectors.

The communiqué expresses deep concern over the continued armed conflict and describes an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. This language builds on the August 2025 communiqué, which had already raised alarm over famine conditions, particularly in El-Fasher.

By February 2026, the PSC’s concern had sharpened further. It explicitly highlights reported famine and starvation, demands unhindered humanitarian access, and calls for the protection of humanitarian workers.

The recurrence of El-Fasher in successive decisions suggests that earlier appeals for lifting sieges and allowing safe access corridors have not yielded sufficient compliance.

The humanitarian crisis is therefore no longer treated as a by-product of armed confrontation. The communiqué strongly condemns systematic killings, ethnic targeting, mass displacement and destruction of infrastructure by parties to the conflict, particularly the RSF in El-Fasher.

By grounding its condemnation in international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the PSC signals that accountability is not optional. It moves the conversation beyond ceasefire appeals to potential legal consequences.

A central and recurring position of the PSC has been that there is no viable and sustainable military solution to the conflict. This formulation appeared in August 2025 and was reiterated again in February 2026. The repetition is deliberate. It reflects frustration with a battlefield logic that continues to dominate the conduct of the warring parties.

The PSC once again calls for a humanitarian truce leading to an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive Sudanese-led dialogue addressing both security and political dimensions of the crisis. What distinguishes the 1330th Communiqué, however, is its engagement with the Sudanese National Initiative for Peace presented in December 2025.

The PSC welcomes its components, including an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, disarmament, security sector reform, national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Crucially, it stresses that these elements must align with the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan. Support for the initiative is therefore conditional on inclusivity and alignment with continental frameworks, with transitional arrangements that reflect the aspirations of the Sudanese people and enable a smooth return to constitutional order through elections.

The question of a ‘parallel government’ has remained a central concern since mid-2025. In March, the PSC categorically rejected such an entity. In July, it reiterated that AU member states and the international community should not recognise any parallel authority in Sudan. The February 2026 communiqué restates this rejection and calls upon member states and partners not to recognise the so-called parallel government.

This consistency reflects a clear normative boundary. The AU will not legitimise fragmentation or unconstitutional political structures emerging from armed groups. The defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity is presented not merely as a legal principle, but as a safeguard against de facto partition and long-term regional instability.

At the same time, the communiqué places increasing emphasis on the issue of external interference. In 2025, the PSC had already condemned external actors fuelling the conflict and called for measures to address such interference.

The February 2026 decision goes further by requesting the PSC Sub-committee on Sanctions, in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties militarily, financially and politically, and to propose measures to contain them within three months.

This is one of the more operationally significant aspects of the communiqué. If implemented robustly, it could begin to disrupt the transnational networks that sustain the conflict and complicate prospects for peace.

The communiqué also emphasises the centrality of AU leadership in the peace process and welcomes coordination through the Quintet, comprising the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the United Nations and the European Union. This reflects recognition that multiple and sometimes competing mediation tracks risk fragmentation.

Earlier decisions had already called for the consolidation of peace frameworks under AU and IGAD leadership. The February 2026 communiqué reiterates the need to prevent overlap and ensure coherence. The emphasis on Sudanese ownership, combined with coordinated international engagement, illustrates an effort to balance sovereignty with pragmatic diplomacy in an increasingly crowded mediation landscape.

Beyond ceasefire and dialogue, the communiqué includes institutional measures aimed at restoring normative oversight and operational presence. It reiterates the request for a comprehensive human rights report by the AU Commission and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, welcomes the deployment of a humanitarian assessment mission, stresses the urgent need to reopen the AU Liaison Office in Sudan, and reiterates the intention to undertake a PSC field mission.

These measures are designed to translate political commitments into institutional engagement on the ground, ensuring that AU involvement is not merely declaratory but tangible.

Taken together, the 1330th Communiqué represents a comprehensive and principled reaffirmation of the AU’s normative framework. It condemns atrocities, rejects fragmentation, demands humanitarian access, calls for a ceasefire and dialogue, addresses external interference, and reinforces continental leadership. It situates Sudan’s crisis within broader commitments to sovereignty, constitutional governance and collective security.    

The decisive factor, however, will be implementation. Will sanctions mechanisms effectively identify and constrain external spoilers? Will humanitarian corridors be secured in practice? Will the proposed inter-Sudanese dialogue be genuinely inclusive, reflecting the voices of civilian actors? Will the warring parties accept that military escalation cannot produce sustainable political outcomes?

Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The AU has articulated a clear roadmap rooted in African solutions and collective responsibility. Whether this framework translates into durable peace will depend on political will inside Sudan, coherence among regional actors, and the capacity of continental institutions to move beyond declarations toward enforcement and facilitation.

* Jessica Uiras is a Peacebuilder from Namibia. This article was originally published at https://www.accord.org.za/

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

Independent Online, popularly known as IOL, is one of South Africa's leading news and information websites bringing millions of readers breaking news and updates on Politics, Current Affairs, Business, Lifestyle, Entertainment, Travel, Sport, Motoring and Technology

View original: https://iol.co.za/sunday-tribune/world/2026-03-22-sudan-at-a-crossroads-as-the-path-to-peace-remains-complex/

Further Reading

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 1330TH MEETING OF THE PSC HELD AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ON 12 FEBRUARY 2026 ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN

Last Updated on Thursday 12 February 2026

https://aupaps.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1330th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-at-ministerial-level-on-12-february-2026-on-the-situation-in-sudan

PDF Version https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/1330.1.comm-en1.pdf

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Sudan: Open Briefing at UN Security Council - The UK is penholder on Sudan and Council president for Feb

"In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations. ...

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft." Read more.

From What's In Blue 
Posted Wednesday 18 February 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Sudan. The UK, the penholder on Sudan and Council president for February, has elevated the meeting to ministerial level, with its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper, expected to chair. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. The Council will also hear from a civil society representative, who will address the situation of women in the context of the conflict in Sudan, including the high incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Sudan as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

DiCarlo is expected to provide an overview of the security situation as the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April, amid a dangerous phase marked by intensified hostilities with increasing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened governance structures, exacerbating civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity. The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors reportedly providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, resulting in regional spillover and proxy dynamics. In this regard, reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring states as transit routes for weapons and supplies have raised alarm about the risk of further regional destabilisation. Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to voice concerns about the trajectory of these perilous trends. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the ongoing violence and reiterate calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, reports from the UN and other entities have documented grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) by parties to the conflict. In this context, several Council members are expected to urge compliance with IHL and IHRL obligations, while highlighting broader protection concerns, including widespread CRSV. They may also underscore the need to ensure accountability for such violations. (For more information, see our 8 February What’s in Blue story.)

On 13 February, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in late October 2025 that resulted in the seizure of El Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. According to the report, the documented patterns indicate that the RSF and allied Arab militias conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in the city. OHCHR monitoring suggested that the RSF and allied militias committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, launching indiscriminate attacks, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) requested the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM) to conduct an urgent inquiry into alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher following the seizure of the city by the RSF. The findings of the inquiry are expected to be released tomorrow.

Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. Tomorrow, several Council members are expected to voice support for mediation efforts, with some emphasising the importance of complementarity and coordination among such initiatives.

UN mediation efforts have been led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, who had regularly briefed Council members during closed consultations on Sudan. Media reports suggest that Lamamra will finish his role by the end of the month. He had been scheduled to brief during consultations following tomorrow’s briefing, but it appears that the consultations are not expected to take place and that Lamamra is not slated to brief.

During a donor conference held on 3 February in Washington DC, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos reportedly announced that a document outlining a peace plan had been agreed among the Quad members—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—aimed at securing a humanitarian truce and opening safe corridors for relief efforts. In a 14 February interview with Foreign Policy, Boulos said that, alongside the Quad, the US has been engaging with several regional countries on the initiative. He added that the US intends to bring the plan to the Security Council with the aim of adopting a resolution.

On 12 February, the Quintet group—comprised of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—released a joint statement which called for the immediate halting of any further military escalation and urged all concerned sides to support efforts towards a humanitarian truce and the delivery of life-saving assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, has continued to seek support for his proposal to end the conflict (which he presented during the Council’s 22 December 2025 briefing on Sudan), including during recent visits to Switzerland and Germany. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from areas under its control. Sudan has also continued efforts to secure readmission to the AU following its suspension after the October 2021 military takeover. In a communiqué adopted following a 12 February AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) ministerial meeting on Sudan, the AUPSC welcomed Sudan’s 22 December 2025 proposal as well as efforts led by the Quintet.

At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for insecurity and violence in Sudan. Yesterday (17 February), the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) proposed the designation of four RSF commanders under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. Since the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has not yet been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the UK circulated the proposal under a no-objection procedure until 24 February. (There is an understanding that respective presidents of the Council will handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs until the chairs have been appointed.) At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may highlight this measure and underline the need to consider expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur, considering the evolving conflict dynamics across other regions of the country. Several Council members—including the African members, China, and Russia—have opposed this proposal, which some other members have raised in the context of discussions on the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, most recently in September 2025.

Tomorrow, Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. She may emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and CRSV.

She may describe how intensifying hostilities are exacerbating risks to civilians, fuelling displacement and humanitarian needs, and shrinking humanitarian space while making operations increasingly dangerous for aid workers. The conflict has been marked by frequent attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as humanitarian assets, personnel, and convoys. Recent OCHA press releases have highlighted a sharp increase in deadly drone strikes across the Kordofan region, resulting in civilian casualties and further deepening the humanitarian crisis. In this context, Wosornu and several Council members are likely to stress the urgent imperative of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure and condemn their deliberate targeting.

Wosornu is also expected to reiterate calls for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and underscore the need for increased and flexible funding to sustain life-saving operations amid rising needs. She may also highlight ongoing efforts by OCHA and its partners to deliver assistance despite acute operational challenges. In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations.

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/sudan-briefing-7.php

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