Sudan: UN Security Council will hold an open briefing followed by closed consultations on Fri 27 June 2025

Report from UN Security Council

What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday, 26 June 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (27 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. 

The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 

Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. 

The chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), is expected to brief the Council on the committee’s work. 

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the closed consultations.

Pobee is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating security situation in Sudan. 

In June, the conflict witnessed shifting front lines and intensified fighting across several regions. Fierce battles continued in the Kordofan region, as both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to consolidate territorial gains, exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts and inflicting significant harm on civilians.

The situation in El Fasher and other parts of North Darfur state continues to be highly volatile. El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has been under siege by the RSF since May 2024. 

In a 20 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted that, on 15 June, the RSF launched a renewed assault on the city following months of increased fighter mobilisation across Darfur, including the recruitment of children. He added that the operation aimed at capturing El Fasher, which involved a ground offensive, mirrored the RSF’s April attack on the nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, widespread sexual violence, and a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 18 May and 12 June What’s in Blue stories.)

Pobee may also address the regional dimensions of Sudan’s conflict. 

On 10 June, the SAF accused forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), of supporting RSF attacks on its positions along the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan—an allegation that the LNA has denied. 

After the SAF’s withdrawal from the tri-border zone on 11 June, the RSF claimed control over this strategic area, enabling it  to secure a supply line from Libya and advance towards the Nile Valley and Northern State, both of which are considered SAF strongholds. 

The conflict has also spilled into Abyei and South Sudan, escalating local tensions, displacing civilians, and worsening insecurity. 

Meanwhile, media reports indicate that the SAF has relocated warplanes to Eritrea amid increasing RSF drone strikes. (For more information, see our 18 March What’s in Blue story.)

In a 24 June press statement, Council members condemned the 20 June attack by “suspected Sudanese armed elements” on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeepers patrolling near the Central African Republic (CAR)-Sudan border. 

The incident resulted in the death of a Zambian peacekeeper. 

In their statement, Council members expressed concern about the impact of the crisis in Sudan, particularly in border areas, including RSF incursions into the CAR’s territory and its coordination with local armed groups.

Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across Sudan and reiterate their calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 

They may also discuss the destabilising impact of the conflict in Sudan on the region, including the influx of refugees to neighbouring countries.

Speakers are likely to stress the urgent need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as medical and humanitarian personnel, while condemning the deliberate targeting of these individuals and facilities. 

Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence, and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. 

Some may highlight the 21 June attack on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan, which reportedly killed more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. At the time of writing, it was unclear who was responsible for the attack.

In a separate development, the US has accused the Sudanese government of using chemical weapons in 2024, in violation of the country’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and announced on 22 May the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. The Sudanese government has denied these allegations.

Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. 

On 19 May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader, appointed Kamil Eltayeb Idris as Prime Minister. In a 20 May statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed hope that the appointment would serve as a first step towards inclusive consultations and the formation of a broad-based technocratic government. 

After assuming office, Idris dissolved the existing cabinet and, on 19 June, announced plans to appoint a 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. On 24 June, he named the ministers of defence and interior. 

However, the dissolution of the previous cabinet has sparked divisions among groups allied with the SAF, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, who argue that the move violates the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which provided for the allocation of cabinet positions and other political appointments to its signatories under a power-sharing framework.

During the closed consultations, Lamamra is expected to provide an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. 

On 2 June, the Personal Envoy held consultations in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, reportedly focusing on the need for coordinated international efforts to secure a ceasefire and advance an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue. He also spoke with Idris on 4 June—their first interaction since the prime minister’s appointment. 

As mediation efforts have yet to yield a breakthrough, Council members may wish to hear Lamamra’s assessment of recent political developments, prospects for de-escalation, and potential next steps, including the status of anticipated technical-level proximity talks. This may include strategies to enhance cooperation among stakeholders—particularly regional and sub-regional organisations—and to address the underlying challenges impeding the peace process. (For more information on recent mediation efforts, see our 18 May What’s in Blue story.)

On 3 June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the conflict in Sudan with the Quad ambassadors to the US (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 

According to a press release issued after the meeting, Landau acknowledged that the conflict in Sudan poses a threat to shared regional interests and underscored the importance of the Quad working collectively to persuade the warring parties to cease hostilities and pursue a negotiated settlement.

Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels today (26 June). 

Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the UK, the US, and Saudi Arabia.

Sudan’s civilian space remains fragmented, as evidenced by recent exchanges between different coalitions over Lamamra’s mediation efforts. 

Media reports suggest that a group of Sudanese politicians, activists, and diplomats sent a letter to Guterres on 13 June, accusing Lamamra of failing to establish a viable peace process and of aligning closely with the SAF’s narrative, and therefore calling for his replacement. 

By contrast, a different group of Sudanese political and civil society actors has reportedly expressed support for Lamamra and cautioned against efforts to undermine the mediation process.

Tomorrow, some Council members may reiterate their call on member states to refrain from external interference in Sudan, which they believe is exacerbating conflict and instability, and to instead support mediation efforts for a durable peace. They may call for strict compliance with the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime.

The appointment of the Panel of Experts assisting the committee, whose mandate was most recently extended through resolution 2772 of 17 February, remains stalled due to holds placed by some Council members. Some members may call for the urgent resolution of this impasse to ensure effective monitoring and implementation of the sanctions regime.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-11.php

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US Treasury sanctions SAF leader Burhan, SAF weapons supplier Abdalla, and RSF leader Hemeti

"AS a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked." Read the full story in breaking news, just in:

From The Sentry

Dated Thursday 16 Jan 2025, 21:09 GMT. Full copy:

US Sanctions Sudan’s Armed Forces Commander Burhan

January 16, 2025 (Washington DC) - Today, the US imposed sanctions on Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), citing actions including “indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure, attacks on schools, markets, and hospitals, and extrajudicial executions.”
 
The new sanctions designations by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) follow the designation of the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (known as “Hemedti”), and an official designation of genocide taking place in Sudan.

  

John Prendergast, co-founder of The Sentry, said: "Having recently sanctioned the leader of the paramilitary RSF, General Hemedti, it was critical that the US also sanction the leader of the Sudanese army, as they have both overseen massive human rights violations and deep-seated corruption.  In the end, when the death tolls are tallied, General Burhan may be responsible for more deaths than anyone in Sudan due to his obstruction of humanitarian aid as a famine has unfolded. Now the European Union, UK and others concerned about Sudan's plight should follow the US lead and impose sanctions on Hemedti and Burhan as well."

  

Brian Adeba, Senior Advisor at The Sentry, said: “The sanctioning of the leader of the Sudan Armed Forces is a significant move in the right direction. Sadly, as atrocities committed by the Sudan Armed Forces continue in offensives in central Sudan now, it is a stark reminder that such errant military leaders are still at work committing mass murder. This action should cajole the international community to activate international mechanisms designed to hold war criminals accountable as well as doubling efforts to bring the war in Sudan to a quick end to protect civilian lives.”

  

In addition, OFAC also sanctioned one company and one individual involved in weapons procurement in the Sudan conflict.

  

Read the US Department of Treasury’s sanctions announcement: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789
  

For media inquiries, please contact: Greg Hittelman, Director of Communications, gh@thesentry.org

  

About The Sentry
(Short descriptor for press use: “The Sentry, an investigative organization that tracks corruption.”)

The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy. Pull back the curtain on wars, mass atrocities, and other human rights abuses, and you’ll find grand corruption and unchecked greed. These tragedies persist because the perpetrators rarely face meaningful consequences. The Sentry aims to alter the warped incentive structures that continually undermine peace and good governance. Our investigations follow the money as it is laundered from war zones to financial centers around the world. We provide evidence and strategies for governments, banks, and law enforcement to hold the perpetrators and enablers of violence and corruption to account. These efforts provide new leverage for human rights, peace, and anti-corruption efforts. Learn more at: https://TheSentry.org

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Sudan: UN Security Council Private Meeting 29 Apr

Report from United Nations

Security Council Report (SCR)

What’s In Blue

Dated Sunday, 28 April 2024 - here is a full copy:

Sudan: Private Meeting

Tomorrow morning (29 April), the Security Council will convene for a private meeting to discuss the security and humanitarian situations in Sudan. Malta, April’s Council president, scheduled the meeting following bilateral consultations with some Council members and the parties concerned. Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are expected to brief. Sudan is expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

Tomorrow’s meeting comes against the backdrop of a severe escalation of violence across several parts of Sudan, particularly in the city of El-Fasher, the capital city of North Darfur state. One year into the conflict that erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s military leader, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemeti), the fighting continues to have devastating consequences for civilians. As at 14 April, more than 15,500 people had reportedly been killed since the onset of the conflict, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), a non-governmental organisation that collects conflict-related data.

In 2023, the RSF made significant advances, taking control of parts of Darfur, Khartoum, and Kordofan. El-Fasher remains the only capital city in the Darfur region outside the RSF’s control. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, dated 15 January, noted that amidst initial violence in April 2023 local authorities in El-Fasher had brokered a ceasefire agreement, dividing the city between the SAF, the RSF, and the armed movements in Darfur, which are signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. This arrangement allowed the SAF and the RSF to maintain positions on the west and east sides of the city, respectively, with a central area designated as a buffer zone under the control of the joint force of the armed movements. Recently, the joint force reportedly renounced its neutrality in the conflict and pledged support to the SAF, apparently citing the RSF’s provocations, including attacks on its positions and threats to block humanitarian aid, as the reasons for its decision.

In recent days, several UN officials have raised the alarm about the potential outbreak of full-scale fighting in El-Fasher and the resulting humanitarian consequences. In a 13 April statement, Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern about escalating tensions between armed actors in El-Fasher, noting that an attack on the city “would be devastating for civilians…and could lead to an expansion of the conflict along intercommunal lines across the five Darfur states”. He reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire and a durable cessation of hostilities. He also called on the warring parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and facilitate full and unrestricted humanitarian access to all areas in need.

On 19 April, Council members met to discuss the situation in Sudan, at the request of the UK, the penholder on Sudan. In her remarks, Msuya said that on 13 April, following weeks of rising tensions and airstrikes, RSF-affiliated militias attacked and burned villages west of El-Fasher. Since then, she added, there have been continuing reports of clashes in the eastern and northern parts of the city. She further noted that the continuing violence poses an extreme and immediate danger to the 800,000 civilians residing in the city and risks triggering further violence in other parts of Darfur—where more than nine million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. At the same meeting, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo informed the members that in the north of El-Fasher, clashes had erupted between the RSF and SAF-aligned members of the joint force in the district of Mellit. She added that “fighting in El-Fasher could unleash bloody intercommunal strife throughout Darfur…[and] would also further impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance in an area already on the brink of famine”. (For background and more information, see our 19 April What’s in Blue story.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, Msuya is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in the region in light of the evolving security developments. A 26 April OCHA press release said that the security situation has effectively cut off humanitarian access to El-Fasher—which serves as an important hub for reaching other parts of Darfur, including for aid shipments through the Tine border crossing from Chad and from Port Sudan. It added that more than a dozen trucks with lifesaving supplies for 122,000 people remain stranded in Ad Dabbah in the Northern state, due to persisting insecurity and lack of guarantees for safe passage.

On 27 April, Council members issued a press statement, co-authored by the UK and members of “A3 plus one” grouping (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana). The statement expressed concern about the escalating tensions and military operations around El-Fasher. Members called on the SAF and RSF to end the build-up of military forces, take steps to de-escalate the situation and comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. They reiterated their call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, leading to a sustainable ceasefire. In addition, they urged all member states to “refrain from external interference which seeks to foment conflict and instability and instead to support efforts for a durable peace” and reminded the Sudanese warring parties and all member states to comply with the arms embargo obligations, imposed by resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004 and most recently renewed by resolution 2676 of 8 March 2023. Several members are expected to reiterate these points at tomorrow’s meeting.

Another key issue that is likely to feature in tomorrow’s discussion is the flow of arms into Sudan in violation of the arms embargo. The 15 January final report of the Panel of Experts indicated that since the onset of the conflict, the RSF had been able to secure new supply lines to and through Darfur for weapons, vehicles, and logistics, including through eastern Chad, Libya and South Sudan. The report noted that the accusations levelled by the SAF that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Chad had provided military support to the RSF through Amdjarass were found credible. Furthermore, the report found that, from July 2023 onwards, “the RSF deployed several types of heavy and/or sophisticated weapons including Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS [Man-Portable Air Defence Systems]”, which had a massive impact on the balance of forces, both in Darfur and other regions of Sudan—in violation of the arms embargo.

Today (28 April), Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Al-Harith Idriss al-Harith Mohamed, apparently sent a letter to the Council claiming that the UAE’s support to the RSF represents a “flagrant violation” of the UN Charter and the Sudan sanctions regime. The letter requested the Council to convene an emergency meeting to discuss the “UAE’s aggression against Sudan…[and] hold it responsible for the crimes committed against the Sudanese people”. The UAE has denied these allegations on several occasions, most recently in a 21 April letter addressed to the Council, which said that “[a]ll allegations of the United Arab Emirates’ involvement in any form of aggression or destabilization in Sudan, or its provision of any military, logistical, financial or political support to any faction in Sudan, are spurious, unfounded, and lack any credible evidence to support them”.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Sudan, Sudan (Darfur)

About What's In Blue

When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed in blue. What's In Blue is a series of insights on evolving Security Council actions designed to help interested UN readers keep up with what might soon be "in blue".

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/04/sudan-private-meeting.php

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SUDAN WATCH UPDATE on Mon 29 Apr 2024 22:39 GMT: The above report, originally entitled Sudan: Private Meeting has been retitled and updated by What's In Blue as follows:

Sudan: Closed Consultations*

*Post-script (29 April, 9:50 am EST): After the story’s publication, the format of the meeting was changed from private meeting to closed consultations. An earlier version of the story indicated that Sudan will participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. After the changing of the meeting’s format this was no longer possible, as closed consultations do not allow participation of non-Council member states. The story was amended to reflect these changes.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/04/sudan-private-meeting.php

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