Sudan: UN Security Council closed consultations may discuss measures to support protection of civilians

TOMORROW'S UN Security Council briefing and consultations "may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC [protection of civilians] as well as assess existing strategies. 

In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. 

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan." 

Read more from What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday, 27 October 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (28 October), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the consultations.

Eighteen months into the conflict, hostilities continue unabated as the warring parties engage in a protracted war of attrition. Over the past several weeks, fighting intensified across multiple front lines as the rainy season subsided. In September, there was a severe escalation in El Fasher—the capital of North Darfur state, which has been under siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since May—after the RSF launched a coordinated attack on the city, followed by intensive shelling and airstrikes from both sides, resulting in civilian casualties. On 26 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive in Khartoum and surrounding areas in a bid to besiege areas under RSF control, making significant advances in the ensuing days. In addition, the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces (a coalition of armed movements from Darfur) engaged in fighting with the RSF on several front lines in North and West Darfur states. In the past few weeks, the SAF has reportedly been able to make strategic advances in Sennar and Al Jazira states. Media reports indicate that, on 24 October, the RSF launched a retaliatory attack on villages in East Al Jazira, following the defection to the SAF of Abu Aqla Kikal, a prominent RSF commander. While some sources report that the attack killed about 50 people, others suggest that the death toll could be much higher. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and listen to our 4 September podcast episode.)

Tomorrow, Guterres and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across the country and stress the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Guterres is likely to highlight that the conflict has resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Sudan and has had destabilising effects on the region. On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. The report describes an alarming intensification of intercommunal and identity-based violence and highlights a significant increase in human rights violations and abuses in areas under the control of both warring parties. It outlines the widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks carried out by the warring parties in residential neighbourhoods and sites sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres and several Council members are likely to emphasise the crucial need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and medical and humanitarian personnel.

Guterres is likely to focus on the recommendations outlined in his report under three broad headings: intensifying diplomacy towards ending the fighting, changing the behaviour of the warring parties, and supporting broader protection measures. The report highlights an urgent need for a renewed diplomatic push, including through the “personal involvement” of some heads of state, to ensure that the warring parties uphold their legal obligations. It calls on the warring parties and relevant stakeholders to pursue scalable, locally negotiated ceasefires and other measures to reduce violence, protect civilians, and prevent the spread of conflict. It strongly recommends that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The report calls for an immediate cessation of the direct or indirect flow of weapons and ammunitions into Sudan, which continue to fuel the conflict. Highlighting the need to monitor violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, the report underlines the importance of supporting and cooperating with regional and international independent investigation bodies. It further calls on the international community to provide technical and financial support to Sudanese civil society organisations and community-based initiatives.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan. Some Council members are apparently exploring options for a possible deployment of an African Union (AU)-led mission and how the mission could be supported in the context of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). The Secretary-General’s report acknowledges these calls but notes that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. However, it expresses the UN Secretariat’s readiness to engage with the Council and relevant stakeholders on “operational modalities”, including localised efforts feasible under the current conditions that can contribute to effectively reducing violence and protecting civilians.

Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing regional and international initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis, his engagement with key regional and international interlocutors, and his efforts to coordinate different peace initiatives. With the mediation efforts, not having achieved any breakthrough as yet, members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps, including strategies for enhancing cooperation among stakeholders and addressing the underlying issues hindering the peace process. Tomorrow’s closed consultations may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC as well as assess existing strategies.

On 3 October, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members undertook a field mission to Port Sudan to engage with senior officials from the Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders. In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AUPSC members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Wosornu is likely to highlight the spiralling humanitarian situation in the country, especially food insecurity, and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid across Sudan. She and several Council members are likely to reiterate the critical need to ensure full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and criticise impediments to such access. They may also call on the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorisation for the use of the Adre crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for humanitarian operations, which was initially authorised on 15 August for a three-month period.

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. While expressing appreciation for assurances of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities, they underlined the need to operationalise these commitments. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan.

Earlier this month, during negotiations on a draft press statement proposed by the UK (the penholder on Sudan), Russia apparently requested the removal of the phrase “administrative or other impediments”, arguing that it suggests that Port Sudan authorities are creating artificial barriers for aid delivery and distribution. Some members, such as France, however, contended that several obstacles remain to the delivery of aid. Continuing disagreements among members led the penholder to withdraw the draft text after four revised drafts. (For background on Council dynamics regarding the issue of humanitarian access, see the brief on Sudan in our October Monthly Forecast and 13 June What’s in Blue story.)

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-9.php

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Former Sudan PM Hamdok meets Macron in Paris

REGARDING the absence of the Sudanese government from the Paris conference, President Macron stated during a meeting with Sudanese civil society representatives that the government had lost its legitimacy due to the 2021 coup against civilians. 

In the previous week, Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed “its utmost astonishment and condemnation” of the conference, convened by France, Norway, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the European Union, denouncing “that such a conference is convened on a matter concerning Sudan without consultation or coordination with its government and without its participation…” Read more.

From Radio Dabanga English - www.dabangasudan.org
Dated Wednesday, 17 April 2024 PARIS / OTTAWA - here is a copy in full:

Former Sudan PM Hamdok meets Macron in Paris

Former Prime Minister of Sudan, Abdallah Hamdok (File photo: SUNA)

Former Prime Minister of Sudan and current chair of the Civil Democratic Forces (Tagaddum), Abdalla Hamdok, engaged in discussions on the war in Sudan with French President Emmanuel Macron during a closed session in Paris yesterday.

Following his visit to the French capital, Hamdok expressed gratitude to President Macron for France’s unwavering support of the Sudanese people’s aspirations and their stance in backing Sudan’s December revolution and the transitional civilian government. 

He commended the success of the Paris conference, which drew global attention to Sudan’s plight, raising €2 billion in pledged support from France, Germany, and the European Union for humanitarian aid.

Underscoring the significance of building on the achievements of the Paris conference, the Tagaddum head urged continued international efforts towards silencing the guns of war.

President Macron, in turn, welcomed Hamdok’s participation in the conference activities and reaffirmed France’s commitment to supporting Sudanese efforts for peace, freedom, and justice.

The former Sudanese leader also held discussions with Canadian Minister of International Development Ahmed Hussen and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock on the sidelines of the humanitarian conference in Paris.

Earlier this week, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly announced sanctions against two individuals and four entities affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces for undermining peace, security, and stability in Sudan.

Regarding the absence of the Sudanese government from the Paris conference, President Macron stated during a meeting with Sudanese civil society representatives that the government had lost its legitimacy due to the 2021 coup against civilians.

Last week, Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed “its utmost astonishment and condemnation” of the conference, convened by France, Norway, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the European Union, denouncing “that such a conference is convened on a matter concerning Sudan without consultation or coordination with its government and without its participation…”

Hamdok reiterated that a military solution to the conflict was untenable and advocated for a negotiated peace process driven by Sudanese initiatives. 

He called for unity among Sudanese factions to streamline peace efforts and avoid fragmentation.

View original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/former-sudan-pm-hamdok-meets-macron-in-paris

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EU aims to further strengthen relations with Chad

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: This report is translated from French using Google translate. If memory serves, in 2003-4 200 French troops were swiftly dropped into Chad by helicopter when news broke of war in Darfur. I blogged about it at the time because I was surprised at France being the first to send troops to land near Sudan on a mission to provide humanitarian aid.  

Report from LE N'DJAM POST
Dated Wednesday, 7 February 2024 in Chad

Cooperation: EU aims to further strengthen relations with Chad

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chadians Abroad, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, received in audience, on February 7, 2024, the Special Representative of the European Union for the Sahel, Emanuela Del Re. The objective was to discuss the relations between Chad and the European Union and the crucial role that the Chadian government plays within the Sahel region.

The discussions during this meeting focused on topics related to the promotion of peace and stability in the Sahel. It is in view of the many challenges facing Chad and the subregion that the two stakeholders intend to strengthen their cooperation to eradicate these problems.

Thus, the EU Representative for the Sahel, Emanuela Del Re, took the opportunity to congratulate and encourage Chad for its efforts and contribution to the search for durable solutions. She did not lose sight of the ongoing transition process in Chad and welcomed the commitment of the Chadian government to the reception of thousands of Sudanese refugees in the east of the country.

View original: https://lendjampost.com/cooperation-lue-entend-renforcer-davantage-ses-relations-avec-le-tchad/

Source: Hat tip and thanks to Cameron Hudson @_hudsonc

https://twitter.com/_hudsonc/status/1755506600242979283 Feb 8, 2024

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Is Chad to be the next domino to fall in the Sahel?

THIS tweet posted to X by @jebren_ in reply to Cameron Hudson's Dec 6 tweet copied here below says: "A distinguished forward-looking article that dealt with the internal situation in Chad clearly and put the dots on the letters. Cameron, be assured that the situation in Chad will reach your assumptions in the near future. France and America will not understand what observers of Chadian issues write (perhaps they have their own concerns). Kaka in deep troubles with his own clan and others. cause everyone knows his weakness they’ll try to take advantage! Thanks

Cameron Hudson

@_hudsonc

·

6h

Is #Chad going to be the next domino to fall in the Sahel? My latest analysis for @CSIS argues that not only is the country on the brink of a coup and possibly civil war, but that Washington is deeply unprepared to prevent it.

9:36 PM Dec 6, 2023"

A distinguished forward-looking article that dealt with the internal situation in Chad clearly and put the dots on the letters.
Cameron, be assured that the situation in Chad will reach your assumptions in the near future. France and America will not understand what observers of… https://t.co/jRXJ6BkNSl

— Jebren جبرين (@jebren_) December 6, 2023

__________________________________

HERE is a full copy of the above mentioned analysis:

From the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Commentary by Cameron Hudson
Published December 6, 2023

Chad: The Sahel’s Last Domino to Fall 

Photo: DENIS SASSOU GUEIPEUR/AFP/Getty Images

It is no understatement to say that Africa’s arid Sahel region, occupying a 4,000-mile stretch of North African Sahara from the Atlantic to the Red Sea coasts, is likely the most dangerous and unstable stretch of territory in the world today.

The region has always been crushingly poor and pockmarked by bad governance. But in recent years, the region has been buffeted by a rash of democratic backsliding, nine coups, high levels of terrorist violence, a civil war, and the overall displacement of more than 15 million people. Despite this bleak scenario, the Sahel has a new risk on the horizon as one of its last dominoes risks falling from internal stability and spreading the regional contagion of instability even further.

Chad, the landlocked country in the heart of the region, has largely escaped getting drawn into the chaos that surrounds it on all sides. But it is on a knife’s edge internally and the direction it tilts will affect the fates of tens of millions of people in what is now also the fastest-growing population center on earth. Wedged between a raging civil war to the east in Sudan and an unchecked terrorist insurgency in the western Sahel, Chad’s collapse could open a bridge that merges the flow of fighters, weapons, and violence between these two regions embroiled in conflict: a virtual Pandora’s box clear across Africa.

The view from this side of the Atlantic has always been that Chad is a French problem. Paris’s former colony has continued to remain close to the fold, hosting France’s largest military base on the continent, and now serving as the rally point for French troops retreating out of Niger, where a military coup last July dethroned the region’s last remaining bright spot and democratic partner. In exchange for its loyalty, France has continued to confer its legitimacy on successive Chadian military leaders.

When the country’s longtime military dictator, Idriss Déby Itno, died commanding his troops on the battlefield in 2021, it was President Emmanuel Macron who presided over Déby’s funeral and, in a move so well practiced by generations of French leaders, anointed Déby’s son, Mahamat, as the country’s new leader.

But two years later, Déby is now learning that it is harder to hold power after being handed it as opposed to earning it, either at the ballot box or on the battlefield, as his late father did. Since being thrust into the pink palace, Chad’s presidential residence on the banks of the Chari River, the young leader, at 38, has struggled to consolidate his rule, keep happy the Zaghawa tribal elites who installed him, or manage the country’s complex foreign relationships. Wisely, he has continued his father’s counterterror operations across the region, which has kept him in good standing with foreign backers.

But major cracks in his rule at home are emerging, which could ultimately spell Déby’s demise and usher in a new period of transition and violent instability for the country and the wider region. News in recent months that Déby has turned over use of an airport in the far eastern city of Amdjarass, his father’s ancestral home and burial place, in exchange for financial promises from the United Arab Emirates is angering Chad’s Zaghawa generals, who oppose the Emirati effort to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in neighboring Sudan’s civil war.

The elders of this minority Arab tribe that has ruled Chad since 1990 see RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo—who comes from his own mixed Chadian-Sudanese parentage—as a potential pretender to the throne in Chad and a threat to their rule. Concerns have long circulated in Chadian circles that if Hemedti were ever chased from Sudan he would most certainly retreat westward out of Darfur and into Chad where he would continue to seek power for himself and avoid accountability for his many atrocity crimes. Similarly, Hemedti’s recent efforts to recruit Zaghawa tribesman and draw them into his war has been resisted by most of the Chadian Zaghawa community, many of whom view his ethnic cleansing of the non-Arab Masalit community in West Darfur, with whom they share many cultural and familial ties, as a threat to them.

Reported discussions with Russia over the use of private military companies to help Déby subdue northern rebels and begin to exploit significant gold reserves in the Tibetsi mountain range near the country’s border with Libya have further stoked the ire of the country’s generals, who take pride in their reputation as the region’s most effective fighters. They bristle at the notion of needing outside assistance like their Malian and Burkinabe neighbors. The recent news that Hungary would offer military forces to nominally aid in Chad’s counterterror and human trafficking interdiction efforts is suspected by many of being a thin cover for the creation of a Praetorian guard to protect Déby from the types of palace coups that have recently plagued other heads of state in the region.

Meanwhile, the nationalization of the Chad’s oil sector, along with the impetuous expulsion of Germany’s ambassador for his “discourteous attitude,” all point to a reckless vanity that has rightly caused many around him to question the young leader’s judgment. Déby’s retirement of Chadian generals who had served his father, along with the promotion of childhood friends, like Youssof Boy, seen as the enabler of some of Déby’s worst instincts, as advisors has further catalyzed the country’s political and military elite to question his hold on power.

Despite these many missteps, Déby is still seeking ways to consolidate his rule, with or without the generals he relies on. Last month Déby cut a deal with his principal political opponent, Succès Masra, to return to the country after a year of exile, stemming from a bloody crackdown on his party and pro-democracy protesters last October. In the episode, now referred to as “Black Thursday” by civil society, scores were killed and hundreds more arrested and detained in the country’s most significant pro-democracy protest.

Later this month he will attempt to put in place the second element of his power play. After organizing a national dialogue last year that excluded prodemocracy and armed groups, he will soon ram through a new constitution that lowers the age requirement for the presidency from 40 to 35, thus enabling his candidacy. At the same time, the vote will enact a new restriction requiring candidates to have both parents be Chadian born, a bar that neither of his two main opponents, Masra or Hemedti, can clear. Once legitimized by an election-like process next year, likely to be signed off on by Washington and other capitals still requiring his security services, Déby’s assumption of power will be complete. If he can survive that long.

Chad is today rife with rumors of an impending military coup. But a look at how the West has responded to coups in neighboring Niger and Sudan, neither of which saw sanctions imposed in response, suggests that would-be coup-makers do not have much to worry about, so long as they quickly pledge to make good on previous CT commitments and keep France’s military base operating.

Except this myopia obscures an understanding of Chadian history that suggests the coming coup will not resemble the quick and bloodless episodes that have defined recent power grabs in the region. Since its independence, Chad’s power transfers have been anything but peaceful. Most have been coups, coming in the context of larger civil conflicts. In this sense, past is almost certainly prologue.

Last year, Washington alerted Déby to an aborted coup attempt by forces of southern Christians, supposedly receiving military training in neighboring Central African Republic. This suggests at least an awareness in Washington of the threats Déby faces, if not a willingness to see him maintain power. Similarly, the same armed rebel groups that succeeded in killing Idriss Déby recently declared that they were restarting their armed struggle with his son.

And yet, neither Washington nor France has done much to either push Déby into genuine reforms or to support the demands of the struggling democratic forces in the country. For his many transgressions, Déby has felt not much more than a slap on the wrist in the form of critical statement from Washington calling for accountability for his attacks on protesters last year and a stern talking-to from Macron. But today the stakes are far higher.

Facing ongoing threats to stability across the region and a showdown in Chad, a coup is likely to unleash a wave of violence in a region already beset by instability, creating even more opportunities for extremists to flourish, democracy to fail, and civilians to suffer. Instead of watching passively as either a constitutional coup or a military coup unfolds in Chad, Washington needs a more active plan of engagement that acknowledges the deep divisions in Chadian society as well as the broader risks to internal and regional stability a coup entails. Underpinning this approach must be a clear-eyed strategy that balances the tensions and tradeoffs inherent in seeking to align Washington’s genuine security interests with the demands of a population desperate to rid themselves of dynastic rule.

For nearly 30 years, Chad has presented the outside world with a mirage of stability held in check by a powerful ruling minority whose internal repression was excused because of its utility to Western security interests. Western powers allowed that mirage to persist when Idriss Déby was killed and his son assumed his place. But as Chad faulters, welcoming Déby’s consolidation of his hereditary rule with another slap on the wrist, for fear of exacerbating the country’s internal fissures, will no longer work. Instead, Washington would be better served by getting ahead of the curve and helping to foster a genuine transition in Chad under conditions it can influence before forces beyond anyone’s control impose.

In a region beset by political, security, ethnic, and even demographic threats, where coups d’état are no longer a thing of the past, continuing the charade that Chad is still a stable and reliable security partner only undermines Chadians’ hope for genuine reform and puts at risk the United States’ long-term security interests. It is time to end that charade before the dam breaks.

Cameron Hudson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

View original: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chad-sahels-last-domino-fal

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