Chadian born camel trader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa "Hemedti" now controls half of Sudan

"SUDANESE speculate that Hemedti sees himself either as president of a breakaway state, or still harbours ambitions to rule all of Sudan.

It's also possible that he sees a future as an all-powerful political puppet master, head of a conglomerate that controls businesses, a mercenary army and a political party. By these means, even if he isn't acceptable as Sudan's public face, he can still pull the strings.

And as Hemedti's troops massacre civilians in el-Fasher, he is confident that he enjoys impunity in a world that does not care much." Read full report.

From BBC News

By Alex de Waal
Africa analyst
Published Tuesday 4 November 2025, 00:42 GMT - full copy:

He made his money selling camels and gold. Now this warlord controls half of Sudan

Image source, ANADOLU VIA GETTY IMAGES

Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti", has emerged as a dominant figure on Sudan's political stage, with his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now controlling half of the country.

The RSF scored a notable victory recently when it overran the city of el-Fasher, the last garrison held by the Sudanese army and its local allies in the western region of Darfur.

El-Fasher residents are suffering from famine following the RSF's 18-month siege of the city, a UN-accredited group of food security experts confirmed on Monday.

Feared and loathed by his adversaries, Hemedti is admired by his followers for his tenacity, ruthlessness, and his promise to tear down a discredited state.

Hemedti has humble origins. His family is from the Mahariya section of the camel-herding, Arabic-speaking Rizeigat community that spans Chad and Darfur.

He was born in 1974 or 1975 - like many from a rural background, his date and place of birth were not registered.

Led by his uncle Juma Dagolo, his clan moved into Darfur in the 1970s and 80s, fleeing war and seeking greener pastures and were allowed to settle.

After dropping out of school in his early teens, Hemedti earned money trading camels across the desert to Libya and Egypt.

At the time, Darfur was Sudan's wild west - poor, lawless and neglected by the government of then-President Omar al-Bashir.

Arab militiamen known as the Janjaweed - including a force commanded by Juma Dagolo - were attacking the villages of the indigenous Fur ethnic group.

This cycle of violence led to a full-scale rebellion in 2003, in which Fur fighters were joined by Masalit, Zaghawa and other groups, saying they had been ignored by the country's Arab elite.

In response, Bashir massively expanded the Janjaweed to spearhead his counter-insurgency efforts. They quickly won notoriety for burning, looting, raping and killing.

Image source, GETTY IMAGES. Image caption: 

The atrocities of the Janjaweed militia caused international outrage

Hemedti's unit was among them, with a report by African Union peacekeepers saying it attacked and destroyed the village of Adwa in November 2004, killing 126 people, including 36 children.

A US investigation determined that the Janjaweed were responsible for genocide.

The Darfur conflict was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which brought charges against four men, including Bashir, who has denied carrying out genocide.

Hemedti was one of the many Janjaweed commanders deemed too junior to be in the prosecutor's sights at that time.

Just one, the Janjaweed "colonel of colonels", Ali Abdel Rahman Kushayb, was brought to court.

Last month he was found guilty on 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity and he will be sentenced on 19 November.

In the years following the height of the violence in 2004, Hemedti played his cards skilfully, rising to become head of a powerful paramilitary force, a corporate empire, and a political machine.

It is a story of opportunism and entrepreneurship. He briefly mutinied, demanding back-pay for his soldiers, promotions and a political position for his brother. Bashir gave him most of what he wanted and Hemedti rejoined the fold.

Later, when other Janjaweed units mutinied, Hemedti led the government forces that defeated them, in the process taking control of Darfur's biggest artisanal gold mine at a place called Jebel Amir.

Rapidly, Hemedti's family company Al-Gunaid became Sudan's largest gold exporter.

In 2013, Hemedti asked - and got - formal status as head of a new paramilitary group, the RSF, reporting directly to Bashir.

The Janjaweed were folded into the RSF, getting new uniforms, vehicles and weapons - and also officers from the regular army who were brought in to help with the upgrade.

Image source, AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES. Image caption:

The RSF was an ally of the army, before they fell out

The RSF scored an important victory against the Darfur rebels, did less well in fighting an insurgency in the Nuba Mountains adjacent to South Sudan, and took a subcontract to police the border with Libya.

Ostensibly curbing illicit migration from Africa over the desert to the Mediterranean, Hemedti's commanders also excelled in extortion and, reportedly, people-trafficking.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) called on the Sudanese army to send troops to fight against the Houthis in Yemen.

The contingent was commanded by a general who had fought in Darfur, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, now the head of the army at war with the RSF.

Hemedti saw a chance and negotiated a separate, private deal with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to provide RSF mercenaries.

The Abu Dhabi connection proved most consequential. It was the beginning of a close relationship with the Emirati president, Mohamed bin Zayed

Young Sudanese men - and increasingly from neighbouring countries too - trekked to the RSF recruiting centres for cash payments of up to $6,000 (£4,500) on signing up.

Hemedti struck a partnership with Russia's Wagner Group, receiving training in return for commercial dealings, including in gold.

He visited Moscow to formalise the deal, and was there on the day that Russia invaded Ukraine. After the war in Sudan broke out, he denied the RSF was getting help from Wagner.

Although the RSF's main combat units were increasingly professionalised, it also encompassed a coalition of irregular old-style ethnic militia.

As the regime faced mounting popular protests, Bashir ordered Hemedti's units to the capital, Khartoum.

Punning on his name, the president dubbed him himayti, "my protector", seeing the RSF as a counterweight to potential coup makers in the regular army and national security.

It was a miscalculation. In April 2019, a vibrant camp of civic protesters surrounded the military headquarters demanding democracy.

Bashir ordered the army to open fire on them. The top generals - Hemedti among them - met and decided to depose Bashir instead. The democracy movement celebrated.

Image source, AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES. Image caption: The RSF leader turned on then-President Omar al-Bashir, helping to depose him

For a time, Hemedti was lionised as the fresh face of Sudan's future. Youthful, personable, actively meeting diverse social groups, and positioning himself as the challenger to the country's historic establishment, he tried to change his political colours. That lasted just a few weeks.

As he and the joint head of the ruling military council, Burhan, stalled on handing power to civilians, the protesters stepped up their rallies, and Hemedti unleashed the RSF, which killed hundreds of people, raped women, and threw men into the River Nile with bricks tied to their ankles, according to a report by campaign group Human Rights Watch (HRW), external.

Hemedti has denied the RSF committed atrocities.

Pressed by the quartet of countries formed to promote peace and democracy in Sudan - the US, UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE - the generals and the civilians agreed to a compromise drafted by African mediators.

For two years, there was an unstable coexistence of a military-dominated sovereign council and a civilian cabinet.

As a cabinet-appointed committee investigating the companies owned by the army, security and RSF closed in on its final report - which was set to expose how Hemedti was fast expanding his corporate empire - Burhan and Hemedti dismissed the civilians and took power.

But the coup-masters fell out. Burhan demanded that the RSF come under army command.

Hemedti resisted. Days before a deadline in April 2023 to resolve this issue, RSF units moved to surround the army headquarters and seize key bases and the national palace in Khartoum.

The putsch failed. Instead, Khartoum became a war zone as the rival forces fought street by street.

Violence exploded in Darfur, with RSF units mounting a vicious campaign against the Masalit people.

The UN estimates as many as 15,000 civilians died, and the US described it as genocide. The RSF denied the allegation.

RSF commanders circulated videos of their fighters torturing and killing, advertising the atrocities and their sense of impunity.

The RSF and its allied militia rampaged across Sudan, pillaging cities, markets, universities, and hospitals.

An avalanche of looted goods are for sale in what are popularly known as "Dagolo markets" reaching beyond Sudan into Chad and other neighbouring countries. The RSF has denied its fighters are involved in looting.

Trapped in the national palace under attack from artillery and airstrikes, Hemedti was badly injured in the early weeks of the conflict and disappeared from public view.

When he reappeared months later he showed no remorse for atrocities and was no less determined to win the war on the battlefield.

Image source, REUTERS. Image caption: 

The war in Sudan has forced millions of people to flee their homes

The RSF has acquired modern weapons including sophisticated drones, that it has used to strike Burhan's de facto capital, Port Sudan, and which played a crucial role in the assault on el-Fasher.

Investigative reporting by, among others, the New York Times, has documented that these are transported through an airstrip and supply base built by the UAE just inside Chad. The UAE denies that it is arming the RSF.

With this weaponry, the RSF is locked in a strategic stalemate with its former partner, the Sudanese army.

Hemedti is trying to build a political coalition, including some civilian groups and armed movements, most notably his former adversaries in the Nuba Mountains.

He has formed a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity", taking the chairmanship for himself.

With the capture of el-Fasher, the RSF now controls almost all the inhabited territory west of the Nile.

Following escalating reports of mass killings and widespread condemnation, Hemedti declared an investigation into what he called violations committed by his soldiers during the taking of the city.

Sudanese speculate that Hemedti sees himself either as president of a breakaway state, or still harbours ambitions to rule all of Sudan.

It's also possible that he sees a future as an all-powerful political puppet master, head of a conglomerate that controls businesses, a mercenary army and a political party. By these means, even if he isn't acceptable as Sudan's public face, he can still pull the strings.

And as Hemedti's troops massacre civilians in el-Fasher, he is confident that he enjoys impunity in a world that does not care much.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

More about the conflict in Sudan

A simple guide to the war in Sudan

'I was accused of spying and beaten' - a boy's escape from captured Sudan city

New videos show executions after RSF militia takes key Sudan city

'We saw people murdered in front of us' - Sudan siege survivors speak to the BBC

Reports of mass killings in Sudan have echoes of its dark past

Sudan's fertile region where food is rotting amid famine and war

View original: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3vn17r29v9o

Ends

Sudan: Military has far too much power (Eric Reeves)

• The RSF is still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue. 
• What about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago? 
• If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.
• Will Hemeti disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?
• Will all arrests be made only by policemen?
• One of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.  Read full story:

Analysis from Radio Dabanga.org

By Dr Eric Reeves - NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA

Published Wednesday 07 August 2019

The Constitutional Charter and the future of Sudan

FCC leader Ahmed Rabee and Hemeti with copies of the Constitutional Declaration during the signing ceremony in Khartoum on August 4 (Picture SUNA).

The “Constitutional Charter” (CC) signed on August 4 is an inspiring read, if stripped from the grim context in which it has been brought into being—if we forget the many hundreds who have been killed, wounded, raped, and tortured in the course of the uprising that has brought at least the hope of civilian governance into sight. The insistence on human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, press freedoms, tolerance, and indeed the priority of peace—all of this provides at least the ghostly outline of a what a free and just Sudan—truly at peace with itself—might look like.

But what has been stipulated in the CC and what seems likely in the near future seem to me two very different things, and I am far from alone in my misgivings. Canvassing Sudanese social media over the past three days—and for months prior to this—I find two major concerns, fundamental issues that many feel have not been addressed by the CC.

The first, and most frequent, is that far too much power has been left in the hands of the military, now a hybrid military, with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nominally under the command of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” (CC §34).* Moreover, many have observed that the RSF is left fully intact, a force unto itself, and still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue.

In Khartoum itself, all evidence points to a concerted plan by the RSF to undertake what has come to be known as the “June 3 Massacre,” in which more than 150 people were killed (perhaps many more), dozens of women and girls raped, and widespread violence of a sort not seen even during the uprising of September 2013. It is impossible to believe that the orders for the deadly clearance of protesters in front of army headquarters did not come from the Transitional Military Council, and indeed “Lt. General” Hemeti (he has no formal military training, a fact reflected in the lack of discipline throughout the RSF). Unsurprisingly, the RSF was again responsible for the deadly violence in El Obeid on July 29.

The second criticism, voiced in various forms, is that the fundamental economic issues in Sudan—a nation struggling under the burden of an economy that has largely collapsed—are nowhere addressed with any specificity. This is perhaps to be expected of an interim constitutional document, but the greatest hindrance to economic rehabilitation in Sudan has long been the inordinate amount of the national budget devoted to the military and security services. All independent Sudanese economists I’ve encountered estimate that the percentage is between 50% and 70% of all national expenditures.

Will the military men who play such a large role in what was to have been a movement to bring about civilian governance in Sudan willingly give up this previously compulsory largesse, provided by the ordinary people of Sudan? Senior officers have enjoyed what is by Sudanese standards a lavish salary and lifestyle: will they give this up in the interest of the nation? And what about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region, about which so much has been made in recent years? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago?

The point many Sudanese seem to be making is that the greatest obstacle—both to peace in the country and to economic rehabilitation—is the continuing central role of the armed forces in Sudan’s governance over the next 39 months. It may be that the members of the soon-to-be-dissolve Transitional Military Council (TMC) will no longer be able to move with the same ease of executive fiat as was the case during the al-Bashir years. But there are all too many “work-arounds” evident in the constitutional text, as well as the massive inherent power of the “deep state” that so many Sudanese worry about. 30 years of tyranny, corruption, war, and kleptocracy cannot be whisked away with any document, no matter how eloquent or impressively democratic. And Hemeti has proved himself at once hugely ambitious and unreservedly deceitful and expedient.

Here it is important to remember that the al-Bashir regime abided by not one of the agreements it signed during its long tenure: not the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (annexation of Abyei is only the most egregious violation of the various Protocols of the CPA, signed in January 2005); the Nuba Mountain ceasefire (January, 2002); the Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006); the peace agreement with the Eastern Front (October 2006); the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011); and the list goes on and on. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.

But such an outcome has one terrible downside for the military, if it indeed seizes national power: the economy will continue its collapse, and we may be sure that protests will resume, with anger even greater, political frustration even more intense. It’s hard to say what the economic consequences of eight months of sustained demonstrations, protests, and strikes has been—but it has been enormous, and the people of Sudan have seen just how powerful they are. Without a massive shift in economic priorities, which will entail cooperation from Sudan’s work force, agriculture will continue to decline; the ability to finance critical imports—including food, medicine, and refined petroleum products—will further diminish; and inflation that has brought so many Sudanese families to the very edge of survival continues to roar ahead, even as the Sudanese Pound continues its precipitous collapse.

More Challenges

Even now, of course, we must note Sudanese concern about what is not in the CC, and that is the July agreement between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The armed opposition has universally rejected the CC of August 4, and several political parties in Khartoum have now insisted that any real path forward requires much more participation from those in the armed movements, and especially civil society elements from the regions where the movements have been most active: Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Pessimism is in no short supply.

How will we know if this broadly shared pessimism is warranted? Usefully, the text of the CC provides for some early tests of the military’s willingness to embrace the ideals set forth:

[1] “All people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law” (§ 5.i). Will we see any change in Darfur, where the rule of law has been only a vague rumour for two decades and more? Where rape, murder, abduction, and pillaging are virtually daily events?

[2] “Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law”(§18.i). Does this apply to RSF commander Hemeti? Will he disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?

[3] “The General Intelligence Service is a uniformed agency that is competent in national security. Its duties are limited to gathering and analysing information and providing it to the competent bodies. The law defines its obligations and duties, and it is subject to the sovereign and executive authorities by law” (§36). Can we expect to see an end to the arrests and torture for which the “former” National Intelligence and Security Services are notorious? Will all arrests be made only by policemen? These questions are also raised by §45: “Every person has the right to freedom and security. No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention, or deprived of freedom or restricted therefrom except for cause in accordance with procedures defined by law.”

[4] §56 speaks of “the right to access the internet, without prejudice to public order, safety, and morals…” Will we see this? And who decides what is a threat to “to public order, safety, and morals”? Is the conditionality of this language a way to justify future internet shutdowns?

[5] §64 speaks of the State undertaking “to provide primary health care and emergency services free of charge for all citizens, develop public health, and establish, develop and qualify basic treatment and diagnostic institutions.” Does this mean that the ghastly humanitarian embargo imposed by the al-Bashir regime will at long last be lifted from large areas of South Kordofan, after eight years of suffering, hunger, and denial of assistance?

This last test of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.

In short, we could know very soon whether the Transitional Military Council, prior to its dissolution, means to send a signal of good faith. I’m not holding my breath.

* All citations are from a translation of the version of the Constitutional Charter that was signed on 4 August 2019, prepared by International IDEA (www.idea.int).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributing author or media and do not necessarily reflect the position of Radio Dabanga.

Eric Reeves is a regular contributor and commentator to Radio Dabanga. He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, who has spent the past 20+ years as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the USA and internationally **.
His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

View Original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan