WATCHED LIVE STREAM of a special meeting on Sudan held at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva today. What an eye opener. Sad to say, after watching it and reading of the one held by the UN Security Council today, I no longer believe the African Union is up to handling the Sudan crisis. The UN will be needed. More on this at a later date. Meanwhile, I couldn't let another minute pass without posting for posterity this urgent masterpiece by Prof Alex de Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation.
Report from ResponsibleStatecraft.org
Written by Alex de Waal
Dated Wednesday 10 May 2023 - full copy:
The conflict in Sudan threatens to devolve into a regional maelstrom
Given the number of potential spoilers and intruders, the US and other peace brokers urgently need to bring in the United Nations
Sudan’s war is on the brink of igniting a regional ring of fire. That can be prevented — but it needs the United Nations to play its role.
At the weekend, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia convened talks in Jeddah on a short-term ceasefire to allow aid in and civilians out. That is a tough ask. But the American and Saudi diplomats face a second, equally difficult challenge: how to insulate the Sudan crisis from becoming ensnared in regional and global antagonisms.
No outside player wanted the war, and none want it to escalate — and that includes Russia and China. External powers, especially in the Middle East, may have their favorites to head the country, but none of them want to see their candidate ruling over ruins. With every passing day, the risk is rising that outside powers become entangled.
Egypt openly favors General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces, or SAF. Turkey and Qatar, both of which have close ties to Sudan’s Islamists, lean that way. The United Arab Emirates has ties to both generals, but has closer political and commercial ties with his rival, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as “Hemedti,” and his Rapid Support Forces, or RSF.
The Arab League has followed the Egyptian position, identifying al-Burhan as representing the Sudanese state, implicitly labeling Hemedti as a rebel.
The Wagner Group has a partnership with the RSF, but the Kremlin also has interests in a Red Sea naval base and in SAF-controlled military businesses. China has investments in Sudan, especially in the oil sector, and sees the Red Sea as a strategic link in its Belt and Road Initiative — the waterway is its main maritime trade corridor to Europe.
The conflict poses a national security risk for Sudan’s neighbors. Egypt is struggling to cope with a mass influx of people that already tops 100,000. Privately they expect a million, including many dual Sudanese-Egyptian nationals. Saudi Arabia is receiving evacuees across the Red Sea. The Gulf monarchies all have Sudanese diaspora communities who will be bringing their extended families. They, and countries such as Turkey, have major investments in Sudan’s agriculture that face collapse.
The re-ignition of conflict in Darfur will ensnare Sudan’s western neighbors. One group to watch is the Arab militia of Musa Hilal, the Janjaweed commander defeated by Hemedti when the RSF took control of Darfur’s gold mines. Others are fighters loyal to Minni Minawi’s Sudan Liberation Army and Jibreel Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement, both of which have stayed neutral thus far. But as the SAF tries to close the borders, attack the gold mines, and burn Hemedti’s home base, Darfur is likely to explode, with terrible humanitarian consequences.
Libya is already entangled. Khalifa Haftar, head of the so-called Libyan National Army — and another member of the Wagner group of friends — is already supplying Hemedti with logistics. RSF fighters and others with different allegiances back home have fought on different sides in Libya: some will return to join the fray, others may fight one another in Libya. All these groups are also armed and dangerous in Chad and Central African Republic. Chadian President Mahamat Deby knows that his father, and his father’s predecessor, both took power in invasions from Darfur, and that his opponents will be assessing their chances.
There is upwards of a million South Sudanese in Sudan — refugees, labor migrants, and residents who stayed after the 2011 secession. They have few attractive options as their home country is fragile. South Sudan is in the path of the storm as trade from the north is cut, oil exports through Sudan are imperiled, and militias on both sides of the two country’s common border become emboldened. South Sudan’s president Salva Kiir has offered to mediate, but has made no progress.
Sudan’s war also intersects with Ethiopia’s. In recent weeks, the federal government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has switched horses — he has a new common front with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front against Amhara militias and Eritrea. The war zone is adjacent to Sudan, including the al-Fashaga Triangle — an area disputed between the two countries. There are 80,000 Tigrayan refugees inside Sudan in danger, and battalions of Tigrayan soldiers who had served with the UN and been given asylum there. Meanwhile, Egypt will be wondering if this might be a moment to disrupt the scheduled filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam during this summer’s rainy season, a step it fiercely objects to.
The only neighbor that sees potential benefits is Eritrea. The chaos is a chance for Eritrean security agents to roam freely, rounding up dissidents who will disappear into that country’s gulag and press-ganging refugees to replenish the depleted ranks of its army. And the more Eritrea’s neighbors are in turmoil, the more the Eritrean despot Isseyas Afewerki becomes the region’s military hegemon.
This regional tinderbox risks, first, that every neighbor will be involved, and, second, each will use its leverage to impede its rival’s. Any government that tries to step into the role of mediator will be seen by others as pursuing its interests, at the expense of others.
The U.S., China, and Russia share the basic agenda of stopping state collapse. But if Washington is visibly acting as the powerbroker, the other two will be tempted to play the spoiler.
On Thursday, President Biden issued an executive order authorizing sanctions against “individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan” or who are obstructing the democratic transition or committing serious human rights abuses. This isn’t likely to frighten the Sudanese generals or their foreign backers, who are accomplished sanctions-busters. But it will rile China, Russia, and African states, who are united in their opposition to unilateral U.S. sanctions wherever they are deployed.
The U.S. appears to have given up on the UN. True, it’s weakly led, it abandoned Sudan in its hour of need, and making it work demands careful diplomatic footwork. But if a regional conflagration is to be avoided, all the potential spoilers need to be neutralized, and for that the UN is indispensable.
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Alex de Waal [pictured here] is executive director of the World Peace Foundation, Research Professor at the Fletcher School of Global Affairs, Tufts University, and Professorial Fellow at the London School of Economics. He has worked on the Horn of Africa and on humanitarian issues since the 1980s as a researcher and practitioner. He initiated the UN Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa and was director of the AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative and was a senior advisor to the African Union High Level Panel on Sudan and South Sudan. De Waal’s recent books include: The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power (Polity 2015), Mass Starvation: The history and future of famine (Polity 2018), and New Pandemics, Old Politics: 200 years of the war on disease and its alternatives (Polity 2021).
