Sudan: Only a united civilian coalition can bring peace

Article at World Politics Review - worldpoliticsreview.com
Written by Yasir Zaidan 
Published Thursday 22 June 2023 - here is a full copy:

Only a United Civilian Coalition Can Bring Peace to Sudan

People chant slogans during a protest in Khartoum, Sudan, Oct. 30, 2021 (AP photo by Marwan Ali).

The current conflict in Sudan between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group is a security and humanitarian crisis. But more importantly, it is a political crisis, one that grows out of the failure to build a sustainable democratic transition after the popular uprising that removed former dictator Omar al-Bashir from power in April 2019.

That failure can be traced through the various transitional deals that have been signed and then either ignored or violated since 2019. In that time, the civilian political actors in Sudan’s transition have been unable to overcome their deep divisions, giving free rein to the armed forces under Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemedti—to seize and now compete for control of the country. Tragically, the same thing is recurring now, meaning that when the guns are finally silenced, Sudan’s civilian political actors will be unable to play a meaningful role in steering the country to a sustainable peace.

Sudan’s first transitional agreement was a power-sharing constitutional declaration between the military and the Forces of Freedom and Change, or FFC, the civilian alliance that led the negotiations with the army after the removal of Bashir’s regime. The declaration laid the groundwork for the formation of a joint military-civilian government whose goal was to ultimately guide Sudan back to civilian rule by 2022. But it failed to achieve the uprisings’ demands because of political disputes between rival groups among the civilian participants.

The FFC represented a broad range of political parties that opposed the Bashir regime as well as rebel groups from Darfur, Blue Nile and Southern Kurdufan. That and its unity gave it a powerful position in leading the uprising that erupted in December 2018 and negotiating with the Transitional Military Council, TMC, once Bashir was deposed. However, differences started to emerge between the FFC’s civilian members and the rebel groups, who criticized the Khartoum-based FFC parties’ decision to begin talks with the TMC before the rebels were able to participate.

After signing a peace agreement with the transitional government in October 2020, representatives of the rebel movements were able to return to Khartoum, where they were incorporated into the transitional governing institutions as political actors. But the distrust that was created within the FFC only increased, due to serious concerns among the rebel groups over how the structures of the power-sharing government benefited the group of parties that negotiated the transitional agreement with the military.

As a result, the FFC split into two factions. The first, known as the FFC-Central Committee, or FFC-CC, compromises the Umma Party, the Unionist Assembly and the Sudanese Congress. The second faction, which included the rebel groups and the Unionist Party, called itself the FFC-Democratic Bloc, or FFC-DB. In addition, the Baathists and communists left the coalition entirely and created a new front called the Radical Alliance. The resulting political disputes combined with the country’s economic deterioration opened the door for the military takeover in October 2021.

Instead of finding a common position to propose a political roadmap out of the current crisis, Sudan’s civilian actors are busy repeating their previous mistakes.

These divisions were exploited and leveraged by Hemedti, who has proved to be a skillful political operator. Hemedti initially sought to inherit Bashir’s political machine, appointing many Bashir loyalists as advisers during the first months of the transition. He also sought the backing of Sudan’s tribal chiefs and traditional institutions by showering them with gifts and financial favors.

But after the military takeover in 2021, Hemedti also sought to mend fences with civilian actors by publicly apologizing for supporting the coup in the months that followed. He subsequently moved closer to the FFC-CC and eventually became an ally. In September 2022, he announced his support for the interim constitutional draft proposed by the FFC-CC to guide the country back to civilian rule, putting him at odds with the armed forces’ position of supporting only initiatives that included all political stakeholders in Sudan and not only the FFC-CC.

Meanwhile, the United Nations-led political process to facilitate talks between the FCC-CC, FCC-DB and the military initiated after the October 2021 military takeover further exacerbated the divisions among Sudan’s civilian factions. The U.N. Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan, or UNITAMS, deliberately designed the talks to exclude other important civilian actors, such as the Resistance Committees—the neighborhood groups that have led Sudan’s pro-democracy movement since 2019—and traditional tribal chiefs, and sidelined the FFC-DB from the outline agreement signed in December 2022.

That agreement ultimately served as the catalyst for the current conflict, because it called for integrating the RSF into the Sudanese armed forces, which has been a critical national security fault line ever since the 2019 uprising. Created during the Bashir regime’s war in Darfur, the RSF subsequently maneuvered between several institutional umbrellas. After the war in Darfur subsided in intensity, Bashir used the RSF to protect against potential military coups by the armed forces. Hemedti used that privileged status to gain control of lucrative commercial interests, including gold mines, front companies and banks. After Bashir’s ouster, the RSF further expanded militarily and financially.

The disagreement over the timeline for integrating the RSF into the armed forces—the military proposed a two-year transition, while Hemedti argued the process should take at least 10 years—intensified pre-existing tensions between the two sides as the deadline for signing the finalized UNITAMS-brokered agreement approached. Soon after the deadline was postponed in April, both forces mobilized their troops in Khartoum, with the fighting beginning on April 15.

But if Hemedti sought to leverage the FFC-CC in his rivalry with al-Burhan in the run-up to the conflict, the FFC-CC had similarly aligned with the RSF in an effort to play the different armed services against each other. In September 2022, for instance, Yasir Arman, an FFC-CC leadership council member, said that “the RSF represents a force to build the national army,” giving the RSF equal institutional status as the armed forces. And since the outbreak of war, the FFC-CC has refused to denounce Hemedti’s move to seize power.

There is now an urgent need to stop the war, which has left at least 900 civilians killed and 1.3 million displaced and risks triggering a regional conflagration. So far, talks between the armed forces and RSF hosted by Saudi Arabia have struggled to achieve more than shaky cease-fires and intermittent humanitarian access. In the meantime, instead of finding a common position to propose a political roadmap out of the current crisis, Sudan’s civilian actors are busy repeating the same mistakes. Several Resistance Committees have announced their withdrawal from the FFC-CC-led Civilian Coalition to Stop the War due to the FFC-CC’s neutral stance in the war as well as its narrative equating the RSF with the armed forces.  

Above all, Sudan urgently needs a new broad national front to correct the errors—in particular, the narrow and divisive political process—that led to the war. To be effective, however, any new political alliance should stand with Sudan’s remaining state institutions and insist that ultimately Sudan’s civilians must decide the fate of their country, for only that will sustainably end the war.

Yasir Zaidan is a doctoral candidate at the Jackson School for International Studies at the University of Washington.

View original: https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/conflict-sudan-crisis-civil-war-democracy-rapid-support-forces/

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UN envoy: Sudan's new deal saved the country from civil war

Here is a full copy of a news report published at abcnews.go.com

Written by NOHA ELHENNAWY Associated Press (AP)

Dated and published at abcnews.com on Friday 26 November 2021, 20:53

UN envoy: Sudan's new deal saved the country from civil war

The U.N. envoy to Sudan says a deal struck to reinstate the country's civilian prime minister after a military coup is imperfect but has saved the country from falling into civil strife

The Associated Press

Thousands of protesters take to the streets to renew their demand for a civilian government in the Sudanese capital Khartoum, Thursday, Nov. 25, 2021. The rallies came just days after the military signed a power-sharing deal with the prime minister, after releasing him from house arrest and reinstating him as head of government. The deal came almost a month after the generals orchestrated a coup. Sudan’s key pro-democracy groups and political parties have dismissed the deal as falling short of their demands for a fully civilian rule. (AP Photo/Marwan Ali)

CAIRO -- The deal struck in Sudan to reinstate the prime minister following a military coup is imperfect but has saved the country from sliding into civil strife, the U.N. envoy to Sudan said on Friday.

Special Envoy Volker Perthes was speaking of the agreement between Sudan's military leaders and Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who was deposed and put under house arrest following the coup last month that stirred an international outcry.

The military takeover threatened to thwart the process of democratic transition that the country had embarked on since the ouster of longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir.

The deal, signed on Sunday, was seen as the biggest concession made by the country's top military leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, since the coup. However, the country's pro-democracy groups have dismissed it as illegitimate and accused Hamdok of allowing himself to serve as a fig leaf for continued military rule.

“The agreement of course is not perfect,” Perthes told The Associated Press. “But it is better than not having an agreement and continuing on a path where the military in the end will be the sole ruler."

Both signatories felt compelled to make “bitter concessions” in order to spare the country the risk of more violence, chaos and international isolation, he added.

“It would not have been possible to exclude a scenario which would have brought Sudan to something close to what we have seen in Yemen, Libya or Syria,” Perthes said. He spoke to the AP via videoconference from Khartoum.

Sudan has been struggling with its transition to a democratic government since the military overthrow of al-Bashir in 2019, following a mass uprising against three decades of his rule.

The deal that Hamdok signed with the military envisions an independent Cabinet of technocrats led by the prime minister until new elections are held. The government will still remain under military oversight, although Hamdok claims he will have the power to appoint ministers.

The deal also stipulates that all political detainees arrested following the Oct. 25 coup be released. So far, several ministers and politicians have been freed. The number of those still in detention remains unknown.

“We have a situation now where we at least have an important step towards the restoration of the constitutional order,” said Perthes.

Since the takeover, protesters have repeatedly taken to the streets in some of the largest demonstrations in recent years. Sudanese security forces have cracked down on the rallies and have killed more than 40 protesters so far, according to activist groups.

Further measures need to taken to prove the viability of the deal, said Perthes, including the release of all detainees, the cessation of the use of violence against protesters and Hamdok's full freedom to choose his Cabinet members.

On Friday hundreds rallied in Khartoum and other Sudanese provinces to demand a fully civilian government and protest the deal for the second straight day. It came after thousands protested on Thursday.

One of the marches was led Siddiq Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a leader of Sudan's prominent Umma Party, which has split with other pro-democratic groups over the deal to reinstate Hamdok. He told journalists that protesters must remain steadfast in their calls for the generals to surrender power . Al-Mahdi was among those who were arrested during the coup and was let go in recent days.

He refused the idea of further negotiations.

“As things currently stand, there is no opportunity for things to move forward,” he said.

View original: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/envoy-sudans-deal-saved-country-civil-war-81404904

In Sudan, Hemedti leads the fray (Gérard Prunier)

• In reality, it is Hemedti, the brutal and cunning general who organised the harsh crackdown in Khartoum last June, who wields the real power in Sudan, writes Gerard Prunier
• After arresting Bashir, Hemedti became vice-president of the Transitional Military Council and was effectively its real boss
• The RSF's military and technical equipment in fact come from the United Arab Emirates
• The overthrown regime seemed to embody all the mistakes of the past. Read full story:

In Sudan, General Hemedti leads the fray
Analysis from The New Arab - www.alaraby.co.uk

Dated 5 February 2020

By Gérard Prunier (Former chief of the Centre français des études éthiopiennes in Addis-Abeba, member of the Centre d’études des mondes africains of Paris and author of several articles and books on Sudan)

Since the overthrow and arrest of President Omar al-Bashir on 10 April last year, there has been a fragile cohabitation between civil society and the semi-privatised "armed forces". 

Indeed Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who represents the civilian side of the set-up, told a visiting US congressional delegation in Khartoum in January that "the civil-military partnership in Sudan could serve as a model for other countries." 

The idea, far from just being a piece of triumphalist braggadocio, raises the question of what has been going on in Sudan in recent months.

A return to civil society

After 25 years of dictatorship, the Islamist regime in Khartoum had nothing more to offer than further failures and mounting corruption. The economic crash was the last straw. In 2018, the price of a kilo of lentils went up by 225 percent, rice by 169 percent, bread 300 percent, and fuel 30 percent. 

There was no cooking gas, or even running water. At the same time, the 2018 budget of Sudanese pounds (SDG) 173 bn (about $27 bn) allocated nearly SDG 24 bn to the military and security sectors, but only just over SDG 5 bn to education and less than SDG 3 bn to health.

Civil society responded to this descent into hell with a spontaneous mobilisation whose roots went back to October 2012, and which now gathered momentum. Workers' groups began setting up professional organisations.

Today there are 17 of them, federated under the umbrella Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA). This clandestine unionism operated with an organisational rigour worthy of the pre-1917 Leninists, but without any particular ideology apart from an embryonic democratism and a rejection of violence.

The slogan "Silmiyya!" (Peaceful!) was to become the rallying cry of the protestors. Political parties which had become more or less forgotten under the 30 years of military-Islamic dictatorship regained at least a little strength, brought together in the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC).

Despite its extraordinary popularity, this democratic movement had three weak points: it was very urban in nature, it grouped essentially the Awlad al-Beled (the Arabs of the central provinces), and apart from the trade unionists of the SPA, it was very divided.

A general backed by the UAE

The situation at the beginning of 2019 was thus somewhat special. The Islamic-military regime was no longer Islamic, and the regular army had been set into competition with paramilitary forces which had become autonomous when then-President Bashir deployed them into overseas conflicts. The dispatch to Yemen of the "volunteers" of the Rapid Support Force (RSF) by their commander, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Daglo aka Hemedti, was crucial.

After arresting Bashir, Hemedti became vice-president of the Transitional Military Council and was effectively its real boss, rather than its official president, Gen. Abdel Fatah Abderrahman Burhan. Significantly, these volunteers are better armed than Burhan's regular army. The RSF's military and technical equipment in fact come from the United Arab Emirates.

Cunning, brutal and intelligent, if little educated, Hemedti became a millionaire through the "muscular" exploitation of the gold mines in western Sudan. He was the Janjaweed militia chief in Darfur, where he committed massive violence before overthrowing President Bashir, who saw him as his protector. 

Hence the ambiguity of the situation: was this a military coup d'état, or a democratic revolution? 

The popular uprising was a mixture of jamboree, open-ended political forum and social solidarity display. Everybody was looking after children - there are lots of them - women were everywhere, and the people came to the capital from afar. The basic slogans: "Silmiya!" (Peaceful!), "Hurriya!" (Freedom!), "Thawra!" (Revolution!), "Didd al-haramiyya!" (Down with the thieves!) and "Madaniyya!" (Civilian!). 

A camp, a festival, a space for joy and celebration, the sit-in was essentially revolutionary.

But while some soldiers were fraternising with the crowd, others, especially in the provinces, were killing or injuring the supporters of change. Those who opened fire on the demonstrators were not soldiers of the regular army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), which was doing its best to protect them. It was either mercenaries of the RSF who came from Darfur, or an operations unit of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) - the secret services, set up by Salah Gosh.

The uprising in Darfur had already destroyed the image of a "homogenous nation" led by a radical version of Islam, and had exposed the reality of a mafia regime which had deviated into illegal commerce during its dream petrol period between 1999 and 2011.

The "deep state" created by the Islamists had established itself as the ideological - and financial - flipside of a Sudan which had become phoney. For many in Sudan, the events of 2019 were an occasion to go back over developments since independence in 1956. Everything was brought out in the popular debates: the "civil war" with the disparate South, the coups, the empty rhetoric of a democracy lived in fits and starts, Islamism as the magic solution, the colonialism of the centre over all the outlying areas.

Even Arabism did not escape criticism. In this amazing thirst for demystification, the overthrown regime seemed to embody all the mistakes of the past.

Symptoms of the nostalgic revolution

This "nostalgic revolution" has been very ill understood by the international community. There are, of course, parallels with the various "Arab springs" - the same hostility to dictatorship, the same aspiration to democracy, but with no illusions about political Islam, which aroused obvious hostility among the protestors, no doubt because of Sudan's ethnic heterogeneity.

The killer General Hemedti hails from the outlying Darfur area and he has rallied to the RSF flag many soldiers straying from the wars of the Sahel-Chadians, Nigerians, Central Africans, and even some Boko Haram deserters.

He does not harbour hostility to Islam because it is too much part of Sudanese culture to be rejected. But the Islamists who prefer the Islamist "deep state" to their Sudanese homeland have lost control of the population. That is why the attempt by the Saudis and the UAE to preserve an Islamist regime without the Muslim Brotherhood has little chance of success.

Clean up at the NISS barracks

The UAE leader, Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed (MBZ), realised this more swiftly than his Saudi "allies", as indeed did General Hemedti. When on 14 January semi-demobilised elements of the NISS mutinied in two of the barracks where they were cooling their heels, Hemedti's reaction was immediate: his men attacked the barracks, and fighting went on late into the night. 

The mutineers had just learned that their operations unit, which was involved in racketeering, kidnapping and illegal taxation, had been disbanded.

The NISS groups got the worst of it, and their dead were written off. But the General had to make a trip to Abu Dhabi to explain to MBZ precisely what he was up to. He may be the UAE's ally in Sudan, but he is far from being a passive tool in the region, as MBZ realised when Hemedti declined to send reinforcements to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Libya, stalled outside Tripoli without being able to take the city. 

The Emiratis were reduced to recruiting "security guards" through small ads using Black Shield Security Services, a UAE front company.

Another example of the Darfur General's autonomy came on 11 January, when groups linked to the Islamist "deep state" tried to organise antigovernment demonstrations at Wad Madani, in central Sudan. Hemedti did nothing to help them, and they had to pay unemployed agricultural workers to swell their ranks.  

So was Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok justified in portraying civil-military relations in Sudan as a model to the Americans? Half. By "military" one means Hemedti, because the regular army no longer controls the situation, either politically or militarily. When there were negotiations in Juba with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (a guerrilla faction which still exists in Kordofan, in the south of Sudan), it was Hemedti who took charge of the talks and won SPLM-North agreement to a framework accord which may be ratified on 14 February.

PM accused of sluggishness

Under the power-sharing agreement signed in Khartoum on 5 July last year, there will be no elections until 2021, and those involved in the current transition will not be allowed to stand. 

PM Abdallah Hamdok is certainly doing what he can. But he is doing it at a pace which is irritatingly slow for a population which had struggled with astonishing determination until June 2019. He has only just dismissed the foreign minister, whose incompetence was a drag on Sudanese diplomacy, resurgent after 30 years of paralysis and corruption.

It remains for the World Bank to be begged for aid which the Americans continue to block on the basis of sanctions imposed earlier on the Islamist regime, and which are now obsolete.

Hemedti appears to maintain correct, but not warm, relations with the prime minister. He has talked to old political parties such as the Ummah of Sadeq al-Mahdi, and more discreetly with others. His men are involved in distributing free food and medicine. Nowadays he recruits his soldiers not just from his native Darfur, but also from among the Awlad al-Beled, the inhabitants of the country's central Nile Valley regions.

What about the people of Darfur, whose relatives he may have massacred? They are queueing up outside his offices in Khartoum. "At least he's someone we know, we know how to handle him. And it would be nice to have one of our own in the presidency, after having been colonised." 

How far will the camel trader turned militia chief go? 

People may object to his lack of education, and to his non-Sudanese origins, but that has not prevented him becoming a key player on the national and regional scenes.

Gerard Prunier is a French academic and historian specialising in the Horn of Africa.

This article was originally published by our partners Orient XXI. 

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

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View Original: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2020/2/5/in-sudan-general-hemedti-leads-the-fray