UN chief Guterres: “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century”

Stand with Africa: Guterres

Meanwhile, UN chief António Guterres noted that cooperation and solidarity to advance the continent’s future is more needed than ever.

“I look forward to African governments continuing to seize the opportunities presented by the continent’s natural, human, and entrepreneurial richness, by working to increase private investment and raise resources at home,” he said in his message for Africa Day.

The annual commemoration May celebrates the founding of the Organization of African Union, the African Union precursor, on 25 May 1963.

The Secretary-General urged the international community to stand with Africa as multiple rises – from COVID-19 to climate and conflict – continue to cause great suffering there.

He further stated that African countries are underrepresented in global governance institutions, such as the UN Security Council, and denied the debt relief and concessional funding they need.

“Africa deserves peace, justice and international solidarity,” he said.  “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century.” 

Read full story at UN News report 25 May 2023:

Security Council urged to step up on financing for AU peace operations

https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137047

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UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa: Financing of AU-led peace support operations

THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. 

Report at What's In Blue

Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):

Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa

Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa. 

Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May. 

The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).

Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007. 

Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent. 

Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.

The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)

The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.

The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million. 

Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.

Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February. 

The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.

In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.

One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions. 

This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.

In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.

The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission. 

As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. 

Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements. 

Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php

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UN Human Rights Council votes on monitoring of rights abuses in Sudan: 18 Yes; 15 No; 14 Abstain.

🔴BREAKING

The @UN Human Rights Council decided that the mandate of the designated Expert on #Sudan should include detailed monitoring & documentation of all alleged human rights violations & abuses since 25 October 2021 including those arising directly from the current conflict pic.twitter.com/tFh2ezJhto

— UN Human Rights Council (@UN_HRC) May 11, 2023

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: I watched this meeting while it was streamed live and was shocked by the poor attitudes and unprofessional behaviour (mainly by women) of most attendees. The audio was so low I could barely hear what some countries were saying. Camera panned in on a woman mindlessly chewing gum, oblivious to her surroundings, head down low while using her mobile phone. Many acted indifferent and bored like they didn't want to be there. The majority seemed too young and immature to appreciate what they were doing there or understand the magnitude of why they were there.

The live streamed audio was left on during breaks in the meeting that was held in tandem with the one on Sudan at the UN Security Council in New York along with an AU meeting on same day. Forgetting themselves and the cameras, groups chatted loudly and laughed like hyenas, women cackled loudly aloud, they all sounded like happy guests at an enjoyable wedding party. It was disgusting to see and hear.

South Africa's speech on why it was abstaining felt like a kick in the teeth and to crown it all not one African country voted for the detailed monitoring of human rights abuses in Sudan.

All attendees from what I saw (except Finland, a woman who gave a professional performance and heartfelt speech) should be sacked and have their expenses unpaid for bad performance. I can't imagine the cost of that meeting. Also, whoever was in charge of conveying audio translations onto the live stream should be investigated because it seemed apparent political games were in play. It felt like the onlookers and taxpayers footing the bill for humanitarian crises were treated as inconsequential fools. The Chairman was excellent, came across loud and clear. A translation of China's speech was whispered so low it was impossible to hear.

Not long after, news emerged of a war of words between the US and South Africa because South Africa is providing military equipment and weapons to Russia to help decimate Ukraine where unspeakable horrors are occurring.

From what I can gather, and I was shocked to learn of this now for the first time: South Africa has supported Russia ever since Russia supported South Africa during apartheid.

Note that some of the first African Union peacekeeping soldiers in Sudan at a most dangerous time in Darfur were from South Africa's excellent SANDF [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_African_National_Defence_Force ]. Now I'm wondering if that is why, after much arm twisting Sudan's President Bashir allowed peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur at that time.

I'm hopping mad at everything right now.

Photo source: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/12/goede-vrienden-arresteer-je-niet-toch-a4164533:You don't arrest good friends. Nevertheless? The debate in South Africa If Putin wants to go to the BRICS summit, South Africa must pick him up. But that's just not possible, says Africa editor Jamila Meischke.

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UN Rights Council votes to strengthen monitoring of abuses in Sudan

Report from IBT

By Nina LARSON, AFP

Dated Thursday 11 May 2023 AT 11:51 AM EDT - full copy:

UN Rights Council Votes To Strengthen Monitoring Of Abuses In Sudan

The UN Human Rights Council held a special session on the situation in Sudan AFP

The United Nations top rights body narrowly decided Thursday to beef up monitoring of abuses amid Sudan's spiralling conflict, despite vehement opposition from Khartoum.

The UN Human Rights Council's 47 members voted with 18 in favour, 15 opposed and 14 abstaining for a resolution calling for an end to the violence and strengthening the mandate of a UN expert on Sudan.

The resolution was adopted during a special council session, called following a request by Britain, Germany, Norway and the United States, and with the support of dozens of countries, to urgently address the violence that erupted in Sudan on April 15.

The tight vote came after Arab countries and others, including China, called for countries to oppose the resolution, maintaining it infringed upon Sudan's sovereignty, and African countries urged finding "African solutions to African problems".

But backers of the text insisted it was vital for the council to act swiftly.

"This is a really important day" British ambassador Simon Manley told AFP, hailing the council for its "vote for peace."

Nearly a month into Sudan's bloody conflict, civilians are still trying to flee, boarding evacuation planes with just a few belongings and leaving behind their homes, relatives and lives.

More than 750 people have been killed and hundreds of thousands have been displaced in the fighting that began on April 15 between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, who commands the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The fighting has plunged "this much-suffering country into catastrophe", United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk said at the start of the one-day session.

Decrying "the wanton violence", he called on "all states with influence in the region to encourage, by all possible means, the resolution of this crisis".

Thursday's council session in Geneva was called to urgently address a situation that everyone present agreed was dire.

But the mandate adopted was not very strong.

It called "for an immediate cessation of violence by all parties, without pre-conditions", but refrained from ordering any new investigation into abuses.

Instead, it ordered the existing Special Rapporteur on the rights situation in Sudan to provide "detailed monitoring and documentation of... all allegations of human rights violations and abuses since the 25 October 2021, including those arising directly from the current conflict", and to report his findings to the council.

Even with such a weak text, it barely squeaked past.

Sudan's ambassador Hassan Hamid Hassan vehemently opposed the special session and the resolution, insisting to the council that "what is happening in Sudan is an internal affair" and cautioning the session could distract from efforts to achieve a lasting ceasefire.

Without Sudan's blessing, other African and Arab countries said they would not be able to support the resolution, while some other countries also expressed opposition.

"The international community should respect Sudan's sovereignty and ownership of internal affairs," China's ambassador Chen Xu said.

Critics also charged that there had been no need to rush to hold a special session when the rights council's next regular session is only weeks away.

But US ambassador Michele Taylor insisted that "the devastating human rights and humanitarian conflict in Sudan over the past four weeks is truly heart-wrenching."

"We needed to act with urgency because of the enormous gravity and suffering of the people of Sudan today."

View original: https://www.ibtimes.com/un-rights-council-votes-strenthen-monitoring-abuses-sudan-3692661

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UN Security Council meets today to discuss Sudan

NOTE from Sudan Watch Ed: The UK, penholder on Sudan at UN Security Council, requested a meeting of the Council to be held today (11 May) to discuss the deteriorating humanitarian and security situations in Sudan.

Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) Volker Perthes and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths are expected to brief.

In this report from What's In Blue, the yellow highlighting is mine for easy future reference. Hopefully, the Council members will agree on the "product" needed in response to the escalating violence in Sudan.

Report from What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday 11 May 2023 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This morning (11 May), following the briefing on the ICC’s Libya-related activities, Security Council members will hold closed consultations on Sudan. 

The UK, the penholder on the file, requested the meeting to discuss the deteriorating humanitarian and security situations in the country, in light of the fighting that erupted on 15 April between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—Sudan’s military leader and Chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council—and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) Volker Perthes and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths are expected to brief.

Council members last met to discuss the situation in Sudan on 25 April, when the Council convened for an open briefing at the request of the UK. Secretary-General António Guterres, Perthes, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator Joyce Msuya, and Permanent Observer of the AU to the UN Fatima Kyari Mohammed briefed. In his remarks, Guterres said that the power struggle in Sudan is not only jeopardising the country’s future but is also “lighting a fuse that could detonate across borders, causing immense suffering for years and setting development back by decades”. He called on Council members, the wider UN membership, and regional organisations with influence to press the Sudanese leaders to de-escalate tensions. (For background, see our 25 April What’s in Blue story.)

Fighting has continued in and around Khartoum despite repeated calls by regional and international actors for a ceasefire. According to a 6 May OCHA flash update, at least 528 people have been killed and 4,599 injured since the outbreak of hostilities. Additionally, more than two-thirds of hospitals across Sudan are not functional because of direct attacks, occupation by the warring parties, as well as lack of electricity, water supply, fuel, or medicine.

Perthes is likely to update members on political developments in Sudan, as well as on the various ongoing regional and international efforts aimed at resolving the crisis. On 2 May, the AU Commission (the regional organisation’s secretariat) held a follow-up meeting to its 20 April special ministerial session on Sudan. Among other matters, the meeting focused on identifying priorities, strengthening the unity of the international community, promoting a ceasefire agreement, and advancing efforts to return to a democratic, inclusive, and civilian transition.

In a 2 May press release, South Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the warring Sudanese parties had agreed to a seven-day truce starting on 4 May, and to name their representatives for talks led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), under the leadership of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit in Juba. The seven-day truce was reportedly not observed by the parties and, at the time of writing, only al-Burhan has named his representative for the IGAD-facilitated talks. 

On 8 May, Kiir held a meeting with al-Burhan’s special envoy, Dafallah al-Haj Ali, in Juba, during which Ali reportedly affirmed the primacy of IGAD in mediation efforts to resolve the ongoing conflict. 

On 10 May, Kiir met Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry in Juba. According to a press statement released following the meeting, both leaders discussed “proposed modalities to merge the many different processes, forums and efforts into meaningful ceasefire” to end the ongoing conflict.

On 6 May, Saudi-US facilitated talks between representatives of the warring parties began in Jeddah. In a 7 May statement, Saudi Arabia and the US urged the parties to earnestly engage in the talks, with the aim of “achieving an effective short-term ceasefire, facilitating the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance and restoration of essential services, and scheduling subsequent expanded negotiations to achieve a permanent cessation of hostilities”. The statement added that the parties began to review a proposed “Declaration of Commitment to Protect Civilians and facilitate and respect Humanitarian Action in Sudan”.

In an 8 May interview with an Egyptian media outlet, al-Burhan reportedly expressed support for a political solution to the ongoing conflict but emphasised that the withdrawal of RSF forces from residential areas and public facilities in Khartoum is a pre-condition. Speaking about the ongoing talks in Jeddah, he added that discussions about a lasting settlement could take place only after a permanent ceasefire is achieved in Khartoum.

On 7 May, the League of Arab States (LAS) convened an emergency ministerial-level meeting of its Executive Council in Cairo to discuss the situation in Sudan, during which it adopted a resolution stressing the need to respect the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Sudan. The resolution called for protecting Sudanese state institutions and preventing any “foreign interference” that could destabilise regional peace and security. It also established a contact group on Sudan, consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and LAS Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Among other things, the contact group is mandated to communicate with the Sudanese parties, regional and international partners, and international organisations with the aim of reaching a settlement; undertake efforts to reach a complete and sustainable ceasefire; address the underlying drivers of conflict; and coordinate with humanitarian relief agencies to provide assistance and medical aid.

At today’s meeting, Griffiths is likely to brief about his recent visit to Port Sudan on 3 May, where he met Perthes and the heads of several humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In a press briefing during the visit, Griffiths noted that he is working to have clear and public commitments from the warring parties about protecting humanitarian assistance and allowing the delivery of aid. In this regard, he stressed the “need to have agreements at the highest level and…deliver those commitments into local arrangements”. Griffiths added that he hopes to meet SAF and RSF leaders, separately, in person, to explain to them the humanitarian requirements based on the discussions with the UN and other humanitarian agencies.

In a 9 May press briefing, OCHA Spokesperson Eri Kaneko noted that Griffiths was also present in Jeddah to engage with relevant parties and countries with influence to secure security guarantees for the UN and other humanitarian actors for the delivery of aid across various parts of the country. She added that prior to that, Griffiths also held phone calls with SAF and RSF leaders, in which he stressed the importance of developing safe corridors for the delivery of aid. At today’s meeting, Council members may wish to learn more about the scale and reach of OCHA’s operations and engagement with the respective parties for ensuring the safety and security of the humanitarian personnel and facilities.

Some Council members are expected to express concern about attacks against civilian infrastructure and the looting of humanitarian facilities in Sudan. On 9 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) said that it had verified 28 attacks against healthcare facilities since 15 April, which resulted in eight deaths and 18 injuries. In a tweet on the same day, WFP Executive Director Cindy McCain noted that nearly 25 percent of the WFP food stock has been stolen and that the organisation’s offices in the country have been looted.

Another likely issue of concern for Council members is the internal displacement of civilians and influx of refugees into Sudan’s neighbouring states. A 9 May IOM Sudan situation report noted that, since 15 April, almost 736,223 people have been displaced internally across Sudan, 13.8 percent of whom are foreign nationals. It added that approximately 177,116 individuals have sought refuge in neighbouring states, mainly in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan.

It appears that Council members continue to have diverging views on whether a Security Council product is needed in response to the escalation of violence in Sudan. Council members apparently failed to adopt a draft press statement that was proposed by the UK following the AU Commission’s 20 April ministerial meeting because of opposition from the A3 members of the Council (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique). The A3 apparently argued that adopting a Council product could lead to duplicate messaging and create complications at a delicate time. It seems that China and Russia supported this position. 

Apparently, during Council members’ 25 April closed consultations on Sudan, the UK, with support from other Council members, again called for a press statement. However, this proposal did not garner consensus after the A3 members, followed by China and Russia, reiterated their objection to a product.

Tags: Insights on Africa, Sudan

View original:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/sudan-closed-consultations.php

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The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: A UN research report 26 April 2023 copied below for future reference caught my eye because of this paragraph:

"Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform."

So I searched for UNSG report 30 April 2023 and found a page here listing latest statements. What a coincidence and a disappointing one too: instead of it providing news of progress made regarding the African Union (AU) and the financing of AU Peace Support Operations, it says:

United Nations Secretary-General

30 April 2023 New York

Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan    

Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General

In light of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Sudan, the Secretary-General is sending the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, to the region immediately.  

The scale and speed of what is unfolding is unprecedented in Sudan. We are extremely concerned by the immediate as well as long-term impact on all people in Sudan, and the broader region.  

We once again urge all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, allow safe passage for civilians fleeing areas of hostilities, respect humanitarian workers and assets, facilitate relief operations, and respect medical personnel, transport and facilities.

View original: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-04-30/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-sudan%C2%A0-%C2%A0%C2%A0

_______________________________ 

Research Report from Security Council Report.org

Dated 26 April 2023 - full copy:

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

To read the full report, please download the PDF here.

The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.  

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognising the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.  

In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members, but was never put to a vote because of one permanent member’s strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU’s development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023. 

There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOs since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.  

The Council asked that the Secretary-General’s April 2023 report include “recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources”.  It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.   

In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.  

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php

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