Middle East Crisis: UN Security Council Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Posted Monday 6 April 2026 - full copy:

Middle East Crisis: Vote on a Draft Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz

Tomorrow morning (7 April) at 11 am EST, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution which strongly encourages states interested in the use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts of a defensive nature to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels.

It demands that Iran immediately cease all attacks against merchant and commercial vessels and any attempt to impede transit passage or freedom of navigation in the Strait and further calls for the cessation of attacks against civilian infrastructure, including water infrastructure and desalination plants, as well as oil and gas installations. The draft text was proposed by Bahrain in close coordination with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan.

Background

Recent weeks have seen a sharp escalation in and around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which around 20 percent of global oil consumption and approximately one-quarter of globally traded maritime oil transits occur. The escalation follows the US-Israeli strikes against Iranian targets that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel as well as other countries in the Gulf region that host US military bases. (For more information, see the brief on Maritime Security in our April 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 28 February What’s in Blue story.)

Iran has taken steps to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels and the reported deployment of naval mines. Although Iran had initially signalled efforts to choke the waterway and effectively close it, particularly for the US and its allies, it has since allowed selective passage to vessels it considers “non-hostile”.

The US and Israel have targeted Iranian naval facilities and assets, including mine-laying vessels, reportedly inflicting significant damage on its maritime capabilities. US President Donald Trump has called for a multinational naval coalition to operate in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Several allied countries—including Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the UK—have taken a cautious approach, with some explicitly indicating that they would not participate in enforcement actions to reopen the Strait or provide airspace for such operations.

Regardless of differing approaches, reopening the Strait appears to be a strategic priority for many US allies. France has indicated that it is working with partners to explore a possible international mission to facilitate this objective once the intensity of military operations subsides, while the UK hosted talks on 2 April among 40 countries aimed at forming a coalition for this purpose.

Meanwhile, GCC countries and Jordan have strongly advocated for ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region, including through the use of force. Since the escalation began on 28 February, they have faced sustained Iranian attacks targeting vessels, port infrastructure, and energy assets across the Gulf, which have disrupted maritime trade and energy flows and contributed to broader regional economic and supply chain instability.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The negotiations on the draft resolution were difficult. Bahrain circulated the zero draft of the text to Council members on 21 March and held multiple rounds of negotiations. Following five subsequent revisions, two silence breaks, and closed consultations on 1 April (held at France’s request), a sixth revised draft was put in blue today (6 April). The process involved intensive, high-level engagement, including meetings at the level of permanent representatives and sustained bilateral consultations between GCC countries and Council members, including at the level of foreign ministers.

Initially, the draft text was put in blue on 2 April for a vote on 3 April; however, persistent disagreements prompted Bahrain to delay the vote to continue deliberations, during which the text underwent significant amendments before being put in blue for a vote tomorrow.

During the negotiations, Council members broadly expressed concern about the escalating regional situation, underscored the unacceptability of attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and stressed the urgent need to address the crisis. However, divergences emerged regarding the appropriate approach and tools to address the crisis.

The initial draft text proposed by Bahrain invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and would have authorised member states, acting nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships, to use all necessary means in and around the Strait of Hormuz to secure transit passage and repress, neutralise, and deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait, until such time as the Council decides otherwise. The text also expressed the Council’s readiness to impose measures, including targeted sanctions, against those who take actions to undermine the freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These provisions apparently proved problematic for several Council members, prompting efforts to streamline the text to enhance clarity and narrow its scope. It appears that concerns focused in particular on the reference to Chapter VII and the authorisation of the use of force, as well as the breadth of the mandate, including its nature, geographic scope, and open-ended duration. Positions diverged, with some European and like-minded members seeking clearer parameters and more precise drafting, while others, notably China and Russia, were more fundamentally critical of the initiative.

It appears that China and Russia expressed concerns about the invocation of Chapter VII, arguing that such authorisation could be interpreted as legitimising the use of force by member states without clearly defined limits. They also raised concerns about the potential imposition of sanctions and maintained that the draft failed to address the root causes of the current crisis in the Middle East. In their view, the text risked exacerbating tensions rather than promoting de-escalation, and they urged Bahrain not to advance the initiative. These reservations led China and Russia to break silence twice.

Responding to these concerns, Bahrain removed the explicit reference to Chapter VII in the third revised draft. However, the authorisation for the use of force and a determination that Iran’s actions near and around the Strait of Hormuz constitute a threat to international peace and security were retained. China and Russia argued that this did not address their concerns, maintaining that the draft continued to legitimise the use of force without accounting for the underlying causes of the escalation. The current draft resolution in blue does not include an explicit reference to Chapter VII and retains the determination regarding Iran’s actions as threats to international peace and security.

Additionally, the reference to sanctions measures was amended based on proposals from Colombia and the UK. The current draft text in blue therefore expresses the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, as appropriate, against those who take actions that undermine the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz as well as in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

France, supported by some other members, particularly Greece, also expressed concerns about the scope of the authorisation for the use of force, which, as France had argued, should be strictly limited to defensive purposes. The UK, among others, also sought clearer and more concise language to better define the scope of the authorisation.

In parallel to Bahrain’s text, it appears that France also prepared a draft resolution in March, which was circulated to a limited number of Council members but not formally tabled for wider discussion. Some elements of this text, as proposed by France during the negotiations on Bahrain’s draft, appear to have been incorporated into the current text in blue. This includes language urging de-escalation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman; calling for a return to diplomacy; and welcoming ongoing efforts towards a durable peace in the region.

To address concerns raised by several members, the language on the authorisation underwent multiple iterations, with successive drafts introducing qualifiers to clarify its scope and parameters. This included stipulating that any action must be commensurate with the circumstances and undertaken with due regard for the safety of international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; the latter edit was based on a proposal by the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia). In the fourth revised draft, Bahrain apparently incorporated some suggestions, including narrowing the geographical scope to the Strait and its adjacent waters and introducing a time limit of at least six months from the resolution’s adoption, an issue apparently raised by the UK. While these changes were reflected in the first draft text put in blue on 2 April, some were omitted from the current version in blue following further revisions undertaken in an effort to reach common ground. Of these proposed provisions, only the text specifying that “any action must be commensurate with the circumstances” remains in the current draft in blue.

The proposed limitations on the nature of the mandate did not appear to satisfy some members. In addition to China and Russia, France, supported by Greece, also broke silence, reiterating its concerns. As a compromise, Bahrain ultimately amended the language to authorise member states to “use all defensive means necessary”, as suggested by France.

However, it appears that strong positions expressed by some members persisted, requiring continued deliberations. In the current text put in blue, Bahrain omitted the language on authorisation and instead incorporated elements drawn from the French draft, strongly encouraging states with an interest in the “use of commercial maritime routes in the Strait of Hormuz to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz”.

Based on suggestions from Colombia and France, the draft text in blue also requests the participating states to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the activities they undertake related to this resolution are conducted in full compliance with international humanitarian law, and applicable international human rights law, and have due regard for the rights and freedoms of navigation of the ships of any third state. The amended draft text in blue further added language specifying that such measures should be undertaken with a view to urgently ensuring unhampered and unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The amended draft text in blue makes several references to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including reaffirming the right of member states to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It further affirms that this resolution applies only to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and does not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of member states under international law, including UNCLOS, in any other context, underscoring in particular that it should not be regarded as establishing customary international law.

The draft resolution also introduces a reporting requirement, requesting the Secretary-General to provide to the Security Council a written report within seven days of the adoption of this resolution, and every 30 days thereafter, on any further attacks and provocations on merchant and commercial vessels, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms, by Iran in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/04/middle-east-crisis-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-on-the-strait-of-hormuz.php

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The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away (UK FM Cooper)

"Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda." - Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary. Read more.

From The Independent.co.uk

Editorial by Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary

Published Friday 09 January 2026 10:00 GMT - full copy:

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away

As the conflict in Sudan passes the grim milestone of 1,000 days, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper writes that the same diplomatic energy that helped end the war in Gaza is needed to end the crisis

South Sudan's worsening water crisis [VIDEO]

The world is catastrophically failing the people of Sudan. Today marks a grim milestone – 1,000 days of devastating violent conflict involving unimaginable atrocities, millions pushed into famine, and the most barbaric abuse of Sudan’s women.

The scale of the humanitarian crisis happening now is greater than any in the 21st century and the security consequences are likely to be felt far beyond Sudan for many years to come.

The world must not look away from the conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces that is terrorising Sudan. I am determined we shine a searing spotlight on the unfolding atrocities and make 2026 the year the world comes together to drive urgent new momentum towards peace.

Last month, I listened as Sudanese civilians and community workers from their Emergency Response Rooms recounted the horrific human cost of the RSF’s October capture of the town of El Fasher after a grinding 18-month siege – including ethnically motivated mass killings and use of rape and starvation as weapons of war.

These stories on the ground corroborated the satellite images from space – images of blood-soaked earth and mass graves that all too briefly jolted the world’s attention.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper (Reuters)

Aid workers in Tawila gave me a virtual tour of the makeshift camps where hundreds of distressed children arrived having made a 46-mile journey from El Fasher on foot. Traumatised women and children are scraping an existence with scant rations under thornbush shelters.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff recounted their struggle to support unprecedented numbers of victims of sexual violence in what they described as a war on women’s bodies. As shocking as what I saw was what I did not see – boys or men. Fathers, husbands and brothers missing, likely killed, following forced separation from their families.

Over 30 million people still need lifesaving aid. Famine is spreading. Infrastructure has collapsed. Preventable diseases are rampant. The conflict is escalating and spreading in the Kordofan region. 

The RSF have been accused of war crimes (File picture). 

Rapid Support Forces

For the leaders of Sudan’s warring parties to refuse to halt the war or to prevent massacres and atrocities on this scale is horrendous. For so many soldiers to be systematically raping Sudanese women is barbaric.

The case for action is deeply moral. But it is also about our wider security. Wars that rage unresolved radiate instability. They undermine the security of neighbouring states, they become easy targets for extremist groups to exploit. And they lead migrants to embark on dangerous international journeys.

Sudan’s war goes far beyond Sudan. It is regionalised and globalised. It poses a global test of our ability to mobilise the agile alliances, partnerships and multilateral weight to get a breakthrough.

Words of international concern or outrage are not enough. We need a concerted diplomatic drive to arrest the spiralling violence and suffering.

Sudanese residents gather to receive free meals in Al Fasher 

(AFP via Getty Images)

The US have been working to get a truce and wider plan in place – drawing together the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (the ‘Quad’). That is why last month in Washington I held talks with Secretary Rubio and the President’s senior advisor on Africa and I have repeatedly engaged Quad members on ways forward.

But we need the same international focus and energy now from right across the world that we had around securing the Gaza ceasefire.

Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda.

At the heart of international efforts must be pursuing the humanitarian truce and a push for a permanent end to hostilities. This can only come through greater pressure on the warring parties – crucially from their regional backers.

Second, we have to prevent further atrocities by either side. This means working to raise the cost of committing or backing further massacres. On 12 December, the UK sanctioned senior RSF commanders, including the so-called “Butcher of El Fasher” who has openly boasted on social media of murdering Sudanese civilians.

Sudanese who fled el-Fasher city crowd to receive food at their camp in Tawila (AP)

And we are working to combat impunity and hold perpetrators to account. In November, UK leadership at the UN Human Rights Council secured international agreement to an urgent UN inquiry into crimes in El Fasher. We are supporting vital investigations by the International Criminal Court.

Third, unimpeded aid needs to reach populations in need. The UK has provided an additional £21 million for food, shelter, health services and protection of women and children in hardest to reach areas. This brings our total support to £146 million this financial year.

But for aid to save more lives, the belligerents must lift their deliberate and systematic barriers to humanitarian access.

Ultimately, no amount of aid can resolve a crisis of this magnitude until the guns fall silent. It must be the Sudanese people, not any warring group, that determine Sudan’s future.

The world must now come together around this cause – to stem the bloodshed and help set Sudan on a path to peace.

View original: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sudan-war-humanitarian-crisis-yvette-cooper-b2897125.html

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Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
What’s In Blue
Dated Wednesday 01 October 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This afternoon (1 October), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the current escalation of violence in El Fasher in North Darfur state; ongoing efforts to secure a humanitarian pause; and recent diplomatic engagements on Sudan, including during the General Assembly’s high-level week. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are expected to brief.

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, there has been an alarming escalation in hostilities in the fighting, which has centred around El Fasher and the Kordofan region. The growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict. A 29 September Washington Post article reported that the RSF now possess anti-aircraft weapons, drones, and surface-to-air missiles. A report published on the same day by the Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale School of Public Health identified at least 43 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) near the RSF-controlled Nyala airport in South Darfur and 36 launchers.

Regional and international initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan have continued, but a meaningful breakthrough remains elusive, as the positions of both Sudanese warring parties and key member states have become entrenched. In recent weeks, the US has sought to reinvigorate peace-making efforts through the convening of the “Quad” countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to explore ways of generating new momentum. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.)

On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the Quad countries issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to allow the rapid delivery of assistance across Sudan, with the aim of paving the way for a permanent ceasefire. The statement proposed that an inclusive and transparent transition process be launched and concluded within nine months, leading to the establishment of an independent, civilian-led government with broad-based legitimacy and accountability. The ministers committed to press all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and ensure humanitarian assistance reaches those in need; promote conditions that ensure the security of the broader Red Sea region; counter transnational security threats from terrorist and extremist organisations; and deny space to destabilising regional and domestic actors.

In a 29 September press briefing in New York, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos described ongoing discussions on the humanitarian situation in Sudan. He noted extensive engagements with organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and said that the US is working closely with both the RSF and SAF to facilitate urgent aid delivery to El Fasher, with plans to extend assistance to Kordofan and other affected areas. Boulos also recently held discussions with Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, which focused on the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the situation in Sudan featured in his exchanges with regional and international stakeholders, including with African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf during a September visit to Addis Ababa.

On 24 September, the Quad countries convened at ministerial level on the margins of the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, continuing their discussions on ways to restore peace and security in Sudan.

That day, the AU, the European Union (EU), France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with regional and international stakeholders to address the situation in Sudan and coordinate efforts towards de-escalation and the protection of civilians. The statement issued following the meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire and called on them to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of civilians.

In September, Lamamra undertook a regional tour aimed at advancing peace efforts with the Sudanese parties and relevant interlocutors. In Nairobi, Kenya, he held consultations with independent civilian representatives as well as delegations from the RSF-aligned “Tasis” alliance and the Civil Democratic Alliance of the Revolution’s Forces (“Sumoud”), which emerged earlier this year following a split from the “Taqaddum” coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In a post on X, Lamamra underscored his commitment to engage actors all across the spectrum, irrespective of their political affiliations, to foster consensus on the way forward. He also held a meeting with Kenyan President William Ruto, during which Lamamra reportedly provided an update on his recent peace engagements and discussed ways to intensify efforts to end the conflict.

Lamamra subsequently travelled to Port Sudan, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Transitional Prime Minister Kamil Eltayeb Idris and members of his cabinet. According to a 17 September press briefing by Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric, Lamamra also engaged with civilian political actors, women’s groups, and members of the diplomatic corps. Dujarric said that this visit was part of efforts to “lay the complex groundwork necessary to support an inclusive peace process” capable of delivering a sustainable solution. This afternoon, Council members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps in the mediation process and of ways to address the underlying issues hindering peace efforts.

At the meeting, Msuya is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in light of the evolving security developments and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid. The situation is particularly grave in El Fasher, where more than 260,000 civilians—including 130,000 children—remain trapped, according to UN estimates. Civilians in the area are facing growing risks of sexual violence, forced recruitment, and arbitrary detention. As conditions deteriorate, people have resorted to desperate measures, such as eating animal feed and food waste.

Satellite imagery published by Yale’s HRL shows that, since May, the RSF has been constructing a massive earthen berm encircling El Fasher, which now stretches more than 68 kilometres, leaving only a narrow three- to four-kilometre gap. Civilians continue to face daily threats from shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks. On 19 September, one of the deadliest incidents in recent months occurred when a mosque near the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) was struck by a drone reportedly belonging to the RSF, killing more than 70 people, including at least 11 children.

In a 29 September statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan Denise Brown called for the lifting of the siege on El Fasher, an end to indiscriminate attacks, and clear orders to fighters to prevent sexual violence and ethnically motivated attacks. She also emphasised the need to guarantee safe passage for civilians wishing to leave the city through open, secure, and accessible routes, while ensuring that those who remain are protected and have access to food, water, and other essential supplies.

Msuya might elaborate on Fletcher’s recent engagements with the Sudanese warring parties. On 24 September, he met with Idris to discuss the expansion of humanitarian access and the UN’s presence in Sudan, including efforts to move pre-positioned aid supplies in El Fasher. The following day, he spoke with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, expressing grave concern about the humanitarian crisis in El Fasher and stressing the urgent need to protect civilians, halt the fighting, and ensure safe humanitarian access. At today’s meeting, Council members may be interested in Msuya’s assessment about the prospects for securing humanitarian pauses in El Fasher and expanding humanitarian access into the area.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-closed-consultations-9.php

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