Showing posts with label Kordofan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kordofan. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 04, 2026

Security situation in Sudan's Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile state, repeated drone strikes targeted in El Obeid

From Security Council Report
What's In Blue 
Posted Tuesday 04 August 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations


Tomorrow afternoon (5 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country, specifically in light of the ongoing violence in the Darfur and the Kordofan regions as well as in Blue Nile state. In requesting the meeting, these members highlighted the impact of the hostilities on civilians, including continued restrictions on humanitarian operations and attacks on civilian infrastructure that have disrupted essential services, impeded the delivery of medical care and humanitarian assistance, and further exacerbated humanitarian conditions. The anticipated briefer is Lisa Doughten, the Director of the Financing and Outreach Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).


The security situation in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, remains alarming. The city is a strategic gateway linking the capital, Khartoum, with the Greater Darfur region and serves as a critical logistical hub for humanitarian operations across Kordofan. Recent reports indicate a significant build-up of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied fighters around the city, accompanied by intensified drone strikes and shelling. OCHA has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites. These developments have prompted growing concern among regional and international actors, who have warned of the risk of widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and stressed the need for urgent action to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 25 June What’s in Blue story.)


Meanwhile, in late July, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a major ground offensive in North Kordofan and announced that it had recaptured the Al Sadarat highway and five key towns along the route, including Bara, Um Sayala, and Gebrat al-Sheikh, following two days of intense clashes with the RSF. The highway, which runs north of El Obeid and southwest towards Khartoum, had been a critical corridor for the RSF and, according to analysts, enabled the group to sustain pressure on El Obeid and constrain SAF operations across North Kordofan. The SAF’s recapture of the corridor restores an important supply and movement route, significantly improving its ability to reinforce positions around El Obeid. At tomorrow’s meeting, some Council members may seek Doughten’s assessment of what these developments could mean for humanitarian access.


At the same time, fighting has intensified on other fronts in North and West Darfur states. According to media reports, the RSF has increased drone strikes targeting the town of Tina in North Darfur, which borders Chad, as part of a broader offensive to capture the SAF’s remaining positions in Darfur, including Tina, Um Baru, and Karnoi. On 21 July, at least 21 civilians were reportedly killed and dozens injured when an RSF drone strike hit a vital water source in Tina. In a 23 July update, the international non-profit organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded 63 conflict-related fatalities across the Tina, Karnoi, and Um Baru localities since June, highlighting the intensification of fighting along Sudan’s border with Chad.


In a 3 August press release, OCHA noted that a 2 August drone strike in the village of Ghara al Zawiya in North Darfur state reportedly caused dozens of casualties, although the number of civilian casualties could not be independently verified. Media reports citing the Emergency Lawyers Group, a Sudanese human rights monitoring group, attributed the strike to the SAF, saying that it hit a traditional court session—during which people had gathered outdoors to attend hearings on local cases and disputes—and killed at least 35 people.


In Blue Nile state, the security and humanitarian situation deteriorated following the expansion of fighting around the town of Kurmuk and other areas along the Ethiopian border, reportedly displacing approximately 100,000 people across the state, many of whom have sought refuge in the capital, Ed Damazin. In early July, following intense clashes, the SAF retook control of Kurmuk from the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The RSF and the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction had captured Kurmuk in March, using the strategically located town as a base for operations in southern Blue Nile. The fighting has raised concerns over further regionalisation of the conflict, particularly amid allegations of external support to the RSF, including reports of a training and drone infrastructure facility linked to the group in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region and claims that Ethiopian territory has been used as a supply conduit for RSF operations.


Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Ed Damazin and other parts of Blue Nile state has continued to deteriorate, with heavy rainfall and flooding compounding the challenges faced by displaced populations. Thousands of people living in displacement sites and temporary shelters have been affected, with several shelters reportedly damaged or destroyed by flooding. Humanitarian actors have also raised concerns over the outbreak of disease amid pressure on already limited health, water, and sanitation services.


More broadly, the health crisis has continued to worsen across Sudan, with multiple disease outbreaks emerging amid the collapse of healthcare services, particularly in conflict-affected areas. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced a new wave of cholera, voicing particular concern about vulnerable populations, including in besieged areas such as El Obeid. In a 27 July press release, OCHA reported more than 2,000 suspected cholera cases and 170 related deaths since May, with the majority of cases recorded in the Kordofan region. OCHA has also noted that the WHO and Sudanese health authorities are responding to a growing dengue fever outbreak, with more than 1,000 cases and five related deaths reported in Blue Nile state in July, alongside more than 130 cases in South Kordofan state.


At tomorrow’s meeting, Doughten is likely to note that developments in Blue Nile, Darfur, and Kordofan underscore the devastating impact of attacks on civilian infrastructure—including healthcare facilities, water systems, and electricity networks—which have disrupted essential services and hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance. She may also highlight how the increasing use of drones and other advanced weaponry in the conflict is intensifying civilian suffering, with attacks increasingly affecting populated areas and critical infrastructure.


Doughten and several Council members are likely to reiterate calls for the cessation of hostilities and express support for efforts to achieve a humanitarian truce. They may raise broader protection concerns and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. Some members may also underline the need for a Council response amid the spiralling security and humanitarian situation. They might emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.


Doughten may also provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. She may call for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and stress the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $2.87 billion, was only 40.4 percent funded.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/sudan-closed-consultations-12.php


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Monday, August 03, 2026

UNSC Prog Aug 2026: South Sudan's UNMISS & Developments in Sudan's Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan

Denmark holds the presidency of the Security Council in August. Council members adopted the provisional programme of work for the month earlier today (3 August). Read more.

From What's In Blue 

Posted Mon 3 Aug 2026 - excerpts:


Security Council Programme of Work for August 2026


Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on Sudan on 5 August. Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting on 31 July to discuss the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly developments in the Darfur, Blue Nile, and Kordofan regions. An OCHA official is expected to brief.


The Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on the situation in South Sudan and the work of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Briefings are expected from Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS Anita Kiki Gbeho, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) Major General (retired) George Aggrey Owinow, and a civil society representative.


Original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/security-council-programme-of-work-for-august-2026.php


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Friday, June 26, 2026

Grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan. CRSV in Darfur could be crimes against humanity

From What's In Blue 
Dated Thursday 25 June 2026 - excerpts:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (26 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. [...]


Colombia, in its capacity as Council president for June and in the absence of a Chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to deliver a statement on the work of the Committee. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Pekka Haavisto will brief in the closed consultations. [...]


Over the past several weeks, regional and international interlocutors have expressed alarm over the escalating situation in El Obeid, drawing comparisons with the RSF’s October 2025 offensive and subsequent takeover of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. That offensive was accompanied by widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including reports of mass killings, summary executions, abductions, arbitrary detention, and other abuses against civilians. 


In an 18 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that an imminent offensive on El Obeid “risked fresh commission of serious international crimes and deepening the catastrophic impact on an already beleaguered civilian population”. [...]


In recent weeks, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites.


Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). In this regard, there may be reference to the 23 June report published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which documents patterns and trends of CRSV in Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023 to mid-April this year, including links to conflict dynamics. The report noted that CRSV has been perpetrated in conjunction with systematic and coordinated attacks against civilians as a tactic of war, including as retaliation against individuals perceived to be affiliated with opposing parties and as part of ethnically motivated attacks. It found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that some acts of sexual violence committed in Darfur, in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, may amount to crimes against humanity. [...]


Tomorrow, Sulieman and several Council members are likely to highlight the devastating impact of the conflict on children, particularly in light of the escalating hostilities in and around El Obeid. They are expected to express deep concern about the continued perpetration of grave violations against children in Sudan. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; abductions; and the denial of humanitarian access.) The Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 16 June and covering developments in 2025, verified 1,889 grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan.


During the closed consultations, Haavisto is expected to provide an update on ongoing initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with the Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. Between 3 and 5 June, the Quintet—comprising the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—held consultations in Addis Ababa with a broad spectrum of Sudanese political and civilian stakeholders. 


A press release issued after the meetings noted that discussions focused on possible pathways towards the establishment of a preparatory committee for an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. The latest discussions built on the Quintet’s initial engagement with a group of Sudanese civilian actors on the sidelines of the international Sudan conference held in Berlin on 15 April. 


On 7 June, Haavisto visited Sudan, where he met with SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and several other senior Sudanese officials. He also held discussions with political figures, women civil society leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and the UN Country Team. This was his second visit to Sudan following his appointment on 24 February. According to a UN readout, Haavisto’s discussions focused on UN-led efforts to promote de-escalation and confidence-building measures among the parties. During his meeting with Burhan, he also discussed the Quintet’s recent consultations in Addis Ababa and efforts to advance an inclusive political process.


On 19 June, Haavisto held a telephone conversation with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, during which he underscored the urgent need to de-escalate the situation in and around El Obeid and avoid any actions that could further exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation. In a briefing earlier today (25 June), Haavisto said that he plans to visit Kenya, Chad, South Sudan, and Uganda in the coming weeks as part of his ongoing regional outreach. He expressed hope that the Quad group—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—could help secure a humanitarian truce. In his assessment of the conflict dynamics, he noted that both sides still appear to believe that military gains remain achievable. At the same time, he underscored that regional actors, including Gulf countries, are increasingly rejecting the notion of a military solution.


Haavisto also met with US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos on 23 June. According to a post by Boulos on X, the two discussed the Quintet’s ongoing efforts to advance an inclusive, Sudanese-led civilian political dialogue, as well as ways to ensure unhindered humanitarian access for the UN and its humanitarian partners. Boulos further noted that he will participate in tomorrow’s Council meeting, during which he intends to emphasise the need for international support for a humanitarian truce, a pathway towards a permanent ceasefire, and an inclusive Sudanese-led political dialogue and civilian-led transition.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-13.php


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Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Sudan: Three Years of Conflict and Displacement. More than 11.58 million people were uprooted

Report from International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Dated 15 April 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Three Years of Conflict and Displacement


Following the start of the conflict on 15 April 2023, Sudan became the largest displacement crisis in the world. Nearly one in three people in Sudan— over 15 million people— were displaced from their homes, either within the country or across borders. Sudan alone accounted for 15 per cent of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. By January 2025, the crisis reached its peak in terms of displacement: More than 11.58 million people were uprooted inside Sudan—8.85 million driven out by the current conflict, and 2.73 million displaced from earlier conflicts.


This factsheet presents key statistics on displacement and return, based on three years of nationwide data collection from IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix. 


Key Figures: 15 April 2023 - 15 April 2026

  • The number of IDPs more than tripled due to the conflict, increasing by over 200 per cent from 3.8 million IDPs in 2023 to a peak of 11.58 million IDPs in 2025.
  • DTM recorded 805 events triggering displacement: On average, there was an event triggering displacement every 1.5 days for over 1,000 days. Some months witnessed as many as 88 incidents.
  • An average of approximately 231,779 additional IDPs were displaced each month between April 2023 and the peak of displacement in January 2025.
  • In addition to conflict-related displacement, over a quarter million individuals were displaced due to natural hazards (285,135 individuals).
  • Displacement spans the entire country: individuals were displaced from every single state and fled to nearly 13,000 locations in 185 localities across all 18 states.

Displacement and Return in April 2026


After three years, the number of displaced people has decreased due to increased return movements. 

  • Approximately 8,936,175 IDPs remain in Sudan, a 23 per cent decrease compared to the highest-ever recorded displaced population.
  • Despite the recent decrease in IDP figures, displacement remains at historically high levels: the displaced population is still more than double compared to its pre-conflict figures.

Nearly 4 million people have now returned home.

  • An estimated 3,994,019 individuals have returned to areas of origin across nine states.
  • Of these, 83 per cent moved back from internal displacement and 17 per cent returned from locations abroad.
  • Sixty per cent of households have returned to damaged homes, including fully collapsed roofs and broken walls or windows.
  • The majority of returning families moved back due to improved security (87%), and the majority intend to stay (92%).

View original, graphics, download full report

Period Covered Apr 15 2023 - Apr 15 2026:

https://dtm.iom.int/reports/sudan-three-years-conflict-and-displacement


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Saturday, January 10, 2026

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away (UK FM Cooper)

"Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda." - Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary. Read more.


From The Independent.co.uk

Editorial by Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary

Published Friday 09 January 2026 10:00 GMT - full copy:


The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away


As the conflict in Sudan passes the grim milestone of 1,000 days, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper writes that the same diplomatic energy that helped end the war in Gaza is needed to end the crisis

South Sudan's worsening water crisis [VIDEO]


The world is catastrophically failing the people of Sudan. Today marks a grim milestone – 1,000 days of devastating violent conflict involving unimaginable atrocities, millions pushed into famine, and the most barbaric abuse of Sudan’s women.


The scale of the humanitarian crisis happening now is greater than any in the 21st century and the security consequences are likely to be felt far beyond Sudan for many years to come.


The world must not look away from the conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces that is terrorising Sudan. I am determined we shine a searing spotlight on the unfolding atrocities and make 2026 the year the world comes together to drive urgent new momentum towards peace.


Last month, I listened as Sudanese civilians and community workers from their Emergency Response Rooms recounted the horrific human cost of the RSF’s October capture of the town of El Fasher after a grinding 18-month siege – including ethnically motivated mass killings and use of rape and starvation as weapons of war.


These stories on the ground corroborated the satellite images from space – images of blood-soaked earth and mass graves that all too briefly jolted the world’s attention.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper (Reuters)


Aid workers in Tawila gave me a virtual tour of the makeshift camps where hundreds of distressed children arrived having made a 46-mile journey from El Fasher on foot. Traumatised women and children are scraping an existence with scant rations under thornbush shelters.


International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff recounted their struggle to support unprecedented numbers of victims of sexual violence in what they described as a war on women’s bodies. As shocking as what I saw was what I did not see – boys or men. Fathers, husbands and brothers missing, likely killed, following forced separation from their families.


Over 30 million people still need lifesaving aid. Famine is spreading. Infrastructure has collapsed. Preventable diseases are rampant. The conflict is escalating and spreading in the Kordofan region. 

The RSF have been accused of war crimes (File picture). 
Rapid Support Forces

For the leaders of Sudan’s warring parties to refuse to halt the war or to prevent massacres and atrocities on this scale is horrendous. For so many soldiers to be systematically raping Sudanese women is barbaric.


The case for action is deeply moral. But it is also about our wider security. Wars that rage unresolved radiate instability. They undermine the security of neighbouring states, they become easy targets for extremist groups to exploit. And they lead migrants to embark on dangerous international journeys.


Sudan’s war goes far beyond Sudan. It is regionalised and globalised. It poses a global test of our ability to mobilise the agile alliances, partnerships and multilateral weight to get a breakthrough.


Words of international concern or outrage are not enough. We need a concerted diplomatic drive to arrest the spiralling violence and suffering.

Sudanese residents gather to receive free meals in Al Fasher 

(AFP via Getty Images)


The US have been working to get a truce and wider plan in place – drawing together the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (the ‘Quad’). That is why last month in Washington I held talks with Secretary Rubio and the President’s senior advisor on Africa and I have repeatedly engaged Quad members on ways forward.


But we need the same international focus and energy now from right across the world that we had around securing the Gaza ceasefire.


Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda.


At the heart of international efforts must be pursuing the humanitarian truce and a push for a permanent end to hostilities. This can only come through greater pressure on the warring parties – crucially from their regional backers.


Second, we have to prevent further atrocities by either side. This means working to raise the cost of committing or backing further massacres. On 12 December, the UK sanctioned senior RSF commanders, including the so-called “Butcher of El Fasher” who has openly boasted on social media of murdering Sudanese civilians.

Sudanese who fled el-Fasher city crowd to receive food at their camp in Tawila (AP)


And we are working to combat impunity and hold perpetrators to account. In November, UK leadership at the UN Human Rights Council secured international agreement to an urgent UN inquiry into crimes in El Fasher. We are supporting vital investigations by the International Criminal Court.


Third, unimpeded aid needs to reach populations in need. The UK has provided an additional £21 million for food, shelter, health services and protection of women and children in hardest to reach areas. This brings our total support to £146 million this financial year.


But for aid to save more lives, the belligerents must lift their deliberate and systematic barriers to humanitarian access.


Ultimately, no amount of aid can resolve a crisis of this magnitude until the guns fall silent. It must be the Sudanese people, not any warring group, that determine Sudan’s future.


The world must now come together around this cause – to stem the bloodshed and help set Sudan on a path to peace.


View original: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sudan-war-humanitarian-crisis-yvette-cooper-b2897125.html


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