Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
What’s In Blue
Dated Wednesday 01 October 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This afternoon (1 October), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark, France, Greece, Panama, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the current escalation of violence in El Fasher in North Darfur state; ongoing efforts to secure a humanitarian pause; and recent diplomatic engagements on Sudan, including during the General Assembly’s high-level week. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya are expected to brief.

Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continue, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. In recent months, there has been an alarming escalation in hostilities in the fighting, which has centred around El Fasher and the Kordofan region. The growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict. A 29 September Washington Post article reported that the RSF now possess anti-aircraft weapons, drones, and surface-to-air missiles. A report published on the same day by the Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale School of Public Health identified at least 43 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) near the RSF-controlled Nyala airport in South Darfur and 36 launchers.

Regional and international initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan have continued, but a meaningful breakthrough remains elusive, as the positions of both Sudanese warring parties and key member states have become entrenched. In recent weeks, the US has sought to reinvigorate peace-making efforts through the convening of the “Quad” countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—to explore ways of generating new momentum. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our September 2025 Monthly Forecast.)

On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the Quad countries issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to allow the rapid delivery of assistance across Sudan, with the aim of paving the way for a permanent ceasefire. The statement proposed that an inclusive and transparent transition process be launched and concluded within nine months, leading to the establishment of an independent, civilian-led government with broad-based legitimacy and accountability. The ministers committed to press all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure and ensure humanitarian assistance reaches those in need; promote conditions that ensure the security of the broader Red Sea region; counter transnational security threats from terrorist and extremist organisations; and deny space to destabilising regional and domestic actors.

In a 29 September press briefing in New York, US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos described ongoing discussions on the humanitarian situation in Sudan. He noted extensive engagements with organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and said that the US is working closely with both the RSF and SAF to facilitate urgent aid delivery to El Fasher, with plans to extend assistance to Kordofan and other affected areas. Boulos also recently held discussions with Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, which focused on the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the situation in Sudan featured in his exchanges with regional and international stakeholders, including with African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf during a September visit to Addis Ababa.

On 24 September, the Quad countries convened at ministerial level on the margins of the General Debate of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, continuing their discussions on ways to restore peace and security in Sudan.

That day, the AU, the European Union (EU), France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with regional and international stakeholders to address the situation in Sudan and coordinate efforts towards de-escalation and the protection of civilians. The statement issued following the meeting urged the warring parties to resume direct negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire and called on them to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of civilians.

In September, Lamamra undertook a regional tour aimed at advancing peace efforts with the Sudanese parties and relevant interlocutors. In Nairobi, Kenya, he held consultations with independent civilian representatives as well as delegations from the RSF-aligned “Tasis” alliance and the Civil Democratic Alliance of the Revolution’s Forces (“Sumoud”), which emerged earlier this year following a split from the “Taqaddum” coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In a post on X, Lamamra underscored his commitment to engage actors all across the spectrum, irrespective of their political affiliations, to foster consensus on the way forward. He also held a meeting with Kenyan President William Ruto, during which Lamamra reportedly provided an update on his recent peace engagements and discussed ways to intensify efforts to end the conflict.

Lamamra subsequently travelled to Port Sudan, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Transitional Prime Minister Kamil Eltayeb Idris and members of his cabinet. According to a 17 September press briefing by Spokesperson for the Secretary-General Stéphane Dujarric, Lamamra also engaged with civilian political actors, women’s groups, and members of the diplomatic corps. Dujarric said that this visit was part of efforts to “lay the complex groundwork necessary to support an inclusive peace process” capable of delivering a sustainable solution. This afternoon, Council members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps in the mediation process and of ways to address the underlying issues hindering peace efforts.

At the meeting, Msuya is expected to provide an update on the humanitarian situation in light of the evolving security developments and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid. The situation is particularly grave in El Fasher, where more than 260,000 civilians—including 130,000 children—remain trapped, according to UN estimates. Civilians in the area are facing growing risks of sexual violence, forced recruitment, and arbitrary detention. As conditions deteriorate, people have resorted to desperate measures, such as eating animal feed and food waste.

Satellite imagery published by Yale’s HRL shows that, since May, the RSF has been constructing a massive earthen berm encircling El Fasher, which now stretches more than 68 kilometres, leaving only a narrow three- to four-kilometre gap. Civilians continue to face daily threats from shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks. On 19 September, one of the deadliest incidents in recent months occurred when a mosque near the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) was struck by a drone reportedly belonging to the RSF, killing more than 70 people, including at least 11 children.

In a 29 September statement, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan Denise Brown called for the lifting of the siege on El Fasher, an end to indiscriminate attacks, and clear orders to fighters to prevent sexual violence and ethnically motivated attacks. She also emphasised the need to guarantee safe passage for civilians wishing to leave the city through open, secure, and accessible routes, while ensuring that those who remain are protected and have access to food, water, and other essential supplies.

Msuya might elaborate on Fletcher’s recent engagements with the Sudanese warring parties. On 24 September, he met with Idris to discuss the expansion of humanitarian access and the UN’s presence in Sudan, including efforts to move pre-positioned aid supplies in El Fasher. The following day, he spoke with RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, expressing grave concern about the humanitarian crisis in El Fasher and stressing the urgent need to protect civilians, halt the fighting, and ensure safe humanitarian access. At today’s meeting, Council members may be interested in Msuya’s assessment about the prospects for securing humanitarian pauses in El Fasher and expanding humanitarian access into the area.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/10/sudan-closed-consultations-9.php

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South Sudan: UNSC Briefing and Consultations

THE security situation has remained tense since clashes erupted in March. 

The South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) has continued operations, including ground offensive and aerial bombardments against opposition-held areas and other armed groups, including in the Greater Upper Nile and Greater Equatoria regions. 

The ceasefire agreed to in the revitalised agreement has effectively collapsed, with force unification stalled amid ongoing SSPDF offensives, as well as defections to and recruitment by the SSPDF. 

Intercommunal violence has further aggravated insecurity, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, according to the Secretary-General’s report.

At Monday’s meeting, several Council members are expected to raise the country’s dire humanitarian situation, including rising food insecurity. 

These challenges have been compounded by flooding and a collapsing healthcare system amid a severe cholera outbreak. 

The country also continues to grapple with the adverse humanitarian, security, and economic effects of the ongoing fighting in Sudan and the resulting influx of refugees and South Sudanese returnees.

Impediments to humanitarian access, including attacks on humanitarian workers and looting of humanitarian assets, are another matter of concern for Council members.

Read more in Security Council Report

By What's In Blue 
Dated Friday 15 August 2025

South Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/south-sudan-briefing-and-consultations-28.php

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Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians. VIDEO: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

Video of full meeting:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting

Result of voting: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

See live broadcast courtesy of UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

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