Sudan: Closed Consultations at UN Security Council

Security Council Report
From What's In Blue 
Dated Mon 4 Aug 2025 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

This afternoon (4 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. The meeting was requested by Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) to receive an update on the humanitarian and political situations in the country, specifically in light of the recent escalation of violence in North Darfur state and the Kordofan region. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk are expected to brief.

Ahead of the meeting, Russia apparently objected to having an official from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) brief on Sudan, arguing that the office lacks the mandate to brief the Council on the issue. However, Denmark and the UK countered this argument, noting OHCHR’s strong presence in Port Sudan, as well as its access to nationwide networks and to parties to the conflict. They also argued that the Council should be able to draw on all relevant information to inform its work and cited precedents of briefings from OHCHR officials to the Council on other situations.

At this afternoon’s meeting, Lamamra is expected to provide an overview of the grave security situation in the country, amid spiralling and unabated violence. In recent months, North Darfur state and the Kordofan region have witnessed an alarming escalation in hostilities, with large numbers of civilians bearing the brunt of the fighting. Fierce clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have continued, as both parties seek to consolidate territorial control. The fighting has been marked by heavy use of drones, artillery, ground operations, and airstrikes, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and raising concerns about widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. (For background and more information, see our 26 June What’s in Blue story.)

The Kordofan region has become a key flashpoint in the ongoing conflict due to its strategic importance as a crossroads linking the country from east to west and north to south. Control of the region is critical to shaping the balance of power in Sudan’s civil war. El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state and a focal point of fighting, remains the SAF’s westernmost stronghold after it broke the RSF’s siege in February. The SAF reportedly uses El-Obeid as a base for launching airstrikes into Darfur and for preventing RSF advances towards Khartoum. Recent media reports have indicated an RSF mobilisation aimed at seizing El-Obeid.

In a 17 July statement, OHCHR noted that it had verified the killing of at least 60 civilians by the RSF in the Bara locality of North Kordofan since 10 July. Civil society groups have reported significantly higher figures, with some estimates placing the death toll at up to 300. The OHCHR statement added that at least 23 civilians were reportedly killed and over 30 injured in airstrikes carried out by the SAF on two villages in West Kordofan state between 10 and 14 July. Additionally, on 17 July, a SAF airstrike in the Bara locality killed at least 11 civilians.

In the same statement, Türk warned that a continued escalation of hostilities would worsen the already dire humanitarian situation and heighten risks to civilians. He urged those with influence to prevent such an escalation and to ensure that both parties uphold their obligations under international law, including to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Türk reiterated his call on the warring parties to ensure safe, sustained, and unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, including through humanitarian pauses. He stressed that alleged violations must be independently investigated and those responsible held accountable. This afternoon, the briefers and several Council members are likely to reiterate these messages.

Today’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. Kamil Eltayeb Idris—who has been appointed as Sudan’s prime minister by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader and chairperson of the Transitional Sovereignty Council—has continued appointing members to a recently established 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. Meanwhile, the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (known as “Tasis”)—a coalition of rival armed and political groups, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, which controls territory in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states—announced in late July the formation of a parallel government in RSF-held areas. The structure includes a 15-member presidential council headed by the RSF’s leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with Hilu serving as vice president and Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as prime minister.

Several regional and international interlocutors have denounced the RSF’s decision to establish a parallel governing authority, warning that it risks entrenching Sudan’s political fragmentation, and have underscored the importance of upholding the country’s territorial integrity. In a 29 July press statement, members of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) rejected the creation of the so-called “parallel government” and stressed that the AU only recognises the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the recently formed civilian transitional government, until consensual arrangements are reached to restore constitutional order.

Sudan has on multiple occasions expressed its desire to be readmitted to the AU, after having been suspended in the wake of the October 2021 military takeover. The AUPSC convened earlier today to consider the situation in Sudan, under the rotating presidency for the month of August of Algeria (an elected UN Security Council member in 2024-25).

Lamamra most recently briefed Council members in closed consultations on 27 June, providing an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan. He apparently underscored the urgent need for a united and coordinated approach to address the crisis through immediate and concrete action. It seems that Lamamra also shared insights from the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels a day earlier (26 June). The next round of the consultative meeting is expected to be held in Addis Ababa, although the date has yet to be determined.

At a tri-partite meeting in Baghdad in May, the leaders of the UN, AU, and the League of Arab States (LAS) agreed to maintain regular contact to better coordinate peace efforts in Sudan. The AU Chairperson’s special representative to Sudan, Mohamed Belaiche, visited Port Sudan last week, where he met with senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan and Idris. (For more information, see our 18 May and 26 June What’s in Blue stories.)

In recent months, the US has appeared to reinvigorate efforts to advance peace talks in Sudan, in coordination with regional and international partners. In early June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the Sudan conflict in Washington DC with the ambassadors to the US of the other Quad countries, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US had also planned to host a high-level meeting of Quad foreign ministers on 29 July; however, according to media reports, the meeting was postponed indefinitely due to disagreements between Egypt and the UAE—who are said to support opposing sides in the conflict—over the language of a proposed joint statement. There have also been reports that the US rejected an Egyptian request to include representatives of Sudan’s government in the meeting. Separately, the Sudan conflict has featured in recent bilateral discussions between senior US officials and key interlocutors, including Egypt and Qatar.

Security Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement, authored by the “A3 Plus” members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Guyana) and the UK, that responds to the announcement made by the RSF-led Tasis alliance establishing a parallel governing authority. The draft press statement was open for comments until this morning. At the time of writing, members were awaiting a revised version of the text.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/08/sudan-closed-consultations-8.php

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The London Conference on Sudan 15th April 2025

Presidential Palace Khartoum 2012 by the author

Sudan - can the UK's "progressive realism" help?

Sir Nick Kay

Former Ambassador

April 11, 2025

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis and one of its most dangerous, complex, bloody wars gets a moment in the spotlight in London on 15 April. Foreign ministers and senior officials from international organisations will meet at Lancaster House to discuss Sudan. After two years of conflict, the UK is taking a diplomatic initiative that many believe long overdue given its historical ties and current responsibility at the United Nations Security Council to hold the pen on Sudan resolutions.

But is the conference likely to lead to anything positive for the Sudanese people? 

Expectations are understandably low. The de facto Sudanese authorities led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have criticised the UK for not inviting them to the conference. They object strongly to the UAE being invited because they consider it an ally of the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and therefore a party to the conflict. On the ground both the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have pledged to continue the war until they achieve complete victory. No impartial observer thinks that possible. As the war drags on, Sudan suffers from political polarisation, fragmentation and continued external meddling.

It's too easy to look the other way and too easy to think this is just a messy, protracted struggle that will continue inconclusively. But the immediate future may not be a continuation of the last two years. 

Red warning lights are flashing. Sudan’s neighbour South Sudan is teetering on the brink of civil war and the Sudanese conflict is playing its part in destabilising South Sudan and vice versa. Other neighbouring countries are also vulnerable to fall-out from Sudan: Chad in particular. With any expansion of war in the region, the humanitarian consequences and political risks of spiralling conflict magnify. Within Sudan itself the increased presence of Islamist extremists, armed militia and potentially international terror groups is another flashing light. Geopolitical tensions - already existing - may escalate. The Sudan Armed Forces have been ostracised by western powers and have entered agreements with Russia and Iran in their search for arms. Both countries see establishing a presence on Sudan’s Red Sea coast as a prize. But such a move would be highly provocative for others, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Over the last two years efforts to broker ceasefires have failed, only limited progress has been made on improving humanitarian access and efforts to bring about a comprehensive political settlement between the various actors - the two military forces, political parties, armed movements and civil society actors - have all led to nought. Many have tried, including the UN, AU, IGAD, the US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey but none has succeeded. These “track 1” efforts have been complemented by multiple “track 2” initiatives led by NGOs and peace foundations. But so far the willingness to give as well as take in any negotiation is sorely missing.

Proposals

Absent political will by the protagonists and their external backers, what can be achieved in London? 

Limited but important steps can be agreed in three areas: the humanitarian response, political process and international cooperation. 

On the humanitarian front, the key challenges remain both funding and access. In April 2024 at a conference in Paris, donors made generous pledges totalling USD $2 billion. Much of that has yet to be disbursed. London is not a pledging conference, but should be the opportunity for partners to live up to their past commitments and renew their determination to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance for the 11 million Sudanese forced to flee their homes— food, shelter, medicines and healthcare at a minimum. The challenges for humanitarians are enormous: Sudan’s domestic political and ethnic complexity compounded by the regional tensions with and between Sudan’s neighbours necessitate an enhanced international aid effort coordinated by a senior UN figure. 

A political process remains the missing element and in London agreement may be possible on how to deal with the most immediate challenge as well as on the essential elements for a future process. Since the SAF now control the capital Khartoum again, it is likely they will press ahead with their own political roadmap and appoint a civilian government subordinate to the military to take forward a transition towards eventual restoration of democracy. 

How should the international community respond to this - reject, ignore, embrace, or shape it? Given the risk of Sudan being partitioned into two warring regions - Darfur and the South controlled by the RSF and the North, East and centre being controlled by the SAF - no SAF-imposed roadmap is going to be the final word. Not only will it not include the RSF and its supporters, but also many of the political actors who supported the 2019 revolution, which overthrew General Bashir’s military rule, will have nothing to do with the SAF roadmap. So the challenge for the international community is to try to work within the new political reality on a temporary and tentative basis. The aim should be to shape the SAF’s actions in order to move towards a credible inclusive political transition. The London conference could agree criteria by which such a political process will be judged. Key questions will be: how inclusive is the process and what genuine efforts are made to ensure inclusiveness of all Sudan; how are civil and political rights protected; how will security, justice and reconciliation be achieved; what are the criteria for selection of members of a transitional administration; what real authority will the administration have over economic and budgetary affairs; what are the provisions and realistic timetable for an all-inclusive Sudanese national dialogue? Above all, how firmly enshrined is the commitment to full democratic and civilian rule in Sudan, for which Sudanese men, women and youth struggled and died over the years? 

These are difficult questions that have defied easy answers since 2019. Helping Sudanese actors address them will require substantial and coordinated international action. 

The third way the London conference could contribute is by setting out agreed principles and a framework for the international community. The Sudan crisis is of such a complexity and international nature that it requires a creative and collaborative approach. The conference could propose that an international panel of mediators be appointed, led by the African Union but comprising additional senior figures from beyond Africa. Rank is important and ideally the panel would be at former head of state or government level and mandated by a UN Security Council resolution. The panel’s focus should be on advancing a comprehensive political settlement. Early consultation with the SAF, RSF and Sudanese civil and political actors about the terms of reference will be essential. The conference could agree who should take forward this consultation and a time frame.

Conclusion

Foreign Secretary David Lammy convened the conference after seeing at first hand the devastating impact of the war on Sudanese women and children on the Chad-Sudan border. Just because the Sudan war is complicated and far from our TV screens, we cannot in all conscience ignore it. This is a moment to put the Foreign Secretary’s doctrine of “progressive realism” into action.

 [These are the personal views of the author and do not represent the views of any organisation with which he is associated.]

CMI — Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation 

Diplomats without Borders 

View original: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sudan-can-uks-progressive-realism-help-sir-nick-kay-nc3be/

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Related 

Sudan Watch - 19 Nov 2010

British Ambassador in Khartoum Nicholas Kay is blogging the drama and scale of the change taking place in Sudan

The British government's Foreign & Commonwealth Office, commonly called the Foreign Office or the FCO, has started a blog about the work of the British Ambassador to Sudan. The blog is authored by Nicholas Kay CMG, Her Majesty's Ambassador to Sudan. Mr Kay (pictured below) arrived in Khartoum to take up his role as HM Ambassador to Sudan on 29 May 2010. Here is a copy of his first two blog posts followed by several related reports.

Full story: https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/11/british-ambassador-in-khartoum-nicholas.html

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Sir Nicholas Kay KCMG
British Ambassador to the Republic of Sudan 2010 to 2012
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/nicholas-kay

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South Sudan on brink of civil war, UN's Haysom warns

“The time for action is now because the alternative is too terrible to contemplate” -Nicholas Haysom, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

Read more in report from UN News

By Vibhu Mishra

Dated Monday, 24 March 2025 - full copy:

South Sudan on the brink of civil war, top UN official warns

© WFP/Peter Louis Displaced people in Renk County, Upper Nile State, South Sudan. (file)

South Sudan is teetering on the brink of a return to full-scale civil war as violence escalates and political tensions deepen, the head of the UN Mission in the country (UNMISS) warned on Monday.

Briefing journalists at UN Headquarters in New York via videolink from Juba, Nicholas Haysom described indiscriminate attacks on civilians, mass displacement and rising ethnic tensions.

He urged all parties to pull back from the brink and commit to peace before the country plunges into another devastating conflict.

“A conflict would erase all the hard-won gains made since the 2018 peace deal was signed. It would devastate not only South Sudan but the entire region, which simply cannot afford another war,” he warned.

Fragile peace at risk

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, but the world’s youngest nation has been plagued by conflict and instability ever since.

A civil war erupted in 2013 between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those aligned with his former deputy, Riek Machar. The war – marked by ethnic violence, mass atrocities and widespread humanitarian crisis – lasted until a fragile peace deal was signed in 2018.

Though the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement brought a degree of stability, delays in its implementation and continued political rivalries have kept tensions simmering.

Mounting violence

The latest wave of violence erupted on 4 March when the so-called White Army – a youth militia – overran South Sudanese army barracks in Nasir, Upper Nile province.

In response, Government forces launched retaliatory aerial bombardments on civilian areas, using barrel bombs that allegedly contained highly flammable accelerants.

“These indiscriminate attacks on civilians are causing significant casualties and horrific injuries, especially burns, including to women and children,” Mr. Haysom said, adding that at least 63,000 people have fled the area.

Reports indicate that both the White Army and national forces are mobilising for further confrontations, with allegations of child recruitment into armed groups.

The deployment of foreign forces at the request of the Government has further heightened tensions, evoking painful memories of the country’s previous civil wars.

Rising ethnic tensions

Political tensions are also escalating, Mr. Haysom continued.

Senior officials affiliated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) – the main rival militia – have been removed, replaced, detained, or forced into hiding.

There is also an increasing use of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, which is fuelling ethnic divisions and fear, making reconciliation even more difficult.

“Given this grim situation, we are left with no other conclusion, but to assess that South Sudan is teetering on the edge of a relapse into civil war,” the senior UN official warned.

Diplomatic efforts stalled

Mr. Haysom further reported that UNMISS has engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts alongside regional and international partners, including the African Union (AU), the regional development bloc, IGAD, and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.

However, a scheduled high-level visit by IGAD foreign ministers to Juba, aimed at mediating between the parties, was abruptly postponed by the South Sudanese government without explanation.

“This is a disappointing development at a time when diplomatic outreach is more important than ever,” he said.

Recommit to peace

Mr. Haysom urged South Sudan’s leaders to immediately recommit to the 2018 peace deal, respect the ceasefire, release detained officials and resolve disputes through dialogue rather than military confrontation.

He also called for President Kiir and First Vice President Machar to meet and publicly reaffirm their joint commitment to peace.

“The time for action is now because the alternative is too terrible to contemplate.”

WATCH VIDEO: Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for South Sudan speaks to the press via videolink.

View original: Here

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