'Complicity' in war crimes alleged: Top Lundin Energy executives charged over Sudan legacy

Full copy of news report published at Upstream Online.com

Written by IAIN ESAU in London 

Dated 11 November 2021 14:22 GMT UPDATED  17 November 2021 16:08 GMT

'Complicity' in war crimes alleged: Top Lundin Energy executives charged over Sudan legacy

Swedish Prosecution Authority lays charges against chairman Ian Lundin and director Alex Schneiter after 11-year investigation into historic operations of Lundin Oil

Pictured in 2009: The Thar Jath oilfield lies in Block 5A in South Sudan. It was discovered in 2001 before South Sudan's independence and before Lundin Energy sold its stake in the block Photo: AFP/SCANPIX

The Swedish Prosecution Authority (SPA) has laid criminal charges, including "complicity in grave war crimes", against Lundin Energy chairman Ian Lundin and director Alex Schneiter, related to the company's legacy operations in Sudan.

Lundin Oil was a key player in war-torn Sudan between 1991 and 2003, when it exited Block 5A.

It quit the country fully in 2009, two years before the country split into South Sudan — which holds most of the oil — and Sudan, through which the south's oil is exported.

The SPA said Lundin Oil was active in Sudan when control of oilfields in the country's southern region became a contentious issue in a long-running civil war.

The SPA — which began its probe into the company's Sudan activities in 2010 and has now generated an 80,000-page report — said the two men are "suspected of having been complicit in war crimes committed by the then Sudanese regime with the purpose of securing the company’s oil operations in southern Sudan".

Lundin 'refutes' charges

The Stockhom-listed independent said it "refutes that there are any grounds for allegations of wrongdoing by any of its representatives", stressing that both executives "strongly deny the charges and have the full support of the board in contesting them at trial".

Lundin Energy said in a statement today the charges against its chairman and director refer to periods of operations in Sudan running between 1999-2003 and 2000-2003, respectively.

The charges include claims against Lundin Energy involving a forfeiture of economic benefits of about SKr1.39 billion ($159 million) and a corporate fine of SKr3 million.

This forfeiture represents a gain of SKr720 million the company made when selling its Sudanese business in 2003.

The prosecution said the company was actively exploring Block 5A in Unity State, which eventually became one of the areas worst affected by the war.

Military forces from the south were originally charged with providing security around Lundin Oil's assets when the company started operations in 1997, said the SPA, claiming that a militia group allied to the Khartoum government tried to take control of Block 5A, but failed, although its attacks led to "great suffering" among civilians.

Khartoum-militia protection

In 1999, the SPA said that Sudan's military, together with the same militia group, led operations to take control of the area and create the necessary conditions for the company to continue its activities, leading to a conflict that was still underway when Lundin Oil quit the block in 2003.

The SPA believes Sudan's government, through its military and the militia allied to the Khartoum regime, carried out a war that conflicts with international humanitarian law and, according to Swedish law, constitutes grave war crimes.

Systematic attacks

Public prosecutor Henrik Attorps, SPA's head of the Sudan probe, said: ”In our view, the investigation shows the military and its allied militia systematically attacked civilians or carried out indiscriminate attacks. Consequently, many civilians were killed, injured and displaced from Block 5A.”

Chief public prosecutor Krister Petersson, alleged that directly after the military went into Block 5A in May 1999, in breach of a local peace agreement, "Lundin Oil changed its view of who should be responsible for security around the company’s operations", requesting from Sudan's government that its military should undertake this role, "knowing that this meant" the use of "force."

"Complicity"

He said: "What constitutes complicity in a criminal sense is that (the company) made these demands despite understanding or... being indifferent to the military and the militia carrying out the war in a way that was forbidden according to international humanitarian law.”

The SPA alleges that Ian Lundin and Schneiter "continued to promote crimes that the (Sudan) military and its allied militia were to commit to enable continued oil operations until March 2003."

"Comprehensive" evidence

The SPA said its evidence is "comprehensive" and centres on civilians who were attacked.

"We will also hear witnesses who followed and studied the situation in Sudan and... met refugees and heard their stories. We will rely on written reports from the area, primarily from the UN and other international organisations as well as from journalists who observed the area”, said public prosecutor Karolina Wieslander.

In terms of support for its allegations of complicity in war crimes, the SPA said this consists of Lundin Oil's internal reporting, its communications with Sudan's government and witnesses connected to the company.

In total, the SPA said it has carried out about 270 interviews with about 150 people.

As a result of these charges, Ian Lundin will not stand for re-election as chairman at Lundin Energy's 2022 annual general meeting, but both he and Schneiter will remain board directors.

"Incomprehensible decision"

Commenting on the charges, Ian Lundin said: “This is an incomprehensible decision by the SPA since it is not supported by any evidence in the investigation, a situation that has not changed for the last 11 years.

"I know that we have done no wrong and that we will ultimately prove this in court."

He was placed under investigation by the SPA in 2016 and interviewed for the first time a year later.

Lundin Energy said it is "extremely concerned about the fairness, reliability and legal basis of the investigation and about the credibility and accuracy" of reports from a non-governmental organisation "that seem to form the basis of the prosecution case."

While the company did not name the NGOs, Amnesty International and Christian Aid have both published reports on the Sudan conflict.

"No evidence"

"In the company’s firm opinion," said Lundin Energy, "there is no evidence linking any representative to the alleged primary crimes and this will be fully demonstrated at trial."

The company said it is "firmly convinced" it was a positive force for development in Sudan and operated there "responsibly", as part of an international consortium, and in "full alignment" with the policy of constructive engagement endorsed by the United Nations, European Union and Sweden at the time."

"No legal basis" to fines and forfeitures

Lundin Energy said it will "firmly contest the claims for a corporate fine and forfeiture."

The company said the forfeiture amount is less than announced by the SPA in 2018, and believes "there is no legal basis for any such claim."

Lundin Energy pointed out that the SPA's decision to lay charges is another step in a lengthy legal process that may take "many years" to reach a conclusion. (Copyright)

View original: https://www.upstreamonline.com/people/complicity-in-war-crimes-alleged-top-lundin-energy-executives-charged-over-sudan-legacy/2-1-1097152

Why Sudan’s coup leader Gen Burhan risked a blatant power grab - Who can trust him to keep his word?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor:  Here below is a copy of Professor Dr. Alex de Waal’s latest Sudan coup analysis, published at BBC NEWS in the early hours of Wed 27 Oct 2021. British-born Alex (pictured below) is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US. 

If you zoom in on the photo of Alex you can see some of the books are about Sudan and South Sudan. The large grey book with the title MASS STARVATION printed in a white circle is one of his many published works. This is not the most flattering photo available online. I have chosen it because it conveys some of the weariness and exhaustion he must feel after the miles of serious papers he has read during his lifetime. The deeply sad and difficult subjects he studies and writes about are, I believe, succeeding in making an important contribution towards world peace. 

The twitter account of World Peace Foundation @WorldPeaceFdtn is at: https://twitter.com/WorldPeaceFdtn

A list of published works by Alex de Waal is at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_de_Waal

IMAGE, Professor Dr. Alex de Waal. IMAGE SOURCE, World Peace Foundation, Tufts University: 

https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2018/05/14/new-video-alex-de-waal-on-mass-starvation/

Sudan coup: Why the army is gambling with the future

Analysis at BBC NEWS online

By ALEX DE WAAL

Africa analyst

Published Wednesday 27 October 2021

Sudan's coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken a leap into the dark. 

He has endangered Sudan's international standing as a nascent democracy, imperilled essential debt relief and international aid, and jeopardised peace with rebels in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains.

He was head of Sudan's Sovereign Council and the face of the army in the country's civilian-military cohabitation - until Monday, when he seized complete power.

He dissolved the country's civilian cabinet, arresting Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other prominent civilians with whom the military had agreed to share power until elections were held next year.

The general's autocratic ambitions were no secret.

Over the last months, he showed impatience with Mr Hamdok's leadership, signalling that a strong ruler was needed to save the nation.

At a recent military-backed demonstration in the capital, Khartoum, protesters blamed Mr Hamdok for deteriorating living conditions - not helped by a blockade at the main port in the east which has led to shortages.

Sudanese democrats were alert to the army's stratagems, which seemed to be copied from the playbook that led to Abdul Fatah al-Sisi's military takeover in Egypt in 2013.

The Sudan Professionals Association and the multitude of neighbourhood committees that had orchestrated the non-violent protests which brought down the 30-year rule of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019 prepared for a new round of street demonstrations.

IMAGE: Source EPA. Caption, Protestors are determined not to allow the army to steal the revolution that saw Omar al-Bashir ousted in 2019

Foreign diplomats were also worried. US Special Envoy Jeffrey Feldman visited Khartoum at the weekend to press for agreement between the generals and the civilians. He left the city on Sunday with - he thought - a pact agreed.

The coup was staged hours later, leaving the Americans not only dismayed but outraged.

Making it clear that they had been deceived, the US administration has "paused" a $700m (£508m) financial assistance package.

An even bigger issue is the status of Sudan's debt relief package, recently negotiated by Mr Hamdok.

After two years of painful delays, international aid to salvage Sudan's economy was finally in prospect - and is now in jeopardy.

The African Union (AU), the United Nations, the East African regional body Igad and all of Sudan's Western donors have condemned the coup and called for a return to civilian rule.

The Arab League has also called for the constitutional formula to be respected. The grouping is usually in step with the Egyptian government, raising the question of how much Gen Burhan can count on the backing of Cairo.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which provided crucial financial aid to Gen Burhan in 2019, have stayed silent so far.

Their sympathies probably lie with the army strongman, but they will also know they cannot cover the costs of bailing out Sudan.

Gen Burhan was already the most powerful man in the country, his role legitimised by the August 2019 power-sharing deal between the military and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a loose coalition of civilian groups.

So why would he risk it all on a blatant power grab?

Commercial empires

According to that agreement, Gen Burhan was due to step down as chairman of the Sovereign Council next month.

At that point, a civilian chosen by the FFC would become the head of state, and the civilians in government would be better placed to push ahead with implementing key items on their agenda.

“Not only was the army commanding a vast share of the national budget, but military-owned companies operate with tax exemptions and often alleged corrupt contracting procedures" 

- Alex de Waal, Africa analyst

IMAGE: Source, GETTY

One is accountability for human rights violations. The government is committed in principle to handing over ex-President Bashir to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

His former lieutenants - including Gen Burhan and leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces Gen Mohamed Hamdan "Hemeti" Dagolo - wanted him to be tried in Sudan and not in The Hague.

They have good reason to fear that Bashir will name them as culprits in the alleged atrocities meted out during the Darfur war.

Gen Burhan and his fellow officers have even more reason to fear that investigation into the massacre in Khartoum in June 2019 would also point the finger of blame in their direction.

It took place two months after Bashir's removal by the army, when peaceful protesters were calling for civilian rule.

Tackling corruption and implementing security sector reform were other agenda items that worried the generals.

Take the cumbersomely named "Commission for Dismantling the June 30 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds."

This was not only exposing and uprooting the network of companies owned by the Islamists forced out of power in 2019, but also the tentacles of the commercial empires owned by senior generals.

Mr Hamdok had become increasingly outspoken in his criticism of the military entanglement in the economy.

Not only was the army commanding a vast - and still-increasing - share of the national budget, but military-owned companies operate with tax exemptions and often allegedly corrupt contracting procedures.

Placing the army under proper civilian control was also a priority for the next stage of the transitional period.

Risk of rebel action

Gen Burhan is claiming he is keeping the transition to democracy on track - and has promised a technocratic civilian government and elections in two years.

Most Sudanese see this as an unconvincing façade.

The crackdown has dissolved the key trade unions and professional groups that organised the previous street protests. Internet and social media are largely shut down. Troops have fired on protesters, reportedly killing 10.

VIDEO: Media Caption, Demonstrators take to the streets of Khartoum to protest against the arrests

Street activists have overcome such clampdowns before and forced the army to back down, most notably in the aftermath of the June 2019 killings.

The generals must also face the reality that the civil war in parts of the country is not over.

A peace agreement last year brought several armed opposition groups into government - but no deal was yet reached with the biggest two rebel forces.

IMAGE: Source, AFP. Caption, Gen Burhan (L) and civilian PM Hamdok (R) were part of a power-sharing administration

In Darfur there is the Sudan Liberation Movement headed by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, and in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan there is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.

Both command popular support and have shown military resilience. Both were in peace talks with the government and had confidence in Mr Hamdok. The coup threatens renewed conflict.

With his unconstitutional seizure of power, Gen Burhan has taken a huge gamble.

He is offering no answers to Sudan's most pressing issues - the economy, democratisation and peace - and is risking turmoil and bloodshed at home and pariah status abroad.

In July 2019, following the army's violent crackdown on the democracy movement, the "quartet" of the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, working hand-in-glove with the AU, stepped in to press for a negotiated solution - which followed the next month.

A similar process may be needed to bring Sudan back from the brink. The problem is, after Monday, who can trust Gen Burhan to keep his word?

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

More on the Sudan coup:

• IN PICTURES: Sudan coup protesters take to streets
• EXPLAINER: Sudan coup: What you need to know
• ANALYSIS: Sounding the alarm for Sudan’s democracy

Related Topics

Sudan crisis

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan

Sudan

More on this story

A quick guide to Sudan

Published 9 September 2019

Around the BBC

Africa Today podcasts

Source - BBC NEWS, view original at:  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59050473

Sudan's PM Hamdok, detained after coup, is home

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor:  Although I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the following report, I am posting it here because it provides some details about Sudan's Prime Minister Hamdok and his wife. Sadly, I have not found any reliable news about Mr Hamdok's cabinet colleagues, their current whereabouts and how they are being treated. I am reluctant to post this report here today but am confident that Mr Hamdok and his wife have been released safely. Reportedly, they were abducted and detained at the home of Sudan's coup leader Gen. Burhan. More on this at a later date.   

Photo, Sudan's head of the military Gen Abdel-Fattah Burhan speaks during a press conference at the General Command of the Armed Forces in Khartoum, Sudan, Tuesday, Oct 26, 2021. (AP Photo/Marwan Ali)

Sudan’s prime minister, detained after coup, returns home

Report at Fox17 dot com 

Written by SAMY MAGDY, Associated Press (AP) 

Published Wednesday 27 October 2021 

Sudan's deposed prime minister and his wife were allowed to return home Tuesday, a day after they were detained when the military seized power in a coup, according to a statement issued by his office.

The release of Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and his wife followed international condemnation of the coup and calls for the military to release all the government officials who were detained when Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan seized power on Monday.

The statement by Hamdok's office said other government officials remained in detention, their locations unknown. The deposed prime minister and his wife were under "heavy security" at home in the upscale Kafouri neighborhood of the capital Khartoum, said a military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media. The official did not say whether they were free to leave or make calls.

Earlier in the day, Burhan said Hamdok had been held for his own safety and would be released. But he warned that other members of the dissolved government could face trial as protests against the putsch continued in the streets.

View full report plus 14 photos here:  https://fox17.com/news/nation-world/sudans-prime-minister-detained-after-coup-returns-home

Sudan: Militia strike gold to cast a shadow over Sudan's hopes of prosperity

Supported by wealthy foreign backers, a feared paramilitary outfit controls Sudan’s most lucrative industry, complicating the country’s path to democracy. Read more:

Militia strike gold to cast a shadow over Sudan's hopes of prosperity

Analysis from The Guardian UK

Written by Ruth Michaelson (funded in part by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation)

Dated 10 February 2020, 07.00 GMT

Photo: Sudanese Rapid Support Forces display gold bars seized from a plane that landed at Khartoum airport as part of an investigation into possible smuggling. Photograph: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters

Ornate, heavy necklaces gleam on stands above stacks of thick filigree bangles in the windows of Khartoum’s gold market. The gold is Sudanese, dug from the rich mines that span the country.

Shop owner Bashir Abdulay hands over a palm-sized lump of pure gold with two small bore holes as he explains how the prized metal goes from mine deposit, through middlemen, to Khartoum.

Abdulay describes the Jebel Amer gold mine in Darfur [ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-darfur-gold/special-report-the-darfur-conflicts-deadly-gold-rush-idUSBRE99707G20131008 ], one of several controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group whose leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/29/hemedti-the-feared-commander-pulling-the-strings-in-sudan ] is now a central figure in Sudan’s transition to democracy.

“There are many people working there, some work on their own, others for the RSF. Everyone has his place, and the RSF have theirs,” he says, the metal twinkling in the bright shop lights. “The RSF have a big place producing gold, and selling it on their own.”

The RSF seized control of the Jebel Amer gold mine in Darfur in 2017, immediately making Dagalo, known as Hemedti, one of Sudan’s richest men. The RSF and Hemedti also control at least three other goldmines in other parts of the country, such as South Kordofan, making them a key player in an industry that produces Sudan’s largest export [ https://oec.world/en/profile/country/sdn/ ].

After the 2019 uprising that overthrew [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/sudan-army-ousts-bashir-after-30-years-in-power ] former dictator Omar al-Bashir, Hemedti became part of the transitional military council and the sovereignty council designed to shepherd Sudan to democracy before elections are held in 2022.

Despite tentative government efforts to wrestle parts of the gold industry away from Sudan’s security services and back under state or private control, questions remain about whether Sudan [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/sudan ] can truly transition to democracy while the politically powerful RSF run a parallel economy all of their own.

To buy gold from the RSF, where do you go? Abdulay answers without hesitation: “Al Gunade have an office upstairs on the second floor,” he said, gesturing at the ceiling, unapologetically connecting the two organisations.

Al Gunade is a mining and trading corporation with deep ties to Hemedti and the RSF. Hemedti’s brother Abdul Rahim Dagalo and his sons are the three owners of Al Gunade, while reported RSF deputy Abdul Rahman al-Bakri is the general manager.

According to one of the documents [ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6469821-Al-G.html#document/p1/a530944 ] obtained by the anti-corruption NGO Global Witness, Hemedti himself sits on the board of directors.

Photo: Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, at a meeting in Khartoum. Photograph: Ümit Bektaş/Reuters

After reviewing evidence of the activities of Al Gunade and the RSF, Global Witness concluded [ https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/exposing-rsfs-secret-financial-network/ ] that “the RSF and a connected company have captured a swathe of the country’s gold industry and are likely using it to fund their operations”.

The organisation obtained bank data and corporate documents that, they say, show the RSF maintains a bank account in their name at the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (now part of the First Abu Dhabi Bank) in the United Arab Emirates, providing “evidence of the financial autonomy of the RSF”.

The UAE is by far the largest importer of Sudanese gold in the world. Global trade data from 2018 shows it imported [ https://trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx?nvpm=1%7c729%7c%7c%7c%7c7108%7c%7c%7c4%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1 ] 99.2% of the country’s gold exports. The Gulf nation has also subcontracted RSF militiamen to fight in Yemen [ https://apnews.com/d5705f44afea4f0b91ec14bbadefae62 ] and Libya [ https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/1-000-sudanese-militiamen-arrive-in-libya ], providing funds to the RSF.

The relationship between Sudan’s gold, wealthy foreign backers and the RSF militia is concerning observers. Global Witness believes the RSF is “an organisation whose military power and financial independence poses a threat to a peaceful democratic transition in Sudan”.

A former camel-trader, Hemedti gained his nickname from the words “my protector”. Before taking part in the coup that toppled him, he was the right-hand man of former dictator Bashir. Hemedti’s RSF grew out of the infamous Janjaweed militia active in Darfur, described as “men with no mercy” and accused of war crimes in a 2015 Human Rights Watch report [ https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan ].

HRW found that during the RSF’s campaign in Darfur, the militia were responsible for “egregious abuses against civilians … torture, extrajudicial killings and mass rapes”, as well as “the forced displacement of entire communities; the destruction of wells, food stores and other infrastructure necessary for sustaining life in a harsh desert environment”.

Last June, the RSF were accused of attacking peaceful protesters [ https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/17/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum ] to disperse a sit-in in Khartoum calling for a handover to civilian rule. Protestors and observers said [ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-remove-rapid-support-forces-from-khartoum-streets-immediately/ ] the RSF brought the violent methods deployed in Blue Nile, South Kordofan and Darfur to the capital, shooting, stabbing, burning or crushing the skulls of at least 104 civilians, dumping bodies in the Nile, and raping at least 70 men and women.

Photo: Members of the Rapid Support Forces secure a site in Khartoum. Photograph: Ümit Bektaş/Reuters

The RSF have consistently denied their involvement. An investigation is ongoing.

“Hemedti himself, he understands the process of transition personally,” says Montaser Ibrahim, a former human rights defender who works with the RSF as an “unofficial consultant” on human rights. “This is one of the reasons that led me to deal with him.”

His new role has led to criticism from some in human rights activism, but Ibrahim sees the RSF as champions of minority rights, and Hemedti as a challenge against political elites.

“Hemedti is a revolutionary,” he says. He dismisses any notion of the RSF’s involvement in violence against protesters, branding accusations of war crimes against Hemedti and the Janjaweed as “propaganda”.

Both of Al Gunade’s two offices above Khartoum’s gold market are accessed via a dank staircase where bare wires jostle for space on the filthy walls.

Behind the tinted windows of Gunade’s offices, a kilogram gold bar sat on a lacquered wooden desk among office stationary, an ostentatious paperweight that may be the real thing. A man who repeatedly refused to give his name referred all questions about Al Gunade to the central bank, opening the office door to indicate that no further discussion would be accepted.

Sudanese authorities have begun attempts to overhaul the gold trade, dissolving mining companies involved with the former regime’s security services. Sudan now allows private traders to export gold [ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-gold/sudan-opens-up-gold-market-in-bid-to-raise-revenue-idUSKBN1Z81M2 ] provided 30% of deposits remain in the central bank.

An official from Sudan’s mining ministry, who cannot be named as they are not permitted to brief the media, said extra checks are made to screen out companies associated with the previous regime. The official said that the people behind a company mattered less than whether or not it followed the rules. 

“Now even if the head of the transitional military council came himself, he has to go with the regulations,” the official said.

Photo: Goldmine workers wait to get their raw gold weighed at a shop in the town of al-Fahir in North Darfur. Photograph: Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters

Mohammed Tabidi, a Khartoum gold trader, says the new gold trading laws are a world away from those under the previous government that forced traders to buy gold from Sudan’s security services, or face arrest. “It’s a free market now,” he says.

He is hopeful about the possibilities of free trade amid a powerful black market and spiralling inflation that make daily life a struggle for many. Around the corner from the glistening mall where Tabidi works, men perch on bonnets in a car park, flicking fat wads of Sudanese pounds to signal their trade to drivers passing through. The official rate of 25 Sudanese pounds to the dollar is obsolete compared with the black market rate of 75, maybe even 80.

Tabidi says that while gold companies associated with other security services were rendered obsolete by the overhaul, Al Gunade remained.

“There is no company similar to Al Gunade [now],” he says. “There is nothing else like it.” The law is in flux, he says, and it is up to the authorities whether Al Gunade will continue.

“If export opens for traders, maybe Al Gunade won’t work,” he says. “But if they get a deal with the ministry of finance, they can.”

“Hemedti now is vice-president,” he said. “There are some things I can’t talk about.”

The RSF said [ https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/global-witness-response-to-news-that-head-of-sudans-rapid-support-forces-preparing-to-hand-over-gold-mining-areas-to-hamdouk-government/ ] in December that they would hand control of Jebel Amer to the government. Who will reap the profits remains very much in question, given the lack of transparency in Sudan’s gold industry and the difficulties in controlling a supply chain plagued by smuggling and remote sites controlled by militias. There are also few safeguards in place to prevent the RSF and Al Gunade operating illegally.

Richard Kent of Global Witness is critical of the RSF’s claim: “We welcome the development because it is potentially very beneficial to the Sudanese people and gold industry, but it’s still unclear exactly what this means,” he says. “Does this mean giving up the Al Gunade concession, reinstating some kind of civil or traditional administration – and if so how would that work, would it be independently appointed by the civilian government?”

Political transition offers the tools needed to transform Sudan’s most lucrative industry, cleaning up ministries and the supply chain. But there is a long road ahead before the Sudanese gold industry reaches the standards set by international observer bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

“There needs to be a level of transparency in the process,” Kent says. “The RSF and to a lesser extent other security agencies haven’t demonstrated [that] in other areas of their business until now. The reality is, there are still a lot of individuals associated with the intelligence agencies riddled throughout the industry and ministries. As long as general intelligence service and the RSF still have a hold over natural resources and over governing institutions, it’s very hard to see how the gold industry would be able to implement the internationally accepted standards it needs to improve and attract investment.”

Sipping tea outside a French cultural centre where he is taking classes, the RSF’s consultant Ibrahim, an avid reader of Paulo Coelho, says: “The RSF looks like a rebel force. But we need to use them to change the political situation in Sudan.”

Ibrahim’s role illustrates the RSF’s hints of reform and change. While Ibrahim is very concerned about being misunderstood, he declines to say whether he is paid, what the job actually entails or whether he believes there are receptive RSF ears for his talk of human rights.

“Hemedti believes in the revolution – I know you might be shocked by this,” he says.

Ibrahim maintained that the only way forward for Sudan’s transition is for cooperation between civil society and the security sector. He believes he is part of the solution, not the problem. “The security sector in Sudan can’t be cut from the political process,” he says. “This doesn’t contradict the idea of democracy.”

Formerly a “a political adviser” to the Sudan Liberation Army, Darfur-based militants, Ibrahim says he became a prisoners’ rights campaigner during Bashir’s regime and his latest role is the apex of a long journey in Sudanese politics. He has created an organisation within the RSF intended to provide training “for NGOs and civil society”. But not the RSF themselves? “No,” he answers dismissively.

Members of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), an umbrella trade union association that spearheaded the mass protests leading to Bashir’s overthrow, are confident that Sudan’s path towards democracy isn’t threatened by the RSF or their economic interests, says their spokesman Dr Mohanad Hamid.

“Hemedti is dangerous not because he’s one of the richest men in Sudan, but because he has an army, a militia in pure terms that’s independent from the Sudanese army – this is the issue,” he says. “Of course the economy is one of the main concerns, [but] peace is also one of the main concerns.”

Photo: Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, centre, waves a baton as he arrives for a rally in the village of Abraq, about 60km north-west of Khartoum. Photograph: Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images

Hamid is confident that Hemedti and the RSF’s wealth won’t present a problem, provided their businesses are eventually brought under state control. “It’s all of four months since the beginning of the transitional period – this process is years,” he says. “If we get all the money back into the ministry of finance at the end of the three years it will be great, but we’re still waiting.”

Other SPA representatives, like Dr Batoul Altayeb, are unfazed by the RSF.

After protesters staged a mass demonstration [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/13/sudanese-protesters-demand-justice-after-mass-killings ] against the RSF and the military following the Khartoum massacre, the SPA believe people power can contain the force of the RSF.

“We did it before and we will do it again,” says Altayeb calmly. “[The sovereign council] includes the RSF because they know that peace is the key before the economy. Democracy is on the way – it’s a process, not just an outcome.”

This article was corrected on 10 February 2020 to clarify the ownership structure of Al Gunade. This article was amended on 11 February 2020 to add additional comments from the Sudanese Professionals Association. About this content This website [above] is funded by support provided, in part, by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The journalism and other content is editorially independent and its purpose is to focus on global development.

View Original: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2010/sep/14/about-this-site