Sudanese GONU pledges to implement AUPD Report - Mbeki met with Turabi and Mahdi

From SRS - Sudan Radio Service, Monday, 14 December 2009:
GONU Pledges to Implement AU Panel Report

(Khartoum) – The Government of National Unity has repeated its willingness to implement the report of the African Union Panel on Darfur headed by Thabo Mbeki.

Presidential advisor Dr. Ghazi Al-Atabani spoke to journalists in Khartoum on Sunday following his meeting with Mbeki.

[Dr. Ghazi Al-Atabani]: “We have affirmed our readiness to cooperate with the AU panel. We can achieve peace within the time allowed for us because elections will be conducted next April and that will bring in a new government. However, time is limited and so we agreed that we need to move quickly to achieve peace in Darfur. Finally, we agreed that we will consult with them on the procedure to adopt for implementing the report. There are some initial and "non-final" ideas embodied in the report. We have agreed that those ideas need to be explored in greater detail. We have also agreed to hold joint consultations on how to implement them but we do not call these reservations.”

The chairman of the AU panel, Thabo Mbeki, met several northern Sudanese political leaders during his last visit, including the secretary-general of the Popular Congress Party, Dr. Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi and the chairman of the Umma National Party, Saddiq al-Mahdi.

2010 will be the most crucial year in recent Sudan’s history - SID Forum on Conflict: Launch of Sudan Observatory

From Society for International Development (SID)
By Irene Panozzo, November 3, 2009
SID Forum on Conflict: Launch of Sudan Observatory

2010 will be the most crucial year in recent Sudan’s history. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 in Nairobi between president Omar al-Bashir’s government and the then southern rebels of the Sudan’s people liberation movement/army (SPLM/A) is approaching its final and most decisive tests: parliamentary and presidential elections, the first multi-party consultation in 24 years, scheduled for next April and, in January 2011, a referendum through which southerners will decide whether to remain part of the largest African country or to secede, giving birth to an independent South Sudan. More than one year in advance, southerners are widely thought to favour separation. In an unprecedented move, on October 31 Salva Kiir, SPLM chairperson and president of the autonomous South Sudan, has clearly linked the vote for independence to a first class citizenship status in a new country for southerners.

Whichever the South’s choice will be, Sudan’s future appears gloomy. The outcomes of different scenarios exercise by Clingendael Institute and the United States Institute for Peace (Usip) go in the same direction: war might erupt again. Even the best case scenario by Clingendael, ‘CPA Hurray!’, doesn’t exclude conflict, though small-scale and localized. The worst case scenarios by both institutes clearly speak of a renewed large-scale war between North and South Sudan, paralleled by North-North and South-South conflicts and a total collapse of the Cpa. Should this future become reality in 2011 and afterwards, the consequences would be felt well beyond Sudan’s borders, with probable dangerous spill-overs in some East African countries, mainly Uganda and Kenya, and in the Greater Horn of Africa region. Moreover, a new North-South war would certainly have repercussions on Darfur, making a quick solution to that crisis even harder and less probable.

Avoiding a new Sudan’s war is thus clearly the main single challenge the country and its leaderships, both in the North and in the South, must face and possibly win. There is little time left for it: elections will be held in less than six months and there is still a large number of unsettled and potetially disrupting issues blocking the process. North-South borders have not been demarcated yet and the two partners in the government of national unity (GNU), president Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, have an ongoing dispute over the use of last year census results, on which part of the electoral process is based.

However, the most urgent issue to solve is the reform or promulgation of a bunch of laws, provided for in the CPA. At the end of November the last pre-electoral parliamentary session will end. The National Assembly has then the next few weeks only to discuss and vote outstanding bills such as the ones reforming the national security and intelligence services and setting the rules for the 2011 southern referendum. While on the latter the two peace partners are still working for a compromise, few weeks ago the NCP tabled a National security forces draft law which would allow the intelligence services to retain powers of arrest and search, a provision the SPLM and opposition parties say would violate the interim constitution. Therefore, on October 19 the SPLM bloc decided to boycott parliamentary activities until the NCP presents a clear timetable to speed up discussions on the remaining bills, so as to have them approved within the end of November. Failing that, the former southern rebels and some opposition parties have already said they will boycott April general elections.

Preserving the CPA and fostering its full implementation could also help address the Darfur crisis, looking at it through a national lens. Significantly, the new US Sudan policy, formally announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on October 19, gives new emphasis to the troubled relationship between North and South for its importance in itself and as a means to approach Darfur problem for what it is: another (unfortunately not the first, hopefully the last) Sudan’s war. The African Union high level panel on Darfur (AUPD), headed by former South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki, has come to a similar conclusion: in their final report, adopted by the AU Peace and Security Council on October 29, the AUPD members underlined that “Darfur is an integral part of Sudan” and Sudanese people should be enabled “to approach the next important phase of their history as one nation”. Therefore, the AUPD concluded, “there is an urgent need to secure a definitive peace settlement for Darfur before the 2010 general elections”. Time is running dramatically short.

About Irene

Irene Panozzo (Dr.) is researcher and journalist, expert of Sudanese history and politics. Irene’s research work has been focusing on Sudan for more than ten years, with a particular focus on North-South relationship. Her research interests also include the Chinese presence in Africa and the international relations of African countries. Irene holds a bachelor’s in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste and a PhD in History, Institutions and International Relations of Extra European Countries from the University of Pisa.

Get in touch with Irene via Email.

AU's Peace and Security Council on fact-finding mission to Sudan

Untitled report by Sudan Radio Service, November 23, 2009:

(Khartoum) - The African Union Peace and Security Council began a fact-finding mission to Sudan on Monday to learn more about the current situation in country.

Sudan Radio Service spoke to the UNAMID spokesman, Noureddine Mezni, on Monday. He explained the purpose of the visit.

[Noureddine Mezni]: “The African Union Peace and Security Council started a field visit to Sudan on Monday, and this is the first time that the council, which comprises 15 member countries, has organized a field visit out of its headquarters in Addis Ababa.

The aim of the visit is to directly witness the issues on the ground in Sudan and the latest developments; because the council gives a high importance to the situation in Sudan. Beside the visit to Khartoum, the delegation will also visit Darfur, specifically El-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, to meet with the leadership of UNAMID, and the local authorities. After El-Fashir, the delegation will visit Juba, before returning to its headquarters in Addis Ababa.”

Noureddine Mezni was speaking to Sudan Radio Service from Khartoum on Monday.

AU's Peace and Security Council will not discuss AUPD report during visit to Sudan

Report by Sudan Radio Service, November 23, 2009:

(Khartoum) - The Government of National Unity says that the AU’s Peace and Security Council will not to discuss the AU panel report on Darfur during its visit to Sudan.

Last month, the AUPSC held a meeting in Abuja to launch the AU panel report, which recommends the formation of hybrid courts in Darfur in a bid to achieve justice and reconciliation in the region.

The advisor to the Minister of Information in GONU, Dr. Rabie Abdulaati, told Sudan Radio Service on Monday that the AUPSC has no mandate to discuss the details of the AU panel report.

[Dr. Rabie Abdulaati]: “When Thabo Mbeki’s report was launched by the AUPSC last month, committees that were formed to implement the report, taking into consideration the comments of the Sudanese government. So I don’t think that this council is going to discuss this report now because it already discussed it earlier. And I don’t think it is the mandate of the AUPSC to discuss these details, because they have already referred this issue to the concerned bodies in the council.”

Dr. Rabie Abdulaati was speaking to Sudan Radio Service on Monday from Khartoum.

- - -

AU is calling for implementation of recommendations of AUPD report

Report by Sudan Radio Service, November 24, 2009:

(Khartoum) - The African Union says it is calling for the implementation of the recommendations of the Mbeki report on the Darfur conflict.

Joseph Nsenjemana, Rwandan’s Ambassador to the AU, who is currently chairing the Peace and Security Council, told a press conference on Monday in Khartoum that the main purpose of visiting Sudan was to push for the implementation of the report.

[Joseph Nsenjemana]: “The peace and security council has taken the next step to see for themselves what is happening on the ground. I think we are conscious that it is a process. The recommendation is a good thing and the implementation is another one. It is the reason why we wanted to see the situation on the ground and to push it forward where necessary.”

Ambassador Nsenjemana will be visiting IDP camps in North Darfur on Tuesday and Wednesday.

AU Panel Darfur Report in Arabic

Click here to view AUPD report in Arabic.

Hat tip: Alex de Waal - 3 Nov 2009.

Reflections on the AU PSC Summit - ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Alex de Waal)

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur
Reflections on the AU PSC Summit
By Alex de Waal, Tuesday, November 3rd, 2009

The slogan ‘African solutions to African problems’ has become hackneyed and discredited. One reason why it is not taken seriously is that there has been little African analysis of African problems, because African institutions have borrowed their definitions and methodologies from elsewhere. The agenda has usually been set by non-African governments, multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have appropriated for themselves the right to speak for Africans—reducing the African voice to the pronouncements of governments, which are usually disregarded for good reason.

The special meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, at heads of state level, in Abuja, Nigeria, on 28 October, to consider the AUPD report was a departure in several ways. It showed Africa, and the African Union, at its strongest, and gives reason for optimism about the implementation of the recommendations of the report.

In presenting the report, the Panel Chairman Thabo Mbeki, and the Chairperson of the AU Commission Jean Ping, stressed how much Africa cares for Sudan—for Sudan’s sake and for Africa’s sake. They were less interested in pointing the finger and asserting principles for their own sake, and more concerned about helping Sudan look forward rather than getting entangled in its past.

The report is tough on the Sudan government, not only for its misconduct of the war and the need to be called to account for violations, but also for the structural political inequalities it has sustained. Despite this harshness, the Sudan government was ready to listen and accept, more than one would have anticipated. Disarmed by the frank, caring and constructive approach, the Sudan government could not question the Panel’s motives. President Mbeki framed his structural critique as a challenge to the Sudan Government to take a lead in transforming Sudan. The armed movements were not present in Abuja, but they should be assessing the Panel’s work politically, and seeing how it can best be leveraged to their political advantage.

The members of the AU Panel were present in Abuja, but not the advisers such as myself. According to what I learned, two main issues were raised in the closed session of the meeting.

One concerned the Panel’s methodology. The heads of state were interested in the process utilized and wanted it explained. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi took a lead in asking questions about how the Panel had arrived at its conclusions. Arising from his questions, and President Mbeki’s answers, was a broader implication that the Panel had pioneered a bold new approach to analyzing African problems, allowing Africa to take the lead in addressing Sudan’s political crisis. Much of the PSC AUPD’s method started with a simple, disarming and commonsense approach—to listen to the people of Darfur from all walks of life and allow them to define the problem.

The method of participatory listening and formulating recommendations on that basis was validated by the PSC. The heads of state present in Abuja were told that listening to people at the grassroots, led the panel in the direction of comprehensive, moderate, and workable measures, that ordinary people were reasonable in articulating what constitutes a just solution to Darfur’s problem, and that listening to them gave an opportunity to capture the society’s disposition towards a solution. They heard that forty days of consultations and hearings with more than 3,000 people was a worthwhile investment. Prime Minister Meles noted, ‘there is now an African position based on a real investigation.’ He went on to say, ‘This sets a new standard that the AU will have to uphold.’

The second topic for discussion was a broader issue of how the Panel managed to define the central issues in Darfur, what they meant for Africa, and how Africa should respond. Discussing the report was invigorating for African leaders who have become accustomed to being on the receiving end of analysis and recommendations, chasing problems that have been defined by others. They had been reduced to tacticians, dealing solely with damage management. In Abuja they had the opportunity to think strategically, and they responded. Implicit in the points made was that the failure to provide an African analysis of African problems was the root cause of the failure of Africa to pursue its own solutions to those problems.

The discussion around the AUPD report shows the strengths of Africa’s leaders. It demonstrates how Africa’s comparative advantage is to think politically concerning political crises such as Darfur. Africa contributes human resources to peacekeeping operations but has great difficulties in providing any further peacekeeping infrastructure. But recent experience suggests that the burden of sustaining large peacekeeping operations may be sustained at the expense of an erosion of political thinking. Africa, unencumbered by these obligations, and not deeply engaged in humanitarian operations, is able to think in more creative political terms. If the analysis is right, African leaders may be prepared to act boldly and strategically.

Some other points from the PSC meeting deserve mention.

Chadian President Idriss Déby was present at the meeting and reportedly said that the report was positive. He found its analysis educative, and noted that it coincided with his own observations, though he criticized the assertion that arms were coming to Darfur from Chad, rather than vice versa. Other heads of state who were present and commented positively included President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, and President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya. Compaoré noted that the Panel’s analysis was relevant to west African countries (including his own) that face conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. Kibaki’s concern was with the CPA.

There was almost no discussion of the ICC in the summit and nothing significant was said on the hybrid court. One member state raised ICC in the context of making the point that, if the Sudan government implements the recommendations, then the proposal to defer the ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir will be compelling. This issue was not pursued, although the PSC resolution reiterates the July 2008 request that the UN Security Council defer the ICC prosecution of President Bashir. The reason for this being included is that the PSC has not revisited its earlier decision. The underlying reason is that the PSC remains frustrated by the way its request was spurned by the UNSC—it is a reminder to the UN that it should not take the AU for granted.

The PSC established a High-Level Implementation Panel with a one year mandate, comprising the three former presidents. This will oversee the implementation of the Panel’s recommendations. The African leaders all spoke about the imperative of implementation. As has been repeated many times, the problem of Sudan is a problem of too many agreements not implemented. The PSC made a commitment to seriousness in implementation, which is encouraging.

The renewed Panel will also attend to the implementation of the CPA. This is a significant step. The AU has not yet taken any position on the questions that arise from the prospect of self-determination in southern Sudan, other than pro forma support for the CPA. Based on the model of the AUPD, we can expect the new Panel to undertake systematic political analysis of the future of Sudan, whether as one country or two, and consult the people on the questions that arise.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the PSC meeting is the potential for African leadership in defining and pursuing political solutions for crises in Africa. This could be a new page. If the internationals are serious about viable solutions to Sudanese crises, they should find appropriate ways to support this approach.

Click on labels here below for related reports and updates.

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration welcomes AUPD report and applauds African Union

Copy of email just in from US Department of State dated Mon, 02 Nov 2009 08:28:17 -0600 entitled "Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation"

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Abuja, Nigeria
October 29, 2009

Today marks the release of the much-anticipated report by the African Union’s (AU) High Level Panel on Darfur. The Panel, led by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, was convened earlier this year to examine the situation in Darfur and to come up with recommendations to address issues of accountability, combating impunity, and bringing about healing and reconciliation for the people of Darfur. I am attending a special session of AU Peace and Security Council in Abuja, Nigeria, where a number of African heads of state are reviewing the Panel’s findings.

We welcome the release of this report and applaud the efforts of the AU, President Mbeki, and his panel of experts. We will study the Panel’s results and recommendations closely. It is critical that we begin laying the groundwork for peace, justice, and reconciliation in Sudan. As articulated in the United States policy on Sudan, accountability for the genocide and atrocities in Darfur is fundamental and necessary for reconciliation and lasting peace. As such, we will continue to work with the AU, Darfuri armed movements, Darfuri civil society, the Government of Sudan, and the international community to address these critical issues and to bring peace, justice, and reconciliation to Sudan. We will also continue to be supportive of finding a way forward that is deemed credible and unbiased by the standards of international justice and that enjoys the confidence of the people of Darfur.

Thank you for your continued interest, Scott. [end of email]

Mbeki: 'The Sudanese crisis in Darfur' - Reading the AU Panel Report (Alex de Waal)

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur
Reading the AU Panel Report
By Alex de Waal, Friday, October 30, 2009:

The report of African Union High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) has injected a new dynamic into Sudanese political life. President Thabo Mbeki has confounded those who had forgotten that he was the architect of the negotiated dismantling of Apartheid, and short-sightedly misperceived him as a member of the club of African status quo statists. In his opening presentation to the AUPD seven months ago, Mbeki mentioned just one Sudanese by name: John Garang. Recalling that, the substance of the Panel’s report should come as less of a surprise.

The AUPD report moves Sudanese politics ahead in two major respects. First, it shifts the centre of political attention away from responding to immediate human rights violations and humanitarian concerns, to addressing the underlying political malaise in Sudan, that gives rise to such violations. Second, it puts the Sudanese people back at the centre of the process. The report does not contain any blueprint for peace, and correctly so, though it does make a number of proposals for discussion by the Sudanese parties. It is essentially a call for a political process—and in fact the Panel has already set such a process in motion. The challenge is to sustain and accelerate that process.

In his introduction to the Report, President Mbeki writes of ‘the Sudanese crisis in Darfur.’ This is a careful phrasing that represents a deliberate shift in focus from considering the Darfur crisis in isolation, to seeing it as a manifestation of Sudan’s historic problem of inequity. At independence in 1956, the Sudanese nation inherited a gross disparity from its two colonial episodes. The riverain elite has dominated Sudanese political and economic life since independence, and its dominance has sparked recurrent rebellions in the peripheries—notably south Sudan and Darfur.

In specifying the Darfur crisis as a symptom of national minority rule, Mbeki has taken a step beyond all previous international inquiries. Some of these have either focused on the human rights and humanitarian dimensions of the Darfur crisis—the outcome of the political crisis, not its cause. Other international approaches have zeroed in on the need for a Darfur peace, plus solutions to the problems in the three areas and a legitimate referendum in the south. On this blog, this has been criticized as a strategy of liberating the country one Bantustan at a time.

The AU Panel attempts to go straight to the centre of gravity of Sudan’s crisis, as it is manifest in Darfur. It identifies this as a historically-rooted crisis of inequality in governance and development which needs an inclusive Global Political Agreement, in which all stakeholders come to a common commitment on peace, justice, reconciliation, and Darfur’s place in the Sudanese nation, as an integrated whole.

The three pillars of peace, justice and reconciliation make no sense when considered separately. They are meaningful only when part of an overall package, agreed to by all stakeholders, to resolve the root causes of the conflict. Also, they are only meaningful in the light of Darfur’s integration into Sudan’s national political process of democratization and the debate on unity or the separation of the south.

When Mbeki took on the Chairmanship of the AUPD in March, his critics were quick to allege that was seeking an escape route for President Omar al Bashir from the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant. The ICC was indeed the spark for the AU to set up the Panel—to be precise, it was the AU Peace and Security Council’s spurned request to the UN Security Council to consider a deferral of the prosecution that angered the AU. Some wrote off the Panel in advance on these grounds, and even refused to engage with it, arguing that they knew the outcome in advance. Most press attention focuses on how the Panel deals with the ICC, and especially its proposal for a special chamber within the Sudanese judiciary staffed by international jurists to try those alleged to have committed war crimes in Darfur.

The most important point about the ICC in the Report is not whether the Panel endorses it or not, but the position that the Court has within the overall structure of the Recommendations. The ICC issue does not take pride of place in the AUPD Report. The ICC is given its place, along with consideration of a Hybrid Court and a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, as part of a broad agenda of items to be negotiated in a round table process of hammering out a Global Political Agreement. The Panel neither supports the ICC nor seeks to block it. Rather it puts the ICC in its place as one possible part of comprehensive package—perhaps useful, possibly not, depending on the views of the Sudanese themselves.

Critics have also accused Mbeki of being conservative and statist, defending the status quo in Sudan, as he allegedly did in Zimbabwe. In fact, the approach that Mbeki has taken has far more in common with his strategic role in bringing about the negotiated end of minority rule in his own country. Those seeking to understand Mbeki’s strategy should look back twenty years, not five. The implicit, tough message for the Khartoum Government is: negotiate power sharing now, or face the likelihood that Sudan will soon be fragmented and ungovernable. The message for Africa is that the continent cannot afford an irreparably fractured country at its heart.

Across the Sudanese political scene, the report has challenged the opposition to take seriously its responsibility for seeking constructive political solutions. The days of grandstanding and appealing for outside salvation are numbered. Those who respond positively will make the political running in the years ahead, those who do not risk being sidelined.

The Panel’s report therefore shifts the international debate on Sudan from the politics of condemning atrocities (where the UN Security Council has found itself stuck) to the politics of constructing political solutions. Equally importantly, it brings the Sudanese people back as the principal actors. The task of solving Sudan’s crisis in Darfur is first and foremost a challenge for the Sudanese, next for Africa, and finally for the international community.

Any number of think tanks could have articulated such an argument—indeed there is nothing fundamentally new in making the case that there needs to be an inclusive political solution leading to democratization within an ‘all Sudan’ framework. Where the AU Panel differs is its innovative method. All previous international engagements of this kind on Sudan have operated through expert consultations in high-class hotels, with chiefly symbolic trips to the Darfur’s displaced camps to shake hands and have photographs taken. The commissioners then retire to write their report which descends from on high, full of exhortations about what the Sudanese must do to meet international obligations. The UN Security Council may make solemn pronouncements, but as Khartoum has shown, these have little meaning in their own right.

Not so Mbeki and his Panel. During the last six months, the Panel’s three former Presidents, the Nigerian Abdusalami Abubaker and the Burundian Pierre Buyoya, as well as Mbeki, spent at least three months’ worth of full-time work on the task. Overall, the Panel spent more than forty days in town-hall style meetings in Sudan, mostly in Darfur. This was a grueling exercise, unmatched by any special envoy, mediator, or investigator. These were not ad hoc lectures or informal discussions, but well-prepared consultations in which the Darfurians systematically spoke about their fears and hopes. It provided an important role for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. As a result, every recommendation is grounded in what the people themselves have said.

For example, in long meetings with refugees and displaced persons, tribal leaders, women, civil society activists, and nomads, all these groups insisted that they should be directly represented at future peace talks. They were not content for the armed movements to represent them—all felt that the rebel leaders had been a disappointment. The Panel reflects this unanimous demand with its round table formula for political negotiations. The rebel leaders will be unhappy, and so too some of the diplomats who have run the last rounds of failed peace talks. They have already said that it is an unwieldy and complicated process. Mbeki will have a simple response: this is the people’s demand, and it is less complicated to have an inclusive process than another failed accord.

As the initial four month mandate of the Panel came to a close, Mbeki asked for an extension. He told the AU staff, advisors, and fellow panelists that he intended to make a third mission to Sudan, to discuss the draft recommendations. This was also a new departure. Meeting once again—often for the third time—with the same representatives, the Panel had shown its seriousness, and was rewarded when the Darfurian people recognized their own demands in those recommendations. Having generating this sense of ownership, a political process is now in motion.

Implementing the recommendations for peace, justice and reconciliation is a bigger task. The AU Peace and Security Council has endorsed the Report at a special summit level meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. The recommendations already have the broad support of the Darfurian population. The Sudan Government will protest, but ultimately will be under immense pressure to go along. The armed movements are criticizing some details, but will recognize that Mbeki has articulated their own critique of the imbalance of power and wealth in Sudan. Corralling the international community and re-energizing a moribund peace process are next. President Mbeki has shown strategic vision and stamina thus far. Facilitating the negotiated transformation of Sudan will demand even greater political skill.

Comment posted at “Reading the AU Panel Report”
By Ahmed Hassan: October 30, 2009

Dear Alex,

Since I did not read the report, I have just few questions to help me understand the contents of the proposal correctly:

1) How can we read this initiative together with the CPA as far as the pending issues between the North and the South, which are central to the overall crisis of Sudan, are concerned? Can the two processes go together side by side, or does it mean that we have to postpone the CPA as a partial process until we go through and exhaust the processes that the report seems to advocates.

2) You mentioned that one of the pillars of the report is that it shifts the emphasis and puts Darfur in the Centre. My question is that: are Darfur injustices represent a cause or a result of the problem of the North and why for that reason the Beja area or the Blue Nile could not be the centre of focus?; also by putting Darfur first how is that different from “Liberating the Country, one Bantustan at a time” Isn’t Darfur first, as part of the entire Sudan problem, imply that the Nuba Mountains is second, the Blue Nile is third…etc?

3) The second pillar of the proposal which calls for putting justice, peace and reconciliation as one package to be accepted by all, isn’t that quite challenging or next to impossible? I do not see any major challenges with peace and reconciliation, I do have a major concern about the type of justice and whether it will also cover atrocities by all Sudanese political parties in the past as we discussed in the Kampala Conference of 2000? What are the mechanisms to bring consensus on that? And what incentives could the guilty parts find in this proposal?

Click on labels here below to view related reports and updates.

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration will travel to Turkey, Nigeria & Sudan

Source: US Department of State, October 27, 2009
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration will travel to Turkey, Nigeria & Sudan

U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration will travel to Istanbul, Turkey; Abuja, Nigeria; and Khartoum and Juba, Sudan from October 27 to November 2, 2009.

Special Envoy Gration will travel to Istanbul, Turkey, to attend a meeting of the Elders, an independent group of eminent global leaders brought together by Nelson Mandela. Special Envoy Gration will discuss the current situation in Sudan with the Elders and update them on U.S. efforts to support peace and stability in Darfur and fully implement the CPA. The Elders is comprised of Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi Annan, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando H Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Graca Machel, Mary Robinson, Desmond Tutu, and honorary Elders Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi.

Special Envoy Gration will attend the opening session of the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council in Abuja, Nigeria and will be present for the release of the report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. On the margins of the AU meeting, the Special Envoy will also hold bilateral discussions with several of the African heads of state present in Abuja for the AU Peace and Security Council meeting. Special Envoy Gration will additionally participate in a meeting of the E6, comprising the envoys to Sudan from China, the European Union, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Special Envoy Gration will then travel to Khartoum and Juba, Sudan, where he will continue bilateral discussions with the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on resolving the outstanding issues of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation.

Darfur rebel group JEM rejects AU panel report

Quelle surprise. Darfur rebel group rejects AU panel report

From Reuters by Opheera McDoom (Khartoum) Tue Oct 27, 2009 - excerpts:

The Justice and Equality Movement, the most powerful rebel group in Darfur, said serious crimes committed there should be tried by the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

"The report is not clear in what they are saying about the ICC," said JEM spokesman Ahmed Adam. "Concerning the serious crimes in Darfur, including genocide, the only legal mechanism ... is the ICC. "

The report by a panel of African "wise men", headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, recommended the establishment of a special court, including foreign judges, to try those charged with atrocities in Darfur.

The AU report did not go into the question of Bashir's arrest warrant, saying only that the ICC investigations should be discussed during peace talks on Darfur.

Khartoum is saving its reaction for discussions at an AU meeting in Nigeria on Thursday, attended by Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha.

But a government source told Reuters the initial feeling was one of "cautious welcome but with reservations on some details."

The opposition Umma Party said the panel found a good compromise between international and national justice.

"(The panel) did their best to reach a solution which should be acceptable inside and outside Sudan," Umma Party Vice President Fadlalla Burma Nasir said.

(Additional reporting by Andrew Heavens; editing by Robin Pomeroy)

Two Sudanese lawyers applaud AU Panel Darfur report

From Sudan Radio Service, 26 October 2009:
Two Sudanese Lawyers Applaud AU Initiative

(Khartoum) - The Government of National Unity has described the African Union report which aims to achieve justice and reconciliation in Darfur as “positive.”

The AU panel, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, has recommended the formation of a hybrid court and changes to the Sudanese criminal law to deal with the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

GONU has also expressed it’s satisfaction with the contents of the AU report.

The adviser to the Minister of Information in GONU, Dr. Rabie Abdullaati, spoke to Sudan Radio Service from Khartoum on Monday.

[Rabie Abdullaati]: “The report by the AU panel led by Thabo Mbeki, was seen as having many positive sides whose details I can’t mention now, but the issue is that the report is being studied by the authorized bodies, in order to determine clear stances and clear replies towards what the report has mentioned, regarding the formation of African and international courts to try those who committed crimes in Darfur. So until then, we are saying that we highly appreciate these African efforts and Thabo Mbeki’s committee.”

Sudan Radio Service spoke to two prominent lawyers and experts from Khartoum about the AU panel report.

Salih Mohamoud, a lawyer specializing in international law, said that the report confirms that there are crimes and violations that were committed in Darfur.

[Salih Mahmoud]: “It is a comprehensive report and shows the great efforts that were made. If we speak specifically about the proposed hybrid court, I think this confirms that there were crimes and violations that had been committed in Darfur, and that requires bringing those who are implicated in committing these crimes to justice.”

Nabil Adib, a Khartoum-based lawyer, is in favor of the formation of a hybrid court to deal with crimes in Darfur.

[Nabil Adib]: “I think the report is reasonable and a satisfactory solution. I support the idea of the hybrid court. My opinion, and I have said it before, is that to refer the case to a hybrid court, like the hybrid courts which were formed in Rwanda and in a number of similar cases, is a very good idea. I think this report is reasonable and will satisfy all parties that the process will take place before an independent judiciary.”

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against a number of Sudanese officials for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir.

Click on labels here below to view AU Panel report and related reports.

Security situation in Darfur - Oct 26, 2009

Daily Media Brief from UNAMID, El Fasher (Darfur), western Sudan
October 26, 2009/APO:

Security situation in Darfur

The security situation in Darfur remains relatively calm, but unpredictable.

UNAMID military forces conducted 167 patrols including routine, short range, long range, night, and Humanitarian escort patrols, covering 101 villages and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps during the reporting period.

UNAMID police advisors also conducted 109 patrols in villages and IDP camps.

Security Safety Committee Formed In Duma

On 25 Oct 09, UNAMID Police Team including Sector South Police Commander established a Security Safety Committee in Duma IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) camp, in South Darfur. Members of the committee included, UNAMID Police Adviser, Nomads, IDPs, Local Leaders and GoS security operatives involving both Police and Military officials. The nomads and IDPs discussed security matters including security of IDP women during farming and firewood collection. The Committee decided to meet two times every month on the first and third Sundays.

UNAMID Civil Affairs convenes its monthly meeting with Civil Society Organizations

UNAMID Sector South Civil Affairs Section (CAS) convened its monthly meeting with representatives of the Civil Society in South Darfur State.

One of the issues highlighted during the meeting was the recommendations of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) following the panel’s several visits to Darfur and its meetings with and hearings to different stakeholders to the conflict in Darfur.

The meeting is a monthly forum used by CAS to get updates from the Civil Society Organizations on their activities and issues relating to the peace process in Darfur.

Click on label 'Security Situation in Darfur' to view previous and latest reports.

TEXT: Report of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) - Sudan in 2012: Asking New Questions (Alex de Waal)

Quote of the Day
The ‘New Sudan’ agenda has been undermined, perhaps fatally, by the agenda of southern separatism. -Alex de Waal, 26 October 2009 

Source:  Alex de Waal's analysis dated 26 October 2009 (see copy here below)
- - -

African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD) - Download Full Report
From Sudan Tribune, Monday 26 October 2009:

October 24, 2009 (WASHINGTON) – On Thursday October 29 the African Union Peace and Security Council PSC will meet in Abuja to discuss the report submitted by a panel it established earlier this year to examine the situation in Darfur.



Photo:  Members of the African Union Panel on Darfur at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa October 18, 2009 (AU website)

The report has not been made public yet pending the conclusion of the PSC summit where it is expected to endorse the findings of the comission led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki.

Upon the numerous requests recieved, Sudan Tribune is making the full report available for its readers. -(ST)

Click here to download Full Report and note page 122:

APPENDIX D

EXPERTS

Barnabas Philip Afako, Lawyer
  
Professor Salah Eddine Amer, University of Cairo, Egypt 
 
Aref Mohammed Aref, Lawyer, Bar of Djibouti 
 
Catherine Cisse, Executive Director, International  Institute  for  Historical  Justice  and  Reconciliation, The Hague, Netherlands 
 
Professor Tiyanjana Maluwa, Director, School of International Affairs, 
Pennsylvania State University, US 

Dr. Sydney Mufamadi, former South African Minister for Safety and Security and later Minister for Provincial and Local  Government. Currently, Honorary Professor at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa 

Rakiya Omaar, Human Rights Lawyer, Director, African Rights, 
and also a member of the AUPD 

Professor Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, Head of the Department of 
International Politics at the International Relations Institute of 
Cameroon (IRIC), University of Yaoundé 

Dr. Alex de Waal, Program Director, Social Science Research Council, 
New York, US 

- - -

Making Sense of Darfur - Scenarios for 2011

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur
Sudan in 2012: Asking New Questions
By Alex de Waal, 26 October 2009:

The scenario exercises by Clingendael and USIP are extremely useful, both in the possible futures that they pose, and in the questions they oblige us to ask. The comment and elaboration by John Ashworth, which portrays the CPA as no more than a truce in a war of separation that is, implicitly, generations old, concentrates the mind. Could Sudan go down the disastrous course to a new and bloodier war? Recurrent experience with Sudan’s politics gives us the answer: yes it could.

What do they tell us?

The key message from the scenarios is that avoiding a new war between north and south—with all the repercussions that entails—is the single biggest challenge in Sudan. A secondary message is that even if war is avoided, there will be serious governance challenges in both north and south. ‘Serious governance challenges’ could mean large human rights violations and a breakup of the country.

The scenarios did not focus upon Darfur, but the implications of the outcomes are that Darfur is a relatively lesser issue and solutions should be approached through this national lens, rather than the north-south issue being approached through a Darfur lens.

Another implication is that time is desperately short. There is a great deal of political business to be transacted in the few remaining months of the CPA. In fact, at the current pace of political business in Sudan, only a small amount of what is needed will be completed, a factor which could allow any party to challenge the legitimacy of the outcome. The recent call by leading Sudanese civil society figures and academics to concentrate on the key points of the CPA, makes a lot of sense.

There is a big question over whether elections are a good idea or not. The ‘mid-term’ elections were introduced into the CPA text by the international partners against initial resistance by both NCP and SPLM. The rationale against is that (a) they are a burdensome and complicating factor, and (b) the new GoNU will require a great deal of political negotiation and if the signatories to the CPA are not in a dominant position then the remaining provisions of the CPA are in question. In addition, given that the elections can no longer be considered ‘mid-term’ but are coming close to the end of the interim period, the wisdom of electing a new GoNU just a few months before that government is dissolved by the south voting for secession, is questionable. There is a resource question too: elections are expensive (though far cheaper than either war or peacekeeping).

The rationale in favour is that the government that presides over the exercise in self-determination must be a legitimate (i.e. elected) government that includes the major political stakeholders that were not part of the CPA. The major challenge to the legitimacy of the CPA negotiations at the time was the exclusion of the northern Sudanese political opposition, principally the NDA parties but also the Darfurians, and also to a lesser extent the southern parties other than the SPLM. The experience of the 1970s was that the exclusion of these parties from the Addis Ababa agreement meant that when they later joined the government, the gains of the Addis Ababa peace were reversed. The aim was therefore to achieve the democratization of Sudan and the legitimation of the CPA, through inclusivity, during the interim period itself. As Ashworth stresses, the elections are the key benefit of the CPA for northern Sudanese.

The question of whether Darfur can be included in the elections has since arisen. There are strong arguments on both sides. One particularly persuasive argument repeatedly expressed in Darfur is that if the elections are held and Darfur is not included, then this will be a strong signal to Darfurians that they are not full citizens of Sudan. In the same way that the incomplete elections of 1965, 1968 and 1986 (in which the south was underrepresented due to some constituencies being war zones) helped discredit the elected governments and the growth of separatist sentiment in the south, the selective exclusion of Darfur would be an invitation to Darfurians to demand self-determination or secession. (Especially if southern secession took place under a government without elected Darfurian representation.)

What’s missing?

A scenario exercise is only as good as the information and assumptions that are put in, and the questions that are asked. The four drivers identified in the USIP exercise are sound and useful. I suspect, however, that these drivers underplay the importance of inter- and intra-elite patronage in the working of Sudan’s political system. This is something everyone knows about, but no-one talks about in public. It is a factor that both drives and constrains southern separatist sentiment. It drives secessionism insofar as ‘Jellaba politics’ is a source of resentment: southerners see how northern elite patronage and divide-and-rule tactics keep the south in a subjugated position. It constrains separatism insofar as southerners struggle to construct their own unified political institutions, and consequently there are always opportunities for Khartoum-based patronage networks to expand their reach.

Sudanese political life can be seen an ongoing bargaining process, over both substantive political questions (such as unity or separation, Islamism or secularism, etc.) and also over the material rewards for participation in patronage systems.

Most experience and analysis suggests that there is no realistic prospect of the Sudanese political elites coming to agreement on the question of unity or secession, or on whether there is scope for agreement on the reform of the governance system in favour of a more equitable ‘New Sudan’ model. Moreover, there does not appear to be a means of getting to a consensus. The CPA ‘one country two systems’ compromise is no more than a middle point between the positions held by the main players in north and south. Whatever arguments can be marshaled in support of this position, and however much international support is given to the CPA system as a blueprint for the future, it remains a minority position within Sudan. Rather, the northern parties see the CPA as awarding too much power to the south within a united Sudan, while most southerners see it as merely the waiting room for independence.

On questions of the ‘New Sudan’ the Sudanese political elites have a wide distribution of positions and are open to greater flexibility. But there is no consensus, and nor is there likely to be one in the foreseeable future. The ‘New Sudan’ agenda has been undermined, perhaps fatally, by the agenda of southern separatism.

International influence on any outcome in Sudan is modest. Especially as the likelihood of a major political confrontation or war approaches, the Sudanese parties’ focus is on one another, and the opportunities for international leverage decline. International (especially U.S.) support for the south in a new confrontation may strengthen the south but is unlikely to deter the north, while international support for Khartoum will not swing the positions of the southern nationalists. The diversity of international interests in Sudan, and interpretations of the situation and prospects, also detracts from influence.

In Sudan, bargaining over resources, especially finance, typically produces rapid agreements, though not very durable ones. The patronage system, with its primary centre in Khartoum, has operated as a glue that keeps the country from fragmentation. Almost all of the elites are either already part of this system, to a greater or lesser degree. Within this system, ‘making unity attractive,’ does not entail improving the lot of the ordinary people of the south or making them feel valued citizens—it means paying off the elite. The basic flaw in the Khartoum governance strategy is that it has relied on patronage as the only glue, instead of using it as the basis on which to build a wider political strategy that can build deeper loyalties rather than negotiable elite financial interest.

How will this patronage system (or political marketplace) develop over time? Four drivers are important: (1) the amount of money available to the central system; (2) the ability of the Government of South Sudan to establish a cohesive centre of patronage; (3) the strategy followed by other patrons (e.g. neighbouring states, the international community); and (4) the relationship between elites and their constituencies.

The extent and speed of the unification of any patronage system depends on the amount of money in the system. With a sufficiently high oil price and large amounts of largesse to dispense, the ruling coalition in Khartoum might be able to bring most elites within a single network. Importantly, this would unify today’s rival centres of power within Khartoum, and thereby make the patronage system more efficient, freeing up resources for other uses. With a low oil price and a budget crunch, the existing situation of several different competing centres of patronage will be sustained.

Juba has emerged as a secondary patronage centre in Sudan. The viability of southern efforts to build a state that can challenge the north depend critically on the ability of the Government of South Sudan to establish a coherent patronage system of its own, centralizing its financial management. Up to now, it has not been very effective at this, both because of internal mismanagement and rivalry, and also because the Khartoum patronage networks extend into the southern elite, partly because of the SPLM presence in the national government. Many southerners hope that with independence, the northern system can be shut out and the disarray will reduce or end.

The political marketplace in Sudan, and the greater Nile Valley, has been irreversibly internationalized. We cannot expect a return to the days of a purely domestic set of patronage systems. At present, there are agreements are in place to limit Sudan’s involvement in Chad and vice versa, and to reduce Libyan involvement. Eritrea has also been reduced to a subordinate actor, and the east African governments are relatively inactive. This all makes short-term agreements more likely, for example over Darfur. However, in the event of a war of partition, we would expect many of these governments to re-enter the Sudanese affray.

Lastly, it is possible to bring elites into a compact, and then find that this has overlooked the importance of their constituents. The case of Abyei provides an interesting example: the decision of the Abyei tribunal was more-or-less satisfactory to the political elites, but the NCP had not prepared the Missiriya constituency for accepting the decision, as a result of which it faces a new political dynamic which it has so far not contained. Southern sentiment for separation is such that any of their leaders who sell them short on this, on the basis of an elite bargain in the marketplace, will face a local revolt.

This analysis suggests that the financial arrangements governing oil sector revenues during and after self-determination will be crucial. The location of the oil in the south and the pipeline through the north provides a unique opportunity to leverage an agreement, as both sides need the oil to flow. The financial arrangements could become the driver, not only of the likelihood of conflict, but also of the viability of the GoSS efforts to construct a unified patronage system that is sufficiently independent from Khartoum’s.

What makes Sudanese political life so fascinating, so turbulent, and so hard to predict is that the divisive political issues coexist with the centralizing patronage dynamics.

What could change?

Scenario exercises are highly dependent upon the starting assumptions. What happens when one of the base assumptions changes? There are a number of possibilities.

• The Darfur conflict could be resolved in time for the elections, in such a way that the electoral dynamics are shifted decisively in favour of a ‘New Sudan’ political coalition with the SPLM, especially its northern sector, playing a more prominent political role. It is almost certainly too late to alter the sentiments of the southern electorate. But might the pro-unionist bloc in the SPLM leadership be invigorated and able to explore options such as a ‘sovereign association’ between north and south that would avert the otherwise-likely political demise of the SPLM in the north?

• The financial crisis of the GoSS, with its reverberations through the patronage-governance system, has yet to play itself out. Current scenarios assume that the capacity and legitimacy of the GoSS are on an upward trend. This may not be the case.

• The fact of a southern decision in favour of secession, and the way in which that decision is made, will have far-reaching impacts and create unanticipated new scenarios, including new questions. It is possible that if some major political issues, including the financial interests of the south (and especially southern elites) in the north, are settled in advance of a decision, then that decision will pass off without significant conflict—and indeed without any major disturbances to existing relationships. On the other hand, the strategies of the two parties for managing the decision, and in particular their respective internal governance challenges in the wake of the decision, will be critical. The immediate aftermath of the referendum will be a volatile period and it will not be possible to anticipate all the issues that will arise.

- - -

Further reading

Oct. 17, 2009 - Sudan Watch: African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur reports - Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation - Earlier this year, on June 24, the Deputy Chairperson of the SPLM, Malik Agar Eyre participated in a discussion in Washington D.C., hosted by the US Institute of Peace. Among other things, he issued a grave warning that must be of serious concern to the AU and our [African] Continent. He said that the "reading" of the SPLM was that the process of the fragmentation of Sudan would not end with the separation of Southern Sudan, if this was the result of the 2011 Referendum.

Oct. 26, 2009 - From APO's archive:
The African Union Commission Launches the State of the African Population Report, 2008

L’Organisation de la Presse Africaine renforce son action en faveur de la diffusion de l’information relative au continent africain

Excerpt:

Developed with development planners, policy makers, parliamentarians as well as program implementers in mind, the Report presents Africa as the continent that is most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, and cites declining rainfall and agricultural productivity, desertification, severe water shortages, and the spread of diseases, among other environmental challenges and adverse phenomena that will “inflict poverty and human misery on the continent if appropriate actions are not taken at the global, continental, national and community levels”.

The Report further points to a slight decline in population growth around the continent noting, however, that the total population will continue to increase as a result of the young age structure and its associated population momentum.

In 2005, the African population was estimated at 922 million and it is expected to exceed 1 billion in 2010, and approximately 2 billion some 40 years to come. The growth in size has implications for natural resource use and improvement in the quality of life.

Click on AU Panel, AUPD labels here below for related reports and updates.

African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur reports - Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation

Earlier this year, on June 24, the Deputy Chairperson of the SPLM, Malik Agar Eyre participated in a discussion in Washington D.C., hosted by the US Institute of Peace. Among other things, he issued a grave warning that must be of serious concern to the AU and our [African] Continent.

He said that the "reading" of the SPLM was that the process of the fragmentation of Sudan would not end with the separation of Southern Sudan, if this was the result of the 2011 Referendum. He warned that Sudan could be afflicted by a destructive process of further balkanisation, and thus sink into chaos and ungovernability, producing dangerous instability in the nine countries he pointed out share borders with Sudan. The [AU High-Level] Panel believes that the AU should take this warning seriously and act upon it.

Source: The following copy of AfricaFocus Bulletin by William Minter, 11 October 2009 (followed by 'Speech of the Chairperson of the AUPD, Thabo Mbeki, on Handing over the AUPD Report to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping').

African Union Panel reports

African Charter Article #23

1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern relations between States.

2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, States parties to the present Charter shall ensure that:

(a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State party to the present Charter;

(b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State party to the present Charter.

Summary & Comment: This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from the panel’s statement (full text available at http://tinyurl.com/yzqpv74).  The statement was notable for the extensive range of consultation cited, with both Sudanese and a full range of international stakeholders, and for its call for a fully inclusive negotiating process to avoid "forum-shopping" among different international mediators. It also lauded the efforts of U.S. Sudan envoy Maj Gen Scott Gration, called for both the African Union and United Nations to give high priority to helping the Sudanese people meet their challenges, and insisted that all three goals of peace, justice, and reconciliation were essential and interconnected. WM

Sudan: African Union Panel reports

Editor's Note

"Repeatedly during our process of consultation, the Darfurians insisted that the Panel would fail in its mission if it did not identify and address what they called "the root cause of the crisis in Darfur". ... a gross imbalance between a strong centre and a marginalised periphery, which resulted in political power and wealth being concentrated in the centre, with the consequent negative consequences on the periphery."
- African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur

The report presented by the African Union panel last week is still not public, but a statement by the panel's chair, former South African President Thabo Mbeki highlighted both the urgent need for a political resolution in Darfur and the inextricable connection of that goal with parallel efforts for completion of the peace process for Sudan as a whole.

The Panel was established by the African Union in March 2009, and included, in addition to President Mbeki, two other former presidents: General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and Mr Pierre Buyoya, former President of Burundi. The other members were Hon Justice Florence Mumba, Judge of the Supreme Court of Zambia; Ms Rakiya A. Omaar, Director, African Rights; Mr Mohammed Kabir, Lawyer, Nigeria; and Mr Ahmed Maher El Sayed, former Foreign Minister of Egypt.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out by e-mail is one of three posted today. Given the importance and complexity of the issues in Sudan, the AfricaFocus web site carries two bulletins with additional background analysis:

(1) Sudan: Between Peace and War

The pace of diplomacy on Sudan is increasing, with talks set to resume on Darfur and active engagement by the African Union, the United Nations, and the United States in efforts to move Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement forward as it approaches the last year of a projected 6-year interim period. But, says veteran Sudan analyst John Ashworth, in fact the agreement "is not Comprehensive, nor Peace, nor an Agreement. Its failure could ignite a new war even more deadly than the two previous conflicts in Southern Sudan.

For more go to: http://www.africafocus.org/docs09/sud0910b.php and

(2) Sudan: Policy Debates and Dilemmas

In the debate on international policies towards Sudan, the critique of the Save Darfur movement and the International Criminal Court for counterproductive "humanitarian fundamentalism" has been convincingly argued by such analysts as Alex de Waal and Mahmood Mamdani. Both the Obama administration and the "international community" seem to be gearing up to give diplomacy a serious chance, after recent years of alternating bluster and failure to put real pressure on the Sudanese government. But the unanswered question is whether even forceful and skillful diplomacy can overcome Khartoum's long-practiced strategies for delay and deception.

For more go to: http://www.africafocus.org/docs09/sud0910c.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan, see:
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php

End editor's note
*********************************************

Speech of the Chairperson of the AUPD, Thabo Mbeki, on Handing over the AUPD Report to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping

AU Headquarters,
Addis Ababa.
October 8, 2009.

Social Science Research Council, Making Sense of Darfur Blog

For full text see:
http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/10/08/pres-mbekis-speech-on-handing-over-the-au-panel-report/

Contact for the panel is
Barney Afako,
Spokesperson, AUPD;
Tel: +27724740486
+27724740486,
+447917054523
+447917054523;
Email: barneyafako@yahoo.co.uk

Your Excellency, Mr Jean Ping, Chairperson of the AU Commission,
AU Commissioners,
Your Excellencies Ambassadors and members of the diplomatic corps,
Distinguished guests:

Following the decision taken by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its 142nd meeting held at ministerial level, on 21 July 2008, and subsequently confirmed at the 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa on 1-3 February 2009, you, Chairperson, appointed us to serve as members of the independent African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur.

The mandate you gave us required us to examine the situation in Darfur and submit recommendations on how best the issues of accountability and combating impunity, on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing, on the other, could be addressed effectively and comprehensively, within the context of the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Darfur.  As Your Excellency is aware, to begin its work, the Panel decided that it would have to engage in an extensive process of consultation with those who have the possibility to contribute to the solution of the conflict in Darfur.

As a consequence of this, the Panel was privileged to interact a number of times with the President and Vice Presidents of Sudan as well as other members of the Sudanese Government of National Unity. Similarly we interacted with many of the Sudanese political parties, including the biggest among these, as well as Sudanese civil society and specialised formations such as the lawyers' collectives. The Panel took great care that it spend as much time as possible in Darfur. In the end this resulted in four visits to the region, amounting to at least 40 days, and encompassing the three States of Darfur.

These visits to Darfur enabled the Panel to engage in extensive and repeated discussion with the Internally Displaced People, civil society, the Native Administration, the nomadic tribes, the armed opposition, the various State authorities and UNAMID. Necessarily the Panel did everything it could to engage the various Darfur armed opposition groups and therefore met their representatives in Darfur, Chad, Libya, Qatar and here in Ethiopia. Here I should also mention that during our visit to Chad, we also had occasion to interact with some of the Darfur refugees in that country.

We were also privileged to be received at high levels by the Governments of the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and Qatar, all of which engaged the Panel in focused discussions on the various matters on our agenda. We were similarly privileged to be received by and interact with the leadership of the League of Arab States at its Headquarters in Cairo. We were also honoured to have the opportunity to engage the Special Envoys to Sudan of the Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.

In this context I must also report that while we were in Ndjamena, we were fortunate to have the possibility to engage the Ambassadors of the P5 countries and the EU, as well as the African diplomatic corps in Chad. We also thought it proper that we should engage the African and international Non-Governmental Organisations which have undertaken advocacy work, focused on Darfur, and others, such as Justice Cassese, who led the UN team which investigated violations of human rights in Darfur. The Panel was pleased that it had the possibility to engage a number of these.

To complete this account, I must also mention that the Panel was honoured to interact with the leadership of UNAMID and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, the DDDC, UNMIS and MUNURCAT, as well as the Darfur Joint Chief Mediator, the Hon Djibril Bassol,, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, the Hon Luis Moreno-Ocampo, as well as the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and the UN Human Rights Council.

From everything I have said, it is clear that the work done by the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur constitutes the most extensive and inclusive process of consultation ever conducted to facilitate the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. In preparing its Report and Recommendations, the Panel has done its best to take into account the many views it received in Darfur, in Sudan generally, the Sudanese neighbourhood and from the rest of the international community. In this sense, we believe that these - the Report and the Recommendations - are much more than a sum of the reflections of the Panel. Rather, they represent a consensus view among many in Sudan and internationally, including the millions of Darfurians whose representatives we met.

In this regard I must also mention that the Panel also made a special effort to present its Draft Recommendations, which address its mandate, to as many of its interlocutors as possible. I am pleased to say that by and large these Recommendations were welcomed by the various constituencies we engaged. Arising from what I have said, the Panel takes the firm view that in everything it does to accelerate the resolution of the conflict in Darfur, the African Union should do its best to sustain an inclusive approach, drawing in the relevant constituencies in Darfur and Sudan, as well as the rest of the world, behind a common programme and vision.

We are convinced that this is possible, provided that those concerned are truly committed to the central objective of helping to accelerate the advance towards a just and lasting peace in Darfur, rather than other goals. We say this directly emanating from our experience. In the interactions with our interlocutors which preceded the consultations on the Recommendations, in essence we posed the same question to everybody. That question was - what should be done to accelerate the process towards the achievement of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur!

The first and vitally important observation we would like to make in this regard is that everybody in Darfur and Sudan as a whole, without exception, emphasised that everybody has to recognise and respect the fact that the resolution of the conflict in Darfur has to be brought about by the Sudanese people themselves, and cannot and should not be imposed from outside. Secondly, everybody inside and outside Sudan insisted that it was urgent that everything is done to achieve all three outcomes in Darfur - peace, justice and reconciliation. Accordingly, the point was underlined that the conflict in Darfur is political in nature and therefore requires a political solution. Consensus therefore exists that a military solution to the conflict is neither possible nor desirable.

When making the firm statement that there must be peace, that justice must be done and seen to be done, and that reconciliation should be achieved, our interlocutors also recognised the reality that the objectives of peace, justice and reconciliation in Darfur are interconnected, mutually dependent, equally desirable and cannot be achieved separate one from the other. The Panel fully agrees with this approach and is therefore firmly of the view that the negotiated agreement to end the conflict in Darfur must accordingly address the related issues of:

(a) peace,
(b) justice, accountability and impunity, and
(c) reconciliation and healing, as one integrated package.

Like the overwhelming majority of our interlocutors, the Panel is therefore firmly of the view that any attempt to present any of these issues as taking precedence over any other would be counter-productive, and would militate against the speedy achievement of the just and lasting peace for which the people of Darfur yearn. Again consonant with the view advanced by the overwhelming majority of our interlocutors, and relevant to the necessary negotiated Global Political Agreement, it will be critically important that the negotiations are facilitated by one Mediator to avoid forum-shopping. They should also be inclusive in character, to ensure that their outcome is supported by the people of Darfur and Sudan as a whole, the states neighbouring Sudan and the world community as a whole.

Necessarily, therefore, the African Union and the United Nations will have to ensure that they provide the Joint Chief Mediator with the necessary resources to enable him expeditiously to discharge his responsibility, which should include helping to resolve the various matters relating to the measures that should be put in place to ensure the inclusivity of the negotiations process. We must also make the point that everybody we spoke to in Darfur and Sudan was determined that any negotiated agreement arrived at would have to be implemented with the greatest determination, and therefore that the negotiators would have to agree on the ways and means to achieve this result.

As Your Excellency is aware, and as we have already said, the mandate of the Panel related to Darfur and to Darfur only. However, the reality is that Darfur is an integral part of Sudan. In addition, the people of Darfur have not expressed any demand for self-determination.

Accordingly, the conflict in Darfur cannot be resolved unless it is placed within the context of the evolution of Sudan as a whole. We must therefore confess, Your Excellency, that because of this concrete and unavoidable actuality, the Panel had no choice but to consider the wider Sudan setting as it relates to the resolution of the conflict in Darfur, precisely to ensure that it discharges its mission.

Repeatedly during our process of consultation, the Darfurians insisted that the Panel would fail in its mission if it did not identify and address what they called "the root cause of the crisis in Darfur". That root cause is the marginalisation and underdevelopment of Darfur as a result of policies and practices implemented throughout Sudan during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. This is represented as a gross imbalance between a strong centre and a marginalised periphery, which resulted in political power and wealth being concentrated in the centre, with the consequent negative consequences on the periphery.

Many in Darfur have argued that this was the fundamental reason for the armed rebellion which broke out in 2003, and therefore that any just and lasting solution of the conflict in Darfur must redress the imbalance between the historic Sudanese centre and periphery. It is in this context that the point was made to the Panel that what we would have to consider is the "Sudan crisis in Darfur", rather than what is inadequately described as "the crisis in Darfur". Fortunately, the reality of this root cause of the various violent conflicts that have plagued Sudan has been highlighted in various agreements negotiated to end these conflicts.

For instance the Machakos Protocol, which is part of the CPA, says that "historical injustices and inequalities in development between the different regions of the Sudan ... need to be redressed." The Declaration of Principles adopted to resolve the conflict in Eastern Sudan says that the "political, economic, social and cultural marginalisation (of the region) constitutes the core problem..." which had to be addressed. This Declaration goes on to say: "Unity with recognition of and respect for diversity, protection of the fundamental freedoms and rights of citizens, devolution of powers within a federal system, and equitable distribution of national wealth are essential foundations for a united, peaceful, just and prosperous Sudan."

This is also exactly what the people of Darfur say. Thus they expect that this outlook will find concrete expression in the negotiated Darfur Global Political Agreement. This speaks to the challenge that Sudan faces, to effect a fundamental process of social transformation which, as visualised in the CPA and other agreements, would result in a "united, peaceful, just and prosperous Sudan" on the basis of the reconstruction of Sudan driven by the objective to achieve:

unity in diversity;
democracy and respect for human rights;
power sharing; and,
wealth sharing.

It is self-evident that this is an enormous challenge which the Sudanese people as a whole will have to tackle together, and as single-mindedly as possible. The Panel is convinced that the African Union can and should support the Sudanese people as they work thus to reconstruct their country. More immediately, whatever the African Union does to end the conflict in Darfur, perhaps acting on the basis our Recommendations, it will have to take into account two particular and important processes relating to Sudan as a whole. These are the General Elections scheduled for April 2010 and the 2011 Southern Sudan Referendum.

Quite correctly, the people of Darfur insist that they have a right and duty freely to participate in any General Election that takes place in Sudan, as well as fully participate in any national discussion that takes place in the context of the agreed Referendum. The search for a solution to the conflict in Darfur must take these important views of the Darfurians into account. Your Excellency, earlier this year, on June 24, the Deputy Chairperson of the SPLM, Malik Agar Eyre participated in a discussion in Washington D.C., hosted by the US Institute of Peace. Among other things, he issued a grave warning that must be of serious concern to the AU and our Continent.

He said that the "reading" of the SPLM was that the process of the fragmentation of Sudan would not end with the separation of Southern Sudan, if this was the result of the 2011 Referendum. He warned that Sudan could be afflicted by a destructive process of further balkanisation, and thus sink into chaos and ungovernability, producing dangerous instability in the nine countries he pointed out share borders with Sudan. The Panel believes that the AU should take this warning seriously and act upon it. We are convinced that in the interest of Africa as a whole, the AU must place perhaps at the top of its agenda the very important issue of helping the Sudanese people successfully to manage the urgent challenges they face.

In addition, we mention this because it is of critical importance to the achievement of the aspiration shared by the people of Darfur that they remain part of a united Sudan. At the same June 24 Institute of Peace discussion to which we have referred, the US Special Envoy to Sudan, Maj Gen Scott Gration spoke of his hope for a peaceful and successful Sudan. He said he knows of situations in which:

"Yesterday's enemies are today's friends. The wars we fought yesterday - those lands are at peace. Humanitarian disaster areas are today stabilised communities. Negative attitudes become positive behaviour; frowns, smiles; clenched fists become hand shakes, and hate becomes forgiveness. It's possible ... I believe in a vision in which we will have a country that is politically stable, with a responsible government, physically secure, economically prosperous, at peace inside and at peace with its neighbours...That's what we are all hoping for - a future of hope and trust, a future of lasting peace."

Before I conclude, I would like most sincerely to thank and salute the esteemed members of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur who applied themselves to our common project with unequalled diligence, dedication and wisdom.

[section continues with thanks to a wide variety of others who assisted in the deliberations of the panel.]

We trust that we have met our responsibilities to the people of Darfur, Sudan and Africa, and that our findings and recommendations provide a solid foundation from which to accelerate the advance towards peace, justice and reconciliation for all the people of Darfur and the Sudanese nation as a whole. In this regard, Your Excellency and friends, we share the powerful message of hope we cited earlier, as conveyed by President Obama's Special Envoy to Sudan, Maj Gen Scott Gration. We too are convinced that if the right things are done, Sudan faces a "future of hope and trust, a future of lasting peace."

We have the honour to submit and commend to Your Excellency our unanimous Report, entitled Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation.

Thank you.
- - -

Click on AU Panel, AUPD labels here below to view related reports and updates.

Sudan JEM: Mbeki offers African Union solutions to Darfur conflict

From the website of Darfur rebel group JEM, Friday, 9th, October 2009:
Sudan: Thabo Mbeki offers African Union solutions to Darfur conflict

Former South African President Thabo Mbeki has inquired and proposed a report that would expectedly balance the need for justice, peace and reconciliation in Darfur, reports claim. The reports would be presented to the African Union for implementation.

Experts say the Mbeki report is likely to recommend a local tribunal, backed by the AU, Sudan and possibly the Arab League; to deal with the abuses committed in Darfur. But critics of the African Union say the organization is using the commission only to find a way of avoiding the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Mr. Bashir’s arrest. The AU has already refused to honor the warrant and Mr. Bashir has rejected the charges against him, accusing the ICC of colonialism.

However the rest of the African community is waiting to see whether the AU will accept and implement Mbeki’s recommendations that has come after the UN’s outgoing commander in Darfur in August declared that the region was no longer in a state of war, but rather faced low-level conflict and criminality.

The Darfur conflict began in 2003 when black African rebel groups took up arms against the government in Khartoum, complaining of discrimination and neglect. In response, pro-government Arab militias then started a campaign of violence, targeting the black African population.

Legitimacy of Genocide

Some Human Rights activist described the conflict as genocide, following reports that the Arab-led Sudanese government helped organize the militia attacks against the black communities. The ICC’s prosecutors claimed that al-Bashir masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part of three tribal groups in Darfur because of their ethnicity but admitted to the lack of sufficient evidence.

On 31 January 2005, the UN released a 176-page report saying that while there were mass murders and rapes of Darfur civilians, they could not label the atrocities as genocide because genocidal intent appears to be missing. Many activists, however, refer to the crisis in Darfur as genocide, including the Save Darfur Coalition and the Genocide Intervention Network. These organizations point to statements by former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, referring to the conflict as genocide. Other activist organizations, such as Amnesty International, while calling for international intervention, avoid the use of the term genocide.

In May 2006 the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese government. The other faction of the SLM refrained from signing the agreement. On 31 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 which called for a new 26,000-troop UN peacekeeping force called UNAMID to supplant or supplement a poorly funded and ill-equipped 7,000-troop African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeeping force.

Sudan strongly objected to the resolution and said that it would see the UN forces in the region as foreign invaders. The following day, the Sudanese military launched a major offensive in the region.

In March 2007 the UN mission accused Sudan’s government of orchestrating and taking part in gross violations in Darfur and called for urgent international action to protect civilians there. But the ICC rejected a request to charge Mr. Bashir with genocide. However Mr. Bashir has been charged by the ICC with two counts of war crimes - intentionally directing attacks against civilians and pillaging. He is also accused of five crimes against humanity - murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape. In February 2009, Darfur’s UNAMID tried to persuade the rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese government to sign a peace agreement [end of report]

- - -

From Sudan Tribune, October 8, 2009 (WASHINGTON) – excerpt:
AU panel submits report on Darfur but kept confidential

The African Union (AU) panel on Darfur (AUPD) headed by the former South African president Thabo Mbeki has officially submitted its report to the Pan-African body but its content will not be released until a special AU summit later this month.

At a ceremony at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa Mbeki handed the lengthy report to the Chairperson of the AU Commission Jean Ping, eight month after its establishment.



Photo: Former South African President Thabo Mbeki (R) hands to the chairperson of African Union Commission Jean Ping, the report compiled by the high level panel on the Darfur crisis, at the African Union (AU) headquarters in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa, October 8, 2009 (Reuters)

Click on label here below for previous reports and latest upates.

Special Envoys for Sudan of China, EU, France, Russia, UK, US (the E6) met in Moscow 6 October 2009

The E6 received an update on efforts by the UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole to engage with rebel factions and Darfuri civil society, as part of a broader effort to restart peace talks in Doha by the end of October. They strongly supported this objective. They called on the Government of Sudan to do everything possible to facilitate such efforts, and for all Darfuri leaders to engage urgently in the peace talks, including those based elsewhere in the region and in Europe. Any further delay would be unacceptable.

Source: US Department of State
Moscow E6 Statement
Washington, DC
October 6, 2009

The Special Envoys for Sudan of China, the European Union, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (the E6) met in Moscow on 6 October 2009, under the chairmanship of Mikhail Margelov, Special Envoy for Sudan of the President of the Russian Federation.

The E6 reviewed developments in Sudan since their first meeting in Doha in May. They welcomed signs of progress, including over Abyei and towards full deployment of UNAMID, but noted the fundamental challenges remaining. They underlined the need for further efforts and stronger political commitment by all parties in Sudan to build lasting peace, stability and prosperity, and confirmed their readiness to support these efforts, and called on all regional and international partners to do the same.

The E6 particularly underlined the urgency of progress to further efforts for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. They welcomed the work undertaken with the parties in this regard by US Special Envoy Scott Gration, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations, and between the parties themselves. They urged the parties to reach agreement as soon as possible on arrangements for free and fair national elections in 2010 and the 2011 referendum, as well as on a work-plan to address issues of shared interest that will arise after 2011.

The E6 expressed their strong concern over current security and humanitarian challenges in South Sudan, and their readiness to support efforts by the authorities there to tackle these.

The E6 received an update on efforts by the UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole to engage with rebel factions and Darfuri civil society, as part of a broader effort to restart peace talks in Doha by the end of October. They strongly supported this objective. They called on the Government of Sudan to do everything possible to facilitate such efforts, and for all Darfuri leaders to engage urgently in the peace talks, including those based elsewhere in the region and in Europe. Any further delay would be unacceptable. They strongly supported the renewed efforts by all sides to ensure peaceful, cooperative relations across the region, particularly between Sudan and Chad, and to improve levels of humanitarian access and reduce insecurity. In this regard they welcomed the expansion of the High-level Committee on Darfur to allow participation by interested countries, the Arab League and the African Union.

The E6 looked forward to forthcoming report on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in Darfur by the AU High-Level Panel led by former President Mbeki. They expressed their common hope that its recommendations, and follow-up action by all concerned in Sudan, could contribute positively to resolution of the complex challenges facing Darfur, Sudan as a whole and the region.

The E6 underlined the essential role of the United Nations and African Union, as well as other regional organizations and neighboring states, in supporting the parties to work through the urgent remaining challenges to peace. They called for particular attention in forthcoming international appointments to ensuring full coherence and coordination in UN/AU efforts, and for stronger and more concerted leadership at all levels.

The E6 resolved to meet again as necessary to exchange views on the situation in Sudan, and how they could work together and with others to support the parties to build peace.

- - -

From Nam News Network
SUDANESE PRESIDENTIAL ENVOYS HOLDS MEETINGS IN DOHA AHEAD OF DOHA TALKS

MOSCOW, Oct 7 (NNN-SUNA) -- Sudanese Presidential Adviser Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin has held a number of meetings here with delegations participating in the Scientific Symposium on Sudan.

In a statement to SUNA Tuesday, Sudan's Ambassador to Russia, Suraj-Eddin Hamid, said Dr. Salahuddin met the joint envoy of the United Nations and the African Union (AU) on Dafur, Djibril Bassole, and the Chinese envoy and reviewed the preparations for the coming session of negotiation in Doha.

Ambassador Hamid said that the group of envoys was engaged in formulation of a statement including the major views reflected in the symposium, adding that the symposium would review on Wednesday issues of Sudan through three working groups on the economic and social situation, the political situation and the situation in Darfur.

He added that Dr. Salahuddin would continue his meetings on the sidelines of the symposium and was due to meet with the American and the Dutch envoys.

A number of Russian and international mass media and press have interviewed members of Sudan's delegation to the symposium which is headed by Dr. Salahuddin.

Addressing the symporsium Tuesday, Dr. Salahuddin, affirmed the Sudanese government's seriousness to implement the remaining items in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended the war between northern and southern Sudan and led to the southern Sudan-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SOLM) to participate in the national government.

He also urged the international community to live up to its commitments for supporting the implementation of the CPA.

Turning to Dafur, Dr. Salahuddin referred to the government's efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the Darfur issue and the current situation concerning negotiations for solving the Darfur issue, while expressing appreciation for the role of the Arab ministerial committee in this regard.

He called on the international community to boost the efforts for achieving stability and peace in Darfur by urging the armed movements in Dafur to participate in the Doha negotiations.

Dr. Salahuddin affirmed the government's keenness to work for holding elections within the fixed time.

Meanwhile, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister affirmed the commitment of his country to support the peace, stability and unity of Sudan. The symposium was also addressed by Dr. Mutrif Siddiq, Osman Khalid Mudawi, Ghazi Suleiman, Dr. Lam Akol, the special envoy of the Russian President for Sudan, the Qatari State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmed bin Abdalla Al-Mahmoud, the representatives of China, the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Finland, the UN envoy for Sudan, Asharf Qazi, Djibril Bassole and the representative of the Russian Contemporary Development Institute which is sponsoring the symposium. -- NNN SUNA