Sudan: UN Security Council closed consultations may discuss measures to support protection of civilians

TOMORROW'S UN Security Council briefing and consultations "may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC [protection of civilians] as well as assess existing strategies. 

In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan.

On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. 

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan." 

Read more from What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday, 27 October 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (28 October), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu and Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the consultations.

Eighteen months into the conflict, hostilities continue unabated as the warring parties engage in a protracted war of attrition. Over the past several weeks, fighting intensified across multiple front lines as the rainy season subsided. In September, there was a severe escalation in El Fasher—the capital of North Darfur state, which has been under siege by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since May—after the RSF launched a coordinated attack on the city, followed by intensive shelling and airstrikes from both sides, resulting in civilian casualties. On 26 September, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched an offensive in Khartoum and surrounding areas in a bid to besiege areas under RSF control, making significant advances in the ensuing days. In addition, the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces (a coalition of armed movements from Darfur) engaged in fighting with the RSF on several front lines in North and West Darfur states. In the past few weeks, the SAF has reportedly been able to make strategic advances in Sennar and Al Jazira states. Media reports indicate that, on 24 October, the RSF launched a retaliatory attack on villages in East Al Jazira, following the defection to the SAF of Abu Aqla Kikal, a prominent RSF commander. While some sources report that the attack killed about 50 people, others suggest that the death toll could be much higher. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and listen to our 4 September podcast episode.)

Tomorrow, Guterres and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across the country and stress the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Guterres is likely to highlight that the conflict has resulted in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Sudan and has had destabilising effects on the region. On 18 October, the Secretary-General submitted his report (S/2024/759) pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians (PoC) in Sudan. The report describes an alarming intensification of intercommunal and identity-based violence and highlights a significant increase in human rights violations and abuses in areas under the control of both warring parties. It outlines the widespread damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks carried out by the warring parties in residential neighbourhoods and sites sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres and several Council members are likely to emphasise the crucial need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities and medical and humanitarian personnel.

Guterres is likely to focus on the recommendations outlined in his report under three broad headings: intensifying diplomacy towards ending the fighting, changing the behaviour of the warring parties, and supporting broader protection measures. The report highlights an urgent need for a renewed diplomatic push, including through the “personal involvement” of some heads of state, to ensure that the warring parties uphold their legal obligations. It calls on the warring parties and relevant stakeholders to pursue scalable, locally negotiated ceasefires and other measures to reduce violence, protect civilians, and prevent the spread of conflict. It strongly recommends that the warring parties establish a robust and transparent compliance mechanism, as a critical step to ensure implementation of the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The report calls for an immediate cessation of the direct or indirect flow of weapons and ammunitions into Sudan, which continue to fuel the conflict. Highlighting the need to monitor violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, the report underlines the importance of supporting and cooperating with regional and international independent investigation bodies. It further calls on the international community to provide technical and financial support to Sudanese civil society organisations and community-based initiatives.

Amidst mounting protection concerns, several human rights organisations and Sudanese civil society actors have advocated for robust measures, including the deployment of protection forces in Sudan. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in October 2023, recommended in its 6 September report the deployment of an independent and impartial force with a PoC mandate in Sudan. Some Council members are apparently exploring options for a possible deployment of an African Union (AU)-led mission and how the mission could be supported in the context of resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). The Secretary-General’s report acknowledges these calls but notes that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. However, it expresses the UN Secretariat’s readiness to engage with the Council and relevant stakeholders on “operational modalities”, including localised efforts feasible under the current conditions that can contribute to effectively reducing violence and protecting civilians.

Lamamra is expected to provide an update on the ongoing regional and international initiatives aimed at resolving the crisis, his engagement with key regional and international interlocutors, and his efforts to coordinate different peace initiatives. With the mediation efforts, not having achieved any breakthrough as yet, members might be interested in hearing Lamamra’s assessment of potential next steps, including strategies for enhancing cooperation among stakeholders and addressing the underlying issues hindering the peace process. Tomorrow’s closed consultations may provide a good opportunity for Council members to examine and have a frank discussion about potential measures that could be implemented to support PoC as well as assess existing strategies.

On 3 October, AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) members undertook a field mission to Port Sudan to engage with senior officials from the Sudanese authorities and other key stakeholders. In a communiqué adopted following a 9 October meeting, AUPSC members requested the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to reopen the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in order to facilitate the AU’s engagement with stakeholders in Sudan at all levels and to provide technical support to Sudan.

Wosornu is likely to highlight the spiralling humanitarian situation in the country, especially food insecurity, and describe efforts by the UN and its partners to deliver aid across Sudan. She and several Council members are likely to reiterate the critical need to ensure full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and criticise impediments to such access. They may also call on the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorisation for the use of the Adre crossing at the Chad-Sudan border for humanitarian operations, which was initially authorised on 15 August for a three-month period.

In a 25 October joint statement, officials from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNICEF called for intensifying the international response to match the scale of rising needs in Sudan. While expressing appreciation for assurances of cooperation from the Sudanese authorities, they underlined the need to operationalise these commitments. The reality on the ground, they said, “remains fraught with logistical and administrative barriers”, which have hindered the UN’s ability to provide aid and protection to vulnerable communities as well as effectively monitor the delivery of aid. They called for simplifying and expediting approval procedures for aid shipments and personnel, including facilitating cross-line access. The officials also called for re-establishing the UN offices in Zalingei, Central Darfur, and Kadugli, South Kordofan.

Earlier this month, during negotiations on a draft press statement proposed by the UK (the penholder on Sudan), Russia apparently requested the removal of the phrase “administrative or other impediments”, arguing that it suggests that Port Sudan authorities are creating artificial barriers for aid delivery and distribution. Some members, such as France, however, contended that several obstacles remain to the delivery of aid. Continuing disagreements among members led the penholder to withdraw the draft text after four revised drafts. (For background on Council dynamics regarding the issue of humanitarian access, see the brief on Sudan in our October Monthly Forecast and 13 June What’s in Blue story.)

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-9.php

End

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) starts 2-week training rapid reaction forces at UN centre in Uganda

COULD THIS BE what I hope it is: a long awaited African rapid reaction force for crises such as Sudan? This report says 10 East African countries started a 2-week joint training at a UN Regional Service Centre in Uganda.

Report at The Independent Uganda

By Xinhua

Dated Tuesday 23 May 2023 - full copy:

East African countries start training of rapid reaction forces

Joint training started. FILE PHOTO

Kampala, Uganda | Xinhua | Troops from 10 East African countries on Monday began a two-week training at the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Uganda.

Personnel from Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda participated in the training that aims to create synergies and enhance the knowledge and understanding of peace support mission planning, said the East African Standby Force (EASF) in a statement.

“We cannot fulfil our mandate of enhancing peace and security without an effective planning entity for our region,” said Uganda’s Chief of Staff of the Air Force Brig. David Gonyi.

He said the training will enable regional countries to respond to scenarios like terrorism, election violence and disaster management.

“There is no doubt that the commitment given to this learning process is a clear testimony that capacity building and enhancement have a place they deserve in Africa and the region,” Gonyi said.

The EASF, which consists of military, police and civilian components, was established to provide capability for rapid deployment of forces to carry out preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support and stability operations, and peace enforcement.

View original: https://www.independent.co.ug/east-african-countries-start-training-of-rapid-reaction-forces/

___________________________

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF) 

The African Standby Force (ASF) is an international, continental African, and multidisciplinary peacekeeping force with military, police and civilian contingents that acts under the direction of the African Union. The ASF is to be deployed in times of crisis in Africa.^[2] Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, serves as the Force's Headquarters. Douala, Cameroon, was selected in 2011 as the site of the AU's Continental Logistics Base (LOGBASE).^[3]

Map of the partitioning of RECs and RMs of the ASF

___________________________

EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE (EASF)

In the East of the continent, the regional agent of African Standby Force (ASF) is known as the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF).

The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), formerly Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), is one of the five regional forces for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of the African Standby Force, consisting of military, police and civilian components. 

EASF constitutes the regional operational arm of the peacekeeping elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture, put in place by the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.^[1][2]

East Africa Standby Force Logo

[Ends]

UN chief Guterres: “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century”

Stand with Africa: Guterres

Meanwhile, UN chief António Guterres noted that cooperation and solidarity to advance the continent’s future is more needed than ever.

“I look forward to African governments continuing to seize the opportunities presented by the continent’s natural, human, and entrepreneurial richness, by working to increase private investment and raise resources at home,” he said in his message for Africa Day.

The annual commemoration May celebrates the founding of the Organization of African Union, the African Union precursor, on 25 May 1963.

The Secretary-General urged the international community to stand with Africa as multiple rises – from COVID-19 to climate and conflict – continue to cause great suffering there.

He further stated that African countries are underrepresented in global governance institutions, such as the UN Security Council, and denied the debt relief and concessional funding they need.

“Africa deserves peace, justice and international solidarity,” he said.  “With international cooperation and solidarity, this can be Africa’s century.” 

Read full story at UN News report 25 May 2023:

Security Council urged to step up on financing for AU peace operations

https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137047

[Ends]

UN Security Council Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa: Financing of AU-led peace support operations

THIS part of the below copied report sounds good, let's hope it becomes a reality in time to help Sudan where there is no time to waste: "in his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. 

Report at What's In Blue

Dated Wednesday 24 May 2023 - full copy (SW Ed: beige highlight is mine):

Briefing on Peace and Security in Africa

Tomorrow morning (25 May), the Security Council will hold a briefing on peace and security in Africa. 

Switzerland, May’s Council President, is convening the meeting at the request of the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), which was issued on 1 May. 

The expected briefers are Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye; and Bitania Tadesse, Programme Director at Amani Africa, a think tank based in Addis Ababa that provides research and analysis on the work of the AU and its Peace and Security Council (AUPSC).

Tomorrow’s meeting builds on the momentum in the Security Council since July 2021 around the option of financing AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions. This has been a longstanding issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular, since 2007. 

Over the years, Council discussion on the issue has evolved, as Council members have increasingly acknowledged the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent. 

Nonetheless, some Council members have strongly opposed adopting a product that would provide a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN assessed contributions, as was the case with the draft resolution proposed in 2018 by then-Council members Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Equatorial Guinea. Among the complications that underlie AU access to UN assessed contributions are questions relating to the adherence of AUPSOs to accountability and compliance frameworks and to burden-sharing with the AU.

The year 2023 appears to be crucial for advancing the discussion on financing of AUPSOs. In a 12 May communiqué, the AUPSC requested the Security Council’s A3 members to “resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution” on financing AUPSOs through UN assessed contributions. The US, which opposed the 2018 draft resolution, now appears more amenable to a serious discussion on the matter. (For more information, see our 26 April research report titled “the Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?”.)

The Secretary-General’s 1 May report was submitted pursuant to a presidential statement (S/PRST/2022/6), adopted by the Security Council following a debate on peace and security in Africa held during China’s August 2022 Council presidency, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform. (For background, see our 30 August 2022 What’s in Blue story.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, DiCarlo is expected to brief on the main findings of the 1 May report, which builds on previous relevant reports submitted by the Secretary-General, particularly his May 2017 report on options for authorisation and support for AUPSOs. She might note that, in line with the commitments outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, there has been progress since 2017 in the development of the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. DiCarlo may highlight the support provided by the UN and other partners—such as the EU—in developing the AUCF, while underscoring the need to achieve further progress for the AU to attain the highest standards of compliance.

The Secretary-General’s report also provides updates on progress in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund, established in 2002 to finance the AU’s peace and security activities, which by February 2023 had mobilised $337 million. 

Bankole may explain the AU’s recent decisions to provide support through the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is facing a budget shortfall, and the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF), which has deployed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At a 12 May meeting, the AUPSC decided to increase the CRF’s ceiling from $5 million to $10 million to address pressing peace and security issues on the continent.

Bankole may highlight key aspects of the Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities, which was adopted by the 36th AU summit in February. 

The paper, among other things, expounded on the AU’s 2015 decision to finance 25 percent of its peace support operations budget. This decision created the impression that the organisation is committed to sharing the burden of future AUPSOs that will be mandated and authorised by the Security Council, under the assumption that these operations will be granted access to partial funding from UN assessed contributions. According to the paper, however, that amount represents 25 percent of the AU annual budget to support the organisation’s overall peace and security efforts in Africa, that include, but are not limited to, peace support operations. It seems that the Secretary-General’s report tried to avoid the issue of burden-sharing by arguing that “the option of using United Nations assessed contributions to finance, at least in part, the budget of an African Union managed mission is one that remains largely aspirational given the need for guidance from the General Assembly”.

In its August 2022 presidential statement, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the financing of AUPSOs that reflect good practices and lessons learned from past experiences. Tomorrow, DiCarlo may refer to the experience gleaned from support provided by the UN to the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) through the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the experience of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the joint UN-AU review on this unique hybrid mission; and the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022, as well as the UN’s provision of a logistical support package through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that later transitioned into the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). DiCarlo may stress the need for the Security Council to take into account the challenges and achievements of these experiences in its future decisions on the financing of AUPSOs.

One of the contentious issues during past discussions on the financing of AUPSOs was the role of regional mechanisms and their eligibility for access to financing from UN assessed contributions. The AU Consensus Paper argues that regional mechanisms, which are viewed as the building blocks of the AU, should benefit from such arrangements as first responders to conflict and crises in their respective regions. 

This corresponds with the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to address the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups on the continent. In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”. This is particularly relevant to the West Africa and Sahel region, which has been facing serious security challenges.

In his 1 May report, the Secretary-General presented a refined version of the joint planning and mandating process for authorising AUPSOs, which was originally outlined in his May 2017 report. This process now involves not only the AU but also the regional mechanisms, based on the recognition that some regional forces later transition into an AUPSO and then into a UN peacekeeping operation. The refined process, therefore, intends to give regional mechanisms an entry point in case they eventually seek UN financing when they decide to deploy a force, which means that they will have to notify the Security Council in advance and involve the UN in the planning process from the outset.

The Secretary-General has already outlined in 2017 various options for the financing of AUPSOs, which include a subvention in exceptional emergency situations, joint financing of a jointly developed budget, establishment of a UN support office, or joint financing of a hybrid mission. 

As stated in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s 1 May report, both the AU and the UN are of the view that two of these options—hybrid missions and a UN support office—are more feasible and provide predictable and sustainable financing for AUPSOs. 

Lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID indicate that hybrid missions require an alignment of political engagement and a budget that covers the mission’s entire financial requirements. 

Therefore, the Secretary-General’s report seems to lean towards the UN support office option, which is considered flexible and practical in tailoring support to AUPSOs in accordance with specific needs and circumstances, while emphasising that this option should be implemented as part of a coherent political strategy.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2023/05/briefing-peace-and-security-in-africa.php

[Ends]

VIDEO: Opening Ceremony of the 15th Ordinary Session of the STC on Defense, Safety and Security

Streamed live by African Union Friday 12 May 2023. 

Description on YouTube:
To consider the draft AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability in PSOs, and the draft AU, reflect on the outcomes of the workshop on the reconceptualization of the ASF and provide an update on the AMANI Africa III Continental Maritime Exercise.

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: A UN research report 26 April 2023 copied below for future reference caught my eye because of this paragraph:

"Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform."

So I searched for UNSG report 30 April 2023 and found a page here listing latest statements. What a coincidence and a disappointing one too: instead of it providing news of progress made regarding the African Union (AU) and the financing of AU Peace Support Operations, it says:

United Nations Secretary-General

30 April 2023 New York

Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan    

Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General

In light of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Sudan, the Secretary-General is sending the Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, to the region immediately.  

The scale and speed of what is unfolding is unprecedented in Sudan. We are extremely concerned by the immediate as well as long-term impact on all people in Sudan, and the broader region.  

We once again urge all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, allow safe passage for civilians fleeing areas of hostilities, respect humanitarian workers and assets, facilitate relief operations, and respect medical personnel, transport and facilities.

View original: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2023-04-30/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-sudan%C2%A0-%C2%A0%C2%A0

_______________________________ 

Research Report from Security Council Report.org

Dated 26 April 2023 - full copy:

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?

To read the full report, please download the PDF here.

The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.  

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognising the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.  

In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOs from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members, but was never put to a vote because of one permanent member’s strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU’s development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023. 

There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOs since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.  

The Council asked that the Secretary-General’s April 2023 report include “recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources”.  It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.   

In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.  

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-financing-of-au-peace-support-operations-prospects-for-progress-in-the-security-council.php

{Ends]