Sudan: ICC Prosecutor briefs UNSC on Darfur 17 Jan

HERE is a full copy of What's in Blue report dated Tue 11 Jan 2022. Note that Sudan's Prime Minister Hamdok resigned on 2 Jan. The UN Security Council will receive the semi-annual briefing of the ICC Prosecutor on Darfur on 17 Jan. The following meeting was requested by the UK, the penholder on Sudan. 

Sudan: Meeting under “Any Other Business”

Tomorrow (12 January), following the open briefing and closed consultations on Yemen, Security Council members will discuss the situation in Sudan under “any other business”. The meeting was requested by the UK (the penholder on Sudan), together with Albania, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and the US. Special Representative for Sudan and head of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) Volker Perthes is expected to brief.

Perthes is expected to update members on the latest developments in the ongoing political crisis in Sudan following the military coup d’état of 25 October 2021, particularly in light of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s resignation on 2 January. Perthes last briefed the Council on 10 December 2021 (S/PV.8925) on the Secretary-General’s most recent 90-day report on UNITAMS (S/2021/1008). (For background, see our What’s in Blue story from 9 December 2021.)

Hamdok announced that he is stepping down in a televised address, during which he referred to failed mediation attempts between civilian and military leaders and said that the country is at a “dangerous turning point that threatens its whole survival”. His resignation came against the backdrop of ongoing widespread protests in the country against the 25 October 2021 coup and the subsequent power-sharing agreement between the civilian and military entities announced on 21 November 2021, which included Hamdok’s reinstatement as prime minister. Several parties have rejected the agreement, including the main opposition alliance, the Forces for Freedom and Change Coalition (FFC).

The crackdown on protestors since 25 October 2021 is another area of immediate concern for Council members. As at 9 January, according to the medical group Central Committee of Sudan Doctors, 62 people have been killed and hundreds have been injured during protests involving the excessive use of force by security forces since 25 October 2021. Some Council members may emphasise the need to conduct timely investigations into casualties during the demonstrations and the importance of accountability for this violence.

Secretary-General António Guterres took note of Hamdok’s resignation in a 3 January statement and expressed regret that “a political understanding on the way forward is not in place despite the gravity of the situation in Sudan”. He also condemned the “continued violence targeting protestors”. In a 4 January statement, the Troika on Sudan (Norway, the UK and the US) and the EU emphasised that “Sudanese stakeholders will need to work on the basis of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration on how to overcome the nation’s current political crisis, select new civilian leadership, and identify clear timelines and processes for the remaining transitional tasks – including establishing the legislative and judicial branches of government, creating accountability mechanisms, and laying the groundwork for elections”. The statement urged “stakeholders to commit to an immediate, Sudanese-led and internationally facilitated dialogue” and said that the killing and injuring of protestors “is unacceptable”, while calling for independent investigations and accountability for perpetrators. The statement was reportedly rejected by the military.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members will be interested in hearing more from Perthes on the role of UNITAMS, particularly regarding the “UN-facilitated intra-Sudanese political process” announced by Perthes in an 8 January statement. The political process is “aimed at supporting Sudanese stakeholders in agreeing on a way out of the current political crisis and agree[ing] on a sustainable path forward towards democracy and peace”, according to the statement. Noting that “measures taken to date have not succeeded in restoring the course of this transformation”, the statement says that “all key civilian and military stakeholders, including armed movements, political parties, civil society, women’s groups, and resistance committees will be invited to participate”.

The 8 January announcement about the UN-facilitated process followed international pressure to find a way forward in resolving the political crisis. The announcement was welcomed in a statement by the Quad on Sudan (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the UK and the US), which expressed “strong support for the “UN-facilitated, Sudanese-led dialogue initiative”.

In a 10 January press briefing, Perthes announced the commencement of consultations on the way forward and provided further details, emphasising that the UN would play a facilitation role in the process, which will be Sudanese-led. Council members will likely seek further details on the next steps in this process, including an assessment of the various stakeholders’ willingness to participate. According to media reports, the Sudanese Professionals Association—an umbrella association of several trade unions—rejected participation in the initiative, while the FFC said that they would announce a position when further details are available. The military-led Transitional Sovereign Council reportedly welcomed the announcement of the UN-facilitated process, while also calling for AU involvement. (On 26 October 2021, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted a communiqué suspending Sudan from the AU “until the effective restoration of the civilian-led Transitional Authority”. The AU PSC decided, according to a 24 November 2021 communiqué, to “promptly dispatch a mission to Sudan”, which has yet to take place.)

In addition to political developments, members may want to hear more about the situation in Darfur, including after looting and attacks against UN facilities, equipment and supplies which took place during December 2021. On 24 December 2021, there was looting and violence at the former UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) base in El Fasher, North Darfur, which was handed over to local Sudanese authorities three days earlier. On 28 December 2021, a World Food Programme warehouse in El Fasher was attacked by unknown armed groups. Over 1,900 metric tons of food commodities meant to feed 730,000 vulnerable people were stolen, according to the Secretary-General’s spokesperson.

Looking ahead, the Council will receive the semi-annual briefing of the ICC Prosecutor on Darfur on 17 January.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/01/sudan-meeting-under-any-other-business.php

TEXT: Terms of agreement between Sudan's Burhan and Hamdok (framework)

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the following report and a tweet outlining 14 articles in the political agreement between Gen. Burhan and PM Hamdok signed on Sunday 21 Nov 2021.

Here is a full copy of a report at The Eastern Herald www.easternherald.com

By Arab Desk - Dated Sunday 21 November 2021

Sudan… The terms of the political agreement between Al-Burhan and Hamdok (framework)

On Sunday [21 Nov 2021], the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Army, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, signed a political agreement with Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok; With the aim of ending the crisis that the country has been going through for about a month, in the wake of intense international pressure and continuous demonstrations calling for civilian rule.

The agreement, whose signing ceremony was attended by a number of military and political leaders, included 14 articles, as follows:

1- Emphasis on the constitutional document of 2019 and amended in 2020, and that it is the main reference for completing the transitional period.

2- The necessity of amending the constitutional document by consensus to ensure broad political participation, except for the dissolved National Congress Party (the party of former President Omar al-Bashir).

3- The partnership between civilians and the military is the guarantor of the stability and security of Sudan, based on an agreement to implement the partnership in a spirit and confidence, and a commitment to form a civilian government of independent competencies (technocrats).

4 – That the Sovereignty Council be the supervisor of the implementation of the tasks of the transitional period, without direct interference in the executive work.

5- Ensuring the transition of the transitional authority on time to an elected civilian government.

6- Managing the transitional period according to a declaration and a political framework in partnership between the military and civilians, the native administration, the resistance committees, the forces of the living revolution, the youth and women sectors, and the Sufi orders.

7- Conduct an investigation into the events that occurred during the demonstrations, including deaths and injuries of civilians and military personnel.

8- Implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and its entitlements, and the annexation of non-signatories.

9- Completing all the institutions of the transitional authority by forming the Legislative Council and the judicial organs from a constitutional court, appointing the chief justice and the attorney general, and completing the establishment of the rest of the negotiations and other transitional institutions.

10- Starting a broad dialogue with all political and societal forces and the forces of the live revolution establishes the establishment of a constitutional conference.

11- Re-work of the committee to remove the dismantling of the 1989 system and review its performance in the previous period.

12- The release of all political detainees.

13- Work to build a unified national army.

14- Annulment of the decision of the Sudanese army chief, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, to relieve Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Photo: Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Sudanese Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (File Photo/AP) © The Eastern Herald

View original: https://www.easternherald.com/2021/11/21/al-burhan-hamdok-political-agreement/

Sudan: Quick summary of 14-point Political Declaration circulating as a photo on WhatsApp

Here is a copy of a tweet by Eddie Thomas @eddiethomas88 dated 4:14 pm · 21 Nov 2021:

Quick summary of 14-point #PoliticalDeclaration circulating as a photo on WhatsApp. Declaration brings PM #Hamdok back into #Sudan govt. 

1. Constitutional Declaration of 2019, as amended in 2020, is ‘fundamental reference’ for completing transition, with  special attention to East

2. Constitutional Declaration needs amendment in order to ensure participation of all political forces apart from the dissolved National Congress Party. 

3. Civilian-military partnership necessary for stability, commitment to form civilian technocratic govt.

4. Oversight role for civil-military Sovereignty Council transition in line with Art.8 of Constitutional Declaration, no implementation role. 

5. Guarantee of transition to civilian rule ‘on time’ (the photo has actual date, July 2023, printed and then crossed out in pen)

6. Transition will be administered in line with a political declaration setting out partnership between civil forces, military structure, Native Administration chiefs, resistance committees, revolutionary forces, youth and women sectors, Sufi tariqas

7. All political prisoners to be released. 

8. Implementation of Juba Peace Agreement. 

9. Speed up completion of transitional institutions including legislature, constitutional court, Chief Justice and prosecutor, formation of other transitional commissions etc

10. Initiation of dialogue political, social and revolutionary forces to set up constitutional convention. 

11. Reestablish committee to dismantle Bashir regime, review its performance to date, support it with qualified staff, committee to hear appeals against its decisions

12. Investigation of civilians and military deaths and injuries during protests. 

13. Build unified national army. 

14. Repeal of decree of commander in chief dismissing PM Hamdok.

View original: 

https://twitter.com/eddiethomas88/status/1462454414699118594

UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss condemns military coup in Sudan - Calls for release of all detainees

Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has condemned the military coup in Sudan and called on the military to place the democratic transition back on course.

From:

UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Elizabeth Truss MP

Published Friday 5 November 2021

Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said:

The United Kingdom strongly condemns the military coup in Sudan on 25 October. In 2019, the Sudanese agreed on a unique partnership between civilians and military in order to steer Sudan’s transition to full democracy. That partnership delivered huge progress, from abolishing oppressive laws to economic reforms and the Juba Peace agreement to help end decades of conflict.

The military’s unilateral actions threaten all of these gains. In detaining civilian politicians and activists, and unilaterally amending the 2019 Constitutional Declaration, the military have undermined the spirit and letter of both that hard-won 2019 compromise, and also the Juba Peace Agreement. The Sudanese people have taken to the streets in their millions in recent days to reject these actions. International condemnation has been fast and widespread.

It is still however possible for Sudan’s transition to get back on course. The United Kingdom welcomes and supports mediation efforts and urge the military to engage in a spirit of compromise. We note the release of four detainees on 4 November, but call for the immediate and unconditional release of all those detained since 25 October, the restoration of the Constitutional Declaration as a starting point for dialogue, and for security forces to respect the right to peaceful protest.

The United Kingdom will continue to support the Sudanese people in their demands for freedom, peace and justice. The military have the opportunity to put the transition back on course; the United Kingdom urges them to do so now.

Media enquiries

Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

Telephone 020 7008 3100

Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

Published 5 November 2021

View original:  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-condemns-military-coup-in-sudan

العربية

Sudan: Military has far too much power (Eric Reeves)

• The RSF is still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue. 
• What about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago? 
• If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.
• Will Hemeti disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?
• Will all arrests be made only by policemen?
• One of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.  Read full story:

Analysis from Radio Dabanga.org

By Dr Eric Reeves - NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA

Published Wednesday 07 August 2019

The Constitutional Charter and the future of Sudan

FCC leader Ahmed Rabee and Hemeti with copies of the Constitutional Declaration during the signing ceremony in Khartoum on August 4 (Picture SUNA).

The “Constitutional Charter” (CC) signed on August 4 is an inspiring read, if stripped from the grim context in which it has been brought into being—if we forget the many hundreds who have been killed, wounded, raped, and tortured in the course of the uprising that has brought at least the hope of civilian governance into sight. The insistence on human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, press freedoms, tolerance, and indeed the priority of peace—all of this provides at least the ghostly outline of a what a free and just Sudan—truly at peace with itself—might look like.

But what has been stipulated in the CC and what seems likely in the near future seem to me two very different things, and I am far from alone in my misgivings. Canvassing Sudanese social media over the past three days—and for months prior to this—I find two major concerns, fundamental issues that many feel have not been addressed by the CC.

The first, and most frequent, is that far too much power has been left in the hands of the military, now a hybrid military, with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nominally under the command of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” (CC §34).* Moreover, many have observed that the RSF is left fully intact, a force unto itself, and still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue.

In Khartoum itself, all evidence points to a concerted plan by the RSF to undertake what has come to be known as the “June 3 Massacre,” in which more than 150 people were killed (perhaps many more), dozens of women and girls raped, and widespread violence of a sort not seen even during the uprising of September 2013. It is impossible to believe that the orders for the deadly clearance of protesters in front of army headquarters did not come from the Transitional Military Council, and indeed “Lt. General” Hemeti (he has no formal military training, a fact reflected in the lack of discipline throughout the RSF). Unsurprisingly, the RSF was again responsible for the deadly violence in El Obeid on July 29.

The second criticism, voiced in various forms, is that the fundamental economic issues in Sudan—a nation struggling under the burden of an economy that has largely collapsed—are nowhere addressed with any specificity. This is perhaps to be expected of an interim constitutional document, but the greatest hindrance to economic rehabilitation in Sudan has long been the inordinate amount of the national budget devoted to the military and security services. All independent Sudanese economists I’ve encountered estimate that the percentage is between 50% and 70% of all national expenditures.

Will the military men who play such a large role in what was to have been a movement to bring about civilian governance in Sudan willingly give up this previously compulsory largesse, provided by the ordinary people of Sudan? Senior officers have enjoyed what is by Sudanese standards a lavish salary and lifestyle: will they give this up in the interest of the nation? And what about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region, about which so much has been made in recent years? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago?

The point many Sudanese seem to be making is that the greatest obstacle—both to peace in the country and to economic rehabilitation—is the continuing central role of the armed forces in Sudan’s governance over the next 39 months. It may be that the members of the soon-to-be-dissolve Transitional Military Council (TMC) will no longer be able to move with the same ease of executive fiat as was the case during the al-Bashir years. But there are all too many “work-arounds” evident in the constitutional text, as well as the massive inherent power of the “deep state” that so many Sudanese worry about. 30 years of tyranny, corruption, war, and kleptocracy cannot be whisked away with any document, no matter how eloquent or impressively democratic. And Hemeti has proved himself at once hugely ambitious and unreservedly deceitful and expedient.

Here it is important to remember that the al-Bashir regime abided by not one of the agreements it signed during its long tenure: not the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (annexation of Abyei is only the most egregious violation of the various Protocols of the CPA, signed in January 2005); the Nuba Mountain ceasefire (January, 2002); the Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006); the peace agreement with the Eastern Front (October 2006); the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011); and the list goes on and on. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.

But such an outcome has one terrible downside for the military, if it indeed seizes national power: the economy will continue its collapse, and we may be sure that protests will resume, with anger even greater, political frustration even more intense. It’s hard to say what the economic consequences of eight months of sustained demonstrations, protests, and strikes has been—but it has been enormous, and the people of Sudan have seen just how powerful they are. Without a massive shift in economic priorities, which will entail cooperation from Sudan’s work force, agriculture will continue to decline; the ability to finance critical imports—including food, medicine, and refined petroleum products—will further diminish; and inflation that has brought so many Sudanese families to the very edge of survival continues to roar ahead, even as the Sudanese Pound continues its precipitous collapse.

More Challenges

Even now, of course, we must note Sudanese concern about what is not in the CC, and that is the July agreement between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The armed opposition has universally rejected the CC of August 4, and several political parties in Khartoum have now insisted that any real path forward requires much more participation from those in the armed movements, and especially civil society elements from the regions where the movements have been most active: Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Pessimism is in no short supply.

How will we know if this broadly shared pessimism is warranted? Usefully, the text of the CC provides for some early tests of the military’s willingness to embrace the ideals set forth:

[1] “All people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law” (§ 5.i). Will we see any change in Darfur, where the rule of law has been only a vague rumour for two decades and more? Where rape, murder, abduction, and pillaging are virtually daily events?

[2] “Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law”(§18.i). Does this apply to RSF commander Hemeti? Will he disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?

[3] “The General Intelligence Service is a uniformed agency that is competent in national security. Its duties are limited to gathering and analysing information and providing it to the competent bodies. The law defines its obligations and duties, and it is subject to the sovereign and executive authorities by law” (§36). Can we expect to see an end to the arrests and torture for which the “former” National Intelligence and Security Services are notorious? Will all arrests be made only by policemen? These questions are also raised by §45: “Every person has the right to freedom and security. No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention, or deprived of freedom or restricted therefrom except for cause in accordance with procedures defined by law.”

[4] §56 speaks of “the right to access the internet, without prejudice to public order, safety, and morals…” Will we see this? And who decides what is a threat to “to public order, safety, and morals”? Is the conditionality of this language a way to justify future internet shutdowns?

[5] §64 speaks of the State undertaking “to provide primary health care and emergency services free of charge for all citizens, develop public health, and establish, develop and qualify basic treatment and diagnostic institutions.” Does this mean that the ghastly humanitarian embargo imposed by the al-Bashir regime will at long last be lifted from large areas of South Kordofan, after eight years of suffering, hunger, and denial of assistance?

This last test of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.

In short, we could know very soon whether the Transitional Military Council, prior to its dissolution, means to send a signal of good faith. I’m not holding my breath.

* All citations are from a translation of the version of the Constitutional Charter that was signed on 4 August 2019, prepared by International IDEA (www.idea.int).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributing author or media and do not necessarily reflect the position of Radio Dabanga.

Eric Reeves is a regular contributor and commentator to Radio Dabanga. He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, who has spent the past 20+ years as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the USA and internationally **.
His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

View Original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan

Sudan: In Darfur Hemeti has victims by the millions

In Darfur Sudan Hemeti has victims by the millions - He's positioning to be paramilitary ruler of Darfur 

Note from Sudan Watch Editor: Who knows what the Canadian lobbying firm Dickens and Madson is doing to earn the $6 million it is being paid by Messrs Hemeti and al-Burhan? When I see news about Hemeti I read it carefully to check that he is not being turned into a hero after the atrocities he was responsible for in Darfur and for the 03 June 2019 massacre of innocent civilian protestors in Khartoum. So much grief.

The following article by AP has an interesting title.  People who've paid close attention to Sudan and South Sudan over the past 16+ years know Hemeti is a wicked monster.  He dropped out of primary school to become a camel herder.  Can he read and write?  After he initialled the constitutional declaration, he was photographed showing off its gold emblazoned folder.  In this photo he is holding it upside down.  Idiot.

Article by Associated Press

Written by JOSEPH KRAUSS and SAMY MAGDY 

Dated Tuesday, 06 August 2019 6:59 am

A new strongman in Sudan? Experts aren't so sure

CAIRO — When Sudan's protest leaders signed a preliminary power-sharing agreement with the ruling military council in early July, they had no choice but to shake hands with the man many of them accuse of ordering a massacre just a month earlier.

Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, a paramilitary commander from Darfur who is widely known as Hemedti, has emerged as Sudan's main power broker in the months since the military overthrew President Omar al-Bashir.

He boasts tens of thousands of paramilitary forces who have spent years battling insurgents across Sudan as well as rebels in Yemen on behalf of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Experts say he can draw on his family's vast livestock and gold mining operations in Darfur, as well as funding from Gulf Arab countries, to buy the support of tribal leaders and other local elites. That could be the recipe for a new patronage system like the one that kept al-Bashir in power for three decades.

But he also faces considerable headwinds: from the pro-democracy movement that has brought tens of thousands into the streets; from rival tribes and rebel groups that have battled his forces; and from elites in Khartoum, who view the onetime camel trader from distant Darfur as an outsider.

This week the protesters and the military announced a new breakthrough in their efforts to form a joint government that would pave the way to civilian rule. But the democratic transition remains fragile, and Hemedti's rise — along with the growing resistance to it — could plunge the country into further chaos.

A NEW PATRON

Hemedti leads the Rapid Support Forces, which grew out of the feared Janjaweed militias mobilized to put down a rebellion in Darfur in the early 2000s. The International Criminal Court, which charged al-Bashir and other top officials with genocide and crimes against humanity, has not brought charges against Hemedti. But rights groups say his forces burned villages and raped and killed civilians during a series of counterinsurgency campaigns over the last decade.

Spokesmen for the military and the RSF did not respond to multiple requests for comment on Hemedti's past actions or present ambitions.

His forces have won a number of military victories against both rebels and rival Arab tribes, allowing his family to expand its livestock business and branch into the mining of gold, which emerged as Sudan's biggest export after the secession of oil-rich South Sudan in 2011. He can also count on financial aid from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have contracted his forces to battle Iran-aligned rebels in Yemen.

There are few if any publicly available figures for the wealth at the disposal of Hemedti and the RSF. But in recent months he has boasted of depositing $1 billion in the Central Bank and paying the salaries of teachers and police.

"There are all the signs of someone who is trying to be the next military dictator of Sudan," said Suliman Baldo, a senior researcher with the Enough Project. But he doubts Hemedti can sustain a patronage system like the one that kept al-Bashir in power.

"Sudan is totally exhausted, the national economy is in total collapse because of all of this, and there is no way Hemedti can sustain a national economy," Baldo said.

DISTRUST IN KHARTOUM

In the months since al-Bashir's ouster, Hemedti has worked out of an office in the presidential residence, receiving foreign envoys and other officials. But in the capital he is still seen as an outsider.

"The Khartoum elites are unanimous that Hemedti cannot be the ruler of Sudan, because as an uneducated Darfurian he is from the wrong class and the wrong place, and lacks the formal qualifications of education or staff college," said Alex de Waal, a Sudan expert at Tufts University.

The protesters blame the RSF for the clearing of their main sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum on June 3, when security forces killed scores of people. Sudanese prosecutors have charged eight RSF officers, including a major general, with crimes against humanity but say the ruling generals did not order the crackdown.

Some protest leaders have called for the RSF to be disbanded, and both the Sudanese Professionals' Association, which spearheaded the protests against al-Bashir, and the Communist Party have said Hemedti should be tried for alleged crimes in Darfur.

In the end, however, under international pressure , the protesters returned to talks with the military over a power-sharing deal. The two sides signed a preliminary document last month. While Hemedti is technically the deputy head of the military council, it was he who attended the signing ceremony.

The follow-up constitutional document signed Sunday would place the RSF under the command of the military. The protesters said it would also allow for the prosecution of military or civilian leaders if there is evidence of involvement in violence against protesters. Hemedti hailed the deal as a "win-win."

RESISTANCE IN THE PROVINCES

Another route to power for Hemedti could run through the provinces, where neglect and marginalization by the central government have spawned rebellions going back decades.

"The most intriguing possibility today is that Hemedti will cash in on his credentials as a man of the far periphery, and build a support base that includes making agreements with the armed groups," de Waal said. He says Hemedti knows the price of loyalty from personal experience, and that the RSF can more readily integrate the armed groups.

An activist from Hemedti's Rizeigat tribe confirmed that he has paid "lots of money to tribal leaders" and provided jobs and other services to buy their loyalty.

"The opposition against him is silent because they fear the crackdown," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal.

Hemedti has also met with the leaders of various rebel groups — including those he has fought against — in Chad, South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. But experts say he may still have too many enemies from his past campaigns.

Jerome Tubiana, another Sudan researcher, said Hemedti has "already failed to secure a strong base in the center, and his bet to represent all the peripheries, or even the whole Darfur, will be uneasy given his violent past."

Baldo is also skeptical.

"In Darfur, he has victims by the millions and I don't think they will rally behind him," he said.

SOURCE: https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900082821/a-new-strongman-in-sudan-experts-arent-so-sure.html

Related News

Eid in Sudan: 9 killed, several injured after RSF launched assault on Shangal Toubaya, North Darfur

Sudan Watch - Sunday, 11 August 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/08/eid-in-sudan-9-killed-several-injured.html

Film: MEET THE JANJAWEED - Hemedti is positioning himself as paramilitary ruler of Darfur (Alex de Waal)

Sudan Watch - Tuesday, 13 August 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/08/film-meet-janjaweed-hemedti-is.html

Sudan, South Sudan police sign cooperation deal - Plans underway to reopen border crossings

Article from Middle East Monitor

Dated Monday, 05 August 2019 at 6:00 pm

Sudan, South Sudan police sign cooperation deal

Sudan and South Sudan police chiefs on Monday signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) aimed at expanding cooperation between both sides, Anadolu Agency reports.

Director General of Sudan’s Police Gen. Adil Mohamed and his delegation held meetings with the South Sudan team led by Inspector General of Police Gen. Majak Akec Malok in Juba.

Speaking to reporters after the signing, Malok said both sides signed a bilateral agreement after thorough discussions.

He pointed out that plans are underway to reopen border crossings between Sudan and South Sudan.

“There is a good cooperation between us and our doors are open for all Sudanese who are living with us here. In conclusion, the visit of the Sudanese police is successful,” Malok said.

Mohamed noted that the MoU encompasses all aspects of cooperation.

“Also, we signed a matrix for training and joint issues that will be looked into.

“The most important issue is the customs point between the two countries. We also looked at the issue of training and capacity building of the police in South Sudan. We talked about the need to help the police here using the available resources in Khartoum,” he said.

SOURCE: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190805-sudan-south-sudan-police-sign-cooperation-deal/

Analysis: Sudan's Constitutional Charter (Eric Reeves)

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Sudan researcher Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves entitled "The Constitutional Charter and the Future of Sudan” (a preliminary assessment of what has and has not been achieved, and the challenges ahead) dated Wednesday 07 August 2019. The analysis was published in full on the same date by Radio Dabanga online at https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan 

"The Constitutional Charter and the Future of Sudan,” Eric Reeves in Radio Dabanga, August 7, 2019 (a preliminary assessment of what has and has not been achieved, and the challenges ahead)https://t.co/C28otGjD55 pic.twitter.com/jziUlGVrvw

— Eric Reeves (@sudanreeves) 7 August 2019

To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1159206392940650501

Rome Statute of the ICC Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity: Ongoing murder of civilians in Sudan by the TMC junta meets definitional threshold

HERE is a copy of a tweet by Sudan expert Prof Eric Reeves @sudanreeves dated 01 August 2019: Our best definition of “crimes against humanity” comes from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (#ICC). Though the most difficult class of atrocity crimes to define, ongoing murder of civilians in Sudan by the #TMC junta clearly meets the definitional threshold.

Our best definition of “crimes against humanity” comes from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (#ICC). Though the most difficult class of atrocity crimes to define, ongoing murder of civilians in Sudan by the #TMC junta clearly meets the definitional threshold: pic.twitter.com/R6Vo6IpVJF

— Eric Reeves (@sudanreeves) 1 August 2019

To visit the above tweet click here: https://twitter.com/sudanreeves/status/1157028222015627264

Incoming Sudan govt will inherit $8.7-9.2bn trade deficit & business environment beset by corruption

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is an interesting thread of tweets by Sudanese economist Yousif Elmahdi posted on his Twitter page 02 August 2019 @Usiful_ME. 

Note, in the final tweet Yousif reveals the source of his data is as follows: Macro data is from IMF;  agriculture productivity estimates come from a private sector study commissioned by government;  export data is from a mix of sources. 

Yellow highlighting is mine for future reference. I have used green to highlight Yousif's sense of humour.

Yousif Elmahdi

The incoming #Sudan government will be inheriting an economy highlighted (as of 2018) by:

— $8.7-9.2bn trade deficit 

— Fuel subsidy of 8% GDP (over $3bn)

— Wheat subsidy of around $500m, on top of $800m import bill 

— 60% power coverage deficit (4,000 megawatts)

• Yousif Elmahdi
  Alongside this:
• — International reserves were as low as $1bn gross by end-2018. 
• — In reality, there are no reserves because the budget deficit meant Central Bank was financing a parallel budget. On-budget expenditure was covering roughly:
• Yousif Elmahdi
  - All of Chapter 1 (wages and salaries), of which 20-25% security sector wages.
• - 30% of Chapter 2 (capital expenditure)
• Yousif Elmahdi
  — Tax to GDP ratio was 6%. For reference, sub-Saharan Africa average is around 18%.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  — Oil production declined from 160,000 to 70,000 barrels, all of it consumed locally (w/ deficit imported) covering around: 
• - 30-40% diesel needs. For reference, total diesel consumption composition is est: 50% transport sector; 10% industry; 10% agriculture; 5% general)
• Yousif Elmahdi
  - 40-50% gasoline needs. For reference some of locally produced gasoline is exported to Ethiopia in exchange for 100-200 megawatts power. 
• - 70-80% LPG needs.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  — Gold production estimated at 100 tonnes ($4bn), but only 20/30 tonnes ($1.5bn) accounted. 80% artisan produced.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  — Agriculture sector v. low productivity and high cost of 45 million cultivated acres: 44m rain-fed; 1m irrigated (against 5m capacity). 
• Some examples: 
• - 8 million acres sesame: 100kg/acre ($300m exports). For comparison, Turkey produces around 1,700kg/acre.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Another example:
• - 2 million acres sorghum: 3 sacks/acre ($20-60m exports).
• Yousif Elmahdi
  — Business environment beset by corruption, especially around natural resources.
• - State-owned enterprises completely off-budget, no forensic audit etc.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  To fill gap: 
• — Govt. monetized (printed money), especially as couldn’t sell debt due to lack of credit worthiness of Govt. bonds. 
• -> Inflation 73% by end-2018.
• — KSA and UAE also provide $100m monthly in fuel, wheat, medicine, fertilizer etc.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  In the backdrop you have:
• — Real exchange rate that’s hugely overvalued. This of course:
• - renders the whole economy uncompetitive
• - while different exchange rates create distortions (80% transactions in parallel market).
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Given this context, the new government’s priorities must necessarily include:
• 1. Competitive exchange rate 
• 2. Tax reform 
• 3. Business climate reform (including banking sector) 
• 4. Infrastructure (especially energy sector)
• 5. Agriculture 
• 6. Health and Education
• Yousif Elmahdi
  The key priority, however, for new #Sudan Govt. will be to find the resources to finance all of this; to fill the budget deficit; and to cushion the poorest.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  On the latter, previous government social safety net program reached 500-600,000 families against 800,000 target. 
• With poverty rate currently estimated around 36%, about 3 million families (today) need same level of support. 
• Gap is around 1% GDP (based on $5/month support).
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Above all, any reform measures need to be grounded in citizen engagement, trust and awareness building, and transparency.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  A few additional points to this thread:  
• — Any serious & sustainable reform package would have to include (as priority) removal of fuel & wheat subsidies, esp. fuel. 
• - #Sudan fuel prices are amongst lowest in the world and the country simply can’t afford to maintain these
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Difficulty with fuel is that once the subsidy is removed, even if gradually or partially, prices will sky rocket across the entire economy. 
• We would be dealing with the sorts of numbers (in the 000s) you hear in some other countries across the continent.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Exchange rate competitiveness would also entail initial inflationary pressures, but ultimately helps private sector development by improving competitiveness.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Ramifications in the short to medium term would be severest on those whose incomes are not inflation adjusted (public sector especially), and on the poorest. 
• In theory, some of the savings could be directed towards expanding social safety nets and adjusting public sector wages
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Ultimately the public sector is severely bloated due largely to excessive administrative structure. 
• This would need to be reformed at some point but I won’t get into this rabbit hole right now.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Basically, the medicine will be very bitter, for very long before it’s positive effects can start to be felt. 
• Postponing it only exacerbates magnitude of problems to be addressed. This is what previous regime did, ironically because of regime sustainability considerations.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Previous regime structured economy in this way also for regime sustainability considerations (and perverse incentives) and could afford it while it had substantial oil revenues.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  What works in incoming transitional government’s favor is that it won’t be encumbered by election mandate or future election campaign. 
• In terms of resourcing it would potentially have many friends.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  So in theory provides an ideal platform to initiate difficult and politically divisive reforms. 
• However, this assumes the coalition remains stable, Cabinet is well constituted, and public trust can be quickly gained and sustained.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  On wheat imports (approx. $800m), I’ve heard that the major mills believe actual import needs are around $500m i.e. substantial amount of smuggling when you add on the subsidy (approx. $500m).
• It’s believed Khartoum consumes 65% of actual wheat needs.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Staying on agriculture, livestock is a significant export source, generating around $800m from 5 million heads. 
• But when you consider total livestock population, this is paltry, and largely due to lack of transport infrastructure.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  Value could also be significantly increased by exporting as meat (instead of live) but at present the infrastructure and value chains don’t exist.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  I sincerely hope those that assume power will recognize this and will be bold, empowered and supported to initiate reversal. We will need a significant leap in transparency and citizen engagement.
• Yousif Elmahdi
  @Fahad55121907  @Omer58606983  Macro data is from IMF. Agriculture productivity estimates come from a private sector study commissioned by government. Export data is from a mix of sources.
• 
  
• To visit and view the above series of tweets at Yousif's Twitter page click here:  https://twitter.com/Usiful_ME/status/1157545777243316227