Is Darfur sliding back into hell? Spate of violence in ‘ungovernable’ Darfur, Sudan stokes fears of war

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: Sadly, here we are again… (Thanks CW!) 

Is Darfur sliding back into hell? 

Spate of violence in ‘ungovernable’ region stokes fears of war. 

Hopes for lasting peace scatter as the region barrels towards a series of tit for tat tribal attacks – a grim echo of a not-so-distant past. 

A local power struggle is ongoing in Darfur. 

As the Sudanese currency tanks, the control of gold supplies has become incredibly important and many experts believe that Hemeti is the most powerful man in the country. 

He is also perhaps Russia’s top ally in the region, and spent a week in Moscow at the beginning of the Ukraine invasion. Read more:

Tens of thousands of people have been displaced – a grim echo of the past
CREDIT: RAMZI HAIDAR /AFP

From: The Telegraph, UK

By WILL BROWN, AFRICA CORRESPONDENT

Published Monday 23 May 2022; 4:21pm

Is Darfur sliding back into hell? Spate of violence in ‘ungovernable’ region stokes fears of war

Hopes for lasting peace scatter as the region barrels towards a series of tit for tat tribal attacks – a grim echo of a not-so-distant past

It was the first genocide of the 21st century. A once peaceful land governed by traditional leaders split along tribal fissures and turned into a killing field the size of France. Some 300,000 people were shot, brutalised or starved to death.

After two decades of horrors in Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, Ethiopia and now Ukraine, the name Darfur has fallen out of the international consciousness – a distant memory of famished children and men on horseback with Kalashnikovs that the world would rather forget.

But last month, events in southwestern Sudan scattered hopes of a lasting peace and sent Darfur barrelling towards a series of tit for tat tribal attacks.

On April 22, the small town of Kreinik and some 16 villages around it in the West Darfur region were surrounded by hundreds of armed men. Some came on horses, others on motorbikes or in Toyotas decked out with high calibre machine guns.

The men came from the Arab Reizegat tribe. The townsfolk were mainly members of the black ethnic Massalit community. Two Arabs had been recently killed in the town and the gunmen were out for revenge.

The attackers went on a killing spree and then stormed into the Geneina, the region’s capital. The UN said more than 1,000 armed Reizegats swept into the town. According to the governor of the region, the vastly outgunned regular government forces withdrew into the local garrison.

The Reizegats pillaged the town and by the time it was all over, some 200 people had been shot or butchered including medical staff at the main hospital. Tens of thousands had been displaced, a grim echo of a not-so-distant past.

“It is destined to continue and escalate. I don’t expect the violence to subside any time soon. Darfur is ungovernable right now for any armed security force,” said Suliman Baldo, at the International Centre for Transitional Justice and a top expert on Darfur. But why now? Why is Darfur slipping backwards after years of peace negotiations and tens of billions of dollars spent on peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts?

Unresolved tribal competition

The borderland area between Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic is probably the most ungoverned space on earth. Much of what’s going on is a mystery – but there are clearly several factors at play behind the spate of violence.

First, a local power struggle is ongoing. While Darfuri history and communal relations defy simplistic stereotypes, a key factor at the root of the recent spate of violence is a longstanding and unresolved tribal competition for access to resources, according to Mr Baldo.

Darfur is not the endless barren desert portrayed in glossy NGO brochures pleading for funding. Parts of the region are incredibly wealthy with good pasture, arable land and vast quantities of gold.

As Sudan’s tattered economy struggles with global shocks of the pandemic, war in Ukraine and a regional drought, competition over these scarce resources is increasing.

“This is strongly reminiscent of the conflict we’ve seen in Darfur before running along tribal and racial fissures,” said Jonas Horner, an independent expert on Sudan. “The root causes of those conflicts were never addressed.”

Events some 700 miles away in the Sudanese capital are also playing a major role.

For much of the last century, Darfur has been a periphery area that elites in the bustling metropole Khartoum have tried to dominate for resources. The current situation in Khartoum is tense and experts say power struggles are spilling out into the periphery.

Sudan’s old Islamist dictator, Omar al-Bashir – who once played different Darfuri groups against each other and terrorised Darfur with bands of Arab janjaweed militiamen – was swept away in a revolution in 2019 after almost four decades in power.

A liberal former UN-staffer, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, was charged with guiding Sudan along the road to full democracy as part of a complex transitional government. But he was ousted in a coup in October 2021.

Now two major groups are tussling for control. On one hand, is the Sudanese Armed Force (SAF), headed up by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan – who is now the de-facto head of state and in many ways represents the old interests of the old centralised elites.

On the other hand there is Hemeti, a Darfuri warlord from the same Arab Reizegat tribe who carried out last month’s massacre. Hemeti heads up a well-armed militia movement called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was formed out of the old janjaweed raiders and controls some of Darfur’s major gold mining areas.

Locked in a simmering struggle

As the Sudanese currency tanks, the control of gold supplies has become incredibly important and many experts believe that Hemeti is the most powerful man in the country. He is also perhaps Russia’s top ally in the region, and spent a week in Moscow at the beginning of the Ukraine invasion.

Both the SAF and RSF are locked in a simmering struggle which keeps coming perilously close to outright conflict. There are multiple eyewitnesses and media reports indicating that uniformed RSF soldiers supported the Rizeigat Arabs when they attacked the Massalit last month.

Even though the SAF forces have a duty to protect Sudanese civilians, they did not want to confront the RSF in Darfur – most probably because it could have escalated into an even larger fight.

Mr Baldo said the recent attacks shows just how incompetent and ethnicised Sudan’s security forces are, and how little control the Sudanese state has in rural areas.

“The massacre is an indictment of the military-led government in Khartoum, in place since the October 25, 2021 coup. When the military seized power their claim was that they – as security forces – needed to step in to provide security,” Mr Horner said.

“Recent evidence in Darfur and elsewhere sees them failing completely in their most fundamental task,” he added.

Russian mercenaries could also be a factor in the recent spate of violence. Mercenaries working for the Wagner group are involved in diamond and gold mining in the Central Africa Republic and have been accused of carrying out massacres close to the Sudanese border.

This could be feeding into local power dynamics in the Darfur area, upsetting a complex web of local interests in ways which are not fully understood.

Another factor is Chad. The country’s former dictator Idriss Déby used to be the West’s go-to strong man in Central Africa. Mr Deby’s well-trained desert army helped keep a lid on many of the nastiest groups in the region for years, guaranteeing his dictatorial regime strong Western support.

But since Mr Déby was killed last year, allegedly while fighting with his troops on the frontline, his son Mahamat Idriss Déby has struggled to fill his father's shoes. The Chadian security forces are struggling to exert the same amount of influence in Chad’s borderland areas.

This could, Mr Horner says, be giving oxygen to some of the more violent groups in Darfur.

PHOTO AND CAPTION: Darfur has fallen out of the international consciousness – a distant memory that the world would rather forget CREDIT: Zohra Bensemra/Reuters

PHOTO AND CAPTION: A child refugee from the Darfur region of Sudan pictured at a refugee camp in Chad in 2004 CREDIT: Scott Nelson/Getty Images

PHOTO AND CAPTION: A local power struggle is ongoing in Dafur CREDIT: MARCO LONGARI,/AFP

PHOTO AND CAPTION: Supporters of Sudan's former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir protest in Khartoum in 2008 CREDIT: MOHAMED NURELDIN ABDALLAH /REUTERS

View the original here: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/terror-and-security/darfur-sliding-back-spate-violence-ungovernable-region-stokes/

Sudanese Pound hits record lows against world currencies - Committee to investigate El Fakhir

The rate of the Sudanese Pound (SDG) is trading at all-time lows on the streets of Khartoum. There is no end in sight for the ongoing economic malaise in the country – largely a legacy of the corruption and mismanagement by the deposed Al Bashir regime – that has led to unrelenting price hikes for consumer goods, and widespread shortages of bare essentials such as bread. Read more.

Sudanese Pound hits record lows against world currencies

Report from and by Radio Dabanga.org

Dated Thursday 27 February 2020

Photo: A man waits for his money at currency exchange brokerage in Khartoum (Photo: ASHRAF SHAZLY / AFP)

(KHARTOUM) - On Wednesday [Feb 26], traders in Khartoum were asking SDG 107 for one US Dollar (USD) the highest cost for the greenback to date. By comparison, today’s official daily middle US Dollar rate quoted by the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS) is SDG 54.63.

According to dealers who spoke to Radio Dabanga, Pound Sterling (GBP) reached SDG 136.74 on the parallel market, while the price of the Euro reached SDG 114.48. Saudi Riyal (SAR) reached SDG 28.26 on, while the Emirati Dirham (AED) reached SDG 29.04, and the Qatari Riyal (QAR) trades for SDG 29.07.

The head of the Flour and Fuel Distribution Unit in South Darfur announced that the quantities of flour available in the state do not exceed 3,000 50 kg sacks, which is not enough for a day.

He attributed this to the departure of three of the five companies that supplied flour to the state.

In a meeting with the flour distribution mechanism on Tuesday, the acting governor of the state, Maj Gen Hashim Khaled, harshly criticised the mechanism for not notifying him earlier of the seriousness and exacerbation of the state’s bread flour crisis.

Rising commodity prices

Members of the Sudanese Professionals Association of the Ministry of Finance in Kassala accused the state government of causing the price of 50 kg bag of sugar to rise from SDG 1,850 ($33.86*) to SDG 3,100 ($56.74).

In a statement, she stated that the state’s Ministry of Finance has sold a large amount of subsidised sugar, estimated at 32,000 sacks to merchants, expecting increase in sugar prices due to this procedure and demanded the governor of the state to direct the return of the sugar sold to the merchants immediately so that it can go to the target citizen in the specified manner and the specified price, threatening to follow the legal means to return it.

They also demanded the formation of an investigation committee to find out those responsible administratively for this administrative corruption that occurred and hold them accountable immediately.

As reported by Radio Dabanga on February 13, Sudan’s Minister of Industry and Trade Madani Abbas, has apologised to the Sudanese people for the lack of a solution to the bread shortage. He affirmed the state’s commitment to continue subsidising bread until the end of the transitional period. The government currently subsidises a sack of flour by more than SDG 1,600 ($30).

Economists

In recent days, independent economic experts have cited the instability of the Dollar exchange rate and subsidies as major factors in Sudan’s economic crisis.

In an interview with Radio Dabanga, Professor Hamid Eltigani, economist and Head of the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo.

He describes the economic situation as “dangerous”. He warns against “an explosion in the country” in case the economic crisis is not dealt with. He calls for a gradual lifting of subsidies on petrol and diesel, and normalisation of the exchange rate between the Sudanese Pound and the US Dollar.

In an interview with Radio Dabanga this week, former banker and civil society activist Hafiz Ismail, who is a leading member of the Sudanese panel of experts, says that “the current economic crisis is attributable to the lack of vision and the absence of an economic plan to manage the crisis”.

Ismail warns of economic collapse in the country due to the rapid deterioration in value of the Sudanese Pound “around the clock”. He expressed concern that the economic failure would “neutralise the public towards the government and increase the growing rejectionist trend“.

The analyst told Radio Dabanga that the Sudanese economy suffers from two distortions, namely commodity subsidy and multiple [Central Bank of Sudan, customs, and unofficial] exchange rates, and calls “for the development of policies to mitigate harm to the most affected groups through social security networks in preparation for the lifting of subsidies”.

In a separate interview with Radio Dabanga, Professor Hamid Eltigani, economist and Head of the Department of Public Policy and Administration at the American University in Cairo.

He describes the economic situation as “dangerous”. He warns against “an explosion in the country” in case the economic crisis is not dealt with. He calls for a gradual lifting of subsidies on petrol and diesel, and normalisation of the exchange rate between the Sudanese Pound and the US Dollar.

* USD 1 = SDG 54.63 at the time of publishing this article. As effective foreign exchange rates can vary in Sudan, Radio Dabanga bases all SDG currency conversions on the daily middle US Dollar rate quoted by the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS).

View Original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudanese-pound-hits-record-lows-against-hard-currencies

NEWS HEADLINES

March 8 - 2020 KHARTOUM

Sudan: FFC, SSC and the cabinet working together to address the economic crisis
Further, the committee is authorised to form a fact-finding committee to investigate the El Fakhir company, which is reportedly monopolising the gold market in the country with large amounts of cash and the purchase of gold at unreasonable prices.

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Sudan’s sorghum production one third less than last year

March 7 - 2020 SIRBA

Gold mining to continue in West Darfur’s Sirba

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Sudan Finance Minister apologises for govt's inability to curb inflation

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Violence in Central Darfur: Five people killed, two injured, police station torched

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Activists criticise Sudan’s committee tasked with purging remnants of old regime

March 5 - 2020 KHARTOUM

Sudanese Pound hits new low as US Dollar and gold prices soar

Sudan: Military has far too much power (Eric Reeves)

• The RSF is still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue. 
• What about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago? 
• If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.
• Will Hemeti disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?
• Will all arrests be made only by policemen?
• One of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.  Read full story:

Analysis from Radio Dabanga.org

By Dr Eric Reeves - NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA

Published Wednesday 07 August 2019

The Constitutional Charter and the future of Sudan

FCC leader Ahmed Rabee and Hemeti with copies of the Constitutional Declaration during the signing ceremony in Khartoum on August 4 (Picture SUNA).

The “Constitutional Charter” (CC) signed on August 4 is an inspiring read, if stripped from the grim context in which it has been brought into being—if we forget the many hundreds who have been killed, wounded, raped, and tortured in the course of the uprising that has brought at least the hope of civilian governance into sight. The insistence on human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, press freedoms, tolerance, and indeed the priority of peace—all of this provides at least the ghostly outline of a what a free and just Sudan—truly at peace with itself—might look like.

But what has been stipulated in the CC and what seems likely in the near future seem to me two very different things, and I am far from alone in my misgivings. Canvassing Sudanese social media over the past three days—and for months prior to this—I find two major concerns, fundamental issues that many feel have not been addressed by the CC.

The first, and most frequent, is that far too much power has been left in the hands of the military, now a hybrid military, with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nominally under the command of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” (CC §34).* Moreover, many have observed that the RSF is left fully intact, a force unto itself, and still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue.

In Khartoum itself, all evidence points to a concerted plan by the RSF to undertake what has come to be known as the “June 3 Massacre,” in which more than 150 people were killed (perhaps many more), dozens of women and girls raped, and widespread violence of a sort not seen even during the uprising of September 2013. It is impossible to believe that the orders for the deadly clearance of protesters in front of army headquarters did not come from the Transitional Military Council, and indeed “Lt. General” Hemeti (he has no formal military training, a fact reflected in the lack of discipline throughout the RSF). Unsurprisingly, the RSF was again responsible for the deadly violence in El Obeid on July 29.

The second criticism, voiced in various forms, is that the fundamental economic issues in Sudan—a nation struggling under the burden of an economy that has largely collapsed—are nowhere addressed with any specificity. This is perhaps to be expected of an interim constitutional document, but the greatest hindrance to economic rehabilitation in Sudan has long been the inordinate amount of the national budget devoted to the military and security services. All independent Sudanese economists I’ve encountered estimate that the percentage is between 50% and 70% of all national expenditures.

Will the military men who play such a large role in what was to have been a movement to bring about civilian governance in Sudan willingly give up this previously compulsory largesse, provided by the ordinary people of Sudan? Senior officers have enjoyed what is by Sudanese standards a lavish salary and lifestyle: will they give this up in the interest of the nation? And what about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region, about which so much has been made in recent years? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago?

The point many Sudanese seem to be making is that the greatest obstacle—both to peace in the country and to economic rehabilitation—is the continuing central role of the armed forces in Sudan’s governance over the next 39 months. It may be that the members of the soon-to-be-dissolve Transitional Military Council (TMC) will no longer be able to move with the same ease of executive fiat as was the case during the al-Bashir years. But there are all too many “work-arounds” evident in the constitutional text, as well as the massive inherent power of the “deep state” that so many Sudanese worry about. 30 years of tyranny, corruption, war, and kleptocracy cannot be whisked away with any document, no matter how eloquent or impressively democratic. And Hemeti has proved himself at once hugely ambitious and unreservedly deceitful and expedient.

Here it is important to remember that the al-Bashir regime abided by not one of the agreements it signed during its long tenure: not the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (annexation of Abyei is only the most egregious violation of the various Protocols of the CPA, signed in January 2005); the Nuba Mountain ceasefire (January, 2002); the Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006); the peace agreement with the Eastern Front (October 2006); the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011); and the list goes on and on. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.

But such an outcome has one terrible downside for the military, if it indeed seizes national power: the economy will continue its collapse, and we may be sure that protests will resume, with anger even greater, political frustration even more intense. It’s hard to say what the economic consequences of eight months of sustained demonstrations, protests, and strikes has been—but it has been enormous, and the people of Sudan have seen just how powerful they are. Without a massive shift in economic priorities, which will entail cooperation from Sudan’s work force, agriculture will continue to decline; the ability to finance critical imports—including food, medicine, and refined petroleum products—will further diminish; and inflation that has brought so many Sudanese families to the very edge of survival continues to roar ahead, even as the Sudanese Pound continues its precipitous collapse.

More Challenges

Even now, of course, we must note Sudanese concern about what is not in the CC, and that is the July agreement between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The armed opposition has universally rejected the CC of August 4, and several political parties in Khartoum have now insisted that any real path forward requires much more participation from those in the armed movements, and especially civil society elements from the regions where the movements have been most active: Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Pessimism is in no short supply.

How will we know if this broadly shared pessimism is warranted? Usefully, the text of the CC provides for some early tests of the military’s willingness to embrace the ideals set forth:

[1] “All people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law” (§ 5.i). Will we see any change in Darfur, where the rule of law has been only a vague rumour for two decades and more? Where rape, murder, abduction, and pillaging are virtually daily events?

[2] “Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law”(§18.i). Does this apply to RSF commander Hemeti? Will he disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?

[3] “The General Intelligence Service is a uniformed agency that is competent in national security. Its duties are limited to gathering and analysing information and providing it to the competent bodies. The law defines its obligations and duties, and it is subject to the sovereign and executive authorities by law” (§36). Can we expect to see an end to the arrests and torture for which the “former” National Intelligence and Security Services are notorious? Will all arrests be made only by policemen? These questions are also raised by §45: “Every person has the right to freedom and security. No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention, or deprived of freedom or restricted therefrom except for cause in accordance with procedures defined by law.”

[4] §56 speaks of “the right to access the internet, without prejudice to public order, safety, and morals…” Will we see this? And who decides what is a threat to “to public order, safety, and morals”? Is the conditionality of this language a way to justify future internet shutdowns?

[5] §64 speaks of the State undertaking “to provide primary health care and emergency services free of charge for all citizens, develop public health, and establish, develop and qualify basic treatment and diagnostic institutions.” Does this mean that the ghastly humanitarian embargo imposed by the al-Bashir regime will at long last be lifted from large areas of South Kordofan, after eight years of suffering, hunger, and denial of assistance?

This last test of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.

In short, we could know very soon whether the Transitional Military Council, prior to its dissolution, means to send a signal of good faith. I’m not holding my breath.

* All citations are from a translation of the version of the Constitutional Charter that was signed on 4 August 2019, prepared by International IDEA (www.idea.int).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributing author or media and do not necessarily reflect the position of Radio Dabanga.

Eric Reeves is a regular contributor and commentator to Radio Dabanga. He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, who has spent the past 20+ years as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the USA and internationally **.
His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

View Original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan

Sudan: UN report links Musa Hilal to gold profiteering (Part 6)

Article from Foreign Policy

BY COLUM LYNCH 

Dated 04 APRIL 2016, 8:50 PM

EXCLUSIVE

Russia Blocks U.N. Report Linking Alleged Sudanese War Criminal to Gold Profiteering

A leader of the militia that terrorized Darfur is pocketing $54 million a year from gold sales. Why won’t Moscow release a confidential report documenting his abuses?

Tribal leader Musa Hilal arrives in the village of Kala in the West Darfur region of Sudan on Monday, July 12, 2004. Hilal is accused by U.S. officials of being the leader of the Janjaweed which is accused of atrocities in Sudan. (gsb) 2004 (Photo by Evelyn Hockstein/MCT/MCT via Getty Images)

Musa Hilal, an alleged Sudanese mass killer who helped place Darfur on the map of modern genocides, has added a new title to his resume: multimillionaire gold digger.

A key leader of the Janjaweed, the horseback marauders who terrorized Darfuris in 2003 and 2004, Hilal and his armed crew earn about $54 million a year in profits from Jebel Amir, one of the largest unregulated gold mines in Darfur, according to a confidential report by a U.N. Security Council panel.

But the report’s release has been blocked by Russia, which is seeking to redact key details on the Sudanese gold trade. Russia has also refused to extend the contracts of the panel’s five members, effectively putting them out of work. Neither move has previously been reported.

In December, Russia dismissed the report as “extremely biased” and based on “speculation,” according to a diplomatic source. Moscow said it would only accede to the report’s publication if the “most controversial paragraphs are edited out.”

The United States and its Western allies rejected the Russian demand, saying it would set a precedent that would ultimately undermine the independence of U.N. sanctions panels like the committee charged with overseeing the measures taken against Khartoum after the genocide in Darfur. The panel’s findings highlighted the failure of U.N. sanctions to constrain the ongoing fighting between Sudanese authorities, their armed proxies, and opposition groups that has kept the troubled region mired in a state of chaos and violence for more than 15 years. The panel’s report claims that the gold trade has put more than $123 million into the pockets of armed groups throughout Darfur, in addition to Hilal’s earnings.

Moscow views the panel’s push to scrutinize Sudan’s gold industry as part of a politically motivated campaign to punish and weaken Khartoum, rather than promote peace and security in Darfur. A spokesman for the Russian mission to the United Nations, Alexey Zaytsev, told Foreign Policy by email Monday that Moscow put a “hold” on the publication, “pending further consultations in the council,” but didn’t block it.

“The reports by this panel have rarely been balanced or objective,” Zaytsev said. “But the degree of lopsided, unrestrained, and generally unfounded criticism of the Sudanese authorities in the latest report just ran over the top.”

The report, he added, risked “depriving thousands of Darfuri miners of their means of existence.”

The Darfur conflict has its roots in a 2003 uprising by ethnic minorities against the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum. The Sudanese government, working in concert with Hilal’s Janjaweed militia, carried out a scorched-earth campaign that displaced more than 2.5 million people and resulted in the deaths of more than 300,000 Darfuris.

In response, the International Criminal Court charged Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, with three counts of genocide and issued an arrest warrant that has never been executed. Five other Sudanese nationals were accused of multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hilal was never charged by the court, but in 2006, his name was placed on a U.N. Security Council list of individuals banned from travel outside Sudan and subject to a financial asset freeze for impeding the peace process and attacking civilians.

“We all thought he should have been a real target of an ICC investigation, given the facts we documented in our own interviews and fact-finding,” said Richard Dicker, an expert on the International Criminal Court who heads the international justice program at Human Rights Watch.

The panel found that violence was continuing in Darfur, reinforcing reports by Human Rights Watch that a government-backed armed group, the Rapid Support Forces, committed atrocities, including widespread sexual assault.

The report also documented a 225 percent increase in attacks against the joint U.N.-African Union Mission in Darfur, or UNAMID, in 2015. The Sudanese government refused the panel’s request to interview a suspect in a May 24 attack on the peacekeeping mission in the town of Kabkabiya, where Arab militias opened fire on four Rwandan peacekeepers, killing one. Sudan’s refusal to make the suspect available “adversely affects the panel’s ability to gather information, including biometrics” needed to complete the investigation into the attack, according to the panel report.

The Sudanese Air Force, meanwhile, continues to deploy attack helicopters and Antonov An-26 bombers in violation of a U.N. arms embargo, according to the report. The panel also uncovered “clear evidence” that Sudan has deployed cluster munitions in Darfur.

Hilal’s gold mining gives him access to substantial amounts of money and could mark a new phase in the Darfur conflict.

Gold has become an increasingly vital source of national wealth for Khartoum since South Sudan separated from Sudan and declared independence in 2011, taking with it most of the oil fields.

Unregulated gold mining has emerged as a major source of revenue for Darfur’s armed groups. Between 2010 and 2014, more than $4.5 billion in gold was smuggled from Sudan to the United Arab Emirates, according to the U.N. panel report. In 2008, gold accounted for only 1 percent of total Sudanese exports. By 2014, that number had risen to 30 percent, the report stated.

Hilal seized control of the Jebel Amir mines in January 2013 after the Sudanese Armed Forces withdrew from the site to avoid a violent confrontation with his forces.

The report found that Hilal has since turned the area into a gigantic ATM. He charges gold mining merchants $164 per month to do business at the site while vendors interested in providing services to gold prospectors must pay up to $197 per month to operate a stall. Every butcher on the site, meanwhile, must pay $3.28 to Hilal for every slaughtered sheep. All told, the report found that Hilal and his armed followers make $54 million a year from their control of the gold mines.

Hilal has had a complicated relationship with the Sudanese government since 2003, when he was released from prison and helped to lead a government-backed campaign against rebel forces. In 2008, he was named a special advisor to the president, an appointment that brought him to the center of national power in Khartoum.

Hilal has since returned to Darfur to develop his personal power base. In January 2014, he defected from the ruling National Congress party to form the Sudanese Awakening Revolutionary Council and is believed to have ambitions to become Darfur’s governor. Today, Hilal effectively controls more than 400 mines in Jebel Amir, and his permission is required for prospectors or other vendors hoping to enter the area.

The new U.N. report found that Hilal continues to collaborate with Sudanese forces and engage in millions of dollars’ worth of deals with the Central Bank of Sudan. The panel charges that the bank, which facilitates the gold trade, failed to comply with its obligation to freeze Hilal’s assets while the government also permitted him to travel beyond Sudan’s borders with impunity.

In an interview, Sudan’s U.N. ambassador, Omer Dahab Fadl Mohamed, told FP that Hilal hadn’t sold gold to the UAE through the Sudanese banking system. “He doesn’t have an account and did not export gold through the Central Bank of Sudan,” Mohamed said.

Mohamed said the move to sanction Sudan’s gold trade is the latest in a decades-long effort, led by the United States and its allies, to “deprive us of our natural resources.” Nearly two months ago, Sudan summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Khartoum to protest a move by Washington to include illicit gold prospecting in a U.N. list of activities subject to sanctions.

He said that Sudanese mining statistics show that only 13.3 percent of the country’s gold exports come from Darfur, with only “a limited amount” of that coming from Jebel Amir. He said that the Sudanese government has recently taken control of the Jebel Amir mines, something disputed by the U.N. panel, which has said it believes Hilal is still running them.

As for the panel’s claim that Sudan failed to enforce the U.N. travel ban on Hilal, Mohamed said: “The problem we’re facing with Musa Hilal is that he is leading a nomadic lifestyle. It is difficult for us to track his movements.”

Photo credit: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/MCT via Getty Images

Colum Lynch is a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @columlynch

View original:  https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/04/russia-blocks-u-n-report-linking-alleged-sudanese-war-criminal-to-gold-profiteering/

Hat tip:  https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/russia-blocks-un-report-on-darfur-gold-trade

Sudan: Hilal "I am the leader of all the Arab tribes in Darfur" (Part 4)

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: This is Part 4 of a series of posts about Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur, western Sudan. Unfortunately, there was a technical hitch and Part 4 entitled 'Sudan: Hilal turned his forces on SAF and RSF' was deleted.

I have substituted it with the below copied article by BBC News 20 July 2019 by Sudan and Africa expert Dr Alex de Waal, a must-read. Below Alex's article I have re-printed a BBC report dated 2017 about Musa Hilal and his son being arrested. 

Finally, here is an excerpt from Rebecca Hamilton's 03 Dec 2009 article entitled 'The Monster of Darfur': "As Hilal explains it, Arabs were forced to flee their villages long before any “zurga” (literally “black,” a derogatory term for non-Arabs). But, he added scathingly, “[W]e would never go to a [displaced persons] camp and be seen as beggars." To solve the crisis in Darfur, Arabs have to be in charge, he continued. "We have the majority in the field. We have the majority of the livestock. There can be no solution without us”. He sat back in his chair and lit a cigarette. “I am not the leader of the Janjaweed. I am the leader of all the Arab tribes in Darfur,” Hilal said, his relaxed confidence returning." [View original here: https://newrepublic.com/article/71627/the-monster-darfur]

BBC News report

By ALEX DE WAAL

Published 20 July 2019

Sudan crisis: The ruthless mercenaries who run the country for gold

Photo: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of widespread abuses in Sudan, including the 3 June massacre in which more than 120 people were reportedly killed, with many of the dead dumped in the River Nile Sudan expert Alex de Waal charts their rise. (Photo credit AFP)

The RSF are now the real ruling power in Sudan. They are a new kind of regime: a hybrid of ethnic militia and business enterprise, a transnational mercenary force that has captured a state.

Their commander is General Mohamed Hamdan "Hemeti" Dagolo, and he and his fighters have come a long way since their early days as a rag-tag Arab militia widely denigrated as the "Janjaweed".

The RSF was formally established by decree of then-President Omar al-Bashir in 2013. But their core of 5,000 militiamen had been armed and active long before then.

Their story begins in 2003, when Mr Bashir's government mobilised Arab herders to fight against black African insurgents in Darfur.

'Meet the Janjaweed'

The core of the Janjaweed were camel-herding nomads from the Mahamid and Mahariya branches of the Rizeigat ethnic group of northern Darfur and adjoining areas of Chad - they ranged across the desert edge long before the border was drawn.

During the 2003-2005 Darfur war and massacres, the most infamous Janjaweed leader was Musa Hilal, chief of the Mahamid.

Human rights groups accuse Musa Hilal of leading a brutal campaign in Darfur  Image copyright AFP

As these fighters proved their bloody efficacy, Mr Bashir formalised them into a paramilitary force called the Border Intelligence Units.

One brigade, active in southern Darfur, included a particularly dynamic young fighter, Mohamed Dagolo, known as "Hemeti" because of his baby-faced looks - Hemeti being a mother's endearing term for "Little Mohamed".

A school dropout turned small-time trader, he was a member of the Mahariya clan of the Rizeigat. Some say that his grandfather was a junior chief when they resided in Chad.

A crucial interlude in Hemeti's career occurred in 2007, when his troops became discontented over the government's failure to pay them.

They felt they had been exploited - sent to the frontline, blamed for atrocities, and then abandoned.

Hemeti and his fighters mutinied, promising to fight Khartoum "until judgement day", and tried to cut a deal with the Darfur rebels.

A documentary shot during this time, called Meet the Janjaweed, shows him recruiting volunteers from Darfur's black African Fur ethnic group into his army, to fight alongside his Arabs, their former enemies.

Although Hemeti's commanders are all from his own Mahariya clan, he has been ready to enlist men of all ethnic groups. On one recent occasion the RSF absorbed a breakaway faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) - led by Mohamedein Ismail "Orgajor", an ethnic Zaghawa - another Darfur community which had been linked to the rebels.

Consolidating power

Hemeti went back to Khartoum when he was offered a sweet deal: back pay for his troops, ranks for his officers (he became a brigadier general - to the chagrin of army officers who had gone to staff college and climbed the ranks), and a handsome cash payment.

His troops were put under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), at that time organising a proxy war with Chad.

Some of Hemeti's fighters, serving under the banner of the Chadian opposition, fought their way as far as the Chadian capital, N'Djamena, in 2008.

Meanwhile, Hemeti fell out with his former master, Hilal - their feud was to be a feature of Darfur for 10 years. Hilal was a serial mutineer, and Mr Bashir's generals found Hemeti more dependable.

In 2013, a new paramilitary force was formed under Hemeti and called the RSF.

The army chief of staff did not like it - he wanted the money to go to strengthening the regular forces - and Mr Bashir was worried about putting too much power in the hands of NISS, having just fired its director for allegedly conspiring against him.

So the RSF was made answerable to Mr Bashir himself - the president gave Hemeti the nickname "Himayti", meaning "My Protector".

Training camps were set up near the capital, Khartoum. Hundreds of Land Cruiser pick-up trucks were imported and fitted out with machine guns.

RSF troops fought against rebels in South Kordofan - they were undisciplined and did not do well - and against rebels in Darfur, where they did better.

Gold rush

Hemeti's rivalry with Hilal intensified when gold was discovered at Jebel Amir in North Darfur state in 2012.

Coming at just the moment when Sudan was facing an economic crisis because South Sudan had broken away, taking with it 75% of the country's oil, this seemed like a godsend.

Sudan is one of Africa’s biggest gold producers

But it was more of a curse. Tens of thousands of young men flocked to a remote corner of Darfur in a latter-day gold rush to try their luck in shallow mines with rudimentary equipment.

Some struck gold and became rich, others were crushed in collapsing shafts or poisoned by the mercury and arsenic used to process the nuggets

Hilal's militiamen forcibly took over the area, killing more than 800 people from the local Beni Hussein ethnic group, and began to get rich by mining and selling the gold.

Some gold was sold to the government, which paid above the market price in Sudanese money because it was so desperate to get its hands on gold that it could sell on in Dubai for hard currency.

Meanwhile some gold was smuggled across the border to Chad, where it was profitably exchanged in a racket involving buying stolen vehicles and smuggling them back into Sudan.

Hemeti has loyal supporters outside the capital

In the desert markets of Tibesti in northern Chad, a 1.5kg (3.3lb) of unwrought gold was bartered for a 2015 model Land Cruiser, probably stolen from an aid agency in Darfur, which was then driven back to Darfur, fitted out with hand-painted licence plates and resold.

By 2017, gold sales accounted for 40% of Sudan's exports. And Hemeti was keen to control them.

He already owned some mines and had set up a trading company known as al-Junaid. But when Hilal challenged Mr Bashir one more time, denying the government access to Jebel Amir's mines, Hemeti's RSF went on the counter-attack.

In November 2017, his forces arrested Hilal [ https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-42141938 ], and the RSF took over Sudan's most lucrative gold mines.

Regional muscle

Hemeti overnight became the country's biggest gold trader and - by controlling the border with Chad and Libya - its biggest border guard. Hilal remains in prison.

Under the Khartoum Process, the European Union funded the Sudanese government to control migration across the Sahara to Libya.

Although the EU consistently denies it, many Sudanese believe that this gave license to the RSF to police the border, extracting bribes, levies and ransoms - and doing its share of trafficking too.

RSF fighters have fought for Yemen’s government in the civil war which is devastating the country

Dubai is the destination for almost all of Sudan's gold, official or smuggled. But Hemeti's contacts with the UAE soon became more than just commercial.

In 2015, the Sudanese government agreed to send a battalion of regular forces to serve with the Saudi-Emirati coalition forces in Yemen - its commander was Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, now chair of the ruling Transitional Military Council.

But a few months later, the UAE struck a parallel deal with Hemeti to send a much larger force of RSF fighters, for combat in south Yemen and along the Tahama plain - which includes the port city of Hudaydah, the scene of fierce fighting last year.

Hemeti also provided units to help guard the Saudi Arabian border with Yemen.

By this time, the RSF's strength had grown tenfold. Its command structure didn't change: all are Darfurian Arabs, its generals sharing the Dagolo name.

With 70,000 men and more than 10,000 armed pick-up trucks, the RSF became Sudan's de facto infantry, the one force capable of controlling the streets of the capital, Khartoum, and other cities.

Cash handouts and PR polish

Through gold and officially sanctioned mercenary activity, Hemeti came to control Sudan's largest "political budget" - money that can be spent on private security, or any activity, without needing to give an account.

Run by his relatives, the Al-Junaid company had become a vast conglomerate covering investment, mining, transport, car rental, and iron and steel.

Since April, Hemeti has moved fast, politically and commercially

By the time Mr Bashir was ousted in April, Hemeti was one of the richest men in Sudan - probably with more ready cash than any other politician - and was at the centre of a web of patronage, secret security deals, and political payoffs. It is no surprise that he moved swiftly to take the place of his fallen patron.

Hemeti has moved fast, politically and commercially.

Every week he is seen in the news, handing cash to the police to get them back on the streets, to electric workers to restore services, or to teachers to have them return to the classrooms. He handed out cars to tribal chiefs.

As the UN-African Union peacekeeping force drew down in Darfur, the RSF took over their camps - until the UN put a halt to the withdrawal.

Hemeti says he has increased his RSF contingent in Yemen and has despatched a brigade to Libya to fight alongside the rogue general Khalifa Haftar, presumably on the UAE payroll, but also thereby currying favour with Egypt which also backs Gen Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army.

Hemeti has also signed a deal with a Canadian public relations firm to polish his image and gain him political access in Russia and the US.

Hemeti and the RSF are in some ways familiar figures from the history of the Nile Valley. In the 19th Century, mercenary freebooters ranged across what are now Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic, publicly swearing allegiance to the Khedive of Egypt but also setting up and ruling their own private empires.

Yet in other ways Hemeti is a wholly 21st Century phenomenon: a military-political entrepreneur, whose paramilitary business empire transgresses territorial and legal boundaries.

Today, this semi-lettered market trader and militiaman is more powerful than any army general or civilian leader in Sudan. The political marketplace he commands is more dynamic than any fragile institutions of civilian government.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

View the original report plus a video here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-48987901

- - -

BBC News report

Published 27 November 2017

Sudan says militia leader Musa Hilal arrested

Sudanese authorities have arrested a powerful militia leader suspected of human rights abuses in the Darfur region

Musa Hilal was detained after fighting with Sudanese forces near his hometown in North Darfur, state media reports.

He is a former ally of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and led the government-allied Janjaweed militia.

Musa Hilal is subject to UN sanctions for his suspected involvement in the Darfur conflict of the mid-2000s.

His son Habeeb was also detained in the clashes in North Darfur, Sudan's defence minister, Lt Gen Ali Mohamed Salem, said.

"They were arrested after clashes in the area but the security situation there is now stable. They will soon be brought to Khartoum," Gen Salem added.

Musa Hilal was appointed as an adviser to President Bashir in 2008 but they later fell out. His fighters have often clashed with Sudanese forces in Darfur.

The latest fighting started on Sunday when Sudanese troops were ambushed as they oversaw a handover of weapons under a disarmament campaign, the Sudan Tribune reported.

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces said they lost 10 members, including a commander.

Musa Hilal has refused to surrender the weapons held by his militia and has also declined mediation to resolve the dispute, the report adds.

The Darfur conflict erupted in 2003 when black African rebels began attacking government targets, accusing Khartoum of favouring Arabs.

In response, the mainly Arab Janjaweed militia was accused of carrying out a policy of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Darfur's black African population.

Arrest warrants against President Bashir were issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 and 2010 on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Darfur. The conflict claimed at least 300,000 lives.

He denies the charge and has evaded arrest.

View the original report here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-42141938

- - -

RELATED NEWS

Musa Hilal called for end to tribal fighting in Darfur

20 July 2016

Sudan Watch - September 09, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/09/sudan-hilal-called-for-end-to-tribal.html

- - -

Musa Hilal faces court martial in Khartoum (Part 1)

10 September 2019

Sudan Watch - September 10, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/09/sudan-musa-hilal-faces-court-martial-in.html

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Must Hilal knows truth about Hemeti & Darfur war (Part 2)

27 November 2017

Sudan Watch - September 10, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/09/icc-hilal-knows-truth-about-hemeti.html

- - -

Musa Hilal given senior govt position (Part 3)  

Sudan Watch - September 14, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/09/sudan-musa-hilal-given-senior-govt.html

- - - 

FROM THE ARCHIVE OF SUDAN WATCH

Musa Hilal of Darfur, Sudan: Lynchpin of Arab Janjaweed Militia Recruitment

Sudan Watch - July 04, 2019

Sudanese Warlord Sheikh Musa Hilal of North Darfur

Useful Background To Crisis In Khartoum, Sudan.

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/07/warlord-sheikh-musa-hilal-of-darfur_4.html

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Musa Hilal & Janjaweed - Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes sign peace deal in W. Darfur, W. Sudan

Sudan Watch - June 30, 2010

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2010/06/african-sheikh-musa-hilal-janjaweed.html

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Video Transcript of 2004 interview with Musa Hilal

Sudan Watch - July 06, 2019

Video transcript of a Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Hilal in Sep 2004. Last paragraph refers to a list of individuals alleged to be guilty of crimes against humanity. Musa Hilal's name is on the list. 

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/07/video-transcript-of-2004-interview-with.html

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Musa Hilal interview in Darfur 2004 and Khartoum 2005

Sudan Watch - July 04, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/07/sudan-warlord-sheikh-musa-hilal.html

- - -

ICC: Darfur suspects must stand trial 

Sudan Watch - June 28, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/06/icc-violence-against-civilians-in.html

- - -

Al-Bashir should face justice, says ICC
Al-Bashir taken from Kober prison to prosecutor's office in Khartoum Sudan, 
formally charged with corruption and money laundering

Sudan Watch - June 27, 2019

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2019/06/mass-killings-in-darfur-al-bashir.html