International consultative meetings on Sudan held at AU HQ in Ethiopia's Addis Ababa: NCP and SPLM partnership important to Sudan's future

Sudanese delegation in Addis Ababa: NCP and SPLM partnership important to Sudan's future
From Radio Miraya - Sunday, 09 May 2010 21:45:

The consultative meeting on Sudan held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ended on Sunday with the Sudanese delegation affirming that a diplomatic partnership between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP) is critical for Sudan when faced with future challenges. The Sudanese delegation headed by Minster of Youth Culture and Sports, Amin Hassan Omer, made the statement as the close of the meetings.

He expressed confidence that that both parties will succeed in the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) based on mutual trust.

The meeting also stressed the need to reach a political settlement for the Darfur issue before the 2011 referendum takes place. The meeting concluded with a reiteration of a comprehensive peace process towards restoring peace in Darfur, taking into account the recommendations of the Council of Wise Men and building on the progress made in Doha.

Related reports and updates

Addis Ababa Consultative Meeting on Sudan Wraps Up, Trusts NCP/SPLM Cooperation
From Sudan Vision Daily - Monday, 10 May 2010:

(Addis Ababa-SUNA) - The international two-day consultative meeting on Sudan present and future political developments held at the African Union Head Quarter in the Ethiopian Capital, Addis Ababa was over yesterday. Sudan delegation to the meeting was chaired by the State Minister of Culture and Youth, Dr. Amin Hassan Omer.

The meeting initiated by the African Union Commission Chairman Jean Ping; AU, IGAD, UN, EU, AL, OIC, representatives of the UNSC permanent member states, UNMIS and UNAMID Chiefs, AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator, Qatar, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finland, AUPSC President for the Month- Burundi, AU President for the month-Malawi and the Evaluation and Assessment Commission participated in the meeting .

The issued communiqué’ stated that the meeting had reviewed the situations in Sudan on the heels of last April elections within the framework of progress on the CPA implementation and Darfur peace process.

The communiqué’ stressed that the partnership between the NCP and SPLM was crucial for Sudan leadership’ struggle against future challenges, expressing confidence in the two partners’ ability to fulfill the CPA implementation given their mutual trust. The communiqué stated that the participants in the meeting pledged to support the efforts of the UNAMID, AU-UN Joint Chief mediator and the Qatari mediation in respect of peace in Sudan.

According to the final statement, the meeting underscored the recent national elections had established new facts in Sudan as new legitimate representatives had been elected all levels. Those representatives would be expected to contribute to the peace building process.

The statement further added that the consultative meeting had expressed intension to support the UN and AU resolution to convene a meeting for the High Executive Group of the AU, Joint Mediation and UNAMID for consultation with Sudan Government on Darfur peace process in the light of the breakthroughs the elections had allowed.

Moreover, the meeting emphasized the importance of reaching a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of Darfur issue ahead of the referendum set for January 2011, while taking into account the recommendations of the AU Panel on Darfur, as well as the achievements of Doha forum.

The AU / UN / Government of the Sudan Tripartite Mechanism
From United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) /APO
Monday, 10 May 2010:

(ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia) - Today, 10 May 2010, officials from the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), and the Sudanese Government will convene in Addis Ababa for the eighth meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism on UNAMID.

Background
Following consultations between the three parties on the fringes of the AU Summit on July 2008 in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, the Tripartite Mechanism was established with the aim of expediting UNAMID’s deployment and promoting a constructive relationship with the Sudanese government. Since then, the Tripartite meetings have offered an opportunity to strengthen cooperation between the three parties for the benefit of the people of Darfur.

Outcomes of previous meetings
The first meeting, held on 7 October 2008 in Khartoum, reviewed and outlined practical solutions to challenges faced in the deployment of UNAMID, the largest and most complex peacekeeping operation ever attempted by the UN or the AU.

By the third meeting, on 16 November 2008, the Mission had reached 60% troop deployment, and a memorandum of understanding on air operations was signed which enabled UNAMID to make more effective use of Sudanese airport infrastructure. The Sudanese government also began providing police protection to the Mission’s facilities in El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina.

At the fifth meeting of the Tripartite mechanism, which followed the expulsion of several international NGOs, it was agreed that UNAMID would assume custody of their assets until a final solution could be reached between the Government and the INGOs.

UNAMID representatives
The Mission will be represented by Joint Special Representative (JSR) Ibrahim Gambari, Deputy JSR of Operations and Management Mohammed Yonis and the heads of UNAMID’s substantive sections.

Agenda
With the Mission now at 87% deployment, the focus of this summit will be on the protection of UNAMID personnel and the implementation of its mandate. Also among the issues to be discussed will be the provision of a radio broadcasting licence for the Mission in Darfur

Sudan activists - UNAMID receives US Envoy Gration in Darfur - Sudan's delegation at AU HQ meeting on Sudan
Sudan Watch - Saturday, 08 May 2010

UN chief: Civil society and rebel groups agree to resume talks in Doha Qatar 18 Jan followed by talks between Government and rebel groups 24 Jan 2010

Quote of the Day

"It will be the Sudanese people who solve Sudan’s problems. But working together, the United Nations and the African Union can provide them with critical assistance on their difficult journey towards lasting peace and prosperity." -UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, 21 December 2009.

Source: Report on UN Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council’s briefing by the African Union High-level Panel on the Sudan, in New York today, 21 December 2009.
From:  UN Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York.  Copy in full:

UNITED NATIONS, AFRICAN UNION CAN PROVIDE CRITICAL HELP ON SUDANESE PEOPLE’S JOURNEY TOWARDS LASTING PEACE, SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SECURITY COUNCIL

Following are UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s remarks to the Security Council’s briefing by the African Union High-level Panel on the Sudan, in New York today, 21 December:

I am honoured to be with you today, and to welcome this esteemed delegation. Today’s meeting is an important symbol of collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations. It is also another concrete demonstration of our common commitment to work with the Sudanese people in addressing the serious challenges they face.

Today the Panel will brief you on their report which has been adopted in its entirety by the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Council also established a High-level Implementation Panel comprised of former Presidents Thabo Mbeki, Pierre Buyoya and retired General Abdulsalami Abubakar. We are privileged to receive their first-hand briefing.

The report of the High-level Panel provides a frank assessment and insightful analysis of the situation in Sudan and offers numerous proposals for the way forward. Perhaps above all, the Panel members have insisted on seeing Sudan in its totality. They have clearly articulated the links between the crisis in Darfur and broader efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Their insights come at a critical moment. In little more than three months, elections are scheduled to take place. In just over a year, the two referenda are scheduled, which will determine the future shape of Sudan. The National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), as the two parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, have taken steps to prepare for these major events, but there is still much to be done.

We must remember that neither the election nor the referenda are ends in themselves. Managing the results -- whatever the outcome -- will require genuine cooperation between the NCP and the SPLM. In the meantime, violence -- in South Sudan in particular -- is occurring on a disturbing scale and frequency.

In Darfur, the peace process has reached a critical point. Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé has been working with the Government of Qatar to generate momentum by giving civil society a strong voice at the peace talks. Representatives of civil society and armed movements have agreed to resume consultations in Doha on 18 January next, which will be followed by direct talks between the Government and the movements on 24 January 2010.

Efforts must continue to encourage the Government, and more especially the rebel movements, to make concessions and embrace the consensus which Mr. Bassolé is building. In my view, the High-level Implementation Panel, and the international community at large, has a critical role to play here. By giving Mr. Bassolé our unequivocal support, we will send a strong message to all parties that they must engage in the negotiations he is leading.

Beyond this, the Panel can make an invaluable contribution to the “soft-landing” we are all working towards after the election and referenda, by helping the parties to the CPA to bridge their differences. This is an outcome that is badly needed for Sudan itself, but also for Sudan’s neighbours and, indeed, for all of Africa. The High-level Panel also addressed the difficult issues of justice and reconciliation in Sudan. Their efforts to develop creative and pragmatic proposals are highly commendable.

We must keep sight of the importance of compliance with Security Council resolution 1593 (2005), referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.

I have just concluded a very productive meeting with the visiting delegation, in the course of which we agreed on the importance of continuing close AU-UN cooperation on Sudan. Beyond our co-management of UNAMID, we must make every effort to ensure that the activities of the United Nations in Sudan and the work of the African Union’s High-level Implementation Panel are mutually supportive.

It will be the Sudanese people who solve Sudan’s problems. But working together, the United Nations and the African Union can provide them with critical assistance on their difficult journey towards lasting peace and prosperity.

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Further reading

REPORT OF THE AFRICAN UNION HIGH‐LEVEL PANEL ON DARFUR (AUPD) OCTOBER 2009

UN Radio - African Union panel briefs the Council on Sudan - 21 December 2009

SECURITY COUNCIL REFERS SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, TO PROSECUTOR OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT - Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States)

Click on tags here below to view related reports.

Darfur Sudan: The media keeps missing the importance of the Doha consultations and Declaration

People are asking why the media keeps missing the importance of the Doha consultations and Declaration.

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur
Friday, December 4, 2009
Civil Society and Doha: Where Next?
By Julie Flint

It is disappointing how little attention there has been, including on this blog, to the civil society conference in Doha in mid-November, the first such meeting held under the auspices of the succeeding Mediations. Two weeks on, the only version of the final Doha Declaration I have seen comes (predictably) not from the mediators, who are no better at informing Darfurians of their work than their predecessors in Abuja were, but from one of those present, Ali B. Ali-Dinar, who posted it on the Sudan Tribune.

In just three days, representatives of the three states of Darfur, including from Khartoum and the diaspora, succeeding in doing what the armed movements continue to fail to do—agree on a single, unified position paper. What is striking about the conference is how intensively ‘ordinary’ Darfurians had prepared for it and how, once in Doha, they re-worked the plan presented to them by the Mediation (see Ali’s account on Sudan Tribune for this). The four topics tabled for discussion (land, power-sharing, civil society, general issues) immediately became seven, with the inclusion of security arrangements and disarmament, wealth sharing and economic and social development, and justice, reconciliation and return. The land chapter was expanded to make specific mention of ‘nomadic routes’.

What is missing from the Declaration is as interesting as what is included. There is no reference to the International Criminal Court, rather an emphasis on ‘transitional justice’ in all its many forms—and at all levels, from local to international—in order to ‘cure the soul and mend the social fabric’ and ensure there is no impunity for any of the crimes committed in Darfur (2.4.1). There is no mention of genocide, ‘ongoing’ or past, only to ‘illegal stop and search[es]’ of IDPs’ and unspecified impediments to security in the IDP camps (2.1.1 C ). (This raises the question: was enough effort exerted to bring to Doha war-affected Darfurians not in camps?) There is no call for the armed movements to have a role in getting the displaced back to their villages, as demanded by the movements. This should be organized by the Native Administration ‘with the help of the unified police, UNAMID forces in addition to the army if necessary’ (2.1.2.D). There is no demand for a single Darfur region, a subject participants said requires more ‘research and consultation’ (2.3.11). There is no finger-pointing: the words ‘militias’ and ‘movements’ do not appear in the text, which recommends ‘the simultaneous collection of weapons from all parties except the regular forces’ (2.1.2 B).

Civil society is looking forward, not back, demanding the re-establishment of boarding schools (especially important for pastoralists), ‘major development projects of national character [to] foster a sense of nationhood and [remove] a sense of marginalization’ (2.2.1), job creation (2.2.5).

The Doha Declaration requests the parties to observe an immediate ceasefire. The parties claim to represent the people. It’s a pity that the Mediation isn’t exerting greater efforts to get the people’s voice to the parties (and to the media and lobbies that support the parties) to exercise pressure on them to put aside their individual agendas in the interests of the whole.

Many questions remain. Among them:
• Did the Sudan Government in any way impede the meeting or the ability of delegates to travel to Doha? Only five months ago, organizers of Mo Ibrahim’s Mandate Darfur were told that anyone attempting to go to Addis Abada for that civil society meeting would be arrested and put on trial for treason.
• Were pastoralists satisfied with their representation and input?
• How was the Declaration agreed on? By state or delegate? By unanimity or majority?
• Were the movements present as observers? (I believe this was the plan initially) If so, what was their reaction away from the media spotlight?
• What now?
Were any of the readers of this blog present in Doha? If so, can they do what the Mediation hasn’t—supply a detailed account of the meeting (and its corridors)? JEM has (predictably) said ‘most of the civil society representatives (in Doha) are supporters of the ruling National Congress Party’. The conference facilitator, Siddig Umbadda, refutes this. He says ‘quite a few government people declined to come because they thought the opposite’.

One final point: civil society sees a role for itself in ‘documenting’ any future negotiations (2.6.3 F). Had this been done in Abuja, we might not have seen such an immediate, violent reaction against the DPA. The failure of the AU to keep the people of Darfur informed of the progress, and content, of the negotiations was surely one of the main reasons for the uncompromising rejection of the DPA it its entirety.

4 Responses to “Civil Society and Doha: Where Next?”
Ahmed Hassan:
December 4th, 2009 at 9:31 am
Dear Julie Flint,
Many thanks for bringing this issue to discussion. Actually, ever since the meeting ended I was trying very hard to locate this famous Doha Declaration which was only briefly mentioned in the press release of the Qatari government.
I join my voice to you in raising these questions, and hope that someone can shed the light on the details of the meeting.
Moreover, I am also interested to know how representative to the civil society the participants were. A comment that I read in one article claims that the delegations were dominantly supporters of the government and that explains why the issue of the ICC was avoided. I do not claim that this is true, but I would like to know more about the selection and the composition and background of the delegates in addition to answers for the important questions that you raised in this article.
Many thanks again.
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Sean Brooks:
December 4th, 2009 at 5:37 pm
Good post Julie…I too have been asking why the media keeps missing the importance of the Doha consultations and Declaration, see: http://blogfordarfur.org/archives/2102.
I have not heard of the NCP impeding the travel of any delegates, which is something that was of great concern given what happened before Mandate Darfur. As for the the content of the Declaration, I addressed this in a recent post as well http://blogfordarfur.org/archives/2214: “And it seems apparent from the “Doha Declaration” itself that NCP representatives had limited influence on the outcome. In addition to a call for a ceasefire and negotiations, the civil society representatives also made strong demands about carrying out justice, ending impunity, and resolving land issues in Darfur. In fact, the document specifically calls for the return of all land of displaced persons and refugees to their original owners and the evacuation of those who have lived on the land during their absence. It also calls for the disarmament of all armed forces in Darfur, except for the constitutionally authorized regular forces, and the establishment of the necessary security mechanisms by UNAMID to allow displaced persons and refugees to return to their villages.”
As for how the declaration was agreed upon, Ali Dinar mentions that the delegates agreed to merge the recommendations brought to the consultations by the South/West Darfur and North Darfur delegations. Its my understanding that once the recommendations were merged together they were agreed upon unanimously.
I hope other attendees of Doha might answer your other important questions.
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Khalid Al Nur:
December 4th, 2009 at 9:12 pm
Ever since the failure of Abuja, a whole range of Darfurian groups including CSOs have been knocking at the door of the negotiations and asking to be represented. The mediators have always responded that to allow them into the hall would “complicate the process” and might lead to the armed movements (JEM and SLA-Abdul Wahid) pulling out. What this conference shows is that their presence doesn’t complicate the process at all, in fact it moves it forward. And, if there is a deal that brings in all Darfurians including the IDPs, the Arabs, civil society and the native administration, but is boycotted by JEM and Abdul Wahid — what does that mean? My prediction is that Khalil and Abdul Wahid might fulminate but they would have no option but to say, “those are my people, I’m their leader — let me follow them!”
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Ali B. Ali-Dinar:
December 6th, 2009 at 11:08 am
This is in response to Julie Flint’s questions:

(1) Did the Sudan Government in any way impede the meeting or the ability of delegates to travel to Doha?
For the Doha meeting, the wish of the government of Sudan (GoS) for the conference is to issue a statement that is critical of the armed movements and with fewer demands from the GoS. I believe the arrival to the meeting of individuals such General Adam Hamid, the Ex Governor of South Darfur, and General Hussein Abdallah Gibril, the Ex-Governor of North Darfur, whose names are floating around in the unofficial list of Darfur war criminals is a testimony to the government’s intention to derail the meeting/declaration but such attempt has failed. It failed mainly because the delegates from the three states did their homework before arriving to Doha. For Mo Ibrahim’s planned meeting the Government had tried to advance and bar specific individuals and the organizers reacted by canceling the conference. For Doha, the Government has its way in sending it’s people, but they failed in influencing the outcome. For more details about the process through which the Declaration was reached please read my statement: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33323

(2) Were pastoralists satisfied with their representation and input?
The agreed Declaration was endorsed by delegates representing women, youth, IDPs, native administration, local NGOs, and NCP-ers. This is their vision for peace and justice in Darfur and for the benefit of all Darfurians regardless of their livelihood.

(3) Were the movements present as observers?
Some of the movements were already in Doha and in the same hotel (Sheraton) where the conference took place in negotiation with GoS and the team of mediation. The civil society delegates were accommodated in a different hotel (Retaj Al-Rayan). There was no presence from the armed movements in the civil society’s conference neither as delegates or observers because they were not invited. JEM’s response to the Declaration is announce here: http://www.sudanjem.com/2009/archives/21725/en/

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See photo of Julie Flint in report at The Washington Post dated May 28, 2004: Julie Flint travelled for 25 days on foot and horseback in the Darfur region of Sudan to collect evidence of attacks by government-backed militiamen.