Inside The Secret Network Fuelling Sudan's War

From Lighthouse Reports
Co-published with EVIDENT and Sudan War Monitor
On 29 June 2026 - full copy:

INSIDE THE SECRET NETWORK FUELLING SUDAN'S WAR

Lighthouse Reports travelled to Eastern Libya to expose the UAE supported RSF network of military training camps that enabled them to continue their war in Sudan.

The shadowy role of the United Arab Emirates in fueling the war in Sudan – once a well kept secret – is now acknowledged as a key driver of Sudan’s disastrous, yearslong civil war.

Still, little is known about how the UAE co-opts regional governments to achieve its aims in Sudan.

Lighthouse Reports, Evident and Sudan War Monitor travelled to eastern Libya to reveal how the UAE network works on the ground. Through a combination of open source and on-the-ground reporting, the investigation sheds new light on one of the UAE’s most entrenched operations in their vast network of support to the RSF.

As the international community has failed to intervene in Emirati meddling, the UAE has meanwhile built a sprawling network of complex logistics, military bases, financing, and weapons trafficking routes to prop up the Rapid Support Forces and fuel their war efforts in Sudan.

METHODS

The investigations drew on a long term analysis of activity across TikTok, Facebook and Telegram. We reviewed thousands of posts and built an archive of more than 500 relevant clips showing convoy movements between Libya and Sudan, activity at key desert checkpoints and camps, and developments in the border triangle. We verified and connected this material through geolocation, analysis of uniforms, vehicles and other identifying symbols, and social-network analysis of accounts linked to the RSF, the Libyan National Army, and associated networks.

We complimented these efforts with analysis of high resolution commercial satellite imagery of specific sites. Using a custom processing workflow with publicly available Sentinel-2 data., we tracked changes in vehicle routes across remote stretches of the Sahara, helping us understand how smuggling and asset transfers developed in response to changing conditions on the ground. These findings informed reporting trips and interviews.

We worked with ⁨Conflict Insights Group, a public benefit research firm, that conducted analysis of telephones located at Camp 17. CIG used publicly available adtech data, which is information from cookies that users agree to sell to third party vendors when they visit a website or use a mobile application. The information includes movement data, language settings, and other details that users consent to selling to a third party vendor, which CIG purchased. CIG found evidence of at least two South American mercenaries at the site in the summer of 2025. One device located at Camp 17 was set to Colombian Spanish and visited the site from 11-12 June 2025. Another device was set to Argentinian Spanish, and used a military grade phone on 13 aug 2025.

This investigation received kind support from Maltego and IRBIS OSINT-platform.

STORYLINES

Our reporting, including interviews with LNA officers, RSF defectors, and Sudanese military sources, unveiled four previously unidentified RSF camps in Libya, contrary to claims by the RSF that they do not conduct troop training outside of Sudan and contrary to LNA insiders’ claims that the RSF operations in Libya were largely wound down by late 2025.

In Kufra, we embedded with the Libyan National Army in the border triangle area where we had been tracking RSF training and transit sites via social media analysis and heat maps of tracks from suspected RSF resupply convoys throughout the desert for months.

Keen to show us that they were combatting trafficking and had shut down any alleged flow of weapons into Sudan, Lieutenant Enheish Fattah of the LNA’s Subul Al Salaam brigade flatly denied that the LNA facilitated RSF activities in Libya.

“No, that’s all rumors. People are trying to create conflict between the Libyan and Sudanese armies,” Lieutenant Fattah said when questioned on 2025 clashes between the Sudanese Army and the LNA in the border region, in response to increasing frustration of the Sudanese Army and its backers in Egypt about LNA support for the RSF.

Interviews with eight RSF defectors still living in Libya, revealed the full scale of their operations there, which extend from small-scale training activity and transit points in Benghazi to more robust sites in the desert in the border triangle region. These sites include staging sites to prep weapons and modify vehicles for war, training sites where RSF soldiers say they trained alongside the LNA and UAE-contracted Colombian mercenaries, and convoys of trucks carrying fuel and alleged weapons from Libya back into Sudan.

Defectors told us that they were expected to return to Sudan to train their fellow RSF soldiers based on the training they received in Libya.

One defector who agreed to speak on camera to Evident, revealed the location of a previously unknown training camp located approximately 20 kilometers outside of Benghazi.

He described arriving in Libya and being sent to Benghazi through Kufra. Others, he said, were sent to a military camp in Jufra for training. Of his own time at the camp known to him and others in RSF as Camp 17, he told us “there are many here in Camp 17. They are in charge of cars, supplies, and ammo and oversee delivery of them.”

He said the RSF would bring “around 40 or 50, maybe up to 70 or 80” soldiers at a time to train in Camp 17. They would receive their training from LNA soldiers and Colombian contractors.

“RSF is mainly supported by the Emirates,” he told us, adding “but no one can speak up or ask.”

Libyan authorities failed to meaningfully engage with us on the reality of what is happening inside Libya or on their collaboration with the UAE to support the RSF. We traveled to Nairobi, Kenya to interview a spokesman for the RSF government, Tassis, who denied the claims revealed in our reporting.

While the scale of Sudan’s war is almost impossible to account for due to the lack of humanitarian access and the level of violence across the country, recent estimates put the death toll at nearly 400,000 people. 

Regional analysts insist that the level of support from the Emirates for the RSF has allowed violence, particularly in the Darfur region, to spiral out of control. We interviewed survivors from Khartoum and Darfur in Kufra and in Benghazi to understand the true impact of Emirati meddling on Sudanese civilians. 

They arrived in Libya after arduous journeys from Sudan – some traveling through Chad – often harassed by RSF soldiers and human smugglers throughout their journey.

“When we reached Libya, we had nothing left,” Fatima, a mother of four living in Kufra told us. “I have nothing left but my children and my honor.”

CO-PUBLICATIONS

Evident & Lighthouse Reports: 

Inside the Secret Network Fueling Sudan's War

Sudan War Monitor: 

Inside the RSF's Libya Supply Network

Credits: Julia Steers, Klaas van Dijken, Jack Sapoch, Bashar Deeb, Margot Gibbs, Tessa Pang, Wael Eskandar, AM, and many unnamed Sudanese journalists, Amel Guettatfi, Srdjan Stojiljkovic, Stacey Naggiar, Jennifer Smart, Kevin Clancy, Zach Toombs

View original: https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/inside-the-secret-network-fueling-sudans-war/

Hat tip: Dr Eric Reeves, Co-founder Team Zamzam Project, Responding to Famine and Aiding Victims of Sexual Violence in Darfur

linkedin.com/in/eric-reeves-01b6b16 (LinkedIn)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Personal)

fundraise.operationbrokensilence.org (Other)

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Sudan: Open Briefing at UN Security Council - The UK is penholder on Sudan and Council president for Feb

"In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations. ...

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft." Read more.

From What's In Blue 
Posted Wednesday 18 February 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Sudan. The UK, the penholder on Sudan and Council president for February, has elevated the meeting to ministerial level, with its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper, expected to chair. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. The Council will also hear from a civil society representative, who will address the situation of women in the context of the conflict in Sudan, including the high incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Sudan as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

DiCarlo is expected to provide an overview of the security situation as the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April, amid a dangerous phase marked by intensified hostilities with increasing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened governance structures, exacerbating civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity. The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors reportedly providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, resulting in regional spillover and proxy dynamics. In this regard, reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring states as transit routes for weapons and supplies have raised alarm about the risk of further regional destabilisation. Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to voice concerns about the trajectory of these perilous trends. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the ongoing violence and reiterate calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, reports from the UN and other entities have documented grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) by parties to the conflict. In this context, several Council members are expected to urge compliance with IHL and IHRL obligations, while highlighting broader protection concerns, including widespread CRSV. They may also underscore the need to ensure accountability for such violations. (For more information, see our 8 February What’s in Blue story.)

On 13 February, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in late October 2025 that resulted in the seizure of El Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. According to the report, the documented patterns indicate that the RSF and allied Arab militias conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in the city. OHCHR monitoring suggested that the RSF and allied militias committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, launching indiscriminate attacks, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) requested the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM) to conduct an urgent inquiry into alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher following the seizure of the city by the RSF. The findings of the inquiry are expected to be released tomorrow.

Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. Tomorrow, several Council members are expected to voice support for mediation efforts, with some emphasising the importance of complementarity and coordination among such initiatives.

UN mediation efforts have been led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, who had regularly briefed Council members during closed consultations on Sudan. Media reports suggest that Lamamra will finish his role by the end of the month. He had been scheduled to brief during consultations following tomorrow’s briefing, but it appears that the consultations are not expected to take place and that Lamamra is not slated to brief.

During a donor conference held on 3 February in Washington DC, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos reportedly announced that a document outlining a peace plan had been agreed among the Quad members—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—aimed at securing a humanitarian truce and opening safe corridors for relief efforts. In a 14 February interview with Foreign Policy, Boulos said that, alongside the Quad, the US has been engaging with several regional countries on the initiative. He added that the US intends to bring the plan to the Security Council with the aim of adopting a resolution.

On 12 February, the Quintet group—comprised of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—released a joint statement which called for the immediate halting of any further military escalation and urged all concerned sides to support efforts towards a humanitarian truce and the delivery of life-saving assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, has continued to seek support for his proposal to end the conflict (which he presented during the Council’s 22 December 2025 briefing on Sudan), including during recent visits to Switzerland and Germany. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from areas under its control. Sudan has also continued efforts to secure readmission to the AU following its suspension after the October 2021 military takeover. In a communiqué adopted following a 12 February AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) ministerial meeting on Sudan, the AUPSC welcomed Sudan’s 22 December 2025 proposal as well as efforts led by the Quintet.

At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for insecurity and violence in Sudan. Yesterday (17 February), the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) proposed the designation of four RSF commanders under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. Since the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has not yet been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the UK circulated the proposal under a no-objection procedure until 24 February. (There is an understanding that respective presidents of the Council will handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs until the chairs have been appointed.) At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may highlight this measure and underline the need to consider expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur, considering the evolving conflict dynamics across other regions of the country. Several Council members—including the African members, China, and Russia—have opposed this proposal, which some other members have raised in the context of discussions on the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, most recently in September 2025.

Tomorrow, Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. She may emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and CRSV.

She may describe how intensifying hostilities are exacerbating risks to civilians, fuelling displacement and humanitarian needs, and shrinking humanitarian space while making operations increasingly dangerous for aid workers. The conflict has been marked by frequent attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as humanitarian assets, personnel, and convoys. Recent OCHA press releases have highlighted a sharp increase in deadly drone strikes across the Kordofan region, resulting in civilian casualties and further deepening the humanitarian crisis. In this context, Wosornu and several Council members are likely to stress the urgent imperative of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure and condemn their deliberate targeting.

Wosornu is also expected to reiterate calls for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and underscore the need for increased and flexible funding to sustain life-saving operations amid rising needs. She may also highlight ongoing efforts by OCHA and its partners to deliver assistance despite acute operational challenges. In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations.

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/sudan-briefing-7.php

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The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away (UK FM Cooper)

"Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda." - Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary. Read more.

From The Independent.co.uk

Editorial by Yvette Cooper, UK Foreign Secretary

Published Friday 09 January 2026 10:00 GMT - full copy:

The world’s worst humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Sudan - we must not look away

As the conflict in Sudan passes the grim milestone of 1,000 days, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper writes that the same diplomatic energy that helped end the war in Gaza is needed to end the crisis

South Sudan's worsening water crisis [VIDEO]

The world is catastrophically failing the people of Sudan. Today marks a grim milestone – 1,000 days of devastating violent conflict involving unimaginable atrocities, millions pushed into famine, and the most barbaric abuse of Sudan’s women.

The scale of the humanitarian crisis happening now is greater than any in the 21st century and the security consequences are likely to be felt far beyond Sudan for many years to come.

The world must not look away from the conflict between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces that is terrorising Sudan. I am determined we shine a searing spotlight on the unfolding atrocities and make 2026 the year the world comes together to drive urgent new momentum towards peace.

Last month, I listened as Sudanese civilians and community workers from their Emergency Response Rooms recounted the horrific human cost of the RSF’s October capture of the town of El Fasher after a grinding 18-month siege – including ethnically motivated mass killings and use of rape and starvation as weapons of war.

These stories on the ground corroborated the satellite images from space – images of blood-soaked earth and mass graves that all too briefly jolted the world’s attention.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper (Reuters)

Aid workers in Tawila gave me a virtual tour of the makeshift camps where hundreds of distressed children arrived having made a 46-mile journey from El Fasher on foot. Traumatised women and children are scraping an existence with scant rations under thornbush shelters.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) staff recounted their struggle to support unprecedented numbers of victims of sexual violence in what they described as a war on women’s bodies. As shocking as what I saw was what I did not see – boys or men. Fathers, husbands and brothers missing, likely killed, following forced separation from their families.

Over 30 million people still need lifesaving aid. Famine is spreading. Infrastructure has collapsed. Preventable diseases are rampant. The conflict is escalating and spreading in the Kordofan region. 

The RSF have been accused of war crimes (File picture). 

Rapid Support Forces

For the leaders of Sudan’s warring parties to refuse to halt the war or to prevent massacres and atrocities on this scale is horrendous. For so many soldiers to be systematically raping Sudanese women is barbaric.

The case for action is deeply moral. But it is also about our wider security. Wars that rage unresolved radiate instability. They undermine the security of neighbouring states, they become easy targets for extremist groups to exploit. And they lead migrants to embark on dangerous international journeys.

Sudan’s war goes far beyond Sudan. It is regionalised and globalised. It poses a global test of our ability to mobilise the agile alliances, partnerships and multilateral weight to get a breakthrough.

Words of international concern or outrage are not enough. We need a concerted diplomatic drive to arrest the spiralling violence and suffering.

Sudanese residents gather to receive free meals in Al Fasher 

(AFP via Getty Images)

The US have been working to get a truce and wider plan in place – drawing together the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (the ‘Quad’). That is why last month in Washington I held talks with Secretary Rubio and the President’s senior advisor on Africa and I have repeatedly engaged Quad members on ways forward.

But we need the same international focus and energy now from right across the world that we had around securing the Gaza ceasefire.

Today we are announcing that the UK will jointly convene with Germany a major international conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, as we mark the third anniversary of this devastating conflict. And the UK will use its voice and Presidency of the United Nations Security Council next month, to prevent Sudan again slipping down the international agenda.

At the heart of international efforts must be pursuing the humanitarian truce and a push for a permanent end to hostilities. This can only come through greater pressure on the warring parties – crucially from their regional backers.

Second, we have to prevent further atrocities by either side. This means working to raise the cost of committing or backing further massacres. On 12 December, the UK sanctioned senior RSF commanders, including the so-called “Butcher of El Fasher” who has openly boasted on social media of murdering Sudanese civilians.

Sudanese who fled el-Fasher city crowd to receive food at their camp in Tawila (AP)

And we are working to combat impunity and hold perpetrators to account. In November, UK leadership at the UN Human Rights Council secured international agreement to an urgent UN inquiry into crimes in El Fasher. We are supporting vital investigations by the International Criminal Court.

Third, unimpeded aid needs to reach populations in need. The UK has provided an additional £21 million for food, shelter, health services and protection of women and children in hardest to reach areas. This brings our total support to £146 million this financial year.

But for aid to save more lives, the belligerents must lift their deliberate and systematic barriers to humanitarian access.

Ultimately, no amount of aid can resolve a crisis of this magnitude until the guns fall silent. It must be the Sudanese people, not any warring group, that determine Sudan’s future.

The world must now come together around this cause – to stem the bloodshed and help set Sudan on a path to peace.

View original: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sudan-war-humanitarian-crisis-yvette-cooper-b2897125.html

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