Showing posts with label LNA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LNA. Show all posts

Thursday, June 26, 2025

Sudan: UN Security Council will hold an open briefing followed by closed consultations on Fri 27 June 2025

Report from UN Security Council

What's In Blue 

Dated Thursday, 26 June 2025 - full copy:


Sudan: Briefing and Consultations


Tomorrow morning (27 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan


The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. 


Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations (DPPA-DPO) Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and a civil society representative are expected to brief in the open chamber. 


The chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Joonkook Hwang (the Republic of Korea), is expected to brief the Council on the committee’s work. 


Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra will brief in the closed consultations.


Pobee is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating security situation in Sudan. 


In June, the conflict witnessed shifting front lines and intensified fighting across several regions. Fierce battles continued in the Kordofan region, as both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to consolidate territorial gains, exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts and inflicting significant harm on civilians.


The situation in El Fasher and other parts of North Darfur state continues to be highly volatile. El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has been under siege by the RSF since May 2024. 


In a 20 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted that, on 15 June, the RSF launched a renewed assault on the city following months of increased fighter mobilisation across Darfur, including the recruitment of children. He added that the operation aimed at capturing El Fasher, which involved a ground offensive, mirrored the RSF’s April attack on the nearby Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), which resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, widespread sexual violence, and a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 18 May and 12 June What’s in Blue stories.)


Pobee may also address the regional dimensions of Sudan’s conflict. 


On 10 June, the SAF accused forces aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), of supporting RSF attacks on its positions along the tri-border area of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan—an allegation that the LNA has denied


After the SAF’s withdrawal from the tri-border zone on 11 June, the RSF claimed control over this strategic area, enabling it  to secure a supply line from Libya and advance towards the Nile Valley and Northern State, both of which are considered SAF strongholds. 


The conflict has also spilled into Abyei and South Sudan, escalating local tensions, displacing civilians, and worsening insecurity. 


Meanwhile, media reports indicate that the SAF has relocated warplanes to Eritrea amid increasing RSF drone strikes. (For more information, see our 18 March What’s in Blue story.)


In a 24 June press statement, Council members condemned the 20 June attack by “suspected Sudanese armed elements” on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) peacekeepers patrolling near the Central African Republic (CAR)-Sudan border. 


The incident resulted in the death of a Zambian peacekeeper. 


In their statement, Council members expressed concern about the impact of the crisis in Sudan, particularly in border areas, including RSF incursions into the CAR’s territory and its coordination with local armed groups.


Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to condemn the ongoing violence across Sudan and reiterate their calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. 


They may also discuss the destabilising impact of the conflict in Sudan on the region, including the influx of refugees to neighbouring countries.


Speakers are likely to stress the urgent need to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as medical and humanitarian personnel, while condemning the deliberate targeting of these individuals and facilities. 


Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence, and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. 


Some may highlight the 21 June attack on the Al-Mujlad hospital in West Kordofan, which reportedly killed more than 40 people, including six children and five healthcare workers. At the time of writing, it was unclear who was responsible for the attack.


In a separate development, the US has accused the Sudanese government of using chemical weapons in 2024, in violation of the country’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and announced on 22 May the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. The Sudanese government has denied these allegations.


Tomorrow’s meeting is also expected to take stock of recent political developments in Sudan. 


On 19 May, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the SAF’s leader, appointed Kamil Eltayeb Idris as Prime Minister. In a 20 May statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed hope that the appointment would serve as a first step towards inclusive consultations and the formation of a broad-based technocratic government. 


After assuming office, Idris dissolved the existing cabinet and, on 19 June, announced plans to appoint a 22-member non-partisan technocratic government. On 24 June, he named the ministers of defence and interior. 


However, the dissolution of the previous cabinet has sparked divisions among groups allied with the SAF, such as the Justice and Equality Movement, who argue that the move violates the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which provided for the allocation of cabinet positions and other political appointments to its signatories under a power-sharing framework.


During the closed consultations, Lamamra is expected to provide an update on ongoing regional and international initiatives to resolve the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. 


On 2 June, the Personal Envoy held consultations in Moscow with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, reportedly focusing on the need for coordinated international efforts to secure a ceasefire and advance an inclusive inter-Sudanese dialogue. He also spoke with Idris on 4 June—their first interaction since the prime minister’s appointment. 


As mediation efforts have yet to yield a breakthrough, Council members may wish to hear Lamamra’s assessment of recent political developments, prospects for de-escalation, and potential next steps, including the status of anticipated technical-level proximity talks. This may include strategies to enhance cooperation among stakeholders—particularly regional and sub-regional organisations—and to address the underlying challenges impeding the peace process. (For more information on recent mediation efforts, see our 18 May What’s in Blue story.)


On 3 June, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos convened a meeting on the conflict in Sudan with the Quad ambassadors to the US (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). 


According to a press release issued after the meeting, Landau acknowledged that the conflict in Sudan poses a threat to shared regional interests and underscored the importance of the Quad working collectively to persuade the warring parties to cease hostilities and pursue a negotiated settlement.


Tomorrow, Lamamra is also expected to brief members on the fourth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination among the various peace initiatives on Sudan, hosted and chaired by the European Union (EU) in Brussels today (26 June). 


Several regional and international interlocutors attended the meeting, including Lamamra, the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as representatives from Bahrain, Egypt, Mauritania, the UK, the US, and Saudi Arabia.


Sudan’s civilian space remains fragmented, as evidenced by recent exchanges between different coalitions over Lamamra’s mediation efforts. 


Media reports suggest that a group of Sudanese politicians, activists, and diplomats sent a letter to Guterres on 13 June, accusing Lamamra of failing to establish a viable peace process and of aligning closely with the SAF’s narrative, and therefore calling for his replacement. 


By contrast, a different group of Sudanese political and civil society actors has reportedly expressed support for Lamamra and cautioned against efforts to undermine the mediation process.


Tomorrow, some Council members may reiterate their call on member states to refrain from external interference in Sudan, which they believe is exacerbating conflict and instability, and to instead support mediation efforts for a durable peace. They may call for strict compliance with the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime.


The appointment of the Panel of Experts assisting the committee, whose mandate was most recently extended through resolution 2772 of 17 February, remains stalled due to holds placed by some Council members. Some members may call for the urgent resolution of this impasse to ensure effective monitoring and implementation of the sanctions regime.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-11.php

End 

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

Haftar, Hemeti, and a Canadian lobbyist's Libyan connection - Russia moves in on Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt

Middle East Eye.net looked through public documents showing how a former Israeli intelligence officer lobbying for Sudan's military council became a major player in war-torn Libya.  Sudanese fighters have reportedly arrived in Libya, an idea first floated by lobbyists in May.  Full story here below.
Sudanese fighters have reportedly arrived in Libya, an idea first floated by lobbyists in May (AFP)

Article by Middle East Eye.net
Written by Kaamil Ahmed
Published date: 02 August 2019 11:58 UTC

Haftar, Hemeti, and a Canadian lobbyist's Libyan connection

Last week, around 1,000 members of Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were reported to have arrived in eastern Libya, joining the ranks of Khalifa Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) which is waging war against the country's UN-recognised government in Tripoli.

Their arrival, which was reported by Radio Dabanga, a Dutch-based broadcaster run by Sudanese exiles, coincided with Haftar's declaration of an imminent "victory" as his forces amass on the outskirts of the Libyan capital.

According to Radio Dabanga, the RSF members will be deployed to protect oil facilities in Haftar-controlled eastern Libya in order to allow him to concentrate his fighters for an assault on Tripoli. It said the number of RSF fighters in Libya could rise to 4,000 in the next few months.

Al Jazeera also reported that documents from Haftar’s backers in the United Arab Emirates showed orders to transport Sudanese fighters to Libya through Eritrea.

The RSF is a paramilitary force led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, the deputy head of Sudan's ruling military council commonly known as Hemeti, and has played a leading role, according to opposition activists, in a deadly crackdown on protesters in Sudan since the beginning of June.

The movement of fighters has confirmed the fears of those Sudanese protesters about becoming entangled in more regional conflicts since the prospect of RSF fighters - who have already been deployed to Yemen as part of of the Saudi-led coalition - going to Libya was first floated in a lobbying deal made public in June. 

According to documents signed by Hemeti on behalf of the military council in May, and recently published in public listings in the US, the transfer of troops to support the LNA in Libya was proposed as part of a $6m deal between Sudan's military rulers and Dickens and Madson, a Canadian lobbying firm which also has links to Haftar and a record of past dealings in Libya.

The other signatory to the deal was Ari Ben-Menashe, the founder of Dickens and Madson and a Tehran-born former Israeli intelligence officer whose eventful career has included being arrested and put on trial in the US in 1989 for allegedly trying to sell weapons to Iran.

He was acquitted after a New York jury accepted that he had been acting on orders from Israel, according to a profile of Ben-Menashe in Canada's National Post.

Among other lobbying activities, the deal said that Dickens and Madson would "strive to obtain funding for your [Sudan's] Council from the Eastern Libyan Military Command in exchange for your military help to the LNA".

When contacted by Middle East Eye this week, Ben-Menashe said that the "exchange" proposed in the agreement had yet to take place and described it as a possibility only once a civilian prime minister was installed in Sudan.

Libyan 'Wild West'


But the agreement, disclosed under the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) which requires organisations representing the interests of foreign powers to declare these ties publicly, fits a pattern of dealings involving Libya and Ben-Menashe's lobbying firm.

Other documents available through the online FARA registry show that since the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s three-decade rule in 2011, Ben-Menashe’s organisation has provided public relations and lobbying services to several Libyan groups, including Haftar's LNA.

The latest agreement with Sudan is Dickens and Madson's fourth deal linked to Libya, where the organisation has had a particular focus on the eastern part of the country.

Dickens and Madson has offered clients services that range from polishing their image and forging diplomatic links to facilitating oil sales and bringing in hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance - in a turbulent Libyan context some observers have called a "Wild West" for lobbying firms.

Since Gaddafi was killed in October 2011, eight months into an uprising against his autocratic rule, Libya has been torn apart by competing claims to leadership between numerous factions.

The two most prominent bodies claiming power have been the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, and Haftar’s LNA forces and accompanying House of Representatives government.

Haftar became a client of Dickens and Madson in 2015, according to a FARA filing which lists him and others including the House of Representatives as the "foreign principal" for a $6m deal in which the Canadian firm promised to lobby for recognition and favour in the US and Russia, but also vowed to “strive... to obtain” $500m in military assistance from Moscow. 

The goal, the document said, was to get international governments to recognise and help the House of Representative in its purported goal to “restore peace and order to the Republic of Libya”.

Ben-Menashe told MEE that he had not officially represented the House of Representatives since their deal expired earlier this year. He said he did not try to renew it after Haftar's assault on Tripoli began, which he claimed he had tried to prevent.

But he said he remained in contact with Haftar, and had tried to broker a meeting for him with Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister of the GNA in Tripoli who he said he had met in Tunisia and Malta.

"In spite of the fact that we didn’t have this contract [with Haftar anymore] we were requested to help as we know all the sides of the conflict," Ben-Menashe said. "The issue of uniting the two sides had been part of our work for three or four years."

'There has to be a unifying force'

Haftar, who has been backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia, has controlled the dominant military force in eastern Libya since launching a campaign against Islamist militant groups around Benghazi in 2014.

But his forces have been accused of human rights abuses and war crimes. Last month, Haftar promoted a commander who is the subject of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant over the alleged execution-style killing of prisoners in 2016 and 2017.

In May, Amnesty International accused the LNA of possible war crimes for bombarding civilian neighbourhoods in Tripoli.

Speaking to the BBC in July, Ben-Menashe credited Haftar and the House of Representatives with bringing stability to eastern Libya.

“We’ve represented the House of Representatives and I think there’s stability in eastern Libya - much more stable than it was before and we helped bring that about,” he said.

“What Mr Haftar did in Tripoli, that’s a different story. There has to be a unifying force and Mr Haftar got backing from different governments as well.”
Photo: Ari Ben Menashe in Zimbabwe, where he previously represented former President Robert Mugabe (AFP)

While Haftar has been Dickens and Madson's most prominent Libyan patron, Ben-Menashe has also continued to represent another Libyan client - the Unified Libya Movement (ULM) - about which there is limited public information.

The ULM is registered under a Tripoli address and stated in FARA filings that it was “supervised by Libya’s GNC [General National Congress] government”. Created in 2012, the GNC was Libya's transitional legislative authority for two years, before officially dissolving in 2016.

In a 2014 deal previously reported on by MEE, Ben-Menashe’s firm promised to deliver aid, financing and political support to the ULM to help “establish a stable social and political environment for building an inclusive, independent national government for a prosperous sovereign and unitary Libya”.

Speaking to MEE at the time, Ben-Menashe said that his clients were not all necessarily aligned with the GNC.

“Our clients are a group of people [Libyans] who want to bring everybody [from the GNC and House of Representatives] together and start a new legislative body,” he said. “Some [of the clients] are people who were in the GNC and some are still in the GNC.”

In the FARA filing after the deal with the ULM was struck, Dickens and Madson said it could not name the individuals they were representing because it "may place them at physical risk".

Working for the US government

In a 2017 report filed with FARA on the firm’s activity for foreign interests - which at the time consisted of only two Libyan clients, Haftar and the ULM - Dickens and Madson said it had meetings outside the US with individuals “who might in turn have some influence with respect to the position of the United States regarding the establishment of governing structures in Libya”.

The firm also said in the report that it had been working on behalf of the US government.

"Those activities taking place in the United States were undertaken on behalf of the government of the United States in pursuit of policies of the United States, not on behalf of the foreign principals to influence such policies," the report read.

Neither Haftar nor the ULM were Ben-Menashe’s first clients in Libya. 

In 2013, he agreed a $2m deal with the eastern Libya-based Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC) and an allied militia leader, Ibrahim Jathran, shortly after they had taken control of eastern Libya’s oil export ports, which they held until they were driven out by Haftar three years later.

The CTC had announced the creation of its own federal government that same year, and Ben-Menashe’s firm promised to seek recognition for its authority.

The deal said Dickens and Madson would work towards obtaining $75m in military aid from Russia and help find sellers and transport for the plentiful oil supplies in eastern Libya, despite opposition from the GNC in Tripoli

But that deal quickly fell apart, and in October 2014 Dickens and Madson reported to FARA that no work had been done for the client and no money received.

A month later, Ben-Menashe's firm began its work with the ULM. The following year, Dickens and Madson also started working with Haftar, who by then was at war with Jathran, his first client.

'We really thought we could help'

Ben-Menashe told MEE that he had made at least 20 trips to Libya over the course of his work there for Dickens and Madson and reiterated that the company had helped to stabilise the east of the country.

Under former US President Barack Obama, Ben-Menashe said he had advocated for the eastern government to run Libya instead of the UN-backed Sarraj, who he had viewed as a bad choice.

"We really thought we could help," he said. "We were successful in the east, we helped stabilise the east, we helped do everything."

While he said he no longer worked with Haftar, who he described as "impatient", Ben-Menashe said he remained active in Libya, and was also working with the Gaddafi clan and the minority Amazigh community to build a consensus for a unified Libya.

Dickens and Madson is just one among several western lobbying firms who have identified business opportunities in the continuing instability in Libya since the 2011 revolution, according to experts.

"It's like the Wild West," Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow with the Washington DC-based Atlantic Council and former CIA analyst, told MEE.

“As we say here: there’s gold on those hills. There’s money to be made in eastern Libya for those who take the risk. 

“Just as someone’s willing to sell weapons, someone’s going to be willing to do the PR. There are a lot of bottom-feeders out there.”

Ahmed Gatnash, a co-founder of the Kawaakibi Foundation, which works to promote liberal values in the Arab and Muslim world, said the trend for Middle Eastern powers to hire lobbyists, even beyond Libya, might not do much to increase their standing with the US or other foreign powers but could indirectly impact the public’s view of diplomacy. 

“They kind of show the populace that their politicians are potentially buyable,” he said.

"Even if the lobbying firms don’t do something, it fuels a kind of despair that the world is for sale, democracies are easily corruptible. Why would anyone back democracy in Libya when it can easily be bought?"

More than a dozen parties and factions in Libya have struck deals with US-based lobbying firms since 2011, according to FARA documents. Most of them have focused on strengthening relations between the client and the US government, or polishing their public image.

Both Haftar and the UN-backed GNA have signed new lobbying deals even since the LNA assault on Tripoli began. Donald Trump spoke to Haftar in a telephone call in April, in which a White House spokesperson said the US president had recognised Haftar's "significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya’s oil resources".

In May, Haftar’s LNA signed a deal with Houston-based Linden Government Solutions for “assisting in relations between the US government and Client, international coalition building, and general public relations”.

The GNA sought similar assurances from New York-based Mercury Public Affairs.

Sudan's military sidesteps protesters with lobbying and ralliesRead More »

Further Reading

1,000 of Sudan RSF fighters deployed to warlord Haftar's Libya offensive
REPORTEDLY, four thousand members of Sudan’s notorious RSF militia are thought to be deployed to protect Haftar’s oil resources during the offensive on Libya's capital Tripoli.
Sudan Watch - Thursday, August 01, 2019

Sudan militia chief Hemeti hires Canadian lobbying group for $6m to influence US, Russia, Saudia Arabia, UN, AU, Libya in favour of TMC
Article from The Financial Times.com
Sudan Watch - Tuesday, July 02, 2019

Russia Moves in on Africa: Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan
REPORTEDLY, three months before the coup last April in Sudan, a 'draft military agreement' was signed between Moscow and Sudan. 
Gatestone Institute - Tuesday, August 13, 2019
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/14714/russia-sudan