Obasanjo, El Bashir meet to end Darfur crisis

President Olusegun Obasanjo has met with the President of Sudan, Omar El-Bashir, to review on-going efforts to resolve crisis in Darfur. El Bashir, who was in Nigeria for the 7th Leon Sullivan Summit, also discussed the ongoing implementation of the CPA with rebel groups in the south of the country. - allAfrica July 21, 2006.

AU briefs African envoys on Darfur peace implementation

The African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) convened a meeting with the African Group of Ambassadors on 18 July, 2006. The meeting was held to update the group on the activities of AMIS and also exchange ideas and view points regarding the efforts of the Mission in the Sudan.

The meeting was chaired by the Acting Head of Mission Madam Monique Mukaruliza and attended by the Head of the DPA Implementation Team Ambassador Sam Ibok and senior personnel of AMIS, said the AU spokesperson, Noureddine Mezni, in a press release. - Full story ST July 21 2006.

Aid work suspended in Zalinge, Darfur after killing - UN

International aid operations in refugee camps in the Zalinge area of Darfur have been suspended after three water workers were killed by a mob, UNHCR said today - Reuters report via Sudan Tribune:

UNHCR said the three were beaten to death on Thursday in the region near the border with Chad in circumstances that were still unclear.

The incident follows an attack on two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Djebel Mara area, north of Zalinge, two days ago and the fatal shooting of an NGO driver attacked by bandits in Darfur's El Geneina last week, the UNHCR said.

UN workshop aims to help Sudan plan and manage natural environment

UN workshop aims to help Sudan plan and manage natural environment, UN News Centre reported 20 July 2006:

"This country has endured years of turmoil and years of misery," Achim Steiner, UNEP's Executive Director, said in a news release. "A new chance for the people of Sudan will hinge on numerous factors, including strengthening the ability of the Sudanese authorities to sustainably manage their natural resources."

He emphasized that restoring and rehabilitating Sudan's economically important and productive land, forests, river systems, and other crucial ecosystems, which so many people depend on, will play an important role in ensuring stability and a lasting peace.

"Environmental issues in Sudan such as desertification, land degradation and deforestation greatly contribute to the scarcity of vital resources such as water for drinking and irrigation, animal fodder and fuelwood," he said. "This scarcity can drive and exacerbate conflicts and population displacement, which may in turn then result in accelerated environmental degradation and human suffering."

He pledged UNEP's readiness to help the Sudanese authorities to address these problems. The agency is currently conducting a detailed assessment of Sudan's challenges with the aim of identifying environmental issues and priorities that require priority attention. That study is due to be published in October.

Remarks by President Bush and Salva Kiir

Click here for transcript of remarks by President Bush and Salva Kiir, First Vice President of the Government National Unity of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan. White House Press Office July 20, 2006 (via PR Newswire/Yahoo)



Photo: US President George W. Bush with Sudanese Vice President Salva Kiir pictured here in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC. Bush said that there was "a lot of work to be done" before an international force can go to Darfur to help beleaguered African Union (AU) troops. (AFP/Jim Watson)

In a meeting with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Chapters' leaders in the USA and Canada, the Sudanese First Vice President Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir admitted that there is slow progress in CPA implementation.

Sudan to provide UN with plan for change in Darfur

Khartoum, July 19 (SUNA):

The Foreign Minister, Dr Lam Akol, announced that the government will submit to the United Nations on the 1st of next August a plan to change the situation on the ground in Darfur region.

In a press statement at Khartoum airport upon his return from Brussels Wednesday evening, Dr Akol said that he participated in the Donors Conference, which was intended to attract aid for the African Union forces Darfur.

He said that the donors pledged to extend more than 200 million dollars for Darfur, adding that this sum is sufficient for the requirements of the African Union forces in Darfur till after the 30th of next September.

He said that Sudan delegation has met at the conference with the UN Secretary General and senior officials of the European union and explained Sudan vision concerning peace in Darfur and the arrival of international forces in the region.

He said that the government delegation held in Brussels meetings with the American, Dutch delegation and the delegation of the European Union and discussed progress of the bilateral relations. The minister described the meeting as a successful one as it came out with recommendations supporting to the African Union forces in Darfur. He said that the meeting has appreciated the efforts of Sudan government concerning implementation of Darfur peace agreement on the ground. - via ReliefWeb & CFD

US, UK government statements on AMIS Donor Conference

July 19 2006 US Department of State press release via ReliefWeb, excerpt:

United States commits $116 million at Sudan donors conference: The United States maintains a strong partnership with the African Union on the Darfur issue, and we commend the efforts of the AMIS peacekeepers and their leaders. Conference participants expressed broad agreement that the transition of the AMIS to a United Nations Mission should go forward as soon as possible. They universally called for all parties in Sudan to respect the cease-fire agreements and to halt all hostilities.

July 19 2006 UK government statement on African Union Mission in Sudan: Donor conference, Brussels:

The British Government is gravely concerned at the tragic situation in Darfur. It is playing an active part in the response to the political, military and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. Britain has provided over GBP 126 million in humanitarian assistance since September 2003, and continues to support the peace process in every way it can.

The African Union has played the leading international role in Darfur. The troops and civilian police of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) are playing a vital role in easing the suffering of the people of Darfur. The Darfur Peace Agreement provides the only basis for lasting peace in Darfur. Its signature at Abuja in May was a tribute to the African Union mediation. AMIS is critical to the success of the Darfur Peace Agreement and has already reduced large-scale violence and increased security where it operates.

Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, said:

"AMIS has done an impressive job in very difficult circumstances. The UK is proud to support the AU in its first major peace keeping operation. Today we are confirming our additional commitment of GBP 20 million, bringing our total financial support to AMIS to GBP 52 million. This support, together with the welcome contribution from others, will enable AMIS to continue its vital operations as it prepares to hand over to the UN."

Lord Triesman, Foreign Office Minister for Africa, said:

"AMIS' record in Darfur has been impressive. We are extremely grateful to them for what they have done. However the Darfur Peace Agreement has led to AMIS having substantial new tasks added to its mandate, which the AU itself recognises a UN force is best placed to implement. The UN will be able to deploy a larger force which will have a much better chance of preventing future violence, and prevent more people being forced to leave their homes. The United Nations, the African Union and Sudan's international partners all want AMIS to hand over to a UN force. I urge President Bashir to accept this."

Notes to Editors

1. The AMIS Donors'' Conference is an international conference hosted jointly by the African Union and the European Union being held in Brussels on 18 July.

2. Hilary Benn, Secretary of State for International Development, announced the contribution of GBP 20 million additional funding for AMIS during a visit to Sudan in 21-23 February 2006. This brings the total UK contribution to GBP 52 million. The UK will work with AMIS to ensure that the additional funding is put to the best use.

3. The UK was the first donor to AMIS in 2004, and has continued to play a leading role since then. UK assistance to AMIS has already provided 1,000 vehicles, help with airlifting AU troops into and out of Darfur, and funding ground fuel. We have provided civilian police as part of the EU supporting action to AMIS in Darfur, which has contributed significant technical expertise and training, and we have provided military experts. The UK has also provided training for AU troops deploying to Darfur.

4. The UK is also expanding its Khartoum-based Police Training and Development Programme into Darfur to train over 400 officers across Darfur. It has also put forward a proposal to assist the AU in readying itself for its role in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process which will help former rebels return to normal society.

For further information, contact 020 7023 0600, e-mail pressoffice@dfid.gov.uk or call our Public Enquiries Point on 0845 300 4100. - via ReliefWeb

July 20 2006 New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

New funding for AMIS keeps it afloat until Sept. What then?

In response to the $200 million pledged to the African Union force at yesterday's donor conference, a group of leading international aid agencies (CAFOD, CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, IRC, Oxfam and Tearfund) working in Darfur issued a joint statement. A spokesperson for the group said:

"Yesterday donors were asked to respond generously to the desperate situation in Darfur, but instead the African Union force is still $150 million short of what it asked for.

The African Union force is the only protection civilians have in Darfur, yet due in part to the lack of funding, many of their patrols have stopped and come nightfall the troops retreat to barracks.

Even if the money pledged is delivered, according to the chairperson of the African Union it will only keep the mission afloat until September. What then?

If donors continue to opt for protection on the cheap, it will be the men, women and children of Darfur who will pay the price.

With few exceptions, the AU is still dependent on just five donors (the United Kingdom, United States, the EU, Canada and the Netherlands) for the vast bulk of funding for the force.

We urge all the other donor countries who are concerned about what is happening in Darfur to donate generously and work with the African Union to ensure we avert an even greater protection catastrophe."- via ReliefWeb

Jul 18 2006 Annan will propose to the Security Council a new level of support to AMIS - UN peacekeepers will come from Africa and Asia as helpers

Jul 18 2006 EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

Jul 19 2006 EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

Jul 19 2006 Donors pledge US $220m to boost African force in Darfur

Donors pledge US $220m to boost African force in Darfur

IRIN report 19 July 2006 - excerpt:

Aid donors meeting in the Belgian capital have pledged about US $220 million in additional funding to the African Union (AU) force in Darfur.

During Tuesday's pledging conference in Brussels, representatives of the international donor community insisted that the AU peacekeeping mandate must be transferred to the United Nations by 1 January 2007.

"I can't foresee any realistic exit of the Darfur conflict without such a transition [from AU to UN peacekeeping], and I can't either imagine that the government of Sudan would continue to oppose it," the EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana said at the conference.

The United States said it would give $116 million to be used to strengthen the Africa Mission in Sudan, while the EU will make available $31.2 million to the Mission on top of an additional $50 million for the humanitarian effort in Darfur. The Netherlands pledged $31.2 million, Britain $36.6 million, France $2.5 million and Belgium $1.25 million.

The pledges would only be enough to sustain the Mission until the end of September; it needs an extra $450 million to operate until year-end, to pay for extra soldiers to be deployed, communications equipment, air support capability and more vehicles.

"The situation is precarious. The strengthening of [the Africa Mission] should be our priority because the next six months are critical," said the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guehenno. "If we have a strong [Africa Mission], we will have a strong UN mission," he added.

A senior European Commission official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the real problem was that the "the AU is snowed under with the complexities of financial management".

Photo: European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana (L) and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan hold a joint news conference during an International Conference on Darfur at the European Council in Brussels July 18, 2006. Reuters/Francois Lenoir

Annan will propose to the Security Council a new level of support to AMIS - UN peacekeepers will come from Africa and Asia as helpers

July 18 2006 report by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan - excerpt:

I will propose to the Security Council that the United Nations be authorized to provide a new level of support to AMIS, as agreed during our joint assessment mission. But, this support will complement -- not substitute for -- what is being asked of you today. We cannot afford to lose another day before we start giving AMIS the extra resources that it needs.

AMIS must be able to concentrate on the many complex tasks that the Peace Agreement requires it to undertake; on protecting civilians, and on responding to ceasefire violations.

United Nations peacekeeping forces -- which will come primarily from Africa and Asia, with some additional, and much needed, support from developed countries -- will come to Darfur not as occupiers, but as helpers.

Jul 18 2006 EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

Jul 19 2006 EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

Jul 19 2006 AND/Gaberone Bureau report - Botswana to send troops to Darfur ony under UN auspices - Speaking to the local media recently, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Mompati Merafhe, said "As government, our standpoint currently is that we are not in a position to send troops to be part of the African Union contingent." He added that Botswana will do that only when the Sudanese government has agreeds to allow UN troops to replace the African Union peacekeeping forces.



Photo: Kenyan, Zambian and Rwandan soldiers working in Darfur for AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) take turns practicing marksman skills on a 50-calibre heavy machine gun in the Kabkabyia area of North Darfur, Saturday, June 24, 2006. The A.U. has 7,000 men and women in Darfur, a region of 150,000 square miles (388,500 square kilometers), roughly the size of France, where punishing heat and frequent sandstorms take their toll on troops and equipment. (AP Photo)

EU's Solana: Khartoum closer to change of position on UN Mission in Darfur

European Union (EU) foreign policy and security chief Javier Solana said Tuesday that the Sudanese government might be closer to a change of position on a UN mission in Darfur, People's Daily Online reported July 19, 2006. Excerpt:

"Has the government of Sudan changed their position as taken by (Sudanese) President Bashir? No," Solana told a press conference.

"But it is no doubt today a lot of things have been clarified and we are closer probably to have a change of that position and get closer to the will of the majority of countries."

He said he, together with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, held talks with Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol for almost two hours on Monday and "a lot of things that were less clear before are clearer now."

The Sudanese side was not available for comment in Brussels.

A Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said Monday that Akol was not traveLling to Brussels to give a nod to a UN mission.

EU welcomes tentative breakthrough on Darfur: Khartoum agrees to AMIS operating under UN umbrella

There's been a breakthrough in the deadlock between the international community and the Sudanese government over a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, according to the Dutch development minister: Agnes van Ardenne says the EU, together with the UN and the US, have succeeded in getting Khartoum to agree to the establishment of a UN force in Darfur, Radio Netherlands Vanessa Mock reported July 18, 2006. Excerpt:

Speaking at an international conference on Darfur in Brussels, van Ardenne said Khartoum had now bowed to international pressure, but only on condition that AU forces would form part of the UN mission. "[The Sudan government] will not accept a new force. They will only accept the same force under the umbrella of the UN. And now we've understood more clearly what was hampering them before. ... AU troops will remain on the ground, they will be strengthened, more equipped and will operate under the UN umbrella."

Ms Van Ardenne said she was hopeful that the new mission would be ready by the end of the year and said the Netherlands would help train AU troops for deployment under the UN.

The Netherlands also announced it would give an extra 20 million euros to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) so that it could continue operations until the end of the year. The EU has pledged 115 million euros.

However, the sum still falls short of the amount needed to keep AU operations going. The force says its needs over 30 million euros a month and says its coffers will run out by the end of August.

The US, for its part, has refused to give more cash to the AU, in the hope that its financial collapse would hasten the deployment of an UN mission.

Ms Van Ardenne says failure to give more financial backing would spell disaster: "I don't think that the AU mission can keep on going without finances and they cannot be transformed for the UN mission if there's not enough funding. So we must ask our colleagues not only for enough budget for the coming two months but also for the period beyond."

Ms Van Ardenne admits the [Darfur peace] deal got off to a bad start but argues that it is still the right instrument to bring about a lasting peace:

"There was maybe a failure on the part of all of us. But if you read the DPA, there's enough there to implement the peace process. So I don't want to mourn the peace process, it's more important to get more people involved. "It can be salvaged, if we bring in everybody," she insisted.

Photo: U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, left, welcomes African Union President Alpha Oumar Konare during a Darfur donors conference at the European Council headquarters in Brussels, Tuesday July 18, 2006. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed confidence that an international conference Tuesday on Darfur will lead to a stronger African peacekeeping force able to better protect civilians in the Sudanese region from rebels and pro-government militias. (AP Photo/Yves Logghe)

European Union Council conclusions on Sudan/Darfur

Council conclusions on Sudan/Darfur
(2744th EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting - Brussels, 17 July 2006) via ReliefWeb. Excerpt from the conclusions adopted by the Council:

3. The Council emphasized the vital role of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for the peace process in Darfur, and for DPA implementation in particular. The Council stressed the need to continue to enhance the operational capabilities of AMIS, emphasizing especially the need to ensure protection of the civilian population and humanitarian access. In this respect, the Council welcomed the new Concept of Operations for AMIS, and in particular the AU PSC decision of 27 June to approve the additional tasks and the new mandate of AMIS already within its existing strength and capacity. The Council recalled the need to swiftly implement the recommendations of the AU-led evaluation mission of December 2005 in order to enhance the mission's overall efficiency.

4. The Council urged the Government of Sudan to accept the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council, reaffirmed at its meeting of 27 June, to end the mandate of AMIS within the context of a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation.

5. The Council underlined that a UN operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term.

6. The Council reaffirmed the EU's commitment to support the efforts of the AU and AMIS in Sudan and Darfur politically and financially as well as through military and police means.

Photo: Children look on at a school in Greida camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) at Darfur, Sudan June 12, 2006. Sudan, Uganda and Congo are the world's three most dangerous places for children due to wars that have brought death, disease and displacement to millions, a Reuters poll of humanitarian experts showed on July 18, 2006. (Zohra Bensemra/Reuters)

Sudan: European Union response to the Darfur crisis

EUROPEAN UNION FACTSHEET
Source: European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 17 July, 2006 (via ReliefWeb)

Responding to the Darfur conflict that has been raging since 2003, the European Union has been at the forefront of international assistance backing up efforts led by the African Union (AU). The EU's support has included the following major components:

Mobilisation of funds of around EUR 1 billion. Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food aid and aid to Darfur refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission alone has allocated EUR 282 million in humanitarian support. EU Member States have provided around EUR 12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) amount to approximately EUR 325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of EUR 212 million.

Support for human rights inquiries and calls for an end to impunity in Darfur. On 26 July 2004, the EU supported calls for the creation of an international commission of inquiry into human rights violations, which was duly established. It welcomed the international commission's findings, submitted to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 25 January 2005 and condemned the crimes described in the report. The EU stresses the importance of terminating impunity in Darfur and was the prime mover behind UN Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Similarly, the EU fully supports the ongoing investigations by the ICC of human rights abuses in Darfur.

Support for the efforts of UN Special Representative, Jan Pronk, to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions (1556, 1564, 1574, 1590, 1591, 1593, 1651, 1665, 1672 and 1679(1) ). EU Heads of Mission in Khartoum participate in the Joint Implementation Mechanisms established by the Government of Sudan and the Special Representative to supervise compliance with the Resolutions.

Active support for the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). From its early involvement, when it helped broker the N'djamena ceasefire, the EU has steadily increased its diplomatic activity in relation to Sudan, as well as its operational support to AMIS (see details below). The EU, which has been assigned a specific role in the agreement, will continue to play a crucial part in its implementation - notably in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and in the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and by providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.

Continuing support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). This is provided through diplomatic efforts - notably by the EU Special Representative, through political dialogue with the Government of National Unity of Sudan, and through EU assistance programmes that particularly focus on war-affected areas in Southern and Central Sudan. The EU is thus contributing to the overall stabilisation of Sudan, a country that has suffered from civil strife throughout most of its modern history.

EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur - AMIS

The EU and its Member States have been providing a wide range of support to the African Union's (AU) efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004. This support has included financial, personnel and political support to the Abuja talks process and the Ceasefire Commission. It also includes support to AMIS through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers and strategic transportation.

- Almost 100 personnel from the EU and its Member States have been deployed to Sudan in support of the military component of AMIS and a further 50 in support of the civilian police component.(2)

- In the same period, EU Member States have provided coordinated strategic airlift for well over 2000 African Union personnel.

- The EU has committed a total of EUR 212 million from the African Peace Facility in support of AMIS since June 2004. This has provided the funds necessary to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs.

- Additionally, EU Member States have made substantial bilateral contributions - financial as well as the provision of expertise, equipment, food rations, airlift, etc. The estimated amount of Member States' support to AMIS is approximately EUR 115 million.

- The EU Special Representative for Sudan, Mr Pekka Haavisto, who was appointed in July 2005, ensures coordination and coherence of the EU'S contributions to AMIS. He is assisted by a team of EU military and police advisers in Addis Ababa.

Footnotes

(1) For more details: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc

(2) EU personnel currently deployed to AMIS II includes 29 police officers, 17 military experts, and 10 military observers. In addition, 3 military staff, one police officer and one political advisor have been deployed to Addis Ababa to support the EUSR in his contacts and cooperation with the AU. Finally, 3 officers will be deployed to the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (Al Fasher).

Darfur Peace Must Address Water Crisis: Economist

Here is an excellent, important report via DefenseNews.com.

Darfur Peace Must Address Water Crisis: Economist (by Megan Rowling, Reuters July 17, 2006)

There is no chance of peace in Darfur unless the region's dire water shortages are tackled as part of a settlement between rebels and the Sudanese government, a top international economist said on July 17.

The conflict in Sudan's arid west is often attributed to political and ethnic grievances, Jeffrey Sachs, director of Columbia University's Earth Institute, told a climate change conference.

But he said its origins can be traced to severe drought and population growth in the 1980s that sparked a struggle between settled farmers and pastoralists.

"(In Darfur) we need to understand that, at the core, there is a massive ecological and demographic challenge exacerbated by climate change," Sachs said.

"I would say there's not a chance in the world for Darfur to be peaceful unless a solution is found to water stress."

Three years of fighting has killed tens of thousands of people and forced 2.5 million to flee their homes. A peace deal was signed between the government and one rebel faction in May, but violence continues.

International efforts to solve the conflict have been too focused on peacekeeping and not enough on development, Sachs told Reuters on the sidelines of the conference on the outskirts of Helsinki.

"In general, crises like these are viewed through the optic of geopolitics and the military. ... But when you are dealing with very hungry people and desperately poor people, unless you also put forward a realistic and viable development option, you can't make peace," he said.

Sachs called for greater international recognition of the role of climate in sparking violence and a deeper understanding of the affect of climate change on vulnerable communities.

Policymakers need to integrate knowledge about climate change into their planning, he said.

VICIOUS CIRCLE

Sachs also criticized the time it took the international community to respond to disasters, saying delays in addressing food shortages increased the risk of violence.

"The world is overloaded with crises. ... We need to buffer agencies so that (when a disaster happens) they don't have to beg rich governments for money," he said.

Droughts that cause food shortages and hunger can often be predicted using climate modeling and seasonal forecasting, but the current international system for raising funds only kicks in once a crisis is under way -- meaning that relief may not start arriving until months after its onset.

"By then, there may be violence, and then people say they can't respond because the situation is too violent," Sachs said. "Where rains fail in Africa, violence increases. We know that, but we don't seem to be able to do anything about it."

Sachs also said the international community needed to come up with a framework for dealing with growing migration caused by droughts, floods and other disasters linked to climate change.

Population growth -- which is expected to increase the number of people in Africa by 1 billion by the middle of the century -- is likely to make the problem worse by fuelling competition for scarce resources, Sachs said.

Dry, landlocked African nations were likely to become a major source of environmental refugees and richer countries should be prepared, he warned.

"The world needs a better response than locked gates, barbed wire and shooting people. The political challenge is enormous," Sachs said. The conference, organized by several agencies including the World Meteorological Organization, continues until July 21.

Photo: Women use a water pump to fill their containers at the Galap camp for Internally Displaced Persons in the town of Fasher, Darfur, Sudan, June 14, 2006. (Zohra Bensemra/Reuters)

Sudanese First VP due in Eritrea for talks with Darfur's holdout rebel groups

14 July 2006 Sudan Tribune report - Eritrea says Darfur peace deal approach not correct - excerpt:

Sudanese First Vice President is expected to visit Asmara on Saturday 15 July to hold talks with the holdout rebel groups to discuss their demands and see how to establish a common ground with them and the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Eritrea who is sponsoring eastern Sudan peace talks seems more and more interested by the Darfur crisis. The rapid rapprochement between Eritrea and Sudan could encourage Asmara to bring Darfur rebels to the table of negotiations with Khartoum.

Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia (Alex de Waal)

Here are links to an amazing series of excellent articles authored by Dr Alex de Waal, an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations. The articles, published at AllAfrica.com July 14, 2006, concern the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explain how different parts were negotiated by the Sudanese Government and Movement delegations, what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. Dr de Waal states that "one of the reasons for this is that it is important for the Sudanese people as a whole--and the people of Darfur especially--to understand the spirit and letter of the DPA, so that it can be implemented so as best to serve the interests of the people and bring lasting peace to Darfur."

[Tip: Re links here below, click on "Print this page" at AllAfrica for easier view]

(1) Sudan: Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia - This first article asks, how are the Janjaweed and other armed militia to be disarmed? One of the toughest questions in the negotiations in Abuja that led to the DPA was how to control and disarm the Janjaweed and other armed militia in Darfur. Excerpt:

The Movements' negotiators raised this issue time and time again, and went line by line over every relevant paragraph over many long weeks. Each of the Movements' negotiators--Ali Tirayo (SLM-Minawi), Mohamed Adam (SLM-Abdel Wahid) and Tajudeen Niam (JEM)--was closely involved in this issue, and the GoS security team led by General Ismat al Zain was extremely professional and examined every detail. Everyone in the peace talks knew from the beginning that long-term peace and security in Darfur requires the control of all the militia and paramilitary forces, some of which have terrorized Darfurians since the 1980s, and some of which were only recently established.

Security experts agree that the DPA articles concerning the Janjaweed are some of the toughest parts of the whole Agreement. For the first time there is a practical plan for controlling and disarming the Janjaweed. This is a credit to the GoS and Movements negotiating teams in Abuja and the hard work they put in.

(2) Sudan: Security For IDPs and Refugees - This article asks, how is security to be provided for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees?

(3) Sudan: Compensation and Assistance to Victims - This article asks, what provisions are there for victims of the conflict to receive compensation and assistance?

(4) Sudan: The Transitional Darfur Regional Authority - This article asks, what is the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and why was it proposed by the African Union Mediation?

(5) Sudan: How to Include the Different Darfur Movements - This article is concerned with the question of representation of different Movements and fractions of Movements.

(6) Sudan: Guarantees for the DPA - This article deals with the question: how do we know it can work? What are the mechanisms and guarantees?

(7) DDDC - see previous entry here at Sudan Watch 14 July 2006 - Darfur Community Peace and Reconciliation.

(8) Sudan: The Comprehensive Ceasefire - This article is concerned with one of the first and most important aspects of the Agreement, namely the ceasefire.

(9) Sudan: The Future of the Movements' Combatants - This article focuses on the controversial question of the future of the armed forces of the Movements: how many should be integrated into the national army and other security services, and in what way, and what should happen to the remainder.

(10) Sudan: The Question of Land - This article focuses on central question of land tenure. Conflict over land is one of the major reasons for the war in Darfur.

(11) Sudan: Darfurians in the Civil Service and Education - This article focuses on the question of Darfurian representation in the national civil service and educational institutions. It presents the arguments put forward by both the Movements' negotiators and their Government counterparts and the rationale for why the African Union presented its proposals.

(12) Sudan: Human Rights - This article focuses on human rights and how they are respected and promoted in the Agreement.

(13) Sudan: Rebuilding Darfur - This article focuses on the question of rebuilding Darfur.

(14) [Sudan Watch Ed: Article to be inserted here later, if and when I find it - not sure it exists]

(15) Sudan: Leadership for Implementing the DPA - This is fifteenth and last in a series of articles explaining the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining what lies behind the long and complicated text of the Agreement. As these articles have tried to explain, the text of the DPA is strong and reflects the hard work put in by the negotiators on both sides. This final article asks, what kind of leadership will be needed to implement the Agreement?

Alex de Waal

Alex de Waal is a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University and the co-director of Justice Africa. He has been an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations. After receiving his D.Phil. from Oxford University, he became an activist and author of several books on famine, human rights and conflict in Africa especially in north-east Africa including Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (1998). He was editor of the 'African Issues' series with James Currey Publishers, and served as Associate Director of Africa Watch before resigning in 1992 in protest over the U.S. military intervention in Somalia. He was a founder and director of African Rights and the Chairman of Mines Advisory Group 1993-98 (co-laureate of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize), and director of programmes for the International African Institute. He also served as the director of the United Nations' Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance. - [via COC]

Alex de Waal's books include Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-5 (Oxford University Press, 1989; revised edition, 2005), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004), and (with Julie Flint) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War (Zed Books, 2006).

Alex de Waal's recent articles at Open Democracy: "Darfur's fragile peace" - The collapse of the Darfur peace agreement designed to resolve the conflict in western Sudan; "The African state and global governance" - The scale of Africa's political and social crises, exacerbated by the HIV/Aids pandemic.

DDDC: Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (Alex de Waal)

At long last, some food for thought and commentary on the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). Here is a link to an excellent analysis Community Peace and Reconciliation (via allAfrica.com July 14, 2006) by Alex de Waal, an advisor to the African Union mediation group facilitating the Darfur peace negotiations in Abuja. Excerpt:

This is the seventh in a series of articles concerning the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), explaining how different parts were negotiated -- including which negotiators insisted on which articles -- what the paragraphs mean, and how they should be implemented. This article deals with the question of what is next: how the DPA can serve as the foundation for a process of peace and reconciliation among Darfur's fractured and divided communities. It is important that the letter and spirit of the DPA are properly understood by all Darfurians and other Sudanese, so that the Agreement can be implemented and peace can return to Darfur.

As the Darfur peace talks entered their fifth round a year ago, it was clear to all involved that any peace agreement signed between the GoS and the two Movements represented there -- the SLM/A and the JEM -- could only be the first step in a longer process of community peacebuilding and reconciliation. Many groups were not represented in Abuja, and many issues could not be adequately discussed. For example, all the complicated issues of land ownership could only be discussed at the level of general principles -- the specific problems of who owned which piece of land could not be resolved.

This, incidentally, is one reason why the AU Mediation and the international partners were keen for the peace talks in Abuja to come to a rapid conclusion. Only when the DPA had been agreed there by the political leaders, would it be possible to begin the equally important process of creating peace, locality by locality, across Darfur. Only with the leaders' signatures on the DPA would it be possible to bring other groups to the table.

There are two main elements to the ongoing community peace and reconciliation efforts. One is Chapter 4, which concerns the "Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation" and the other is the Peace and Reconciliation Council, a subsidiary body of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which will be set up by the DDDC. [edit]

The DPA does not give a specific timetable for convening the DDDC. This is wise, because the preparatory consultations may take some months to complete. It is more important for the process of dialogue and consultation to be thorough, exhaustive and inclusive, than for it to be quick. The divisions caused by the war in Darfur will take a long time to heal. The people of Darfur will need the opportunity to sit together and discuss their many issues at length, to have the confidence to examine their problems honestly and to find ways of achieving solutions that can be accepted by all.

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July 14 2006 Disarming the Janjaweed and Armed Militia (Alex de Waal) - links to a series of articles by Dr Alex de Waal.

EU: A UN operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term

July 14, 2006 Reuters report excerpt:

A conference in Brussels on Tuesday attended by the European Union, the United States and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will urge Sudan to allow a U.N. mission to replace an ill-equipped and over-extended African Union force in an attempt to stop the violence.

"A U.N. operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term," the European Union will say on the eve of the meeting according to a draft declaration obtained by Reuters.

Tuesday's conference will urge Sudanese rebels to sign a peace deal reached in May between the Khartoum government and one of the main rebel factions.

The meeting will also seek ways to help finance the African Union's 7,000-strong mission until it is replaced by U.N. troops, EU officials said.

UPDATE: July 14 2006 AFP report (via CFD): "The international community's goal is to ensure that AMIS can function at its current level until the end of the year," said an EU diplomat.

On Thursday, EU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner Louis Michel said AMIS, which is likely to be replaced by a United Nations mission, could continue to operate until mid-August or early September.

"After that, we just don't have enough money," he said.

The root causes of the Darfur conflict: A struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it

Today, I did a Google Search with the query "what is the root cause of the darfur conflict?" To put it in a nutshell, here's what I believe:

"The root of the Darfur conflict is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it" - Environmentalist Wangari Maathai, 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner

Notes to myself for future reference. After more than two years of tracking daily news reports on Darfur, I have reached the conclusion that the following excerpts from a report published at the website of the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, DC puts into words (I am no writer) what I believe are the root causes of the Darfur conflict, what can be done and how sensationalist shorthand distorts the reality of Darfur. The following notes, from a pdf report, were difficult to copy here. Please refer to the original source for an exact facsimile:

DARFUR CONFLICT: ITS HISTORY, NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT
Washington, DC June 2005 www.sudanembassy.org -
http://www.sudanembassy.org/sudannewsletter/SudaNews.pdf.

Sensationalist Shorthand Distorts the Reality of Darfur

REALITY OF DARFUR

Casual observers from around the world will be forgiven for having reached a disjointed picture of events, and the root causes of events, in Darfur over the past two years, something which has led to similarly disjointed conclusions and unrealistic solutions.

A combination of lazy and often sensationalist media coverage and the activities of an already active anti- Sudanese campaign have sought to reduce the incredibly complex Darfur issue to one of an attempt by an Arab-dominated government in Khartoum to wipe out its black citizens in Darfur. Some who know a little better accept the fact that the Darfur rebels are the ones who started the conflict by attacking police stations, army garrisons and nomadic leaders and communities - and in so doing murdering hundreds of policemen and precipitating a break-down in law and order.

Apologists for this premeditated violence have nevertheless sought justify that rebel murder and mayhem by echoing rebel claims of the marginalization of Darfur.

In this issue of "Sudan Newsletter", the reader will find how clever manipulators have distorted the realities of Darfur to serve their political agenda, and in so doing deliberately tarnishing the image of Sudan in order to detract from and destabilize the historic peace agreement ending decades of civil war in southern Sudan and to call for a disastrous international military intervention in western Sudan.

The simple facts contradict much of the lacklustre media coverage of events in Darfur and point to the need for an internal solution to the conflict in western Sudan.

As can be ascertained from any reliable source on Darfur, Darfur is a region inhabited by Arabs and non-Arabs alike. They are bound by blood through centuries of intermarriage. The two rebel groups are drawn from three tribes: Zagawa, Fur and Masalit. There are more than eighty different tribes and ethnic communities in Darfur. Any solution that would reward those who carry arms in a deliberate attempt to destabilize Africa's largest country will become a recipe for a full scale war that will spill over the borders of Sudan.

A number of neighboring countries share Sudan's complex ethnic fabric. Countless people identify themselves along tribal lines rather than national affiliation. Ethnically-driven destabilization endangers the entire sub-saharan region and can only but attract extremists and terrorist organizations. Any solution to the Darfur conflict should be preceded by reconciliation between different tribes in the region.

Reconciliation should include compensation, the safe return of villagers to their villages and the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities and violence. A political solution should be inclusive and broad-based. The designation and location of rebel and government forces and positions, as outlined in signed security agreements, is a prerequisite that would enable the government to engage other armed groups and tribes in simultaneous disarmament.

Ambassador
Khidir Haroun Ahmed
Head of Mission
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The Darfur region of western Sudan occupies one fifth of the area of Sudan comprising approximately 250,000 square kilometers. It is larger than Egypt and equals the area of France. Geographically, it is made up of plateau some 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea-level. The volcanic Jebel Marra mountain range runs north to south for a distance of some 100 miles, rising to between 5,000 and 6,000 feet. It borders Libya to the north-west, Chad to the west, and the Central African Republic to the south-west.

Darfur was an independent sultanate that emerged in 1650 and was incorporated into Sudan first by the Turco-Egyption rule in the 19th century. Zubair Pasha and Rudolf Sulatin were among those who served as governors during that era. It remained so through the Mahadia era 1885-1898. Sultan Ali Dinar restablished his ancestors Sultanate until 1916 when he was defeated and killed by Anglo- Egyptian forces.

Since 1994 the region has been divided administratively into three states: North Darfur, with its capital Alfasher, South Darfur with its capital Nyala, and West Darfur with its capital al-Genaina. Darfur is inhabited by six million people, drawn from some eighty different tribes and ethnic groups. From a subsistence point of view, they could be divided into livestock herders - who for the most part are Arabic speakers - and farmers - who are bilingual and perceived as Africans. The ethnic groups in Darfur include the Fur, Bani Halba, Tanhor, Borty, Habaniya, Zaghawa, Zayadia, Rizaigat, Masaleet, Taaishya, Maidoub, Bargo, Dajs, Bani Hussain, Tama, Mahria, Mohameed, Salamat, Messairia, Eraighat, Etafab, Fallata, Ghimir, Bani Mansour, Ab-Darag, Selaihab, Mima, Turgom, Marareet and other African and Arabiantribes. Some tribes extend into Chad, Central Africa and Libya.

Inter-ethnic marriages for centuries have blurred the ethnic differences - all are black Darfurians - and all the people of Darfur are Sunni Muslims. Ecological and demographic transformation had a negative impact on inter-tribal relations where drought and desertification led to conflicts and often violence over scarce resources. During the 1970s and 1980s these tribal conflicts became more intense and bloody, especially between the farmers and cattle herders who in search of water and pasture invaded agricultural land.

Adding to the complexity of the situation is the increased migration of nomadic groups from Chad, Libya, and other states. Tougher living conditions coupled with the absence of or diminishing tolerance resulted in more tension between the locals and the newcomers which led to violence with cross-border implications. Increased access to weapons from southern Sudan, Chad, Libya, and Eritrea aggravated the inter-tribal conflict with the emergence of tribal militias.

Some tribes believe that the government was not able to defend them against other tribes and armed criminal gangs who have more sophisticated weapons, which led several nomadic tribes to form their own defence groups. As a result the region became an open arms market attracting arms dealers to smuggle in all kinds of weapons such as small arms, heavy and light artillery, RPG rocker launchers, and including armoured vehicles.

Between 1983-87 fighting broke out between Fur, Zaghawa and Ma'alihyah communities which resulted in 5,000 deaths, tens of thousands of displaced people and the destruction of 40,000 homes. The conflict was mediated and settled by
government and local tribal leaders. In 1990 the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army inspired an insurgency led by Daud Bolad from the Fur tribe. The insurgency was defeated in few months. In 1996 the Rezeigat and Zagawa tribes came intoarmed conflict. In 1997-99 there was fighting between Massaleit and some Arab tribes. Other tribal conflicts can be summarized as follows:

1- Conflict between Zagawa and Rizigat during 1960s
2- conflict beween Maalya and Rizigat during 1960s
3- Confilct between Taisha and Salmat,

Southern Darfur during 1980s

4- Conflict between Fur and Arabs in Jabal Marra

1978 - 1989

5- Conflict between Zagawa and Rizigat

Northern Darfur 1994

6- Conflict between Arabs and Masaleet,

Western Darfur 1994

7- Conflict between Rizigat and Zagawa,

South Darfur 1997 – 1999

8- Conflict between Maidob and Kababish
9- Conflict between Zagawa and Al-Ghmirr,

West Darfur 1999

10- Conflict between Arabs and Massalit,

Western Darfur 1999

11- Conflict between Fur and Arabs at Jabal Marra 2002
12- Conflict between Mallya and Rizigat, South Darfur 2002
13- Conflict between Arabs and Massalit , West Darfur 2003

The British colonial administration Rudolf Slatin, in his work "Sword and Fire in Sudan", cited similar icidents and tribal conflicts during his tenure as a governor in the 19th century. In most of these conflicts, it was customary for all the tribes to resolve their differences through inter-tribal conferences and reconciliation which they call it "ajaweed and motamarat al sulh" to meet to reach a mutually acceptable solution. The process of modernizing the judicial system from1970 onwards and the increase of college graduates has weakened the native administration and local solutions in the region.

Conflict in Darfur is therefore sadly not unusual. The region have seen it all before, tribal conflicts, insurgency, drought, displacement and death. On this occasion the conflict has spiraled into a humanitarian disaster. Several questions must be asked. What turned this episode into a well-organized, well-armed and well-financed civil war? What led to it being labeled as the world's "worst humanitarian crisis" while the deaths in neighboring Congo reached four million over the last few years?

Similarly, the insurgency in northern Uganda has seen the deaths of tens of thousands of people, the kidnapping of tens of thousands of children and the displacement of more than 1.6 million people in northern Uganda. The focus on Darfur has been sensationalist and disproportionate.

It lies in western sudan, one of the most distinct places in Darfur state.It stretches for several hundred miles from the small town of Kas in the south up to the out- skirts of AlFasher in the North, covereing an area of almost 12800 square kilometers. It is 10.000 ft above sea level, the second highest in the country. It consists of a range of mountains 240 Km long and 80 Km.Wide , with water-falls, volcanic lakes in an outstanding scenic beauty.

[Photo?] Darfur region is the largest producer of livestock in Sudan & it's known for its high quality world wide. A Shepard taking care of his sheep's looking for food & water.

CONFLICT: TIMING AND MOTIVES

Everybody in Sudan and the international community was euphoric when in February 2003 the Sudan government and southern rebels reached the point of no return in their peace negotiations to end the north-south civil war. In that month the government and SPLM/A signed several key peace agreements, including a Memorandum of Cessation of Hostilities.

Technically it stopped the war between the north and the south. Unfortunately, in that same month, February 2003, two rebel groups - one called Justice and Equality Movement, and the other called the Sudan Liberation Army, attacked major towns in northern Darfur, The first one was Gulu, the capital of Jebelmara region. They also attacked Kutum, Tina, Mellit and AlFasher the capital where the rebels destroyed several airplanes on the grounds. They raided the town in hundreds using 40 brand new Land Cruisers, very advanced weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine-guns, mortars, automatic rifles and modern satellite communications.

It was the start of a spate of attacks that left over 400 policemen killed and 89 police stations destroyed. According to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General on January 25, 2005 {"Most reports indicate that the government was taken by surprise by the intensity of the attacks, as it was ill-prepared to confront such a rapid military onslaught. Furthermore, the looting by rebels of Government weaponry strengthen their position. An additional problem was the fact that the Government apparently was not in possession of sufficient military resources, as many of its forces were still located in the South, and those present in Darfur were mainly located in the major urban centers. Following initial attacks by the rebels against rural police posts, the Government decided to withdraw most police forces to urban centers. This means that the Government did not have de facto control over the rural areas, which was where the rebels based."}. The rebels destroyed almost all police stations in the region. They killed most of the police officers, creating a security vacuum which was unfortunately filled by different tribal militias including the notorius Janjaweed. Added to the chaos, is the rebels policy of targeting tribal leaders and theft of thousands of head of livestock from these tribes, which resulted in an explosion of inter-communal violence with revenge attacks and livestock raids by equally well-armed nomadic tribes. That how thousands of people fled their villages and sought refuge around the major urban centers. That mere fact refute allegation of governmental policy of genocide.

MARGINALIZATION: THE MYTH AND THE REALITY

The rebels claim to be acting because of Darfur's marginalisation and underdevelopment. The leader of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) stated to the French news agency in October 2003 the following: "The government is negotiating with the south because of pressures from the international community and military pressure in the south, in the west, and in the east. A peace accord with the SPLM will be a way for the government to regroup to suppress the other marginalized areas, including the west and our movement in particular. We want a comprehensive peace for all of Sudan. We will represent an obstacle to the achievement of peace." It was a preplanned strategy to attract the international community by creating a humanitarian
tragedy.

Today, Sudan which potentially is very rich, is on the United Nations list of the Least Developed Countries in the world, known as LDC and ranks 139 in the UNDP's Human Development Index. It is an accepted fact that Darfur is underdeveloped, but no more so than much of the rest of Sudan, including Kordofan, the Nuba mountains, the east of Sudan, the South, and even the north of Sudan.

Therefore, justifying insurgency and armed struggle as means to redress marginalization is not a valid justification here. Sympathy by major powers of our time to such insurgencies would be at the expense of the fledgling nation-state in Africa and some other parts of the developing world.

Although the whole country is underdeveloped, considerable progress has taken place in the region in all areas and the following table reflects a part of this development. Politically, Darfurians are well represented: they comprise government ministers, state governors and are members of the supreme and constitutional courts.

The irony is that, while claiming lack of development as the cause of their movement, the rebels are repeatedly attacked key development and infrastructure projects. In March 2003 they attacked the school examination center in Tina and stole the examination papers, which adversely affecting tens of thousands of school students and their families. In June 2004 rebel attacks stopped work on an emergency water supply project in El-fasher.

WHO ARE THE JANJAWEED?
"THE EVERYTHING, AND NOTHING"

The Janjaweed is a term that in short means a "jinn" or devil on horseback. It is not a new term, it has been in use for the last two decades. Originally it was a term to define a high-way robber, riding a horse or camel, carrying a gun or a rifle. Before this tragedy it had no ethnic or racial significance. Anyone, African, Arab, or whatever could be a Janjaweed - if he is on a horseback or camelback carrying a rifle and attacking people on highways.

Part of the recent propaganda campaign has been to give this term a new dimension, confined to Arab nomads in the region who are deliberately provoked by the rebels (by stealing their live stock) to focus their wrath against the tribes the rebels are drawn from. This is how burning, looting and other crimes have been committed.

The "Janjaweed" have no political organization or agenda, and included many who have exploited the conflict for their criminal end. It is very difficult to track them, since they included elements from all cultural groups in the area. Once they concluded their criminal attacks, they disappeared into their respective communities. Complicating this was the fact that decades of inter-marriage had made nonsense of any clear ethnic distinction between the so-called Arab and African in Darfur. It must be noted never the less that many Janjaweed had been caught, convicted and jailed.

Executive Summary of Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Allegations of Human Rights Violations by Armed Groups In Darfur, Western Sudan

1- Background:

H.E. President of the Republic Omar Hassan Ahmed El Bashir has issued Decree 2004/97 establishing this Commission headed by former Chief Justice Dafaa Alla El. Haj Yousef. The Commission's mandate was to find facts and collect information on alleged violations of human rights by armed groups in Darfur sates, determine causes of violations when established and possible resulting damage to lives and property. The Commission of Inquiry of 1954. Final report of the Commissions was submitted to H.E. the president of the Republic with the following findings and recommendations.

2- The Commission held 65 meetings, head 288 testimonies and visited all Darfur states several times where it inspected 30 areas believed to have been crime scenes. It met, inter alia, with local authorities and officials of different relief organizations and NGOs

3- The Commission requested and received all documents concerning its mandate and got acquainted with all relevant reports made by missions that visited Sudan from the UN, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League and other organizations. It carefully considered all reports issued by international Human Rights Organizations, including reports made by he Geneva based Commission on Human Rights.

4- Furthermore, the Commission reviewed the decisions made by U.S. Congress, the European Community and the UN Security Council, in Addition to the minutes of talks between the government and armed opposition groups.

5- The Commission contacted armed groups to arrange a joint meeting whenever and wherever they decide in order to listen to their viewpoints, but they gave no favorable response.

6- Whenever means are available, the Commission made written, audio, video and photographic documentation of its
activities.

7- To fulfill its mandate, the Commission had to consider the geographical and historical background of Darfur. This region which has common borders with three neighboring states and more than 80 tribes witnessed considerable demographic and environmental changes due to disastrous waves of drought and desertification. Current events in Darfur essentially reflect these factors, in addition to the irrational politicization of the problem which gave it such an international dimension.

8- Darfur region which represents one firth of the total area of Sudan has a population of nearly 6 million people. It's the homeland of many tribes of Arab and African origins which inter-married and intermingled, culturally and ethnically, for centuries and formed today's unique society in Darfur.

9- Natural diversity in the region resulted in diverse economic activities and means of living, yet farming and cattle raising are the main activities beside cross-border trade.

10- Well-established customs and traditions, where tribes live in specific tribal lands, govern Land tenure in Darfur. Land tenure is closely related to the concept and exercise of authority under various designations. It's also dependent on the nature of economic activities and pastoral tribes' quest for pasture and water.

11- Tribes in Darfur co-existed in relative peace for centuries with sporadic conflicts over natural resources between nomad and sedentary tribes. These conflicts never degenerated in the past and had always been settled through tribal reconciliation conferences organized by the civil Administration under the auspices of the state. Hence, a set of customs and traditions were established to orchestrate tribal relations and activities, This consisted a unique culture feature of Darfur and tribes, regardless of their background, have realized the need to co-exist as no ethnic group can root out the other. The Commission noted that such conflict occurred even between tribes of common origins.

12- It's noteworthy that the local Administration was an essential stabilization factor in the region, considering the key role it played in settlement of conflicts and its collaboration in this respect with the concerned authorities. Unfortunately the dissolution of this Administration in 1970 created an administrative and security vacuum that aggravated these conflicts and led to acute tribalism. As a result of the consequent political polarization, such conflicts gained national dimensions related to issues of marginalization and sharing of power and wealth.

13- The deterioration of economic development and services in Darfur due to factors mentioned in the Commission's report, the administrative instability, the suspension of major development projects, unemployment and the widespread of weapons and ease to obtain them, in addition to political instability in neighboring Chad, have nourished the "culture of violence" in Darfur. This tendency let outlawed individuals from different tribal backgrounds to form semi-organized armed groups, locally referred to as jangaweed and other similar groups, They were responsible for the widespread of looting and smuggling in the 80s. This climate of insecurity forced many tribes to organized-armed groups and form defensive coalitions. The President of the Republic interfered in several occasions to create mechanisms that are capable of reestablishing law and order and State authority.

14- This fluid situation, the revolt against State's authority, conflicting administrative measures taken to deal with the problem without giving due consideration to immediate and future implications, particularly with respect to land tenure, in addition to the impact of civil war in the South and SPLA's attempts to bring the populations of remote states under the banner of the "New Sudan", have transformed these local conflicts into issues of a national dimension. The conflict between rival groups and the State started on an intellectual basis and ended up in armed confrontations which claimed the lives of nearly 500 policemen. The resulting security vacuum and other factor, including the ambitions of some groups to establish a predominant entity, gave this issue an unprecedented political and international aspect.

15- The offensive launched by armed opposition against major towns in the region, their assaults against Armed Forces which caused considerable loss of lives and property, the destruction of public facilities and prosecutors, in additions to the killing of civilians and relief workers, necessitated the interaction of Armed Forces to reestablish law and order. These actions, which triggered the current ordeal, made some of the tribes fearful of potential aggressions and resulted serious violations of human rights.

16- Wide media coverage of those incidents drew the attention of international human rights organiza- tions, but some of these relied on politically motivated information provided by inaccurate and contradictory sources. Thus, some individual states within the UN took advantage of allegations to accuse Sudan of committing ethnic cleansing genocide and organized acts of rape.

17- Accordingly, the Commission initiated its facts finding efforts and listed alleged violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. Investigation procedures involved extensive hearings, visits to alleged crime scenes, review of relevant documents and testimonies under oath.

18- Upon careful evaluation of the aforementioned elements and discussions in the light of International Human Rights Law, provisions of the international Humanitarian Law, the Statue of the International Criminal Court and relevant historical case laws, the Commission reached the following conclusions:

1- There were indeed serious violations of human rights which involved all belligerent parties.

2- Compared with documented crimes of genocide elsewhere in the world, that happened in Darfur, in spite of its gravi- ty, does not constitute such a crime. It has not been established that any specific group had sustained physical or mental damage or been purposely subjected to living conditions leading to its total or partial annihilation.

3- The Commission has established that the description of events in Darfur as genocide was merely due to the overes timation of the death toll.

4- Furthermore, the Commission has established that some civilians lost their lives in air bombardments when Armed Forces inflicted collateral damage as civilians were used as shields by rebel groups and victims received due compensations.

5- The Commission realized that armed opposition groups were responsible for killing unarmed civilians and wounded soldiers.

6- In this prevailing climate of hostility, the Commission found that various tribes committed acts of killing.

7- Killing of civilians in all the above mentioned cases violated common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

8- Acts of killing and their accompanying circumstances which amounted to violation of the said Article, are not viewed by the Commission as a crime of genocide.

9- There were reports of arbitrary executions and the Commission recommended further investigations into allegations not substantiated beyond doubt (para. 16 of the report).

10- The Commission conducted investigations on crimes of rape and sexual abuse and heard many testimonies, including from alleged victims.

11- The Commission found that crimes of rape and sexual abuse had been committed, but they were not systematic or widespread to be viewed as a crime against humanity. Relevant investigations have led to the accusation of few persons, including 10 of the Regular Forces. Most of these crimes were individually motivated in this climate of lawlessness. The Commission noted that most women in Darfur were unaware of the legal and linguistic significance of the word "rape", as they believed it merely meant the use of violence.

12- Forced displacement, as a component of ethnic cleansing is the removal of an ethnic or linguistic group with predominant culture from a legally owned land. Throughout history, ethnic cleansing was related to the concept of the "Nation State" and constituted a crime against humanity.

13- Accordingly, the commission visited several areas where forced displacement was alleged to have occurred. Investigations have shown that a group of non-Arab tribes was forced to leave two predominantly Arab villages. The Commission recommended further investigation as this incident, if true, constitutes a serious unprecedented act.

14- The Commission visited many villages that were burnt down. Statements by local officials and evidences showed that all belligerent parties are to blame for the burning or villages. The villages were deserted as people fled to seek refuge in camps close to areas with different services. The Commission found that allegations of ethnic cleansing were not substantiated.

15- Incidents in Darfur caused widespread panic, horror and massive movement of people to refugees' camps.

16- The current situation in Darfur, with all its implications in terms of human suffering and international repercussions, was the result of viewing the problem in a wider context that omits its local aspects and origins. Misconceptions adopted by some states to exercise pressure on Sudan are being reviewed as the international community realized the need to tackle the roots of the conflict rather than its aftermath.

17- Based on meticulous investigations, the commission found that death toll form all sides, including the armed Forces, amounted to few thousands, contrary to exaggerated figures circulated by international media and organizations.

18- In efforts to evaluate the deplorable loss of lives and property, the Commissions received relevant reports from national and local authorities. It recommended the establishment of a special judicial committee to further investigate civilian property losses.

[Photo?] Raised in a culture of war - Souk in Alfashier. The children of Darfur are raised within the 'culture of war', sadly enough. A little boy holding up a toy bomb.

19- The Commission's recommendations met international support and recognition, including through statements made by the president of African Union and western media. Recommendations were also supported by clear evidence that a considerable number of the national Armed forces personnel are from the very same tribes alleged to have been victims of genocide in Darfur.

20- It's worth mentioning that the government has exerted strenuous efforts to contain the situation prior to the escalation of events. It organized several tribal conferences, and send high level delegations composed of Fur and Zagawa tribal leaders, in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement with armed groups other senior government officials were also negotiating with armed Opposition groups just few days before rebels attack against the town of Al Fasher in April 2003.

21- The Commission has established the involvement of some members of the Chadian Army in the conflict.

22- The causes of this conflict, as determined by the Commission, require effective administrative and judicial arrangements. The Commission recommended the establishment of judicial investigation Commissions to consider the following:

(a)- Allegations of extra judicial executions.

(b)- Expropriation of two Fur tribe villages by Arab groups. Al though a relevant administrative investigation Commission was set up by South Darfur State Governor.

(c)- Investigation into incidents of killing and burning of the wounded in hospitals. The first Vice President of the Republic H.E. Ali Osman Mohammed Taha was mandated to follow up the execution of these recommendations. The Presidency of the Republic, in consultation with Chief Justice, has formed the following three committees:

(a)- Judicial investigation committee headed by member of the high Court Hon, Mohammed Abd Al Raheem.

(b)- Damage assessment committee headed by the judge of the high court Hon. Hussein Abulgasim.

(c)- Administrative committee headed by the Police Force Gen. Eltayeb Abd Al Raheem.

(d)- Other measures.

DEATH TOLL IN DARFUR: THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS

NEWS STORY / Wednesday, April 27, 2005 (WASHINGTON, D.C., 04:27:2005):

In March, 2004, USAID, in a briefing replete with colorful diagrams, estimated that by the Fall of 2004, between 300,000 and 400,000 people would lose their lives in the conflict in Darfur, regardless of international aid efforts. At that time they cited malnutrition as the likely cause of the majority of the deaths. The AID Agency attributed the numbers to "scientific methodology", without further elaboration. This estimate was clearly a prelude to the characterization of the Darfur tragedy as "genocide", an American claim that would soon follow. By the Fall of 2004, a figure of 50,000 surfaced. It was not well received by the self-styled and professional "Sudan watchers", so a figure of 70,000 was floated and attributed to the World Health Organization.

A delegation of the Arab Doctors Union visited all of the internally displaced peoples' camps in Darfur for a full month in the Fall of 2004. Their conclusions brought into serious question the WHO figures of 70,000 deaths, and as a result of their challenge, WHO representatives in Sudan and the Mediterranean region began to distance themselves from the figure, claiming that they had no knowledge of its source or origins.

In March 2005, the U.N. Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs visited Darfur and remarkably claimed that the casualties of the conflict had reached 180,000. When queried on the source of those numbers, he said "he was told" that was the figure! There was no further elaboration on who might have told him.

The Washington Post, for reasons known only to its editorial staff, has uniformly insisted on advancing the casualty figures in Darfur as being as many as 400,000. In an April 24, 2005 editorial, the paper refuted out of hand the figure of 60-160,000 deaths noted by the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Zoellick, suggesting instead that the figures cited by the staunchest and most perennial Sudan critics, Dr. Eric Reeves and Mr. John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, were more accurate.

The Post did not provide any background on why their numbers should be taken as more reliable than those of the United States Government. These wildly swinging numbers claimed by the various interests groups united only in their deep animosity toward Sudan can have only one explanation - pure politics. Not only does the truth become yet another casualty in the tragedy of Darfur, but these exaggerations serve no purpose save that of encouraging the rebel groups to keep on fighting and thus preventing a real peace process in Darfur from gaining traction.

The cynicism involved makes it clear that topping the conflict is secondary to the goal of "keeping the pressure on Khartoum." It is high time that the American sense of honest, transparent goals and fair play replace the cynicism of the biased interest groups which have only served to prolong the tragedy.

RAPE CRIMES IN DARFUR FABRICATED REPORTS

Sudanvision May 9, 2005
The Sudanese authorities concerned are poised to file a case against " Medicin Sana Frontier " Holland for publishing reports that mislead the public opinion about rape crimes in Darfur and dodging the Sudanese authorities attempts to reveal those who made the report. That was asserted by one of Sudan Vision source's that stated: the organization published a report about rape crimes in Darfur on Marsh 8, 2005, which include fabricated information. They prepared their report and pub-lished it on a wide scale defaming Sudan and it's people. The source said, "it was a serious report that the United Nations Secretary General used and mentioned with in a whole paragraph in his statement for the United Nations General Assembly last April."Sudan Vision came to Know that Sudanese authorities, after protested by large sectors against defamation, demanded that the organization should reveal names of those who made the report and provided information, "but the started to procrastinate and protested that those who prepared the report were foreigners working in the organization and their names cannot be revealed", the source said.

They went to consult their headquarters in Amsterdam to have their opinion about the information they used in the report, but they continued to shirk accountability. The source continues." We requested that so that the information might be used in following up every one who is proved to be involved in such violations.

The source affirmed that authorities have decided to start filing cases against responsible figures in the organization under the charge of defaming Sudan and of hiding information, which caused serious harm to the country. He asserted the authorities have decided to put an end to fabricated and unfounded reports.

The Director of The World Health Organization (WHO):
Sensational Numbers Do not Help The Darfur Cause

The Financial Times - Letters Published: May 7 2005 03:00 From Prof Debarati Guha-Sapir, Director, WHO Collaborating Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters, University of Louvain School of Public Health, 1200 Brussels, Belgium:

Sir, An unseemly fight has broken out in the US over how many have died in Darfur. The US government and, in particular, Robert Zoellick, assistant secretary of state, have been singled out for criticism for having deliberately played down the serious situation in western Sudan. The opposition struggle, led by the clearly energetic and driven Eric Reeves, a professor of literature from Massachusetts and self-described "non-epidemiologist", and a group called the Coalition for International Justice, claim the number dead in Darfur is more than 400 000 since September 2003.

They came to this number by asking about 1,000 refugees fleeing into Chad following a violent attack if they had seen anybody killed. Applying this proportion to all of Darfur's affected population (about 2.5m) for upwards of 26 months, the conclusion of 400,000 was reached. The State Department, from its own analysts, has put forward an estimate of 60,00 - 160,000 dead - a considerably lower estimate and closer to ones produced by our team in the WHO Collaborating Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). These are based on 30 statistically representative surveys done by professional statisticians and epidemiologists, taking into account how many would have died in Darfur anyway, without the war. The advocacy powers of Prof Reeves and CIJ are clearly stronger than their statistical ones. Deaths of 300,000- 400,000 are now quoted by the UK House of Commons, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and a series of respectable newspapers - including yours - making those who plod systematically through evidence and come up with less sensational figures look like uncharitable scrooges.

We are all convinced of the serious humanitarian need in Darfur and of the importance of pressing ahead with the peace agenda. Using badly constructed numbers for sensational attention does not help the cause. As everybody in the humanitarian game knows, numbers, alas, are rarely a triggering factor in giving humanitarian aid or initiating peace negotiations. But unsubstantiated figures and exaggerations are easily discredited and do the beleaguered Darfur population a great disservice. Europe and the US must continue - and indeed increase humanitarian aid - to Darfur, not because so many have died but because so many still live!

OF GENOCIDE OCCURRED?

In it's report to the Secretary General of the United Nations on January 25 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur Stated that, "The commission concluded that the gov- ernment of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide."

The report goes " The crucial element of genocide intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are con- cerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihi- late, in whole or in part , a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare."

DARFUR IN THE EYES OF A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER

Environmentalist Wangari Maathai who won the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize stated to The Washington Post on May 12, 2005 that:

"Darfur is an example of a situation where a dire scarcity of natural resources is manipulated by politicians for their own ambition. To outsiders, the conflict is seen as tribal warfare. At its roots, though, it is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it. You must not deal only with the symptoms you have to get to the root causes by promoting environmental rehablitation and empowering people to do things for themselves. What is done for the people without involving them can not be sustained."

Source: www.sudanembassy.org
2210 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20008
Tel: 202.338.8565
Fax: 202.667.2406