Peace in Darfur & Sudan: Impoverishment of millions of people is getting worse - Some form of council of all military actors will be necessary (Alex de Waal)

• The material basis for the civic uprising – the impoverishment of millions of people – is getting worse
• Peace in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile will not be achieved by the FFC forming a civilian government and asking the armed groups to join
• The numerous security actors (military, paramilitary, armed groups, militia) can only implement a set of security reforms by consensus. Some form of council of all military actors will be necessary

Article by Dr Alex de Waal

Dated Friday, 02 August 2019

Sudan’s political marketplace and the prospects for democracy

A political marketplace analysis of Sudan, argues Alex de Waal, is an important tool for democracy activists to understand the power base of the military council.  

Its predicament lies in the fact that the council’s strategy for managing power, by exchanging material rewards for allegiance, can only work in the short term, at the cost of accelerating the same political-economic dynamics that brought down President al-Bashir.

As Sudan’s military rulers and the pro-democracy coalition of Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) resume their fraught negotiations over the composition of a civilian government, real power is being transacted according to a different logic – the political marketplace.

A political marketplace analysis of Sudan is an important tool for democracy activists to understand the power base of the forces they are confronting. Otherwise the leaders of the FFC risk finding themselves with formal responsibility for a political apparatus that runs according to a set of logics they simply cannot control.

The deputy chair of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and de facto ruler of Sudan, General Mohamed ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, is energetically cutting political-financial deals to stay on top of the country’s tumultuous politics. His is using money from the Gulf and gold trading to try to buy enough loyalty to subordinate or eliminate rivals. Hemedti’s immediate challenges arise from members of the ousted establishment, who fear his rule and what it entails. He also faces a looming political-economic crisis, which cannot be solved while he remains dependent on his current sources of political financing.

The paper Sudan: A Political Marketplace Analysis analyses the development of the country’s political economy and political market since independence, with particular attention to its last three phases: the oil-based centralised kleptocracy of the 1999–2011 period; the post-oil transition to a political market funded largely by gold, smuggling and mercenarism; and the situation today following the April 2019 revolution. 

The key lessons are that the shift from oil-based rentierism to reliance on licit and illicit gold sales, and hiring out troops to fight in Yemen, shifted the financial basis of power from the National Congress Party establishment to General Hemedti and his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Both types of rentierism undermined Sudan’s long-term economic development. But reliance on gold and mercenarism also generated a new model of political financing, in which Sudan’s macroeconomic policy (and especially the activities of the Central Bank) had to be subordinated to political market calculations. 

In order to ensure that small-scale gold traders who buy gold from artisanal miners sell it to official channels, rather than smuggle it across the border, the key decision taken was that the Central Bank of Sudan would purchase the gold at an inflated price in Sudanese pounds – and print money to fund this. The result is inflation, which deprives wage-earners in the towns and in the commercial agricultural areas, and which rewards the paramilitaries and associated traders who control gold and foreign exchange.

Since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in April, this political market power configuration has not changed. In fact, it has intensified.

The TMC-FFC negotiations deal only with the façade issues of the composition of the civilian organs of government and not the real sources of power: who controls the gold, the foreign exchange, and the guns. A civilian government emerging from today’s negotiations would be impotent to address Sudan’s real problems.

Meanwhile, the crux of the Hemedti regime’s predicament lies in the fact that its strategy for managing power by exchanging material rewards for allegiance can work in the short term, but only at the cost of accelerating the same political-economic dynamics that brought down President al-Bashir. The cash bailouts that the regime is receiving from Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not enough to square the circle of meeting his own needs for political payouts and also stabilising the economy.

In fact, the material basis for the civic uprising – the impoverishment of millions of people – is getting worse. Alongside continuing high-profile human rights violations by the RSF and other security forces, this continues to give the FFC enormous credibility and leverage when it brings people on to the streets.

The challenge for the civilian administration is not who is represented, but what is the reform agenda? Does it have political acceptance? And can it be implemented? There are three key sets of issues that need to be resolved prior to establishing a credible civilian executive.

The first is political buy-in to fixing the economy. This is where the political marketplace analysis is crucial.

At present, General Hemedti is making the Government of Sudan subordinate to his transnational mercenary and gold business. While this power hierarchy prevails, Sudan cannot achieve economic stabilisation or democracy.

Technocratic reform will require winning a political contest. That requires convening the business sector, the Middle Eastern sponsors and the donors and international financial institutions to agree on a plan. 

This will demand taking control of fiscal and monetary policy by a strong Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and making the Central Bank of Sudan a tool for a technocratic government, not a mint for the dominant faction. 

Key to success will be for the Gulf states to recognise that Sudan’s economic stability (and also the viability of their own investments in agriculture, industry and trade) depends upon them taking a different approach to funding Hemedti and the TMC, and regulating Sudan’s gold trade as well.

The second is an inclusive peace process – a longstanding demand, based on historical inequalities in power and wealth. This isn’t a political marketplace challenge, though the regime will try to use divide-and-rule and monetary payoffs to achieve something that looks like a peace deal.

The leaders of the armed groups have seen this before and are not likely to succumb. Nor will peace in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile be achieved by the FFC forming a civilian government and asking the armed groups to join. The leaders of the armed groups resent this condescension: they may disagree tactically and be prone to division, but they share the same fundamental concerns.

Third is stabilising the security arena. Conventional security sector reform cannot be achieved without a consolidated security sector, which does not exist. In fact, the paramilitary RSF is today the dominant actor, with the army subordinate and the National Intelligence and Security Service vanquished. 

The RSF is emerging as a transnational military-commercial business enterprise. However, it has neither the power nor the legitimacy to enforce its writ. 

The numerous security actors (military, paramilitary, armed groups, militia) can only implement a set of security reforms by consensus. Some form of council of all military actors will be necessary.

This post first appeared on LSE’s Conflict Research Programme blog. 

About the author

Alex de Waal is the Research Programme Director for LSE's Conflict Research Programme, an adviser for the Centre for Public Authority and International Development and Director of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University.

SOURCE: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/08/02/sudan-political-marketplace-democracy/

Since 2004 EU has provided €2.7 billion to support African solutions to African problems

JOINT PRESS RELEASE

22 July 2019

African Peace Facility: African Union Peace & Security Operations boosted by an additional €800 million from the European Union

Addis Ababa, 22 July, 2019: The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat and the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica today announced the signing of an agreement through which the EU commits a further €800 million to support the AU in its efforts to promote peace, security and stability in Africa within the context of the continued implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

“This is a commendable milestone in a long history of EU support to Africa, and is in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture and African-led efforts to silence the guns,” said Chairperson Moussa Faki “I also commend the African contributions to the recently revitalized Peace Fund, which demonstrates the commitment to African ownership of peace and security operations on the continent.”

Commissioner Mimica said “Europe remains Africa’s first partner in the area of peace and security. Since 2004, the African Peace Facility has provided €2.7 billion to support African solutions to African problems. Most of the additional €800 million announced today will go to peace support operations led by our African partners.”

Under this phase of the African Peace Facility, the EU will support 

(i) the strengthening of conflict prevention, management and resolution structures and mechanisms of the African Peace and Security Architecture; 

(ii) AU efforts to establish a continental Human Rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework; 

(iii) an Early Response Mechanism which will provide the African Union with quick funding for preventive diplomacy initiatives, mediation, fact-finding missions, and the first stages of peace support operations; 

(iv) the financing of African-led peace support operations, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) or the G5 Sahel Joint Force specifically, with regards to capacity building, troop allowances, non-lethal equipment. It will also support efforts of the AU to promote gender and human rights principles and practices in peace support operations.

Media contacts:

Mrs Esther Tankou Azaa Yambou, Head of Division: Directorate of Information and Communication, African Union Commission, Tel: +251(0) 911361185, E-mail: YambouE@african-union.org

Mr Biruk Feleke, Press & Information Officer, Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, Tel: +251(0) 911514809 biruk.feleke@eeas.europa.e

SOURCE:https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190722/african-peace-facility-african-union-peace-security-operations-boosted

EU stops funding EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or Khartoum process

Article from Forbes.com

By FREY LINSDAY

Dated Tuesday 06 August 2019, 09:26am

The EU Says It Has Stopped Giving Money To Sudan For Migration Control

In late July, the EU said it had suspended projects related to migration and border control in Sudan and the surrounding countries. 

Until recently, the bloc was giving money to the Sudanese authorities in exchange for them preventing migrants from sub-Saharan Africa heading northward. That arrangement has now been at least temporarily halted.

These projects are collectively referred to under the banner of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, or more simply, the "Khartoum process." The material and funds provided through the process have very likely been used to entrench the power of the Sudanese authorities and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and have possibly directly contributed to the violence we are now seeing in Sudan.

Less well known than similar EU arrangements with Turkey and Libya, the Khartoum Process (KP) serves nonetheless a similar purpose. 

"The Khartoum Process is basically about extraterritorial control of migration on the whole," says Dr. Mohamed Babiker of the University of Khartoum. "It is actually using Sudan as a buffer zone to control migration."

The process was born around the same time as the Valletta Conference on Migration which took place in 2015, amid the turmoil of the migrant crisis. The EU Trust Fund For Africa was created at the conference and endowed with hundreds of millions of euros for, in the EU's words, "stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa." 

Babiker says it does not address the root causes of migration at all.

"It doesn't take into consideration the dynamics in the region, the concerns of the population in terms of their aspirations for development and human rights protection and living a decent life."

Instead, he said, it is a way for the EU to outsource migration control to other countries, ostensibly for their own protection but just as much to prevent them reaching Europe, as with the Turkey-EU deal.

Babiker said that over the last few years in Sudan he has seen many EU-funded training programs run under the KP umbrella. They did not appear to him to be addressing the root causes of migration:

"The main focus was border management, running the borders rather than actually dealing with core issues related to the root cause of migration and also human trafficking, refugee protection. The main purpose behind the Khartoum Process is to control the borders.  That's why we call it extraterritorial control."

But the implications of the Khartoum Process go further than just outsourcing the EU's migrant problems, which has been a fairly established policy tool for the bloc since the migrant crisis.

Conflict is nothing new to Sudan, but since long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in April, the country has descended into violence as pro-democracy demonstrators clash with, or more accurately are brutally attacked by, the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under the control of a council of army generals who took power in April.

While it has not been proven that the material resources provided to the Sudanese authorities by the EU through the Khartoum Process have flown directly to the RSF, they no doubt contributed to their ability to build patrolling and enforcement capacity in the region. In any case, Babiker said the resources were delivered with almost no requirement for accountability once received by Sudan: "These are not accountable governments. So the funding normally ends up entrenching and empowering abusive forces like security operators."

"There are so many questions to be asked about the EU policy with respect to the fact that the RSF has shown its hand as a brutality repressive force," says Maddy Crowther, Co-Executive Director of Waging Peace, a London-based human rights organization which focuses on Sudan. She says that while now might not be the right time to interrogate the Khartoum Process, the priority being of course the current conflict, the process will eventually need to come under serious review. "It will be a travesty if the EU isn't asked really tough questions about how they got to a situation where they were possibly complicit in human rights abuses and atrocities."

Even apart from these very serious concerns, academics such as Babiker and his colleague Lutz Oette of University of London’s School for Oriental and African Studies, say the Khartoum Process was flawed from the start.

For one thing, Babiker points out that migration control is unlikely to be well enforced, or even desirable, in a region where tribal communities exist across, and often pass over, relatively arbitrary colonial borders: "As a policy, it wouldn't work because the concept of borders does not exist."

Moreover, putting responsibility for migrant welfare in the hands of a government with a poor human rights record is a terrible idea in and of itself.

"Our analysis of (the first phase of the Khartoum Process) highlighted the risks for refugees and migrants in Sudan, several of whom were deported to Eritrea where they faced persecution," says Oette. "Others were subjected to ill-treatment in Sudan. There have also been reports that Sudanese forces colluded in smuggling and trafficking."

Oette says with the Rapid Support Forces, who have also been accused of serious crimes in Darfur, in charge of border controls there is little reason to think they will be satisfying the ostensibly humanitarian aims of the Khartoum Process.

"The violence unleashed in Sudan, particularly by the Rapid Support Forces, a key player in enforcing migration controls, serves as an epitaph for an ill-conceived partnership, and as a lesson for policymakers to learn from past failings. The Khartoum Process, particularly Sudan's role, needs a fundamental rethink and new approach."

Oette and Babiker argue that any future collaboration on migration between the EU and countries in the Horn of Africa needs to be evidence-based and well considered, with a goal that goes beyond short-term expedience: "This means looking at the situation on the ground, genuinely engaging with the people concerned, tackling the broader governance problems, and developing an empirically grounded mid-to long-term strategy."

Babiker says that if the EU does want to reduce migration from and through Sudan, it would do best to focus its efforts on helping the country stabilize.

"The EU should put its weight into resolving the Sudanese issue; pushing for democratic transformation and rule of law. Because the result will be counter-productive if the same old approach is followed in terms of controlling migration. One of the policies that needs to be adopted is actually a stable Sudan, a democratic Sudan, where people have rights and can enjoy the rule of law."

Follow me on Twitter.

Frey Lindsay

I am a journalist focussed on business, migration and how the two intersect. As host and producer of the Migrant Crisis Podcast, I covered the massive upheavals across Europe and the world over the last few years, telling stories on the ground from such flashpoints as the Greek islands, Australia and the Serbia/Hungary border. Previously I was a reporter at verdict.co.uk and Share Radio, and my work has also appeared in World Finance Magazine and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Follow me on twitter @FreyLindsayMCP, or email me on friederik.lindsay@gmail.com. 

SOURCE: https://www.forbes.com/sites/freylindsay/2019/08/06/the-eu-says-it-has-stopped-giving-money-to-sudan-for-migration-control/#621ab7f47faf

EU hails signing of constitutional declaration in Sudan

The European Union welcomed Sudanese parties reaching agreement on a constitutional declaration on 4 August.

Article from New Europe.eu

Dated Monday, 05 August 2019 11:52. 

EU hails signing of constitutional declaration in Sudan

Excerpt:

"At this historic moment, we commend the determination and sense of responsibility of the two parties as well as the longstanding efforts of the African Union/Ethiopian mediation" the Union said in a statement.

“The EU is committed to support Sudan on its way towards peace, democracy and prosperity and will work with the civilian-led transitional government to that end”, the statement concludes.

SOURCE: https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-hails-signing-of-constitutional-declaration-in-sudan/

UK Serious Fraud Office investigates De La Rue over South Sudan operations

Note from Sudan Watch Editor: What a story, you could not make this up. The UK's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) is investigating the world’s biggest printer of banknotes over suspected corruption in South Sudan. 

Shares of the 206-year-old UK company De La Rue producing Bank of England notes have more than halved in past year.  The company produces notes for countries worldwide and is also the biggest commercial printer of passports. De La Rue said it was cooperating with the SFO.

Full story in two news reports here below.

Article from The Guardian

By SEAN FARRELL

Date: Tuesday, 23 July 2019 20.25 BST

Serious Fraud Office investigates De La Rue over South Sudan operations

The Serious Fraud Office is investigating the world’s biggest printer of banknotes over suspected corruption in South Sudan.

The SFO said it was examining how the UK company De La Rue, which produces notes for the Bank of England, and associated individuals conducted business in the African country.

De La Rue said it was cooperating with the SFO, which investigates serious fraud, bribery and corruption. The Basingstoke-based company and the SFO declined to give further details about the investigation.

“Given the early stage of these matters, it is not possible to predict reliably what effect their outcome may have on De La Rue,” the company said.

De La Rue has done business with South Sudan since the country was established in 2011, designing and printing the country’s banknotes. The company produces notes for countries worldwide and is also the biggest commercial printer of passports.

The SFO’s attention adds to problems for De La Rue, which is looking for a new chief executive after Martin Sutherland agreed to leave following two profit warnings and the loss of a £490m contract to print the UK’s post-Brexit blue passport.

De La Rue shares closed down 15.8% at 251p on Tuesday. The shares have more than halved in the past year as the company has suffered poor trading and a series of setbacks.

The 206-year-old firm reported a 77% drop in annual profit in May and warned that profit would fall further this year as it faced tough competition. After losing out to a foreign rival to print the new UK passport, Sutherland said the decision risked jobs and that he would appeal, but gave up a month later.

De La Rue’s chairman, Philip Graham Rogerson, will step down once Sutherland’s replacement is found. The company’s senior independent director has also said he will quit by the end of 2019.

Rogerson and De La Rue’s board will face unhappy shareholders at its annual general meeting on Thursday. 

Last week the company rejected a call by its third-biggest shareholder, Crystal Amber, for Rogerson to stand down at the AGM. The activist investor has repeatedly criticised Rogerson’s performance.

The SFO has investigated De La Rue twice in the past 12 years. In 2010 it notified the SFO that some employees had falsified paper specification certificates, costing it at least £35m. Another investigation launched in 2007 was closed with no action taken against the company or employees.

SOURCE: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jul/23/serious-office-investigates-de-la-rue-over-south-sudan-operations

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Article from The Northern Echo, UK

By NICK GULLON

Reporter (Tees Valley)

Date: 23 July 2019

'Suspected corruption' investigation at De La Rue's South Sudan business

Photo: A rare look inside De La Rue Gateshead

SHARES in a North-East passport and bank note manufacturer dived yesterday after it said the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has opened an investigation into "suspected corruption" related to business in South Sudan.

De La Rue, which has a plant in Gateshead, saw shares dive 12 per cent after it informed investors about the investigation.

In a short update to shareholders, De La Rue said: "The UK Serious Fraud Office has informed De La Rue that it has opened an investigation into the De La Rue group and its associated persons in relation to suspected corruption in the conduct of business in South Sudan.

"Given the early stage of these matters, it is not possible to predict reliably what effect their outcome may have on De La Rue."

It said that it intends to co-operate with the SFO in relation to the investigation and said it will provide a further update when appropriate.

De La Rue has worked in South Sudan since first designing and manufacturing a new currency for the country's creation in 2011.

The Basingstoke-based printer has already had a turbulent month, after it blamed the Government’s decision last year to give the post-Brexit passport printing contract to a French company for the potential loss of 170 jobs in Gateshead.

Trade union Unite said the announcement that the company has begun consultation on the future of 170 skilled printing jobs working on the foreign currency contracts came on top of the 100 passport printing jobs due to go in the autumn.

It added the Government’s "short-sighted and blinkered decision" had "seriously undermined" the financial viability of the Gateshead operation.

If the redundancies go ahead, there will still be 200 workers doing currency printing at Gateshead.

A De La Rue spokesperson said at the time: “As the world’s largest commercial banknote printer we regularly review our operational footprint to ensure it meets demand. We are in the final stages of a restructuring programme to ensure we continue to be competitive."

Shareholders are due to vote on the future of chairman Philip Rogerson, as well as executive pay, at the company's annual general meeting tomorrow.

The company is also in the midst of a leadership reshuffle after chief executive Martin Sutherland announced in May that he would quit the firm following a string of profit warnings.

Last week, the firm hit out at Crystal Amber, its third-biggest investor, and described its threats against the chairman as "precipitous and destabilising".

Passport contract 'comes home to roost' with potential loss of 170 jobs at De La Rue

SOURCE: https://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/news/17789795.39-suspected-corruption-39-investigation-de-la-rue-39-s-south-sudan-business/

HERE IS A COPY OF 1 COMMENT

Corruption with African countries??? Printing currency? -----No sh!t Sherlock!!

UN Security Council's 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee is to meet on 9 Aug

Press Release from the UN THE WEEK AHEAD at the UN SECURITY COUNCIL 5-9 August 2019

The 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee is also expected to meet on Friday for an update from its Panel of Experts on its work plan.

SOURCE: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/sudansouth-sudan.php

UNSC Aug 2019 Monthly Forecast Sudan (Darfur) - UNAMID mandate expires 31 Oct 2019

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here is a copy of the UN Security Council's monthly report for August on Darfur, Sudan posted 31 July 2019. Note that the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) expires on 31 October 2019. Getting peacekeepers into Sudan was an extremely difficult and lengthy process in the first place. It started with African Union (AU) peacekeepers. The Sudanese government was against any peacekeepers in Sudan.

This report is important as it explains recent developments in Sudan and serves as a reminder of the importance of UNAMID's peace work in Darfur. Many brave peacekeepers lost their lives or health in Darfur. 

Yellow highlighting is mine for future reference.

Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action

In August, the Council is expected to receive a briefing on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in accordance with resolution 2479, which requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with an oral update about the situation on the ground 60 days after the adoption of the resolution. 

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 October 2019.

Key Recent Developments

On 5 July, following mediation efforts by the AU and Ethiopia, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the civilian-led opposition coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), reached a preliminary agreement towards the formation of a Transitional Sovereign Council to lead the country for a period of three years and three months ahead of elections. It was agreed that the body would comprise 11 members, with five representatives from each side and the final member to be agreed by the parties, and that the TMC would chair the body for 21 months followed by the FFC for 18 months. The parties also agreed to set up an independent committee to investigate the crackdown on protestors in Khartoum on 3 June, which reportedly resulted in over 100 civilian deaths. On 17 July, the parties initialled a constitutional document dealing with the various transitional subsidiary organs that would be established. At press time, planned talks between the parties to discuss remaining aspects of a final agreement were cancelled by the FFC following the reported killing of four children during protests in the city of El-Obeid on 29 July.

On 27 June, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2479, extending UNAMID’s mandate until 31 October. The resolution was a technical rollover of the mandate set out in 2429 adopted on 13 July 2018 and did not authorise any changes to the role of the mission or any further reductions in its troop and police ceiling. Resolution 2479 also requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to provide the Council with a special report by 30 September containing an assessment of the situation on the ground and recommendations for the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of UNAMID, as well as a joint AU-UN political strategy detailing options for a follow-on mechanism to UNAMID. (For more details, see our What’s In Blue story of 26 June.)

The idea of rolling over the mission’s mandate for less than a year without any changes was put forward by the UK and Germany in their statements at the last UNAMID briefing on 14 June. The UK said this approach “would provide time for progress on the broader political situation…time for the issue regarding the handover of UNAMID’s team sites to be resolved, and it would enable the United Nations and the African Union to develop a political strategy to address the outstanding challenges that will remain following UNAMID’s departure.” Germany expressed a similar view at the briefing, as did several other Council members.

Sanctions-Related Developments

On 26 June, Ambassador Joanna Wronecka (Poland), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, provided the quarterly briefing to Council members on the committee’s work, including the joint informal consultations on 21 June with the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee to discuss the presence of Darfuri armed groups in Libya and South Sudan. Wronecka also updated the Council on her intention to visit Sudan, saying that “[g]iven the current political and security situation in the Sudan, the dates for the visit have yet to be determined”.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 8 July, a joint statement was released by the independent expert on human rights in Sudan, Aristide Nononsi; the special rapporteur on the right to peaceful assembly and association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule; and the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, denouncing shutdowns of Internet services in Sudan, starting on 3 June. They said it “is in clear violation of international human rights law and cannot be justified under any circumstances”. The statement added that “[a]ccess to information and communication services is crucial at times of protests. Restricting or blocking access to Internet services not only adversely affects the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and participation, but it also has severe effects on protesters demands’ regarding economic and social rights”. 

Key Issues and Options

The key issue for the Council is to continue to follow developments in Sudan, including the situation in Darfur, and to assess the possible effects of potential further troop reductions on the security and human rights situations. These assessments are likely to be informed by the oral update from the Secretary-General in August on the situation on the ground and the findings and recommendations of the special report, which members expect to receive by 30 September.

A further issue is to assess progress on the benchmarks and indicators of achievement for the exit of the mission set out in the Secretary-General’s report of 12 October 2018. The Council took note of these in its 11 December 2018 presidential statement and asked the Secretary-General to prioritise reporting on progress toward the benchmarks and indicators “to help guide the Security Council’s considerations on the future of UNAMID’s mandate”. The 30 May strategic assessment report on UNAMID recommended that the benchmarks and indicators “be streamlined to serve as long-term progress indicators, beyond the departure of UNAMID”, in three priority areas: developing an updated strategy on the Darfur peace process; strengthening Sudanese rule of law institutions; and long-term support to stabilisation, including durable solutions for internally displaced persons. Council members may be interested in receiving further updates related to progress in this regard.

Council Dynamics

There continue to be differences amongst Council members on the situation in Sudan, including the impact of the current political situation on Darfur, as was again apparent during negotiations on resolution 2479 and the statements made following its adoption on 27 June. The UK said the decision in resolution 2479 “to pause the withdrawal” of UNAMID “recognizes that Darfur is affected by wider instability in the Sudan and that there is a need for the continued protection of civilians in Darfur”. 

The UK called for the Rapid Support Forces (paramilitary forces) to withdraw from all former UNAMID team sites, as committed to by the TMC, and for a transition to a legitimate civilian-led government. If these conditions are not met and the situation in Darfur has not improved by the end of October when UNAMID’s mandate is set to expire, a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding will be unable to continue, the UK said. In its statement the US said that “security in Khartoum is intrinsically tied to security in Darfur,” adding that “if negotiations stall or security conditions continue to deteriorate, we will look more closely at the planned UNAMID drawdown.” South Africa in its statement thanked Council members “for agreeing that now is not the time to continue the drawdown” of UNAMID. Russia reiterated its call for “refraining from insistent attempts to link the state of affairs in Darfur to the situation evolving in the greater Sudan” and emphasised that it was “opposed to attempts of any kind to change the plan for the mission’s drawdown”.

The UK and Germany are co-penholders on the issue; Poland chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. 

UN DOCUMENTS ON DARFUR

View the original report and read more UN documents on Darfur here:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-08/sudan-darfur-6.php

FULL TEXT: Sudan’s constitution - Download PDF file in Arabic and English translation

Here is an English translation of Sudan’s constitution. 1/5. Thanks to @Int_IDEA for the good work. 🖖 pic.twitter.com/I74j8pEFV9

— Justin Lynch (@just1nlynch) 6 August 2019

To see above tweet posted by Justin Lynch @just1nlynch Tue 6 Aug 2019 click here: 

https://twitter.com/just1nlynch/status/1158752668216639488

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Download pdf file - Arabic English translation 

Pdf here:https://t.co/24K4c2opqd

— News & Analysis (@AfricaNewsFeeds) 6 August 2019

To see above tweet posted by @AfricaNewsFeeds Tue 6 Aug 2019 click here: 

https://twitter.com/AfricaNewsFeeds/status/1158780393849544704

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Sudan Constitutional Declaration August 2019

in August 2019, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) initialed a Constitutional Declaration that will replace Sudan's 2005 Interim Constitution and govern the three year transition period. The Declaration is expected to be signed later in August. 

The first PDF is the English version and the second Arabic version of the Declaration. 

Language

Arabic

English

Document type

Interim Constitution

Author type

Government Body

Inter-governmental Organisation

Region/Country

Africa

Sudan

West Asia/North Africa

With thanks to: http://constitutionnet.org/vl/item/sudan-constitutional-declaration-august-2019

Sudan constitutional declaration: Controlling RSF, dismantling the deep state and stabilising the economy are still huge challenges

Article from The Financial Times.com

By Tom Wilson in London

Dated Sunday, 04 August 2019. Excerpt:

Sudan power-sharing deal agreed 

Pro-democracy and military leaders seal power-sharing arrangement in Khartoum 

Sudan’s military leaders and the country’s pro-democracy movement have agreed the terms of a power-sharing deal that mediators hope will lead to a return to civilian rule. 

Leaders from both camps initialled the document on Sunday and mediators hope an official signing will take place later this month. 

Mohamed Hassan Lebatt, an African Union peace broker, announced that the terms of the so-called constitutional declaration had been finalised by the two sides on Saturday. 

The agreement fleshes out a political deal signed last month under which a new sovereign council will be established to run the country for three years until elections are held. The body will be headed by a member of the military for the first 21 months before the leadership rotates to a civilian.  A new legislature and a technocratic, civilian cabinet will also be set up. 

“Glory to the great Sudanese people” said Mohamed Nagy Alassam, one of the leaders of the Sudanese Professionals Association, a workers group that spearheaded four months of protests against former president Omar al Bashir before he was ousted by the military in April. 

The transitional period will not be a picnic, but successive challenges, hard work, diligence and success are our responsibility, he said in the statement posted on Twitter. […]

The incoming transitional administration will face an uphill battle to revive a failing economy and gradually reduce the army’s hold on power. 

Rosalind Marsden, a former UK ambassador to Sudan, said the constitutional declaration appeared to expand on last month’s political agreement but warned of the challenges facing opposition leaders. 

“It’s a significant step forward but there is no room for complacency,” said Dame Rosalind. 

“Controlling the Rapid Support Forces, dismantling the deep state and stabilising the economy are still huge challenges.”

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