Showing posts with label Darfur oil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Darfur oil. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 11, 2023

Sudan: Darfur rebellion started in 2003 never ended

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: When did the Darfur conflict started in 2002/3 end? It didn't end because the root causes were never resolved. See below: 'The root causes of the Darfur conflict: A struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it'.

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Sudan Watch - 14 July 2006
'The root causes of the Darfur conflict: A struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it'

[Ends]

Tuesday, May 02, 2023

AU: Arrest warrants & sanctions should be imposed on Sudan's Burhan & Hemeti, goldmines assets frozen

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Arrest warrants should be issued for Messrs Burhan and Hemeti. Also, they should be sanctioned and the riches they've embezzled from Sudan returned to Sudan to pay for the mess their fights have created. Sudan's goldmines and other natural resources should be sequestered to pay for costs of self-made humanitarian crises. Providing aid to Sudan and areas affected by its fighting is paid for by hard working taxpayers from the world over. Africa is rich. It's time the African Union is empowered to lead and pay for Africa-led initiatives, aid and peacekeepers.

Here is a copy of a tweet dated Monday 1 May 2023 featuring an Al Jazeera English video interview with Africa and Sudan analyst Mr Cameron Hudson.

Sunday, February 23, 2020

Sudan: PM Hamdok meets French President Macron and Darfur war SLA rebel Abdelwahid Nur in France

NOTE from Sudan Watch editor: Here is news of a 30 Sep 2019 meeting between Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Mr Abdelwahid Nur, leader of Darfur war rebel group Sudanese Liberation Army. Mr Nur helped lead the SLA, one of two rebel groups (the other was JEM) that started the Darfur war in 2003 costing 300,000-400,000 Darfuri lives and unimaginable pain and suffering for millions of others. 

The meeting took place in France where, for the past 15 years Mr Nur has sheltered, enjoyed good food, beer and five star hotels. Nur, now aged 50, led and directed the Darfur war by satellite phone from the comfort and safety of an armchair in Paris, France where he still lives in self imposed exile. He fled to France soon after the Darfur war. He is too scared to return to Darfur and face the dwindling support of 'his people'.

In my view he is an arrogant self-serving dim-wit who spouts nonsense and has delusions of becoming president of Sudan. He once set up an office in Israel. He is infuriating. So is France's interest in Chad and the Sudans oil. See 2005 report 'South Sudan: French energy giant Total in oil talks with SPLM/A over White Nile' https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2005/03/south-sudan-french-energy-giant-total.html
Photo: Darfur rebel Abdelwahid Nur, leader of Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA-AW) 
Credit: Sudan Tribune.com report 31 Aug 2019 ‘SLM’s al-Nur calls for referendum on Sudan’s transitional authority before peace talks’

News report from MSN.com
By Agence France-Presse (AFP) - www.afp.com
Published: Tuesday 01 October 2019
Title: Sudan PM meets Darfur rebel chief in 'essential' step to peace: Macron
Sudan's prime minister has met a senior Darfur rebel leader living in France, President Emmanuel Macron said Monday, hailing an "essential step" for peace in the troubled east African nation.
Photo: © Bertrand GUAY Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok visited French President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysee Palace

"We facilitated talks that Prime Minister (Abdalla) Hamdok had yesterday with Abdulwahid Nur, who is in our country," Macron said at a press conference with Hamdok after discussions in Paris.

"I think the step taken yesterday is an essential step," he added. "The Sudanese deserve to finally live in peace and security."

Nur, who is exiled in France, leads the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA/AW), which does not recognise Hamdok's government, which is tasked with leading the country's transition to civilian rule.

Hamdok said that his meeting with Nur, which he had expected to last 30 minutes, went on for nearly three hours and involved "very profound exchanges".

"We discussed the roots of the Sudanese crisis and possibilities for a solution and... we are going to lay the first stones for this edifice of peace," he said.

Sudan's western region of Darfur fell into widespread conflict in 2003 when ethnic minority rebels took up arms against the Arab-dominated government of Omar al-Bashir, who was toppled in April this year.

Tens of thousands of people have been killed in the years-long conflict in Darfur and more than two million displaced, according to the United Nations.

"I accepted to meet the new prime minister not as a prime minister, but as a political figure" in the new political landscape, Nur told AFP on Monday.

"There is no peace, there is no accountability, there is no free press -- the killing in Darfur, in the Nuba mountains, in the Blue Nile is continuing," he said.

"All of us we want to sit together in a partnership country, in a partnership of equal citizenship rights, to identify all together what are the problems of Sudan and what is the solution," he said.

However Nur, 50, stressed that "we are not recognising the military council and we are not recognising the new government".

Hamdok's visit to France was his first to Europe as prime minister, and comes after France's foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Khartoum earlier this month.

Macron reiterated Monday that France was ready to help rebuild Sudan's economy, announcing a 15 million euro ($16.3 million) aid package and plans for a donors' conference in the coming weeks.

Saturday, June 29, 2019

Darfur Sudan war history by Julie Flint & Alex de Waal - Secret World of Friedhelm Eronat and Darfur oil

Darfur Sudan war history by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal

SINCE 2003 when war broke out in Darfur, western Sudan, the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur has stirred politicians, Hollywood celebrities and students to appeal for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. 

Beyond the horrific pictures of sprawling refugee camps and lurid accounts of rape and murder lies a complex history steeped in religion, politics, and decades of internal unrest. 

Julie Flint and Alex de Waal have written the definitive history of the Darfur conflict. Very detailed and thoroughly documented from first hand sources, the book will quickly become a classic and will correct some of the outside misperceptions of who did what to whom and why. Arguments/dp/1842779508
  

Image Darfur: A New History of a Long War (African Arguments) 2nd Edition (April 1, 2008) by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal

The book 'Darfur' traces the origins, organisation and ideology of the infamous Janjaweed and other rebel groups, including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). It also analyses the confused responses of the Sudanese government and African Union. This thoroughly updated 2nd Edition also features a powerful analysis of how the conflict has been received in the international community and the varied attempts at peacekeeping. 
Julie Flint is a highly regarded film-maker and journalist with many years of experience living in Darfur and travelling in Sudan where she has many Sudanese friends. Alex de Waal is one of the foremost experts on Sudan and the Horn of Africa and executive director of the World Peace Foundation.

Look inside and see more reviews at Amazon here: https://www.amazon.com/Darfur-History-Long-African-
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The Secret World of Friedhelm Eronat and Darfur oil

HERE from the archive of this site Sudan Watch are three must-reads on the secret world of the Chelsea oil tycoon Friedhelm Eronat. The three investigative reports give a good insight into the real reason behind for the Darfur war, to clear the way for oil. “Oil is not a commodity,” Eronat said. “It’s a political weapon.”
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Friedhelm Eronat's oil deals in Darfur, Sudan - Secret World of the Chelsea Oil Tycoon
By Adrian Gatton, London Evening Standard
May 26, 2005
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Friedhelm Eronat is behind Cliveden Sudan and Darfur oil deal - It's blood for oil in Southern Sudan
June 09, 2005
Here is a transcript of UK Channel 4 News' Jonathan Miller's report entitled "Briton involved in Sudan oil drill" - below which is a rare photograph of Friedhelm Eronat, courtesy Channel 4 News.
Photo: Friedhelm Eronat
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Invisible hands: The secret world of the oil fixer (Ken Silverstein)
“Oil is not a commodity,” Eronat said. “It’s a political weapon.”
Invisible hands: The secret world of the oil fixer
July 15, 2009
By Ken Silverstein, Harper’s Magazine, March 2009  
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Tuesday, July 28, 2009

S. Kordofan: Heglig, the biggest oil field in Sudan, could be a source of potential conflict between SPLM and NCP

Heglig, the biggest oil field in Sudan, could be a source of potential conflict between the SPLM and the NCP. Sudan Radio Service spoke to political analyst Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh from Khartoum on Monday who explained that:
"As long as Unity state is one of the ten southern states it means that Heglig belongs to the south. The ABC report said Heglig is part of Abyei, the PCA said it is not part of Abyei. The southerners are saying if the PCA has removed Heglig from the Abyei area, it should be part of Unity state. The north is saying no, it should be included in Southern Kordofan state. This is the situation now. There is no confusion in the PCA’s verdict regarding Heglig oil field, the PCA’s decision has redrawn the eastern boundary of Abyei which was stipulated in the ABC report. It arbitrates on a certain longitude which excludes Heglig out of Abyei province. The SPLM says it is out of Abyei province but it lies inside Unity state, and Unity state is a southern state. So these are new disagreements and have nothing to do with Abyei.” 
Full story from Sudan Radio Service, Monday, 27 July 2009: Where is Heglig? An Analyst Explains
(Khartoum) – Heglig, the biggest oil field in Sudan, could be a source of potential conflict between the SPLM and the NCP, following the verdict by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which has placed Heglig and Bamboo oil fields outside the Abyei boundaries. Sudan Radio Service spoke to political analyst Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh from Khartoum on Monday. [Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh]: “There is no confusion in the PCA’s verdict regarding Heglig oil field, the PCA’s decision has redrawn the eastern boundary of Abyei which was stipulated in the ABC report. It arbitrates on a certain longitude which excludes Heglig out of Abyei province. The SPLM says it is out of Abyei province but it lies inside Unity state, and Unity state is a southern state. So these are new disagreements and have nothing to do with Abyei.” Since the two partners have reaffirmed their satisfaction with the PCA’s verdict regarding the Abyei boundaries, Mahjoub explains the source of the disagreements. [Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh]: “The south thinks that it (Heglig) belongs to Unity state according to a previous decree made by the former late president Jafar Nimery. Since he had established Unity state he decreed that Heglig becomes part of Unity state. It was named Unity because it had united the south and the north together, that was the logic. But they are saying that as long as Unity state is one of the ten southern states it means that Heglig belongs to the south. The ABC report said Heglig is part of Abyei, the PCA said it is not part of Abyei. The southerners are saying if the PCA has removed Heglig from the Abyei area, it should be part of Unity state. The north is saying no, it should be included in Southern Kordofan state. This is the situation now.” The SPLM said it is prepared to refer the issue of the Heglig oil fields to the PCA, if necessary. However Mahjoub says that the PCA has already announced its final decision regarding Abyei issue. [Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh]: “The court has no other business regarding this issue, it had announced its arbitration as the case was presented by the two parties, and both of them have accepted and welcomed the verdict, finish.” Mahjoub Mohamed Saleh, a political analyst, was speaking to Sudan Radio Service from Khartoum.
- - - USAID 2001 Sudan Oil & Gas Concessions Map Click here to view large version of the following map from Wikipedia.  Click, once or twice, on image at Wikipedia to see full screen size. Heglig, the largest oil field in Sudan
Click here to view Heglig pin pointed on the following map from Wikipedia. Heglig Location in Sudan Coordinates: 11°59′N 27°53′E Country: Sudan State: South Kurdufan Heglig (also spelled Heglieg) is a small town in South Kurdufan state in central Sudan, near the border with Southern Sudan. The area was contested during the Sudanese Civil War. The South Sudanese Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels attacked the oil rigs of Heglig to damage this important source of revenue for the Sudanese government. Heglig oil field Heglig is situated within the Muglad Basin, a rift basin which contains much of Sudan's proven oil reserves. The Heglig oil field was first developed in 1996 by Arakis Energy (now part of Talisman Energy).[1] Today it is operated by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.[2] Production at Heglig is reported to have peaked in 2006 and is now in decline.[3] The Heglig oil field is connected to Khartoum and Port Sudan via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline. (Source: Wikipedia) Click here to view larger image of map above showing Sudan's pipeline, North-South boundary, Abyei and oil concessions. Image source: www.stratfor.com

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Invisible hands: The secret world of the oil fixer (Ken Silverstein)

“Oil is not a commodity,” Eronat said. “It’s a political weapon.” Source: Harper's Magazine, March 2009 Invisible hands: The secret world of the oil fixer By Ken Silverstein
On a cold, damp night last November, a Mercedes sedan looped through the semicircular drive of the St. James Paris, a century-old chateau-style hotel across the Seine from the Eiffel Tower. As the car rolled to a halt at the hotel’s main entrance, a well- tailored trim man named Ely Calil walked unhurriedly out the lobby door and down wide stone steps, talking into an earpiece that was connected, through a thin black wire, to a tiny cell phone tucked in the closed palm of one hand. The driver stepped from the car and opened the door for Calil, who interrupted his conversation to give the driver instructions. He spoke in a voice a little above a whisper, perhaps just a touch softer than his normal cool, flat tone. The driver returned to his seat and steered the car out through the granite-pillared entryway and onto Avenue Bugeaud. Calil had flown to Paris earlier that day from London, where he resides. Born in Nigeria in 1945 to a prominent family of Lebanese origin, Calil belongs to a small group of middlemen, a few dozen at most, who quietly grease the wheels of the global energy business, brokering transactions between oil companies and governments. The oil business operates on the basis of discreet payments, transfers, and backroom deals—not necessarily illegal— arranged by fixers like Calil. He has funneled money to African dictators to obtain concessions for oil companies, traded oil from Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and advised presidents and exiled political leaders. Along the way, he has not only amassed an immense personal fortune but has established a web of political ties stretching from Africa to the Middle East to the United States. “He’s built a very effective network of contacts and allegiances and loyalties through money and allowances,” a former senior CIA official who has worked with Calil told me, not without admiration. “It’s sort of like The Godfather. One day he’ll come to ask for a favor, and you’ll have to comply.” That night in Paris, Calil’s destination was Spring, a popular restaurant in the ninth arrondissement that offers a set four-course menu to sixteen diners nightly. Awaiting us at a corner table was Friedhelm Eronat, a close friend and sometime business partner of Calil’s who is equally reclusive and press-averse. Like Calil, he is one of the world’s leading oil fixers, having grown rich brokering deals for Mobil (before it merged with Exxon) in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria; more recently he has done business in Argentina, Brazil, and China. Until last year, Eronat lived just down the road from Calil in a Victorian mansion in London’s Chelsea neighborhood. But after an acrimonious separation, and pending divorce, he now spends most of his time in Geneva and Paris, where he lives in an apartment near the St. James. Eronat was waiting at Spring with two Russian models, one tall and blonde in a dark dress and knee-length black boots, and the other with dark hair and porcelain skin and wearing jeans. Eronat was born in Germany but moved with his mother to Louisiana when he was a young boy. Tall and hefty, he looks quite a bit younger than his fifty-five years, and was dressed casually in light-brown corduroys and a tan pullover. Eronat studied petroleum engineering at Louisiana State University in the 1970s and got a job as an engineer after graduating, then went to work for an oil-trading firm before branching out on his own. Eronat met Calil in the early 1980s, in Nigeria. “Ely was the man to see,” Eronat recalled, after sampling a red wine and then ordering several bottles for the table. “Back then,” he added, “it was a very small club, and we all knew one another. You did business by gentleman’s agreement. When you called and said you had a cargo of crude, you confirmed the price and details over the phone. If your word wasn’t honored, you were finished.” For years, Calil and Eronat attended the twice-a-year meetings of OPEC oil ministers, and the two men have partnered together numerous times, though “we never had anything in writing, Friedhelm and I, not once,” Calil said of their dealings. One particularly profitable stretch involved exporting oil from Russia in the early post-Soviet days. Calil recounted that they had met many of the country’s future oligarchs “when they were wearing funny suits and selling shoes and cigarette lighters.” With the global financial markets now in crisis, the two men spoke of some old comrades who had fallen on hard times. “They’re all selling their yachts,” Eronat said with a grim look. One friend, an Uzbek named Sascha, “had $44 billion, and now he’s down to a billion.” “It happens,” Calil deadpanned. The waiter brought a bouillabaisse, small plates of scallops in a truffle sauce, and veal loin with poached pear. Everyone agreed the food was delicious, but there were complaints about the “presentation.” Calil and Eronat, serious gourmets, seemed particularly dismayed. The two men decided to head to the famous brasserie L’Ami Louis for a proper meal. (This would include more wine, a plate of potatoes baked with dollops of goose fat and topped with shaved garlic, foie gras and toast and cornichons, scallops, and snails in butter and garlic.) For years, L’Ami Louis was a sort of headquarters for their mutual operations, and they reminisced about a dinner there in the mid-1990s when they hosted fourteen well-connected Russians. “It was just them and the two of us,” Eronat recalled while we were still at Spring. “We ordered a bottle of wine and then another and another”—he mimed guzzling directly from the bottle—“until the waiter just brought a case of wine and put it on the ground next to our table.” It was an extraordinarily expensive meal, the two men recalled, but well worth it, in that it played an important role in advancing their Russia business. Before dessert was served, Calil asked for the check and called L’Ami Louis from his cell phone. “You don’t ask for a table, you just say you’re coming,” he said as he hung up. The next morning, when I sat down for coffee with Calil and Eronat at the St. James, Eronat was reading the International Herald Tribune. He folded the paper, pushed it my way, and pointed to a story: Spain’s government was hesitating to allow the Russian company Lukoil to buy a controlling stake in Repsol YPF, Spain’s largest oil firm. “Oil is not a commodity,” Eronat said. “It’s a political weapon.” Oil, first and foremost, is a $2 trillion international industry, and most of this annual haul is extracted from under undeveloped nations. As Dick Cheney put it when he was CEO of Halliburton, “The good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas only where there are democratically elected regimes friendly to the United States.” Sometimes, a company will reach out to rulers of oil-rich states on its own, negotiating and striking deals with them through official emissaries. More often, though, a company will instead work through men like Calil and Eronat: independent fixers, whose job it is to know the leaders and other government officials for whom oil serves as both piggybank and “political weapon.” A fixer can open doors for his corporate clients, arranging introductions to the various potentates he knows. He can help companies navigate the local bureaucracy, or provide the lay of the land with political and economic intelligence, or point to important people or companies that should be courted or hired in order to curry favor. And, in some cases, the fixer can feed money to those in power, in payoffs that often would be illegal under the stringent American and European anti-bribery laws. Edward Chow, a former Chevron executive who spent more than three decades in the oil business, described to me the logic by which fixers thrive. With the U.S. anti-corruption laws, he explained, “There is no gray zone. The lines are drawn very strictly. On the other hand, executives of oil companies are sent overseas to make deals, and they are measured by performance: you either make the deal or you don’t. So you’re supposed to be clean but you’re also supposed to create business. That leads to a tension, and a temptation to use middlemen. Let him do whatever he needs to do; I’m not part of it and don’t want to know.” Although bribery and other payoffs have undeniably been part of the fixers’ trade, the best are far more than bagmen to dictators. “There’s a real art to acting as an agent, and the role differs from country to country,” Robin Bhatty, an energy- industry analyst, told me. “In most of the world, business is done on a personal basis. The best way of getting something done is finding someone who knows someone who you want to know, and you use them to make introductions.” (“Just the same way you’re calling me now,” he added, after I asked him to put me in touch with some energy-industry officials I was hoping to interview.) Because oil fixers play such an important and sensitive role, they can accumulate extraordinary power with heads of state, who often bestow on them the title of presidential adviser and grant them use of a diplomatic passport. “Trading in weapons is trading in sovereignty,” says Philippe Vasset, editor of the Paris-based newsletter Africa Energy Intelligence. “If you don’t have them, you can’t defend your borders. It’s the same with oil, which gives you the liberty to run your ships and planes and tanks, and your economy. If you don’t have it, you can’t run your country.” Besides Calil and Eronat, key brokers of recent decades have included Marc Rich, the controversial Clinton pardon recipient who founded what is now the oil-trading firm Glencore and, in the 1970s, pioneered the practice of oil-for-commodities trades; John Deuss, who once owned his own tanker fleet and who during the 1980s smuggled vast quantities of oil to South Africa’s apartheid regime, then under an international trade embargo; Hany Salaam, a Lebanese middleman who made numerous deals for Occidental Petroleum Corporation during the days of Armand Hammer, its former chairman; and Oscar Wyatt, a Houston oilman and corporate raider who was jailed in 2007 in connection with the U.N. oil-for-food scandal. In the African oil market, two major players have been Samuel Dossou-Aworet, a longtime oil and financial adviser to Gabon’s president, Omar Bongo; and Gilbert Chagoury, another Lebanese who was especially close to Nigerian ruler Sani Abacha. “There used to be about forty people who ran the oil-trading business,” Eronat told me. “The world got bigger, especially when the oil market boomed and the hedge funds came in, but it’s still a pretty small group of people.” At breakfast, Calil and Eronat spoke about another fixer, a mutual friend of theirs named James Giffen. A New York business consultant, Giffen is facing charges in an American court over allegations that he funneled more than $78 million to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan. The money allegedly came from fees paid to Giffen by American oil companies that subsequently won stakes in Kazakh oil fields. Giffen also gave Nazarbayev and his wife gifts, including his-and-hers snowmobiles and hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of jewelry. “Oil fields are a battleground,” said Eronat. “If Jim had not been involved, other [non- American] firms would have gotten the contracts, and the loser would have been the U.S. government.” Calil, who had recently visited Giffen in New York, concurred. “Jim never worked for the CIA, but he continuously informed the CIA,” he said, a line of argument that Giffen has advanced in court and that clearly has some merit. “He was never discouraged and in fact was encouraged to have that relationship with Nazarbayev. You don’t take him to court—you give him a medal.” “Americans want their gasoline cheap,” Calil added. “But it’s not possible without cutting a few corners.” I was able to see some of a fixer’s work firsthand last summer, when Calil brought me along to a meeting with a New York hedge fund whose offices overlooked Park Avenue just south of Grand Central station. Calil and a few of his associates gathered around a conference table with the fund’s two bosses, whose names I agreed to withhold. One was American, neatly groomed and dressed, with the personality of an accountant; the other was Austrian, and he did most of the talking. The Austrian wore blue jeans and a white dress shirt with a few buttons undone, and his hair was wild like Einstein’s. Eccentric, arrogant, and utterly obnoxious—all traits that no doubt served him well in directing the hedge fund—he was flying off to St. Tropez the next day for a dental appointment. The Austrian began the meeting by telling Calil and his associates a little bit about the fund. He explained how (no doubt for tax purposes) the firm’s myriad assets were “ring-fenced” in Panama, Luxembourg, and the British Virgin Islands, with separate contracts to operate each property. Its holdings included a boot factory in China and 150,000 hectares of Brazilian rainforest, he said, though when I asked him where the property in Brazil was he had no idea. The fund also had bought two defunct oil refineries, and these acquisitions were to be the subject of the day’s meeting. Because the refineries were quite old and could process only very dirty crude, few countries would allow them to operate today. When the fund took over the refineries, it believed it had buyers who would reassemble them elsewhere, but the deals fell through. Now both of the refineries were crated up, and in one case the hedge fund had a contract requiring that the refinery be removed in a matter of months. The fund had hundreds of millions of dollars tied up in these two refineries, so they were calling on Ely Calil for his expertise in unloading them. As he and the Austrian discussed the problem, a curious negotiation began to take place. The latter took great pains to stress how trifling this matter was to him; if Calil could help, then great, his tone implied, but otherwise he had many ways to resolve the situation. Calil clearly saw through this pose but did his admirable best to remain polite. “Perhaps it’s just my fatalism,” he began, “but it’s not going to be easy to sell the refineries.” He pointed out that few countries today could possibly accept refineries so noxious. Angola had potential, he said, but the country was so corrupt and its bureaucracy so complicated that a deal would be hard to strike. Nigeria was, in theory, another option, but again the politics were complex. “You’d need to find a state governor to support the project, and it’s possible that that could be arranged, but you also already have all the turmoil in the Delta region,” which added, he said, an additional political complication. The Austrian insisted that he already had a number of possibilities in play, and that he even had a “process” whereby he was evaluating those possibilities. He mentioned Pakistan in particular: “We have government support in Pakistan. They can change the government three times, I don’t care. For me this new guy is better than the last one.” But he acknowledged that a refinery there would be in constant danger of having its profits seized by the unstable government. “You have 170,000 starving people, and you don’t want them all running to Islamabad,” he said. “If you have an economic crisis and food prices are climbing, the government might step in and say to the owner, ‘You can only take a 2 percent profit.’ Maybe even for a few years you’d have to take no profit as a ‘contribution’ to the country.” “Through your process and my fatalism,” Calil replied, “we’ve reached the same conclusion.” Of course the hedge fund didn’t really have an easy option in Pakistan, or anywhere else, and so it needed his help—for which he could command a steep price. Calil laid out a rough plan for how he might place at least one of the refineries. He had identified a potential spot in Lebanon, in the port city of Tripoli. An old refinery there had been shut down about thirty years ago; it was fed from a pipeline that originated in Kirkuk and ran through Syria. Now that the Iraqi government wanted to ship oil from Kirkuk again, Calil went on, Lebanon might be persuaded to site a refinery in the same spot. Of course, the hedge fund would need political support; but fortunately, Calil said, he knew the Lebanese energy minister, and also had political contacts in Syria and Iraq. The fund would also need petroleum engineers to work at the Tripoli site, but Calil had just such a team at the ready, a group of twenty-three Bosnian Muslims with whom he’d worked before on a project in China. As mosque-going Muslims, he pointed out, they were less likely to be shot at or kidnapped in Tripoli. It was agreed that within the month, Calil would take a delegation from the fund to Lebanon for meetings with the relevant players. Later that day, after we left the meeting, Calil talked a little more about this deal, and how he happened to be so well situated to help the hedge fund out of its dilemma. “A friend of mine became energy minister in Lebanon—a good friend,” he recalled. “I said to him, ‘Congratulations. What sort of energy opportunities are there in Lebanon?’ We were just chatting. He mentioned that they hoped to get the Iraqi oil pipeline reopened, that that would solve a lot of economic problems. Just knowing that they are looking at that refinery: that knowledge is wealth in itself. You have that knowledge in your head. You also know that Syria imports so much and Lebanon imports so much, and that the Syrians are talking to the Iraqis about opening the pipeline. All that knowledge provides a theoretical solution.” He added: “You also need connections to deliver the solution—to influence the president, the prime minister, the relevant ministers. That is about relationships. If you don’t know the person directly, you know his cousin or someone close to his cousin.” In this case, I asked him, how big a problem would it be to get the political support? “As big as I want it to be,” he replied. A fixer’s business demands discretion. “If you go and blab about your contacts and talk about being a friend of the president, the next thing you know the president doesn’t want to be your friend,” one middleman told me. Calil, for his part, has avoided publicity for most of his thirty-five-year career. Although he is said to be one of the wealthiest men in Britain, and is a regular on the London club circuit, his name has rarely surfaced in the press; for decades, the only photograph newspapers could find to accompany articles about him was a snapshot from his 1972 wedding to the American tobacco heiress Frances Condon, the first of his three wives. During the past few years, though, Calil has become the subject of intense and unflattering press scrutiny. In 2004, a group of about five dozen mercenaries were arrested in Zimbabwe, where they were buying weapons. The men allegedly were en route to effect a coup in Equatorial Guinea, a tiny African country headed by one of the world’s worst rulers, Brigadier General Teodoro Obiang. The regime subsequently claimed the plot had been financed by Calil in hopes of installing Severo Moto, an exiled political leader. The accusations were never proven, and Calil still vociferously denies he had any role in the affair. Calil acknowledges being a friend and financial supporter of Moto and having introduced him to Simon Mann, a former SAS officer who remains in jail in Equatorial Guinea for allegedly having led the plot. But Calil insists he knew nothing about a coup; by his account, Mann was offering only to provide military protection for Moto so he could return to Equatorial Guinea. Obiang has brought suit against Calil over the coup in various countries, including Lebanon and Zimbabwe, and has never won a court victory. In Britain, a judge ruled that Obiang could not even bring suit for lack of evidence. “It would have been great fun,” Calil told me. “He accused me of causing him mental trauma, and he would have been forced to come to court for a mental exam. He has tried every angle and opportunity, and lost each time.” He added: “You had an African dictator and some mercenaries and a shady Arab. It makes for a great novel, but the part of it that wasn’t a novel was tested in court and proven to be wrong. The press has reported a pack of lies.” My acquaintance with Calil began in 2002, when I received a call from Victoria Butler, a public-relations specialist who was helping Severo Moto meet with government officials and journalists. At the time, I was writing frequently about the Obiang regime, and so I went to see Moto at Butler’s town house on Capitol Hill. He had already met with a number of Bush Administration officials and members of Congress, and he expressed a naive optimism that the administration might eventually turn against Obiang because of his undeniably appalling human-rights record. As Moto and I chatted on a sofa, another man sat nearby in an armchair and scrolled through his emails on a BlackBerry. When Butler left the room to get coffee, I asked the man who he was. It was Ely Calil, who told me that he and a number of other “businessmen” had sponsored Moto’s trip and had retained Butler through a P.R. office. I had never heard of Calil, and searches turned up little outside of a few European oil-industry publications. His name had briefly surfaced in a bribery scandal in France, where reports alleged that he funneled money to Nigeria’s Sani Abacha on behalf of Elf Aquitaine, a French oil company (which since has been bought by its French competitor Total). Since that first meeting six years ago, Calil and I have become unlikely friends. My family and I get together with him when he comes to Washington, and on a number of occasions I’ve visited him in London at Sloane House, the Chelsea estate he owned.11. Calil sold Sloane House in 2006 to Sir Anthony Bamford, chairman of a global construction-equipment firm, for an estimated £30 million. Perched behind gates of white stone, the estate was staffed to the hilt with servants and tastefully stocked with antique furniture, leather-bound books, and numerous busts of Napoleon, Calil’s hero. One Sunday afternoon in 2003, I sat with him in his study and listened to him take phone calls, his patter seamlessly switching from Arabic to French to English and back again. There was a Libyan official who told Calil that Muammar Qaddafi wanted to host a future World Cup soccer tournament in Tripoli, and was hoping to establish his bona fides in the meantime by sponsoring a mini-tournament. Could Calil help arrange for the Senegalese national team to take part? A call to an official in Senegal followed; as did a conversation with a well-connected friend in Lebanon about a brewing political crisis there. Several visitors dropped by, including a pencil-thin and dour man from Glencore who grew more dour still when I was introduced as a journalist. Calil was born in the Nigerian town of Kano, where his Lebanese parents settled in the 1920s. George Calil had prospered in Africa through a small business empire that was based on the cultivation of peanuts (for consumption and groundnut oil) but also included aluminum and small manufacturing. At an early age, Ely was sent to Lebanon and was privately educated there and in Europe. After his father died of stomach cancer in 1966, Ely—who has five sisters and a younger brother—was chosen to return to Nigeria and restructure the family business. He established close connections with government officials, becoming especially friendly with the transportation minister. At the time, Nigeria was looking for a firm to help its hajj pilgrims get to Mecca; during one meeting the minister asked Calil if he knew anyone at Lebanon’s Middle East Airlines. “The joke of it was that my brother-in-law’s sister was going out with a guy who was high up in the MEA hierarchy,” he said. “She later married him. So I went to Beirut and met his boss, who was very interested. ‘Do you really know the minister?’ he wanted to know. He made a huge proposal, and at the end Middle East Airlines got a lot of business and Nigeria was able to transport out its hajj pilgrims in style. We had been making a few hundred thousand dollars here and there, but on this deal alone I made a few million dollars. I thought: ‘Screw crushing peanuts to make oil.’ This was as easy as putting two people together who needed each other.” After the first OPEC “oil shock” of 1973, Calil became seriously involved in the petroleum business, first trading oil and then obtaining concessions and reselling them. Within five years, oil had become the largest sector of his business. Calil’s influence and wealth soared after the Nigerian general Ibrahim Babangida assumed power in a 1985 coup. When I asked Calil about his relationship with Babangida, who still is a power broker in Nigeria, he acknowledged that they were close friends. “I took his kids on holidays and to stay with me in London,” he said. “He saw me as a sound independent adviser, not a sycophant. He asked me to handle a lot of back- channel communications, and he sent me out as an adviser to other African governments.” But Babangida was forced out in the face of popular protests in 1993, and ceded power to a civilian government. Three months later, Sani Abacha took power; his regime earned worldwide condemnation by hanging an activist named Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other democracy campaigners. Base Petroleum, a firm of Calil’s that owned several oil concessions in Nigeria, paid Washington lobbyist Robert Cabelly nearly $400,000 between mid-1996 and early 1997 to lobby the Clinton Administration on Abacha’s behalf. Following the election in 1999 of Olusegun Obasanjo, who had been jailed for speaking out against the human-rights abuses and corruption of the Abacha regime, Calil’s influence in Nigeria waned. (In power, Obasanjo headed a government that proved pervasively corrupt itself.) But by then, his scope of operations had expanded enormously. He became a confidant to Denis Sassou Nguesso, who had taken power in a 1997 civil war in the nearby Republic of the Congo. “Calil became the country’s main oil adviser,” said Philippe Vasset, of Africa Energy Intelligence. “All the traders courted him in order to get contracts.” Calil served as a personal adviser to Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, who won office in 2000. Calil befriended Wade when the latter was living in exile in Paris. He provided Wade with an apartment, introduced him to French government officials, and generally promoted him in political and media circles. Wade’s base of operations while in exile was at the Paris offices of Saga Petroleum, a small Norwegian firm run by a friend of Calil’s. Calil also became the chief oil adviser to Idriss Deby, a warlord who had seized power (and still holds it) in Chad. He was tasked with recruiting oil companies to develop projects in that country, and he himself, in conjunction with Eronat, landed a huge exploration concession there roughly the size of Texas. In 2003, the two men sold a major stake in the concession to China in a deal sealed, according to a report in the Evening Standard of London, at a celebratory banquet thrown at Eronat’s estate in Chelsea. “You’d have an African head of state who would want advice—they all wanted oil to happen in their country,” Calil explained. “Of course you offered the advice pro bono, but you used that to build your network. They’d say, ‘Look at this piece of land and see if it’s worth anything.’ And you’d go to Exxon and get them interested and you’d sell them a part and you’d keep the juiciest part of the concession for yourself. Everyone was happy. The president was happy because Exxon was now exploring for oil, Exxon was happy, and you had the heart of the concession. If you hadn’t been there as the catalyst, the thing wouldn’t have happened. You might call it abusing my role. I call it creating entrepreneurial wealth, and I created a lot of wealth.” Africa has remained the main focus of Calil’s operations, but he now does business around the globe. In addition to operations in Russia and the Middle East, he owned a Houston-based firm called Nautilus, which obtained oil and gas concessions in South America and Central Asia. He sold Nautilus to Ocean Energy, which subsequently was bought by Devon Energy, now the largest U.S.-based independent oil and gas producer. Calil also won a gas concession in Brazil, which he later sold to Enron. “When buying and selling oil concessions, you’re dependent on your skills and knowledge, but you’re also very much dependent on the goodwill of the local government, from presidents to ministers,” Calil told me. “You end up building a political network to a) build up the business and b) protect it.” Calil’s social and political networks are astonishing in scope. In Britain, his friends include Lord Jeffrey Archer, the writer and former deputy chairman of the Conservative Party; Lord Peter Mandelson, a key figure in the British Labour Party and currently secretary of state for business, enterprise, and regulatory reform; the Syrian-born billionaire Wafic Said, who made his fortune in Saudi construction deals and once helped broker a mammoth sale of British warplanes to Riyadh; and Robin Birley, an ardent conservative who in 1998 helped coordinate a P.R. campaign on behalf of Chile’s Augusto Pinochet and even arranged his stay at the Wentworth Estate outside London. Birley describes Calil as “ambitious and restless,” a man always in search of a big project. “It’s not so much the money—he wants to build something on an imperial scale,” Birley told me. “He’s not just an average businessman who buys and sells. He’s more a Roman than a Carthaginian in that sense. He’s a seriously clever man.” When I traveled to Sudan in 2004, Calil supplied me with a cell-phone number for one of the country’s most senior intelligence officials. In Lebanon, I dined with Calil at the mountainside estate of Nayla Moawad, a government minister and powerful Christian politician.22. She is the widow of former President René Moawad, who was assassinated in a 1989 car bombing likely orchestrated by Syria. Calil is a close friend of Mohammad al-Saleh, the brother-in-law of King Abdullah II of Jordan. “He has the ability to get things done, just about anywhere,” said the former CIA official of his post-agency business dealings with Calil. “We once needed an answer to a question in Syria, which is a very tough place to work. One of his associates talked his way into the deputy foreign minister’s office and got us the information we were looking for.” In the United States, Calil has relationships with both major political parties, and contacts at the State Department and the CIA. “The minute you get anywhere in the oil business, the U.S. system becomes interested,” Calil told me. “The embassy invites you over and the attaché wants to know what you’re doing, and it builds from there. People tell you that you should meet someone, whether to impress you or please you or use you, and then it becomes a chain. There’s nothing sensitive about knowing people; it’s a talent, at the end of the day.” Fixers have always served an essential function in the oil business. The first to work on an international scale was Calouste Gulbenkian, a stateless Armenian Turk whose father was a banker and a major kerosene importer into the Ottoman Empire. Known as . Five Percent” and the “Talleyrand of oil diplomacy,” Calouste studied mining engineering at King’s College in London and upon graduation in 1887 was sent by his father to the Caspian port city of Baku to learn the oil trade. The young Gulbenkian wrote a series of scholarly articles that piqued the interest of the Ottoman department of mines. Officials there asked Gulbenkian to draw up a report on oil resources, and he pointed to several areas of great potential in the region. “Thus began Calouste Gulbenkian’s lifelong devotion to Mesopotamian oil, to which he would apply himself with extraordinary dedication and tenacity over six decades,” Daniel Yergin recounts in his definitive history of oil, The Prize. Gulbenkian’s fantastic success as an oil broker depended on his knowledge of the region and his cozy relationships—with Turkish officials, on the one hand, and with European and American oilmen on the other. In 1898, two years after he and his family fled the Armenian genocide, the Ottoman government appointed him financial adviser to its Paris and London embassies. In 1902, he obtained British citizenship, cementing his connection with the most powerful player in the partitioning of the Middle East. In 1912, Gulbenkian helped broker a deal that led to the creation of the Turkish Petroleum Company, which was established to exploit Middle Eastern oil fields. The joint owners, which included Royal Dutch Shell, the National Bank of Turkey, and various German and British investors, granted him a 5 percent non-voting share in the new company—hence Gulbenkian’s nickname. Sixteen years later, Gulbenkian drew the map that defined a cooperative agreement among the French, Dutch, British, and Americans—their governments and companies—to extract oil from the former Ottoman territories. This “Red Line Agreement” earned him the bulk of his fortune, and his success established the model of the independent, cash-dispensing oil fixer. The modus operandi was simple and straightforward: the fixer took money from a company seeking an energy concession, kept one part for himself, and funneled the rest into a Swiss bank account belonging to foreign officials who awarded the concession. When the officials got their money, the fixer’s sponsor got its contract. “For years you could not operate in many oil-producing countries without an agent, especially in the Middle East,” Willy Olsen, a former senior executive at Norway’s Statoil, told me. “If you had the wrong agent, one without the right connections, you were not relevant at all.” Today, fixers still play a vital role for oil companies in their dealings with heads of state and other government officials who, in the delicate phrasing of Laurent Ruseckas, an international energy analyst in London, “don’t know how to commercialize their power.” But although straightforward cash bribes are still employed, the means of payoff have become more complex. Partly this is for legal reasons. The United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, which outlawed bribery abroad. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development passed similar rules in 1997; until then, many European countries allowed their firms to deduct bribes on corporate income-tax statements. With the heightened legal risk, the greater public scrutiny of international business, and the more sophisticated government methods of monitoring bank transfers, payoffs now take a multitude of forms. Indeed, while as opaque as before and serving the same purpose, modern-day payoffs are not always illegal. “I spent 99 percent of my time trying to figure out ways to not technically violate the FCPA,” a former Mobil executive in Angola once told me. The federal indictment of Jim Giffen, Calil’s friend, alleges that President Nazarbayev assigned him to negotiate deals with foreign oil companies seeking to invest in Kazakhstan after the country’s independence in 1991. Giffen accompanied the Kazakh leader to Washington for meetings with American officials and, in 1998, even assembled a team of political consultants to lobby the U.S. government on Nazarbayev’s behalf. The team, which sought to win approval for a bogus presidential election held by Na zarbayev and to sanitize his human-rights record, included Mark Siegel, a former executive director of the Dem ocratic National Committee, and Michael Deaver, a former deputy chief of staff to President Reagan. Giffen has not specifically denied funneling money to Nazarbayev, but he claims his role and actions were fully known by the U.S. government. A filing from his lawyers claimed that Giffen’s acts might seem unusual, but that “imposing American domestic conceptions of honest services on all the world’s governments” would “wreak havoc” on the workings of international law. In 2002, Calil himself was arrested by French police and briefly jailed in connection with the payments of enormous commissions to Sani Abacha by a subsidiary of Elf Aquitaine. During a judicial investigation, Philippe Jaffré, who was then Elf’s CEO, confirmed that the payments were made. “The Nigerian oil fields were extraordinarily profitable,” he said. “There was no other way to reach a friendly agreement.” Jaffré said, however, that Calil and two other Lebanese intermediaries—Chagoury and Samir Traboulsi—“apparently received more money than foreseen.” By Jaffré’s account, the three split $70 million among them for their role in moving the funds. Despite a lengthy investigation, Calil was never formally charged in the affair (though a number of Elf executives were sent to jail for embezzling millions of dollars from the company). In discussing the case with me, he acknowledged having received commissions from Elf in order to funnel payments to Abacha, saying: “From a strictly legal standpoint, there was nothing strictly illegal about it. It has become illegal now. The commissions I took from the French companies were sanctioned by the French Ministry of Finance. They had to declare the commissions on their taxes. If it’s wrong, then arrest the minister of finance. Why are you arresting me? Was it legal? Yes. Was it moral? I don’t know. But business isn’t about not making money. I’m not a philosopher, but the law is there to be tested. If you’re on the wrong side you should be sanctioned, and if you’re not you should be left alone.” In recent years, the global energy business has changed in ways that have reduced somewhat the clout of the middleman. Following the expansion of anti-bribery laws, a number of companies and fixers have been tried for their illegal payoffs to foreign officials. Baker Hughes, an oil-services company, recently paid a $33 million fine after admitting it had bribed officials in Angola, Russia, and other countries. A top executive at Halliburton pleaded guilty to making vast payments, in conjunction with three other international firms, to win a multibillion-dollar natural-gas-plant contract in Nigeria. Willbros Group, another oil- services company, was found to have paid off numerous foreign officials to win overseas deals, in one case delivering $1 million in a suitcase. Such judgments have made companies more wary of fixers and more eager to find other means of securing political support. One especially popular technique has been to partner with a local company that is owned by a president, or oil minister, or some other top official who needs to be appeased. Oil-rich states have grown a bit more sophisticated, too, further lessening the utility of middlemen. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, such newly formed oil producers as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had no experience whatsoever with international business. Russia was hardly better off, and so fixers like Calil and Eronat were able to get in early and serve as important oil exporters from the country. In West Africa, after decades of poverty, deficient education, and repressive rule, many governments were staffed entirely by untrained apparatchiks who had no idea how to interact in the business arena. But during the 2000s, year after year of ever-rising oil prices prompted many oil nations to become more savvy about their resources and more inclined to deal with corporations directly. Fixers remain a permanent presence in the oil markets, however, and for good reason. Even with prices dropping in the current slowdown, a worldwide scramble for oil is still under way, with the United States and China as the two major competitors. Companies are always looking for an advantage, and often the right fixer can be the means to gain it. “There’s no way one company can act clean, especially if you’re worrying about what the Chinese and Koreans are going to do,” Edward Chow, the former Chevron executive, told me. “And to be fair, if you’re working for a Chinese or Indian oil company and you’re trying to get into a country or region where the Americans or British or French have been forever, how do you think you’re going to get in?” Furthermore, oil companies today tend to be capital-rich but opportunity-poor: they have plenty of money, but there are fewer fields and concessions available, and much of what’s out there is controlled by national oil companies. So the stakes are higher and the desperation to get in is greater. “The fundamental drivers behind the use of fixers is so strong that it’s hard to imagine the practice is going to go away,” Chow said. Calil agrees, in characteristically blunt terms. “There’s no way to do business in the Third World without enriching government leaders,” he told me. “You used to give a dictator a suitcase of dollars; now you give a tip on your stock shares, or buy a housing estate from his uncle or mother for ten times its worth.” Because of this inevitability, Calil sees the West’s strict anti-bribery laws as fundamentally misguided. “If you want to end corruption, you have to become the policeman of the world, and put in prison—in America—the Obiangs and Dos Santoses and the Qaddafis,” he said. “But the businessman has no choice but to do what those guys want. He’s between the devil and the deep blue sea. The Chinese are coming to Africa and promising 25 percent for concessions. So what do you do: say the U.S. government doesn’t approve? The Chinese will give you the finger.” He added: “No one looks forward to paying bribes. It’s no joke, and it’s coming out of [the fixer’s] pocket, not yours or Uncle Sam’s. But if you have to do it, you have to do it.” So whenever oil business is conducted around the world, it’s quite common to find middlemen at the heart of the deal—even if most of their operations are significantly more limited in scope than were those of the old guard. In Equatorial Guinea, a former top Elf executive named Jean-Paul Driot now has an exclusive agreement to market the government’s share of its international production through his company, Stag Energy. In the Republic of the Congo, another Frenchman, Jean-Yves Ollivier, helps companies navigate the bureaucracy there. London-based Mohammed Ajami, brother of the prominent Lebanese writer Fouad Ajami, helps companies looking for business in Libya, thanks to his close relationship with the country’s intelligence chief, Musa Kusa. Calil himself is still a major operator in the oil business, but he also has diversified into a broader range of industries. He told me that he spends more and more of his time “managing my investments.” One of his most promising investments is a company called Green Holdings, which is in the emerging field of carbon trading: buying the rights to pollute from cleaner businesses and selling them to dirtier ones. The firm has struck deals in China and India, and Calil has traveled regularly to both nations on the company’s behalf, hoping to establish business ties and build political support. It is an ironic turn indeed that Ely Calil, who grew so rich off the excesses of the carbon era, should now stand to profit still more from the long struggle to clean them up. Ken Silverstein is the Washington editor of Harper’s Magazine and the author of Turkmeniscam: How Washington Lobbyists Fought to Flack for a Stalinist Dictatorship.

Friday, June 10, 2005

Friedhelm Eronat and Cliveden Sudan named as buyer of Darfur oil rights

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Further to the previous post at this site Sudan Watch, here is a June 10, 2005 report from The Guardian by David Leigh and Adrian Gatton. Note, the UK's Channel 4 TV News in its special report last night, interviewed JEM rebel Ahmad Hussein Adam.

Full copy of news report from The Guardian.co.uk
Written by David Leigh and Adrian Gatton
Dated Friday 10 June 2005, 00.05 BST
Title 'Briton named as buyer of Darfur oil rights'

A millionaire British businessman, Friedhelm Eronat, was named last night as the purchaser of oil rights in the Darfur region of Sudan, where the regime is accused of war crimes and where millions of tribespeople are alleged to have been forced to flee, amid mass rapes or murders. 

The disclosure was greeted with outrage by human rights campaigners. "From a moral point of view these people are paying a government whose senior members may end up in front of the international criminal court for war crimes," Simon Taylor, director of Global Witness, said yesterday. 

A London representative of the Darfur rebels last night called for oil exploration to stop until there was a peace settlement. "The only beneficiaries are the ruling elite," Ahmad Hussein Adam told Channel 4 news. "This is going to support their military campaign against our people." 

Documents seen by the Guardian suggest that Mr Eronat, who lives in a GBP 20m house in Chelsea, swapped his US passport for a British one shortly before the deal was signed with the Sudan regime in October 2003. US citizens are barred from dealing with Sudan under sanctions dating from 1997. 

The disclosure that Britain is serving as a base for questionable African oil transactions comes in the run-up to the July G8 summit at Gleneagles, at which Tony Blair's central theme will be the need to help Africa. 

The documents show that Mr Eronat may have been acting for China, which has been prominent in the new "scramble for Africa" and its oil deposits. Two Chinese corporations were given an option to buy 50% of Mr Eronat's newly acquired stake in the Darfur field. The option expired last year. It is not known whether China took it up. Mr Eronat's lawyer said yesterday that he "has purchased no oil concessions in Sudan ... and Mr Eronat has no interest" in the oil concession. An initial $3m was paid to the Sudan regime for exploration rights, shared with the state oil company and some other Sudanese interests. 

Mr Eronat, who is reputed to be worth GBP 100m, has made a fortune out of oil deals, mainly through his offshore Cliveden Group. He was accused by Global Witness last year of being the owner of a Swiss company allegedly used as a conduit to pass millions of dollars from Mobil Oil to the president of Kazakhstan. A trial is pending in the US of a banker involved in those transactions. Mr Eronat was not charged with any offence. 

The Islamist regime in the largely Arab north of Sudan has become an international pariah because of long-running attempts to crush rebellions in the south and more recently in Darfur in the west. A peace agreement in the south included agreements to divide up oil revenues, but the deal provoked a second rebellion in the adjoining Darfur region, which began in spring 2003. The military regime's violent response is estimated to have caused more than 1.5 million people to flee. 

The international criminal court says it is considering bringing charges of war crimes and possible genocide against government officials in Sudan. Announcing a formal investigation into the murders, rapes and massacres that have taken place in recent years, a spokesman for the court said evidence was being gathered and a list of suspects would be drawn up. 

A UN commission of inquiry said there had been serious violations of human rights. The UN has forwarded a list of more than 50 suspects to the ICC. Mr Eronat's London lawyer, John Reynolds of McDermott Will & Emery, said yesterday: "Mr Eronat has purchased no oil concessions in Sudan." He said the oil exploration group had various shareholders, of which Cliveden Petroleum Sudan Ltd was only one. "Are you alleging that killing has taken place in [the] concession acreage?" he asked. 

The company documents seen by the Guardian show that at the time of the 2003 sale, Mr Eronat confirmed that he was the sole owner of Cliveden Sudan, registered offshore in the British Virgin Islands with bearer shares and no register of ownership. The documents state that Cliveden Sudan in turn bought the largest single share in the oil exploration concession from the Sudan regime on October 21 2003. 

The disclosure of Mr Eronat as the man behind the Darfur deal followed a dispute between him and the former chairman of one of his companies, the lawyer Peter Felter. Mr Felter said last night: "Eronat is not interested in Darfur or political issues. He's interested in making money."

- - - 

New bid to stop Darfur fighting 
BBC confirms June 10 peace talks between Khartoum regime and two Darfur rebel groups have resumed in Nigeria after a six-month break. Read Full Story.
 - - - 

NATO to airlift AU troops into Darfur 
NATO defence ministers gave the green light on Thursday to an operation to airlift extra African troops to Darfur, the alliance's first mission on the continent. 

Photo: NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (L) listens to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe General James Jones on the second day of a NATO defence ministers meeting at NATO headquarters, Brussels, June 10, 2005. 

Source: Reuters/Francois Lenoir - Jun 10, 2005. 

Thursday, June 09, 2005

Friedhelm Eronat is behind Cliveden Sudan and Darfur oil deal - It's blood for oil in Southern Sudan

Intermission interrupted to share some important news. [June 10 update: The following post, drafted June 9, has been edited to insert additional material. Light blogging continues. If anyone has further info on issues raised here, please let me know and I will add info and link at end of this item and/or in a fresh post at a later date. Thanks. This story may be added to and remain on front page here during six week intermission.] As noted here previously, Sudan confirmed in April that geological studies and surveys proved there are "abundant" quantities of oil in the western region of Darfur. The following excerpt, from a report at Aljazeera April 19, 2005 entitled Sudan discovers abundant oil in war-torn Darfur, covers most of the details provided in April by various newswires [see also AKI report April 20, 2005]
"Sudanese Energy and Mining Minister, Awad Ahmed al-Jazz, said that a newly discovered oil field in Darfur was expected to generate 500,000 barrels of crude oil per day by August this year. At the same time, Mohamed Siddig, a spokesman for the energy ministry also announced that drilling for oil had started in Darfur "on the basis of the geological studies and surveys which proved the presence of oil in abundant quantities in Darfur." Siddig said the ABCO consortium, in which the Swiss company Cliveden has a 37 percent share, owned the rights to the field. He also said work on the first oil well, southwest of El-Fasher in North Darfur State, was underway. Apparently, previous surveys showed that the region has untapped oil, gold, iron, silver as well as natural gas. Currently Sudan exports around 300,000 oil barrels per day. The country's main oil fields are in the south."
This evening (Thurs June 9) on television here in Britain, I watched a Channel 4 News special report on Sudan by Jonathan Miller. The report covers news logged here at Sudan Watch over the past year but the big news is, it revealed the name of the person behind the mysterious Swiss oil company Cliveden. It has given me a lead to google further info [see notes below]. When I last posted on Cliveden, I could not find who was behind the company which appeared to be either Swiss or UK based. Jonathan Miller's investigation is important. He has discovered that the Khartoum government has signed a 25-year contract (which he has a copy of) with a consortium to drill for oil in southern Sudan and reveals the man behind Cliveden and the oil deal is Friedhelm Eronat a former US citizen (who often acted on behalf of Mobil overseas and ex-business partner of convicted Mobil dealmaker J. Bryan Williams) turned British citizen now living in Chelsea, London. How on earth did he get British citizenship so quickly? My understanding from Channel 4's TV news report is that as an American citizen he would have been jailed for 10 years for doing such a deal because of US sanctions. Why do the same rules not apply in Britain? [Note, the point of copying various report excerpts and notes here below is to show how it was known in 2003 there was oil in Darfur - Cliveden's 25-year deal was signed in October 2003. Darfur rebellion began in earnest February 2003. Genocide in Darfur started around Feb/March 2004 causing, over the ensuing year, causing the deaths of some 300,000 - 400,00 Darfurians and millions to flee the region or country. South Darfur is an extremely dangerous and a "no-go area" for UN staff. Scroll down here below to see a map showing how few refugee camps are located in South Darfur, where oil is being explored. Drilling has started.] Here is a transcript of Jonathan Miller's report entitled "Briton involved in Sudan oil drill" - below which is a rare photograph of Friedhelm Eronat, courtesy Channel 4 News. The report, I believe, opened with a mention of Darfur, saying "What a place to be looking for oil": Say Darfur, we think genocide, ethnic cleansing. But to Khartoum and its corporate partners, deep below dustbowl Darfur lie abundant hidden riches. In 2003, as Sudanese government forces and their murderous militias hounded black Africans from their homes, Khartoum signed a deal to drill for oil in Darfur. In April this year, with the burning and killing still going, the oil minister announced they had struck oil. A potential windfall for a pariah regime and its friends. So what on earth does the human misery of war torn Darfur have to do with the exclusive London borough of Chelsea? Well, the man who was behind the Darfur oil deal lives here. Right here, in fact, in this multi-million pound mansion. Until two years ago he was an American citizen. Now though, he's British. His name: Friedhelm Eronat. Peter Felter knows Cliveden's secrets, and Friedhelm Eronat's too. He was his lawyer for eight years and ran the whole empire for four before he was sacked. He is taking the Group to an employment tribunal. Cliveden's rigorously defending the action. Peter Felter was the chairman of Cliveden Sudan at the time of the Darfur oil deal. He said: "He's a complex personality. Very rich, very charming, a very good salesperson. He now is Mr Big Oil, untouchable. He doesn't care about the minor issues of Darfur or genocide." We could not find any film of Friedhelm Eronat. But Channel 4 News has obtained the only known photographs. In 1990 Mr Eronat set up a global oil empire: the Cliveden Group. It operates in Europe, America and Africa. Friedhelm Eronat was at the heart of the deal to get at Darfur's oil. In late 2003, through his company, Cliveden Sudan, he acquired the biggest stake in the consortium drilling for oil. Mr Felter said: "Cliveden Sudan was bringing not only money of course, but it also was bringing quite a level of expertise in looking at the geology in Sudan." Darfur is vast. For many years geologists have suspected it holds abundant reserves of oil. Cliveden Sudan now has the biggest share in a concession granted by Khartoum called Block C. It is almost as big as Scotland arcing across South Darfur and down into southern Sudan. The consortium says an aggressive oil exploration programme is currently underway. Block C is at the southern end of the conflict zone. Many thousands of Darfurians there have been forced to flee to makeshift camps. Channel 4 News has seen the contract granting the concession to explore for oil in Darfur. This gives us an unprecedented insight into the workings of a deal that would normally remain secret. It reveals that the agreement runs for 25 years. And that the consortium which includes Cliveden will - once oil is produced - pay up to $8m in bonuses to the Khartoum government. It also shows how they will share the profits - starting with 70% to the government of Sudan and 13% for Cliveden Sudan. From another document we know that Cliveden Sudan is registered in the British Virgin Islands, a tax haven, and has a business address in Switzerland. Normally, it is impossible to determine the true owner of such companies. But our document reveals that in December 2003, Friedhelm Eronat personally owned Cliveden Sudan. Channel 4 News has obtained confidential photographs, taken by African Union monitors last July in Suleia, a village just to the north of Block C. The following month I went to other nearby burned villages. In them, I met people still on the run from Suleia. They said theyd been bombed by government planes. Some had then been shackled and burned alive, many shot dead; others wounded; women, raped. Suleia is 180km from Block C's first well. Cliveden Sudan insisted to us that the 'wells' are 1000km from the conflict zone. So how did Cliveden Sudan get into bed with a regime accused of war crimes, in the very province the ethnic cleansing is happening? Here's how. Channel 4 News can reveal that Friedhelm Eronat's Sudan venture was very much a Chelsea-set affair. The whole deal brokered by his close neighbour, Lebanese businessman, Eli Calil. If his name sounds familiar it's because he is alleged to have helped bankroll last year's failed coup in the West African state of Equatorial Guinea, an allegation he denies. Mr Felter said: "He was purely and simple an introducing instrument. It was quite natural to ask Eli Calil he said he said I think I know a company that might be interested because they are already in Chad and he therefore introduced the Sudanese lot as it were to Eronat." One of Darfur's rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement is adamant that the search for oil will enflame the conflict. They want all exploration to stop, until there is peace. Ahmad Hussein Adam of the JEM said: "So when they say they discover oil in Darfur, who is going to benefit from that? Are they the people of Darfur? Of course not. Absolutely not, the only beneficiaries is the ruling elite and ruling minority of the regime." In the rebels' view, Cliveden Sudan has joined those accused of propping up a pariah regime, whose members include UN war crimes suspects. Yet, under British law, Friedhelm Eronat has done nothing illegal in doing a deal with Khartoum. But then there is the ethical argument. Mr Felter said: "I would say for Eronat he would deem it pretty irrelevant because it is about getting a signature on a document and I don't think it would be in his mind again Eronat is not interested in Darfur or political issues, he's interested in making money." We've discovered another interesting fact about the mysterious Mr Eronat. A US Treasury Department notice lists individuals who have renounced their American citizenship. One name on the list: Friedhelm Eronat. And the date: October 2003, just before the Darfur oil deal was signed. Co-incidence: maybe. But the effect was certainly helpful. Under US sanctions against Sudan, an American doing business with the Sudanese state oil company could face ten years in jail and fines of half a million dollars. Mr Felter said: "In terms of doing business in Sudan of course one advantage of denouncing your US citizenship is that suddenly you can also do deals in Sudan. If there is a direct connection or not I can't say but the timing was good." In fact, we have learnt that it was in August 2003 that Friedhelm Eronat acquired a British passport. We showed our evidence to a Conservative MP John Bercow, with a long interest in Darfur. In his view, Mr Eronat's new passport and the timing of his Sudan deal raise disturbing questions. Mr Bercow said: "What discussions took place between the British and US administrations about his activities in the oil business? What assurances were sought about the prospective scope of his activities? "What benefit did the British government think that an oil deal of this kind between a company and the government of Sudan could do to help the long-suffering people of Darfur? And what does the British government think that this deal will do for the credibility of its foreign policy towards Sudan?" Mr Eronat has told Channel 4 News that he is not a shareholder or officer of Cliveden Sudan and that he does not work for or financially benefit from Cliveden Sudan. Also that Cliveden Sudan is not the operator of the concession, but a shareholder. In a statement to this programme, Cliveden Sudan said "there has been no commercial oil find in Block C." As the International Criminal Court, backed by Britain, investigates the Sudanese regime for war crimes, and efforts to stop the killing gather pace, a British businessman has thrown oil on the flames in Darfur - and has done so legally. 
Rare photo of Friedhelm Eronat courtesy Channel 4 News UK. Friedhelm Eronat is the man behind the Darfur oil deal
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Sudan's oil deal with Swiss company Cliveden The following report dated October 22, 2003 [via European Coalition on Oil in Sudan] at Al-Sahafah Sudanese newspaper mentions Swiss company Cliveden in an agreement on oil prospecting and production signed for the Block 2 which extends from the Bahr al-Jabal State [southern Sudan] to the borders of the Central African Republic and Chad: KHARTOUM, Oct. 22, 2003 -- An agreement on oil prospecting and production was signed yesterday at the Ministry of Energy and Mining for the Block 2 which extends from the Bahr al-Jabal State [southern Sudan] to the borders of the Central African Republic and Chad. The agreement was signed between the Ministry of Energy and Mining and a group of [oil] companies including the Swiss company, Cliveden, which has a 37 per cent share; High Tech, with 28 per cent; the [national] Sudanese [oil] company, Sudapet, with 17 per cent share; Khartoum State, with 10 per cent; and the Hejlij Company with 8 per cent share. In a press statement after the signing of the agreement, the minister of energy and mining, Dr Awad Ahmad al-Jaz, said these companies had extensive expertise in the oil industry. He added that the presence of the Swiss company Cliveden was going to give a strong impetus in this field. - - - US backs off genocide charge in Darfur Note this excerpt from a report by Brian Smith entitled US backs off genocide charge in Darfur May 3, 2005: Sudan's minister of energy and mining announced last week the discovery of an oilfield in Darfur with abundant deposits. The announcement did not take oil experts by surprise, as previous reports had indicated that Darfur has untapped oil, gold, iron, silver and natural gas deposits. The country's ABCO Corp., in which Swiss company Cliveden has a 37 percent stake, has already started drilling southwest of El-Fasher in North Darfur state. The southern civil war, which lasted 20 years, was prolonged by the question of how the region's oil wealth would be distributed. Sudanese political analyst Mohamed Issam explained, "If you look back to the original demands made by the [Darfur] rebels at the start of the rebellion, they were asking for 80 percent of Darfur's oil wealth." He added, "Now they know for a fact the oil is there. The perception that the government is benefiting from Darfur's resources will fuel resentment and definitely complicate the [peace] negotiation process. - - - Darfur rebel group JEM say oil drilling in Darfur must stop LONDON, April 19 -- Sudan on Tuesday said its ABCO corporation -- in which Swiss company Cliveden owns 37 percent -- had begun drilling for oil in Darfur, where preliminary studies showed there were "abundant" quantities of oil. "The Sudanese people have never benefited from these (oil) discoveries," said Ahmed Hussein, the London-based spokesman for the Justice and Equality Movement. "The oil must wait until a final peace deal is signed." Here is a copy of a report dated April 19, 2005 by Nima Elbagir via Reuters Darfur's two main rebel groups called on the Sudanese government on Tuesday to stop oil exploration in the country's war ravaged western region until a resolution to the two-year-old conflict has been achieved. Sudan on Tuesday said its ABCO corporation -- in which Swiss company Cliveden owns 37 percent -- had begun drilling for oil in Darfur, where preliminary studies showed there were "abundant" quantities of oil. "The Sudanese people have never benefited from these (oil) discoveries," said Ahmed Hussein, the London-based spokesman for the Justice and Equality Movement. "The oil must wait until a final peace deal is signed." "We call upon international companies to not invest in Darfur under these conditions and under this regime," Hussein added. Sudan's main oilfields are in the south and disputes over oil prolonged negotiations to end 20 years of civil war. Mohamed Siddig, a spokesman for Sudan's Ministry of Energy and Mining, told Reuters by phone on Monday: "The drilling (in Darfur) was undertaken on the basis of the geological studies and surveys which proved the presence of oil in abundant quantities." A peace deal signed in January revived interest in Sudan's potential oil reserves but analysts say the conflict in Darfur, where tens of thousands have been killed and at least 2 million driven from their homes, has scared off investors. Sudan Liberation Movement spokesman Adam Ali Shogar told Reuters from the Chadian capital N'Djamena that the drilling for oil was a waste of time. "I welcome this discovery for the Sudanese people but if they find oil -- even if they find gold --, without a just distribution of wealth and a resolution to the conflict it is pointless." Sudan began exporting oil in 1998 and exports around 300,000 barrels per day, which is set to rise to 500,000 bpd by August. Work on the first Darfur oil well, southwest of El-Fasher in North Darfur State, is under way. Analysts say the discovery of oil wealth could give the two sides of the conflict more to fight over. "If you look back to the original demands made by the rebels at the start of the rebellion, they were asking for 80 percent of Darfur's oil wealth," Mohamed Issam, a Sudanese political analyst, told Reuters from Khartoum. "Now they know for a fact the oil is there. The perception that the government is benefiting from Darfur's resources will fuel resentment and definitely complicate the (peace) negotiation process," he added. - - - Update June 11: A kind reader here helpfully points out an error in Nima's report above: the company representing the joint venture partners on Block C is called APCO - not ABCO. A website for Advanced Petroleum Company (APCO) http://www.apco-sd.com was accessible but today when I clicked into it, it throws up a blank page. Maybe the site has been deleted? Even if it has been deleted, is there any way to know the ULTIMATE owner of that domain name? Apparently, Standard Who searches don't go very far. If any readers can throw light on this or anything to do with APCO or Cliveden please let me know for future Sudan oil posts. Thanks. Today, I came across a World Energy News article at IHS Energy. The article is extracted from International Oil Letter, Vol 21 issue 21 published 2005-05-25: APCO fails with its Dokhon 1 wildcat in Block C - Sudan Despite some initial encouragement, APCO has abandoned its Dokhon 1 wildcat in Block C, Muglad Basin, after testing fresh water over an unspecified interval. The well was drilled to a total depth of 3,433m seeking a Lower Cretaceous Abu Gabra sandstone primary objective and is estimated to have cost US$ 5.5 million to drill. It is located around 2km south of the Hiba 1 duster drilled by Chevron in 1979 and is the first well to be drilled on the block for 20 years. Block C covers 65,000 sq km mainly in the Muglad Basin, south-west of the oil producing area of Block 1 and 2 where the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company has significant oil production. APCO (Advanced Petroleum Company) is a joint venture between Cliveden (37%); High Tech Group (28%); Sudan Petroleum Corporation (17%); State of Khartoum (10%) and Hejlij Co (8%). 
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Secret World of the Chelsea Oil Tycoon 
On googling for Friedhelm Eronat and Cliveden Sudan, I came across a great post by British blogger Adrian Gatton who is an investigative journalist and independent film-maker based in London, UK. The post provides an excerpt from his report entitled "Secret World of the Chelsea Oil Tycoon" published in London's Evening Standard newspaper May 26, 2005. Sorry, I have not had a chance to contact the Evening Standard archive for full article:
He is at the centre of the new scramble for Africa but few have heard of him. A bitter struggle with his former lawyer, however, has opened the door on the remarkable life of Friedhelm Eronat. Friedhelm Eronat is one of the world's most successful oil dealmakers. He is also one of the most secretive men in Britain. He has an estimated fortune of at least $100m (£55m) built on controversial deals worth billions - in far-flung, difficult places such as Nigeria, Russia and Kazakhstan. But details about him are scant. He eschews publicity.
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Chinese-backed Cliveden? 
Here are some snippets I have gathered from google searches. Sorry some of the links have broken or require special subscriptions. The notes provide a pointer to further information on Friedhelm Eronat. Most interestingly, snippet (1) mentions "Chinese-backed Cliveden". (1) November 2004 report entitled "Before coup, Chinese-backed Cliveden eyed Equatorial Guinea" via Platts Oilgram News - The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. -- New York - Friedhelm Eronat, ex-business partner of convicted Mobil dealmaker J. Bryan Williams and an unindicted co-conspirator in the Justice Department's pending James Giffen Kazakh bribe case in ... (2) Platts Oilgram News - The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. - New York - Friedhelm Eronat, ex-business partner of convicted Mobil dealmaker J.Bryan Williams and an unindicted co=conspirator in the Justice ... construction.ecnext.com/ coms2/plattsbrowse_PN__1681_1760 (3) Africa Energy Intelligence No. 319 - 27/03/2002 report - Chairman of Cliveden Petroleum, Friedhelm Eronat is a London-based trader who was highly active in the Caspian sea countries in the 1990s. (4) The New Yorker Archives The Price of Oil report by Seymour M. Hersh Issue of 2001-07-09 Posted 2003-04-07. Excerpt: In Mobil's case, the company's in-house investigators came to believe that the proposed swap between Kazakhstan and Iran was but one element in a complex of seemingly high-risk business deals that were devised by Bryan Williams. The investigation also led to the two other Americans named in Tabbah's suit: James H. Giffen, a New York merchant banker and adviser to Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev; and Friedhelm Eronat, a businessman who often acted on behalf of Mobil overseas. The business dealings and friendships among the three men date back many years, and they have done billions of dollars' worth of deals worldwide. The three might never have become the focus of grand-jury scrutiny if they hadn't fallen out with Farhat Tabba. (5) Online Journal Big Oil, The United States and corruption report by Larry Chin: Federal authorities began working on the case in 1999, triggered by a British case in which a Jordanian businessman Farhat Tabbah filed a claim in British court alleging that Giffen had stiffed him out of $40 million of commissions for his help in the oil swaps. According to reporter Seymour Hersh's investigation of the case, Tabbah claims that London oil trader Friedhelm Eronat helped Tabbah arrange the shipments between Mobil and the Kazakhstan government. Eronat denied a major role in the deal. (6) Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections - Is oil intrinsically dirty?: "Gabon's" - The Tengiz oil field on Kazakhstan's Caspian coast is one of the 10 largest oil deposits in the world, and also the centre of a huge scandal involving ExxonMobil. This country is listed at position 88 in the TI index. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported in 2001 that Jordanian businessman Farhat Tabbah had filed a lawsuit in London alleging that Mobil trader Friedhelm Eronat and a representative of the Kazakhstan government conspired to cheat him of millions of dollars in commissions for assisting in a profitable 10-year oil swap between Mobil and Kazakhstan. (7) 12.03.04 Time for Transparency - Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues -- Information contained in legal assistance documents passed to Global Witness reveal that CC-1 is, in fact, Vaeko boss Friedhelm Eronat (8) AC Vol 45 No 21 ... Friedhelm Eronat, an oil trader also active in Sudan and in Central. Asia, has used his connections with them to secure three big concessions, ... www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ bpl/afco/2004/00000045/00000021/art00001 - - - It's blood for oil in Southern Sudan Veteran journalist Julie Flint has written extensively on Sudan and researched and co-authored a Human Rights Watch report on Darfur titled "Darfur Destroyed." She wrote this commentary for The Daily Star Lebanon, published Friday, June 10, 2005: When UN Secretary General Kofi Annan went to Darfur recently, he went to the front line - to Labado, where more than a hundred people died in one of those aerial bombardments the Sudan government says isn't happening. When he went to Southern Sudan, he went to the back line - to Rumbek, administrative center of the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), where the children of a relief generation greeted him with banners saying: "Kofi, no food, hunger imminent." Had Annan gone to the front line - to a village like Payuer, on the east bank of the White Nile - he would have received a very different message. "The war's not over." Five months after Africa's longest-running civil war ended - officially, at least - Rumbek and Payuer are worlds apart. Everyone visits Rumbek; almost no one visits Payuer. Peace will not break down in Rumbek, but it could in Payuer. Rumbek is a seethe of UN officials, relief workers and rebel commanders turned ministers-in-waiting. It has a secondary school (built by the British in 1948), roads, solid brick buildings, satellite dishes and restaurants with napkins. It has children who hold up banners that appear to have been dictated by adults. The biggest security problem the town has experienced since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9 was a fatal hit-and-run accident involving a UN driver. The driver fled into the local police station. Relatives of the victim attacked the police station, took the driver away and lynched him. There are no cars in Payuer, no police and no paper to write slogans on. No one like Annan has ever visited Payuer, and until recently the place received no relief from the UN. Two years ago, Southerners displaced from government attacks on villages around the Adar oilfields were living in stone-age conditions there - eating leaves and re-boiled fish heads; sleeping without blankets or mosquito nets; dying of malaria, kala-azar, diarrhea, respiratory infections and wounds sustained during indiscriminate aerial bombardments. Things are a little better now: there's a small market offering shoes, clothes and oil brought from government towns for the few, the very few, who can afford them. There are a couple of aid workers investigating malnutrition (and finding less than they expected). There are cattle too, although most of them belong to Fellata - Sudanese Muslims of West African origin who have crossed to their prewar dry-season grazing grounds in rebel-controlled territory for the first time since 1983. There is universal relief that aerial bombardment has stopped, but also widespread skepticism about the durability of peace. People here aren't asking for food: not one person, among scores interviewed in the course of a week, even mentioned it. Their message to the international community is this: "You forced this peace through. Now take the government militias away - or see peace fail." Throughout the war, the Khartoum government used ethnic militias to divide and rule, denying any hand in the resulting mayhem. "Tribal trouble," it said, as it says now in Darfur. The CPA was negotiated, and signed, only by the Khartoum government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The militias had no involvement in it. And in Northern Upper Nile, around Payuer, they are not fading away. Far from it: they are recruiting - at government urging, defectors say - training and attacking. Not quite as before, it's true. But attacking nonetheless. Since the CPA was signed, government-supported Southern militias have attacked two SPLA positions around the oilfields near Payuer and displaced Southern civilians from a number of villages. The government has responded by promoting the militia leaders, confirming local people in the belief that the attacks were government-inspired. Militiamen who have chosen to join their kin in SPLA-controlled territory have paid a heavy price: their villages have been attacked and looted, and their families displaced. The people of Payuer see a short-term and a long-term goal in the continued activation of the militias. Both involve oil, an industry currently worth more than a billion dollars a year to the Khartoum government. In the short term, they say, the government means to keep oil flowing, in ever greater quantities, by forcibly removing any people who still live in its way; in the long term, Khartoum will use the militias to fight against the separation of the South (and its oil) if Southerners vote for separation in a referendum in six years' time. The war in Southern Sudan was fought for 21 years and took more than a million lives without ever reaching the UN Security Council. Darfur was raised at the Security Council in May 2004, barely a year after the rebellion there began. The oil war that has raged in Southern Sudan from 1998 onward never captured international imagination, and indignation, in the way that Darfur has. But it was every bit as terrible. Villages were burned, civilians slaughtered, women and children raped and mutilated. Most of the oil discovered in Sudan is located in the South, and to exploit it the government first had to capture the land under which it lay. Hundreds of thousands of Southerners were displaced and remain displaced. Negotiations over oil were among the most difficult in the discussions that led to the CPA. Under the agreement, existing contracts remain valid, but can be reviewed in the event of environmental or ecological problems. New contracts will be negotiated and approved by the National Petroleum Commission, a joint government-Sudan People's Liberation Movement (which controls the SPLA) body which will be the industry's regulatory body. The GoSS will get 50 percent of net revenue from oil produced in the South. But here's the rub: the CPA does not give a categorical definition of the South. It defines the border as the border which was in place at independence in 1956. But even this border was controversial, and there is already disagreement over where the giant Heglig oilfield belongs, with some SPLA officials accusing the government of altering its administrative boundaries to shift it from South to North. If the government sets Southerner against Southerner to try to hold onto oilfields like Adar, or if it seeks to play the boundary card, the SPLA will have only itself to blame. In the weeks before peace, the SPLA signed a number of seemingly illegal deals unilaterally granting oil concessions in the South. Khartoum has challenged the agreements as violations of the CPA - and leading industry analysts agree. As a particularly trenchant critic of SPLA "greed" says: "We have a government which doesn't yet exist - the "Civil Authority of New Sudan" - handing out oil licenses, the rights to which it doesn't own, to so-called oil firms which no one has ever heard of and which appear to have none of the technical, financial, management or operational requirements to take on the Sudd," the Nile swamplands which are at the center of the disputed leases. "If this is the way the South is going to approach the postwar environment, rather than accepting 50 percent of oil revenues and a role in the negotiation of any new oil licenses, then the whole peace agreement will fail. We'll be back to another decade or two of war and the petroleum will stay in the ground for another century."