Showing posts with label El Obeid. Show all posts
Showing posts with label El Obeid. Show all posts

Saturday, June 14, 2025

UN Security Council Meeting on Sudan 16 June 2025

From UN Security Council
What's In Blue 
Posted Thursday, 12 June 2025 - copy in full:

Sudan: Closed Consultations*


On Monday afternoon (16 June), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark, Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country. Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya is the anticipated briefer.*


More than two years since fighting erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the violence has evolved into a protracted armed conflict, resulting in widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, the destruction of critical infrastructure, severe food and water shortages, and severe violations of international humanitarian law. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate amid ongoing hostilities and the growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, which has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict.


Monday’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of escalating attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian personnel, and aid facilities. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since the beginning of this year, attacks on critical infrastructure such as power stations, water sub-stations, and oil refineries across the country have caused widespread electricity outages and severely disrupted access to essential rights and services, including safe drinking water, healthcare and food supplies. In early May, the RSF reportedly launched a series of drone strikes targeting key civilian and military infrastructure in Port Sudan—the country’s de facto administrative capital—and Kassala, cities which had until then remained largely insulated from the conflict. In mid-May, RSF drone strikes reportedly hit three power stations in the city of Omdurman, causing widespread electricity outages across Khartoum state. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast and 18 May What’s in Blue story.)


The security situation in El Fasher and the wider North Darfur region remains highly volatile. In mid-April, the RSF intensified its siege and attacks on the city through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties, the killing of aid workers, and mass displacement. According to the UN, on 29 May, a World Food Programme (WFP) facility in El Fasher reportedly came under repeated shelling by the RSF, causing significant damage to a critical humanitarian hub. On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A 3 June joint WFP/UNICEF press statement said that the aid convoy’s route had been shared in advance and that all parties on the ground had been informed of the convoy’s location. The statement called for an immediate investigation and for those responsible to be held accountable. At the time of writing, it is unclear who is responsible for the attack, for which the warring parties have blamed each other. On Monday, Msuya and some Council members might underscore the need to ensure accountability for such attacks and break the cycle of impunity.


Elsewhere in Sudan, hostilities have intensified in the Kordofan region, with the parties reportedly exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts, causing significant harm to civilians. On 30 May, the Eldaman International Hospital in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, was reportedly struck in a drone attack by the RSF, killing at least six health workers and injuring more than 15 others. In recent days, airstrikes have also reportedly targeted residential areas of El Obeid city, resulting in the injury of civilians.


At Monday’s meeting, Msuya is likely to describe how the conflict dynamics are impacting the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly in areas experiencing intense fighting. He may provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. According to OCHA’s latest humanitarian access snapshot, which was published on 4 June, access across Sudan remains severely constrained due to ongoing insecurity, bureaucratic obstacles, and mass displacement, particularly in South and West Kordofan and North Darfur states. In the Kordofan region, heavy fighting has blocked key humanitarian routes and disrupted supply chains, while shifting front lines and long distances from key logistics hubs, such as Port Sudan and the AdrĂ© crossing at the Chad-Sudan border, have severely hampered operations. Meanwhile, access in Khartoum remained challenging due to insecurity and bureaucratic restrictions, such as delays in processing travel permits and visas for aid workers.


As hostilities persist, Sudan’s health crisis has deepened, with the healthcare system collapsing, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 156 attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in 318 deaths and 273 injuries. Meanwhile, approximately 20.3 million people—over 40 percent of the country’s population—are in urgent need of health assistance, with more than two-thirds of Sudan’s states battling three or more disease outbreaks simultaneously.


The cholera outbreak that started in July 2024 has since spread to 92 localities across 13 of Sudan’s 18 states, infecting 74,000 people and causing 1,826 deaths. Since May, the WHO has reported a rapid increase in cholera cases in Khartoum state, with over 16,000 cases and 239 deaths documented. The WHO attributed the recent surge in cholera cases to poor water, sanitation and hygiene, caused by a shortage of safe water following attacks on major power plants and water sources. Estimates suggest that approximately $40 million is needed to rehabilitate water infrastructure in Khartoum state. (For more information, see our 12 March What’s in Blue story.)


According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as at 28 May, there were approximately 10.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, a decrease of 13 percent compared to the country’s highest-ever recorded population of IDPs early this year. The IOM attributed this reduction to increased return movements, particularly to Khartoum, Sennar, and Al Jazirah states. Since April 2023, more than four million people have sought refuge in Sudan’s neighbouring countries. Returnees continue to face critical humanitarian needs, with limited access to basic services and persistent protection risks. For instance, recent media reports have indicated the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance in areas of return.


In a 10 June statement following his visit to Khartoum, the WFP’s Sudan representative, Laurent Bukera, announced that the WFP has re-established its presence in the area with the opening of an office in Omdurman. He noted that, with people returning to conflict-affected areas like Khartoum, pressure on overstretched resources will intensify. He underlined the urgent need to restore basic services and accelerate recovery through coordinated efforts with local authorities, national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and humanitarian partners.


On Monday, Msuya is likely to underscore the urgent need to act to alleviate the suffering of millions in Sudan. He may call on the international community to scale up its humanitarian response to match the scale and urgency of the crisis. He might also underline the need for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and highlight the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $4.16 billion, was only approximately 14percent funded.


Council members may reiterate key points from their press statement, agreed earlier this evening (12 June), which was authored by the UK. The statement recalled resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher and called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher. In their statement, Council members condemned the 2 June attack on the WFP/UNICEF humanitarian convoy and the 29 May shelling by the RSF that damaged a WFP facility in El Fasher. They also expressed deep concern over the impact of the conflict on humanitarian operations, including reports of air attacks by the RSF in Port Sudan, Kassala and Khartoum. The statement reiterated that deliberate attacks against humanitarian personnel, their premises, and assets may constitute war crimes and called on the parties to abide by their commitments under the 11 May 2023 Jeddah Declaration as well as by their obligations under international law.

________________________________________________________________


**Post-script (13 June, 3:45 pm EST): After the publication of this story, the meeting was pushed from Friday (13 June) to Monday (16 June), due to the scheduling of an emergency meeting on Iran on Friday afternoon. The story was amended to reflect the change in timing as well as the briefer; while Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher was expected to brief on Friday, the briefer expected for Monday is Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya.


View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-closed-consultations-7.php

________________________________________________________________


NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor


Plumpy’Nut - A ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)


A peanut product called Plumpy’Nut could come to the aid of starving people, especially children, across the globe.


Severe acute malnutrition has traditionally been treated with therapeutic milk and required hospitalisation. Unlike milk, Plumpy’Nut can be administered at home and without medical supervision.


Plumpy’Nut has a two-year shelf life and requires no water, preparation, or refrigeration. Its ease of use has made mass treatment of malnutrition in famine situations more efficient than in the past.

Image: Plumpy'Nut, a ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)

Read more at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumpy%27nut


End

Sunday, March 10, 2024

Sudan: Inter-communal conflict Ar Rahad N.Kordofan

DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan Flash Alert - Update Three
Dated Sunday, 10 March 2024 - here is a copy in full:

Inter-communal conflict in Ar Rahad, North Kordofan


On 8 March 2024, field teams reported inter-communal tensions between Nuba tribesmen and Arab Bagara tribesmen in Qawz Bishara, Al Dambair, Tabaldiya, and Hila Deedan villages of Ar Rahad locality, North Kordofan.


The tensions follow previously reported clashes between the two tribes within Ar Rahad locality on 30 December 2023.  


Due to tensions, approximately 476 households were reportedly displaced from affected villages. Affected households sought refuge in Sidrah village of Ar Rahad locality. The situation remains tense and unpredictable. 

DTM will continue to monitor the developments closely and will provide further information on displacement and population mobility across Sudan, on a weekly basis. The latest DTM Sudan report is available here


Disclaimer: Due to the current circumstances, the DTM network is relying on remote interviews with key informants and further verification is not possible at this time. 


*DTM Sudan Flash Alerts provide an initial estimation of affected population figures gathered from field reports. All information is therefore pending verification through DTM’s Emergency Event Tracking (EET) and/or registration activities and is not to be used as official figures.


Source: VIEW IN BROWSER

________________________________


Related


Sudan Watch - July 21, 2023

SAF strikes RSF in Khartoum and North Kordofan

Since the eruption of the conflict, the Sudanese air forces have targeted the RSF positions in Khartoum and have reduced the arrival of their reinforcements from reaching the capital. However, recently, they operate also in strategic North Kordofan.

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2023/07/sudanese-army-strikes-rsf-rebels-in.html

___


Sudan Watch - December 28, 2023

Sudan: Clashes between Nuba and Arab Bagara tribes in Al Hujairat village of Ar Rahad, North Kordofan

On 22 December 2023, inter-communal clashes erupted between Nuba tribesmen and Arab Bagara tribesmen in Al Hujairat village of Ar Rahad locality, North Kordofan. The incident reportedly occurred following a dispute over livestock. Field teams reported that the majority of the Nuba residents in Al Hujairat village were displaced to Ad Dambaer village of the same locality, and have since returned. Field teams further reported that Arab Bagara were displaced to Um Rawaba town of Um Rawaba locality, North Kordofan and to other localities within South Kordofan. 

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2023/12/sudan-clashes-between-nuba-and-arab.html

___


Sudan Watch - December 29, 2023

Sudan: Clashes in Sheikan El Obeid Town, N. Kordofan

Between 23 and 25 December 2023, armed clashes renewed between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in El Obeid Town of Sheikan locality, North Kordofan. Clashes were reported in Al Gadisiya, As Salam, Al Jala’a and Al Guba neighborhoods as well as around the stadium and Haj Al Sayed Mosque. As a result of the violence, three individuals were reportedly killed, and 20 others sustained injuries. 

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2023/12/sudan-clashes-in-sheikan-el-obeid-town.html

___


Relief Web OCHA - January 4, 2024

Sudan Humanitarian Update (4 January 2024)

In North Kordofan State, about 420 people were displaced on 29 December 2023 after inter-communal clashes erupted between Nuba, Al Asra, and Shanabla tribesmen in Arsh Al Yoi village in Um Rawaba locality, North Kordofan State. The cause of the violence remains unknown. IOM DTM field teams report that the displaced people sought safety and shelter in Um Rawaba town. The situation on the ground remains tense and unpredictable. On 30 December 2023, inter-communal clashes renewed between Nuba tribesmen and Arab Bagara tribesmen in Al Hujairat village of Ar Rahad locality, North Kordofan. The incident reportedly occurred following a dispute over livestock. IOM DTM field teams report that about 315 people have been displaced from Al Hujairat village. Affected households have sought refuge in the Sidrah, Karshoum and Ad Damaer villages of Ar Rahad locality.

https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-update-4-january-2024-enar

___


Sudan Watch - January 14, 2024

Sudan Humanitarian Update (14 January 2024)

In North Kordofan State, tensions rose on 3 January between the RSF and Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North Al-Hilu faction in Broka village of Ar Rahad locality, reports IOM DTM. As a result, about 430 people (86 families) were displaced and are taking refuge in Al Huda, Al Safa, and Al Shati’ neighbourhoods in Ar Rahad Town as well as in Aradeba, Tendalti, Umm Habila and As Sawani villages in Ar Rahad locality. The situation remains tense and unpredictable. There are 137,300 IDPs in North Kordofan State post-April 2023, according to IOM DTM.


On 8 January 2024, armed clashes renewed between the SAF and the RSF in El Obeid town, the capital of North Kordofan State. Clashes were reported in southern neighbourhoods of El Obeid town. While no civilian displacement was reported, the situation on the ground remains tense and unpredictable, IOM DTM reported.

https://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2024/01/sudan-humanitarian-update-14-january.html

___


END

Sunday, January 21, 2024

‘No diplomatic end to Sudan’s war in sight' -Baldo

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Peace meetings between Messrs Burhan and Hemeti could happen as soon as Hemeti makes his fighters leave Khartoum and move out of the residential homes and properties they've commandeered in Khartoum. It's as simple as that. Once that happens, Gen. Burhan said (many times) he will attend ceasefire and peace talks. The fact that none of it has happened proves Hemeti is not genuine in wanting peace and security for the people of Sudan. He wants Sudan and what's left of it by the time he's hauled off to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
__________________________

From Radio Dabanga
Dated Friday, 12 January 2024; 18:00 NEW YORK - here is a copy in full:

‘No diplomatic end to Sudan’s war in sight,’ warns Suliman Baldo

Map of Sudan showing areas under SAF (in red) and RSF (in yellow) control as of December 21, 2023 (Source: @ThomasVLinge via X)


As the war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) soon enters its ninth month, there remains no tangible end in sight to the widespread suffering endured by the country and its people. That is despite a flurry of diplomatic mediation efforts, says prominent Sudanese researcher Suliman Baldo.


In his analysis ‘Sudan’s Interminable War, published by the International Centre for Dialogue Initiatives on Tuesday, conflict resolution expert Suliman Baldo* observes that while both the SAF and the RSF “initially believed they would crush the other in days”, the conflict has dragged on into “multiple localised ethnically driven clashes beyond either party’s control”.


On the ground, the RSF has succeeded in expanding its territorial control in Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum, while SAF remains in control of northern, central, and eastern regions, including de-facto administrative capital Port Sudan. In December, an RSF offensive “wrestled the central Gezira state from the army’s control and threatened its presence in the White Nile and Sennar states”.


The war unmasked SAF’s ineptitude, Baldo asserts, “as its senior commanders became too steeped in grand corruption practices to pay attention to the decay of SAF as a fighting force”.


Their adversary, the RSF, is “ethnically aligned, with plunder as the main motivation of its fighters”. The paramilitary force “proved incapable of providing for the population” in El Gezira after it took over the former safe haven for those who fled Khartoum and El Obeid in the early days of the war.


At the end of December, the Wad Madani Resistance Committees lamented the deterioration of security, health and humanitarian conditions in El Gezira, continued attacks by the RSF, the lack of functional hospitals, and the ongoing waves of displacement in the state.


The region is divided over Sudan. Sudanese policy analyst Kholood Khair and civil society activist Asmahan Akam wrote in Time magazine in December that “Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia support the SAF while the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a UN Security Council member, backs the RSF in seeming violation of the body’s own arms embargo on Darfur, first enacted in 2004 and just renewed (with a yes vote from the UAE) in March 2023”.


‘No tangible solution’


The SAF, with junta leader Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan at its head, conditions a ceasefire on the RSF evacuating private and residential areas. Baldo explains that this is most likely to be rejected by the latter, as it maintains a tactical advantage in doing so, especially in Khartoum where it continues to lay siege to several SAF command stations.


Whilst ongoing conflict threatens SAF’s collapse, Baldo believes, “a traffic jam of diplomatic initiatives” has yet to bring forth any sustainable nor tangible end to the conflict.


The Jeddah talks, facilitated by the US and Saudi Arabia, stalled due to belligerents’ failures to honour commitments. The United Nations (UN) “was relegated to an observer’s seat as Sudan unilaterally terminated its political mission”, whereas “offers of mediation by Russia, Turkey, and a Sudan neighbours’ initiative launched by Egypt in July failed to generate traction because the RSF declined to cooperate with any”.


By the end of 2023, the Horn of Africa Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose members include Djibouti, Kenya, the Sudans, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, emerged as a lead mediator for a humanitarian ceasefire and civilian-led political negotiations.


IGAD convened in Djibouti in early December, for an extraordinary assembly session on the situation in Sudan, where members agreed to redouble efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution, including mediating head-to-head talks between El Burhan and RSF commander ‘Hemedti’.


“However, several challenges emerged in the final days of 2023 and early 2024 that risk derailing the IGAD’s role in these processes.”


Hours after the IGAD communiquĂ© of the summit was released, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially denied El Burhan’s agreement to meet with Hemedti without conditions, stating that the communiquĂ©’s content “was not based on consensus nor legally binding.”


Baldo notes that the FA Ministry is “dominated by Islamist allies of the SAF who are most likely behind the initial rejection of the offer. El Burhan later agreed to meet with Hemedti.


Another challenge facing IGAD’s role is the official reception and hospitality received by Hemedti during his Africa tour, in which he was hosted by the heads of four IGAD member states, including chairperson Ismail Guelleh, the President of Djibouti.


“Hemedti’s reception as a visiting dignitary bestowed on him a diplomatic legitimacy that provoked the ire of the SAF, and made less likely that Burhan would agree to meet with him under the IGAD’s auspices after this slight”, the expert explained.


Last June, Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, chaired by El Burhan, declared that “Kenya is not neutral and is home to RSF rebel leaders”.


Last week, acting FA Minister Ali El Sadig announced that Sudan summoned the Kenyan ambassador to protest against the official reception of Hemedti by the Kenyan president.


* Dr Suliman Baldo is an expert in justice, human rights and conflict resolution in Africa and served as the Africa head of International Crisis group, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and has also held human rights and mediation posts in the United Nations. He has provided expert advice on human rights in Mali and Darfur and currently leads the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker. (Source: International Centre for Dialogue Initiatives website)


Continue Reading

Previous

Sudanese in El Gedaref are arming themselves ‘despite hate of Islamists’


View original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/no-diplomatic-end-to-sudans-war-in-sight-warns-suliman-baldo


ENDS