Security situation in Sudan's Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile state, repeated drone strikes targeted in El Obeid

From Security Council Report

What's In Blue 
Posted Tuesday 04 August 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Closed Consultations

Tomorrow afternoon (5 August), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country, specifically in light of the ongoing violence in the Darfur and the Kordofan regions as well as in Blue Nile state. In requesting the meeting, these members highlighted the impact of the hostilities on civilians, including continued restrictions on humanitarian operations and attacks on civilian infrastructure that have disrupted essential services, impeded the delivery of medical care and humanitarian assistance, and further exacerbated humanitarian conditions. The anticipated briefer is Lisa Doughten, the Director of the Financing and Outreach Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The security situation in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, remains alarming. The city is a strategic gateway linking the capital, Khartoum, with the Greater Darfur region and serves as a critical logistical hub for humanitarian operations across Kordofan. Recent reports indicate a significant build-up of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied fighters around the city, accompanied by intensified drone strikes and shelling. OCHA has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites. These developments have prompted growing concern among regional and international actors, who have warned of the risk of widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) and stressed the need for urgent action to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. (For more information, see our 25 June What’s in Blue story.)

Meanwhile, in late July, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched a major ground offensive in North Kordofan and announced that it had recaptured the Al Sadarat highway and five key towns along the route, including Bara, Um Sayala, and Gebrat al-Sheikh, following two days of intense clashes with the RSF. The highway, which runs north of El Obeid and southwest towards Khartoum, had been a critical corridor for the RSF and, according to analysts, enabled the group to sustain pressure on El Obeid and constrain SAF operations across North Kordofan. The SAF’s recapture of the corridor restores an important supply and movement route, significantly improving its ability to reinforce positions around El Obeid. At tomorrow’s meeting, some Council members may seek Doughten’s assessment of what these developments could mean for humanitarian access.

At the same time, fighting has intensified on other fronts in North and West Darfur states. According to media reports, the RSF has increased drone strikes targeting the town of Tina in North Darfur, which borders Chad, as part of a broader offensive to capture the SAF’s remaining positions in Darfur, including Tina, Um Baru, and Karnoi. On 21 July, at least 21 civilians were reportedly killed and dozens injured when an RSF drone strike hit a vital water source in Tina. In a 23 July update, the international non-profit organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) recorded 63 conflict-related fatalities across the Tina, Karnoi, and Um Baru localities since June, highlighting the intensification of fighting along Sudan’s border with Chad.

In a 3 August press release, OCHA noted that a 2 August drone strike in the village of Ghara al Zawiya in North Darfur state reportedly caused dozens of casualties, although the number of civilian casualties could not be independently verified. Media reports citing the Emergency Lawyers Group, a Sudanese human rights monitoring group, attributed the strike to the SAF, saying that it hit a traditional court session—during which people had gathered outdoors to attend hearings on local cases and disputes—and killed at least 35 people.

In Blue Nile state, the security and humanitarian situation deteriorated following the expansion of fighting around the town of Kurmuk and other areas along the Ethiopian border, reportedly displacing approximately 100,000 people across the state, many of whom have sought refuge in the capital, Ed Damazin. In early July, following intense clashes, the SAF retook control of Kurmuk from the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The RSF and the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction had captured Kurmuk in March, using the strategically located town as a base for operations in southern Blue Nile. The fighting has raised concerns over further regionalisation of the conflict, particularly amid allegations of external support to the RSF, including reports of a training and drone infrastructure facility linked to the group in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region and claims that Ethiopian territory has been used as a supply conduit for RSF operations.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Ed Damazin and other parts of Blue Nile state has continued to deteriorate, with heavy rainfall and flooding compounding the challenges faced by displaced populations. Thousands of people living in displacement sites and temporary shelters have been affected, with several shelters reportedly damaged or destroyed by flooding. Humanitarian actors have also raised concerns over the outbreak of disease amid pressure on already limited health, water, and sanitation services.

More broadly, the health crisis has continued to worsen across Sudan, with multiple disease outbreaks emerging amid the collapse of healthcare services, particularly in conflict-affected areas. The World Health Organization (WHO) announced a new wave of cholera, voicing particular concern about vulnerable populations, including in besieged areas such as El Obeid. In a 27 July press release, OCHA reported more than 2,000 suspected cholera cases and 170 related deaths since May, with the majority of cases recorded in the Kordofan region. OCHA has also noted that the WHO and Sudanese health authorities are responding to a growing dengue fever outbreak, with more than 1,000 cases and five related deaths reported in Blue Nile state in July, alongside more than 130 cases in South Kordofan state.

At tomorrow’s meeting, Doughten is likely to note that developments in Blue Nile, Darfur, and Kordofan underscore the devastating impact of attacks on civilian infrastructure—including healthcare facilities, water systems, and electricity networks—which have disrupted essential services and hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance. She may also highlight how the increasing use of drones and other advanced weaponry in the conflict is intensifying civilian suffering, with attacks increasingly affecting populated areas and critical infrastructure.

Doughten and several Council members are likely to reiterate calls for the cessation of hostilities and express support for efforts to achieve a humanitarian truce. They may raise broader protection concerns and emphasise the imperative of ensuring accountability for such acts. Some members may also underline the need for a Council response amid the spiralling security and humanitarian situation. They might emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.

Doughten may also provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. She may call for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and stress the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $2.87 billion, was only 40.4 percent funded.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/08/sudan-closed-consultations-12.php

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UK announces Sudan sanctions package targeting illicit gold and finance networks sustaining the war. UK calls for UN arms embargo to cover El Obeid

"The UK has sanctioned those suspected of being linked to financing, procurement, and commercial networks fuelling the Sudan conflict.

The sanctions come as the UK and international partners are on red alert, monitoring the deteriorating situation in El Obeid, where the RSF is building up surge forces around a city already under immense humanitarian pressure." See list of sanctioned below.

Press release

From Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and 

The Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP

Published Thursday 16 July 2026 - full copy:

UK sanctions illicit gold networks fuelling Sudan’s war amid crisis around El Obeid

The UK has sanctioned those suspected of being linked to financing, procurement, and commercial networks fuelling the Sudan conflict.

• UK announces Sudan sanctions package targeting illicit gold and finance networks sustaining the war
• UK calls for UN arms embargo to cover El Obeid as city on the precipice of major atrocity 
• Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper says UK will tackle those fuelling the conflict.

The UK has today announced sanctions targeting the conflict gold trade in Sudan, procurement networks and financial facilitators that are fuelling Sudan’s war.

Sudan’s booming gold industry is the engine of its war economy. While official gold exports were worth $1.5 billion in 2024 and 2025, the true value of the sector is estimated to be several times higher, with billions of dollars’ worth of gold smuggled out of Sudan each year through illicit channels, helping finance weapons procurement, military operations and the activities of armed groups.

These measures target eleven individuals and entities suspected of being linked to the financing, procurement and commercial networks supporting the RSF or the SAF and fuelling Sudan’s conflict. All are Sudanese but they trade internationally including in the gold markets in Dubai and Hong Kong. 

At the centre of the package is Sudanese national Abu Dharr, suspected of being a notorious RSF financier and procurement facilitator. He is suspected of having helped fund and sustain RSF operations from beyond Sudan’s borders through a web of real estate, conflict gold, and holding companies based in Dubai.

Vast quantities of Sudanese gold continue to be monetised before entering global markets, making it a critical gateway for revenues generated by Sudan’s illicit gold sector.

By targeting these companies and facilitators, the UK is exposing and disrupting key commercial networks that help convert Sudan’s gold wealth into revenue that sustains the conflict.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said:

“The people of Sudan continue to pay the price for a war fuelled not only by guns and fighters, but by illicit flows of gold and finance to fill the war chests on both sides. These sanctions are targeting Sudan’s war economy and they will shine a light on those who seek to profit from these illegal shadow networks. 

“As the world watches the deeply alarming build-up around El Obeid, we continue to call on the RSF to halt their assault. And we are making clear that those enabling atrocities, from the battlefield to the boardroom, will be held accountable.”

The sanctions come as the UK and international partners are on red alert, monitoring the deteriorating situation in El Obeid, where the RSF is building up surge forces around a city already under immense humanitarian pressure.  

The UK has warned that El Obeid is at risk of becoming the scene of another mass atrocity, following the horrors witnessed in El Fasher. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper has called for the UN arms embargo to be extended to reach El Obeid.

Illicit gold will be a priority theme at the UK’s Illicit Finance Summit, due to take place in London in December 2026. The Summit will bring together governments, civil society and the private sector to build an international coalition to tackle flows of dirty money around the world, including the trade in illicit gold.

ENDS.

Notes to Editor.

• Foreign Secretary Statement to the House of Commons with UN arms embargo call to reach El Obeid.

• List of sanctioned.

· Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa Ahmmed – RSF financier and procurement facilitator suspected of using a network of companies to secure funding, move money and support RSF operations.

· Prodigious Real Estate Management Supervision Services – Sudanese UAE-based company suspected of being part of Abu Dharr’s commercial network used to support RSF financing activities.

· Mazin Fadlalla – RSF-linked procurement operative suspected of being involved in acquiring funding, equipment and materiel for the RSF.

· Ahmed Hashim – RSF- linked procurement operative suspected of being involved in sourcing funding and supplies for the RSF.

· Natwest Logistics – Sudanese UAE-based company suspected of being used by Mazin Fadlalla and Ahmed Hashim to support RSF procurement and logistics activities.

· Aoun Commercial Brokers – Sudanese UAE-based company suspected of being used by Mazin Fadlalla and Ahmed Hashim to facilitate procurement and financial transactions for the RSF.

· Ahmad Abdalla – Procurement operative linked to the SAF and Defence Industries Systems (DIS), suspected of being involved in securing weapons, equipment and funding for the SAF.

·Portex Trade Limited – Sudanese Hong Kong-based company suspected of being used by Ahmad Abdalla to support SAF procurement activity and evade existing sanctions restrictions.

· Omdurman Mining – Sudanese state-owned mining company suspected of generating gold revenues that support the SAF’s war effort.

· Ariab Mining Company – Sudanese state-owned mining company suspected of involvement in illicit gold activities that generate revenue for the SAF.

· Sudamin Company Ltd – Sudanese state-owned mining company linked to Sudan’s gold sector and suspected of channelling revenue from conflict gold to both the SAF and RSF, including through past links to sanctioned company Al Junaid.

View original: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-illicit-gold-networks-fuelling-sudans-war-amid-crisis-around-el-obeid

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Grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan. CRSV in Darfur could be crimes against humanity

From What's In Blue 
Dated Thursday 25 June 2026 - excerpts:

Sudan: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (26 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on Sudan. The meeting is being held pursuant to resolution 2715 of 1 December 2023, which requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing every 120 days on the “UN’s efforts to support Sudan on its path towards peace and stability”. [...]

Colombia, in its capacity as Council president for June and in the absence of a Chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is expected to deliver a statement on the work of the Committee. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Pekka Haavisto will brief in the closed consultations. [...]

Over the past several weeks, regional and international interlocutors have expressed alarm over the escalating situation in El Obeid, drawing comparisons with the RSF’s October 2025 offensive and subsequent takeover of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state. That offensive was accompanied by widespread violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), including reports of mass killings, summary executions, abductions, arbitrary detention, and other abuses against civilians. 

In an 18 June statement, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk warned that an imminent offensive on El Obeid “risked fresh commission of serious international crimes and deepening the catastrophic impact on an already beleaguered civilian population”. [...]

In recent weeks, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported that repeated drone strikes have targeted critical civilian infrastructure in and around El Obeid, including power, fuel, and water facilities, as well as displacement sites.

Some members may also highlight broader protection concerns, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). In this regard, there may be reference to the 23 June report published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which documents patterns and trends of CRSV in Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023 to mid-April this year, including links to conflict dynamics. The report noted that CRSV has been perpetrated in conjunction with systematic and coordinated attacks against civilians as a tactic of war, including as retaliation against individuals perceived to be affiliated with opposing parties and as part of ethnically motivated attacks. It found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that some acts of sexual violence committed in Darfur, in the context of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, may amount to crimes against humanity. [...]

Tomorrow, Sulieman and several Council members are likely to highlight the devastating impact of the conflict on children, particularly in light of the escalating hostilities in and around El Obeid. They are expected to express deep concern about the continued perpetration of grave violations against children in Sudan. (The six grave violations, as determined by the Security Council, are child recruitment and use; killing and maiming; rape and other forms of sexual violence; attacks on schools and hospitals; abductions; and the denial of humanitarian access.) The Secretary-General’s latest annual report on children and armed conflict, dated 16 June and covering developments in 2025, verified 1,889 grave violations against 1,681 children in Sudan.

During the closed consultations, Haavisto is expected to provide an update on ongoing initiatives to address the crisis in Sudan, including his engagement with the Sudanese parties, consultations with key regional and international interlocutors, and efforts to coordinate various peace initiatives. Between 3 and 5 June, the Quintet—comprising the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—held consultations in Addis Ababa with a broad spectrum of Sudanese political and civilian stakeholders. 

A press release issued after the meetings noted that discussions focused on possible pathways towards the establishment of a preparatory committee for an inclusive inter-Sudanese political dialogue. The latest discussions built on the Quintet’s initial engagement with a group of Sudanese civilian actors on the sidelines of the international Sudan conference held in Berlin on 15 April. 

On 7 June, Haavisto visited Sudan, where he met with SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and several other senior Sudanese officials. He also held discussions with political figures, women civil society leaders, members of the diplomatic corps, and the UN Country Team. This was his second visit to Sudan following his appointment on 24 February. According to a UN readout, Haavisto’s discussions focused on UN-led efforts to promote de-escalation and confidence-building measures among the parties. During his meeting with Burhan, he also discussed the Quintet’s recent consultations in Addis Ababa and efforts to advance an inclusive political process.

On 19 June, Haavisto held a telephone conversation with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, during which he underscored the urgent need to de-escalate the situation in and around El Obeid and avoid any actions that could further exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation. In a briefing earlier today (25 June), Haavisto said that he plans to visit Kenya, Chad, South Sudan, and Uganda in the coming weeks as part of his ongoing regional outreach. He expressed hope that the Quad group—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—could help secure a humanitarian truce. In his assessment of the conflict dynamics, he noted that both sides still appear to believe that military gains remain achievable. At the same time, he underscored that regional actors, including Gulf countries, are increasingly rejecting the notion of a military solution.

Haavisto also met with US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos on 23 June. According to a post by Boulos on X, the two discussed the Quintet’s ongoing efforts to advance an inclusive, Sudanese-led civilian political dialogue, as well as ways to ensure unhindered humanitarian access for the UN and its humanitarian partners. Boulos further noted that he will participate in tomorrow’s Council meeting, during which he intends to emphasise the need for international support for a humanitarian truce, a pathway towards a permanent ceasefire, and an inclusive Sudanese-led political dialogue and civilian-led transition.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/06/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-13.php

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UK and allies Joint Statement on situation in El Obeid Sudan: Credible signs of an imminent attack by RSF

"We, the Foreign Ministers of like-minded partners (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK), are deeply concerned by reports of a continued assault on El Obeid, despite calls for a halt to the attack and protection of civilians.  

We call on the RSF to halt its attack immediately. Civilians must be able to leave safely, and all parties must ensure rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access. The RSF and the SAF, and their allies, must de-escalate, uphold international humanitarian law, and honour their commitments under the Jeddah Declaration." More.

UK Government response

From: Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and The Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP

Dated Tuesday 23 June 2026 - full copy:

UK and allies Joint Statement on the situation in El Obeid

The United Kingdom and E4+deliver a joint statement on the situation in El Obeid, Sudan.

We, the Foreign Ministers of like-minded partners (France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK), are deeply concerned by reports of a continued assault on El Obeid, despite calls for a halt to the attack and protection of civilians.  

Last year, the world witnessed with horror the atrocities in El Fasher - crimes that are assessed to bear the “hallmarks of genocide”. We must not allow such failures to be repeated.   

In recent weeks, repeated drone strikes on El Obeid have killed civilians and driven acute shortages of fuel, food and water. With the rainy season fast approaching, humanitarian workers continue to provide life-saving assistance but are being deliberately targeted. 

There are now credible signs of an imminent offensive. This is a critical moment, and the international community must act.  

We call on the RSF to halt its attack immediately. Civilians must be able to leave safely, and all parties must ensure rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access. The RSF and the SAF, and their allies, must de-escalate, uphold international humanitarian law, and honour their commitments under the Jeddah Declaration. 

External support continues to sustain this conflict. We call on those fuelling the conflict to cease, and those with influence must exercise it now to avoid further bloodshed.  

We will continue to work closely at the UN Security Council and with regional and international partners to secure a clear and unified response: the violence must end, civilians must be protected, and those responsible must be held to account. We remain committed to supporting a credible path to peace through the Quintet-led process and call on all parties to engage in good faith.

View original: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-allies-joint-statement-on-the-situation-in-el-obeid

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UN Security Council Meeting on Sudan 16 June 2025

From UN Security Council

What's In Blue 
Posted Thursday, 12 June 2025 - copy in full:

Sudan: Closed Consultations*

On Monday afternoon (16 June), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations on Sudan. Denmark, Slovenia, and the UK (the penholder on the file) requested the meeting to receive an update on the humanitarian situation in the country. Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya is the anticipated briefer.*

More than two years since fighting erupted on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the violence has evolved into a protracted armed conflict, resulting in widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, the destruction of critical infrastructure, severe food and water shortages, and severe violations of international humanitarian law. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate amid ongoing hostilities and the growing use of advanced weaponry, including long-range drones, which has further intensified the scale and complexity of the conflict.

Monday’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of escalating attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, humanitarian personnel, and aid facilities. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), since the beginning of this year, attacks on critical infrastructure such as power stations, water sub-stations, and oil refineries across the country have caused widespread electricity outages and severely disrupted access to essential rights and services, including safe drinking water, healthcare and food supplies. In early May, the RSF reportedly launched a series of drone strikes targeting key civilian and military infrastructure in Port Sudan—the country’s de facto administrative capital—and Kassala, cities which had until then remained largely insulated from the conflict. In mid-May, RSF drone strikes reportedly hit three power stations in the city of Omdurman, causing widespread electricity outages across Khartoum state. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our June 2025 Monthly Forecast and 18 May What’s in Blue story.)

The security situation in El Fasher and the wider North Darfur region remains highly volatile. In mid-April, the RSF intensified its siege and attacks on the city through shelling, drone strikes, and ground operations, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties, the killing of aid workers, and mass displacement. According to the UN, on 29 May, a World Food Programme (WFP) facility in El Fasher reportedly came under repeated shelling by the RSF, causing significant damage to a critical humanitarian hub. On 2 June, a humanitarian aid convoy comprising 15 trucks from the WFP and UNICEF came under attack in Al Koma, which is located approximately 80 kilometres from El Fasher. The attack resulted in the deaths of five personnel, injured several others, and destroyed multiple trucks and critical humanitarian supplies. A 3 June joint WFP/UNICEF press statement said that the aid convoy’s route had been shared in advance and that all parties on the ground had been informed of the convoy’s location. The statement called for an immediate investigation and for those responsible to be held accountable. At the time of writing, it is unclear who is responsible for the attack, for which the warring parties have blamed each other. On Monday, Msuya and some Council members might underscore the need to ensure accountability for such attacks and break the cycle of impunity.

Elsewhere in Sudan, hostilities have intensified in the Kordofan region, with the parties reportedly exchanging heavy drone and artillery fire on multiple fronts, causing significant harm to civilians. On 30 May, the Eldaman International Hospital in El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan state, was reportedly struck in a drone attack by the RSF, killing at least six health workers and injuring more than 15 others. In recent days, airstrikes have also reportedly targeted residential areas of El Obeid city, resulting in the injury of civilians.

At Monday’s meeting, Msuya is likely to describe how the conflict dynamics are impacting the humanitarian situation in the country, particularly in areas experiencing intense fighting. He may provide an update on efforts by the UN and its partners to respond to the unfolding crisis and highlight the persistent impediments to humanitarian access in regions where needs are rapidly escalating. According to OCHA’s latest humanitarian access snapshot, which was published on 4 June, access across Sudan remains severely constrained due to ongoing insecurity, bureaucratic obstacles, and mass displacement, particularly in South and West Kordofan and North Darfur states. In the Kordofan region, heavy fighting has blocked key humanitarian routes and disrupted supply chains, while shifting front lines and long distances from key logistics hubs, such as Port Sudan and the Adré crossing at the Chad-Sudan border, have severely hampered operations. Meanwhile, access in Khartoum remained challenging due to insecurity and bureaucratic restrictions, such as delays in processing travel permits and visas for aid workers.

As hostilities persist, Sudan’s health crisis has deepened, with the healthcare system collapsing, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has verified 156 attacks on healthcare facilities, resulting in 318 deaths and 273 injuries. Meanwhile, approximately 20.3 million people—over 40 percent of the country’s population—are in urgent need of health assistance, with more than two-thirds of Sudan’s states battling three or more disease outbreaks simultaneously.

The cholera outbreak that started in July 2024 has since spread to 92 localities across 13 of Sudan’s 18 states, infecting 74,000 people and causing 1,826 deaths. Since May, the WHO has reported a rapid increase in cholera cases in Khartoum state, with over 16,000 cases and 239 deaths documented. The WHO attributed the recent surge in cholera cases to poor water, sanitation and hygiene, caused by a shortage of safe water following attacks on major power plants and water sources. Estimates suggest that approximately $40 million is needed to rehabilitate water infrastructure in Khartoum state. (For more information, see our 12 March What’s in Blue story.)

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as at 28 May, there were approximately 10.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, a decrease of 13 percent compared to the country’s highest-ever recorded population of IDPs early this year. The IOM attributed this reduction to increased return movements, particularly to Khartoum, Sennar, and Al Jazirah states. Since April 2023, more than four million people have sought refuge in Sudan’s neighbouring countries. Returnees continue to face critical humanitarian needs, with limited access to basic services and persistent protection risks. For instance, recent media reports have indicated the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance in areas of return.

In a 10 June statement following his visit to Khartoum, the WFP’s Sudan representative, Laurent Bukera, announced that the WFP has re-established its presence in the area with the opening of an office in Omdurman. He noted that, with people returning to conflict-affected areas like Khartoum, pressure on overstretched resources will intensify. He underlined the urgent need to restore basic services and accelerate recovery through coordinated efforts with local authorities, national non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and humanitarian partners.

On Monday, Msuya is likely to underscore the urgent need to act to alleviate the suffering of millions in Sudan. He may call on the international community to scale up its humanitarian response to match the scale and urgency of the crisis. He might also underline the need for enhanced and flexible funding for the humanitarian response in Sudan and highlight the urgent need for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access. At the time of writing, Sudan’s 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), requiring $4.16 billion, was only approximately 14percent funded.

Council members may reiterate key points from their press statement, agreed earlier this evening (12 June), which was authored by the UK. The statement recalled resolution 2736 of 13 June 2024, which demanded that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher and called for an immediate halt to the fighting and for de-escalation in and around El Fasher. In their statement, Council members condemned the 2 June attack on the WFP/UNICEF humanitarian convoy and the 29 May shelling by the RSF that damaged a WFP facility in El Fasher. They also expressed deep concern over the impact of the conflict on humanitarian operations, including reports of air attacks by the RSF in Port Sudan, Kassala and Khartoum. The statement reiterated that deliberate attacks against humanitarian personnel, their premises, and assets may constitute war crimes and called on the parties to abide by their commitments under the 11 May 2023 Jeddah Declaration as well as by their obligations under international law.

________________________________________________________________

**Post-script (13 June, 3:45 pm EST): After the publication of this story, the meeting was pushed from Friday (13 June) to Monday (16 June), due to the scheduling of an emergency meeting on Iran on Friday afternoon. The story was amended to reflect the change in timing as well as the briefer; while Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher was expected to brief on Friday, the briefer expected for Monday is Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Joyce Msuya.

View original: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/sudan-closed-consultations-7.php

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NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor

Plumpy’Nut - A ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)

A peanut product called Plumpy’Nut could come to the aid of starving people, especially children, across the globe.

Severe acute malnutrition has traditionally been treated with therapeutic milk and required hospitalisation. Unlike milk, Plumpy’Nut can be administered at home and without medical supervision.

Plumpy’Nut has a two-year shelf life and requires no water, preparation, or refrigeration. Its ease of use has made mass treatment of malnutrition in famine situations more efficient than in the past.

Image: Plumpy'Nut, a ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF)

Read more at Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumpy%27nut

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