4 VIDEO CHATS: Sudan War and Civilisation feat. Layla AbdelRahi & Ushari Ahmed Mahmud Khalil

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Here are four 30-minute video chats between Dr Layla AbdelRahim and Dr Ushari Ahmed Mahmud Khalil. The chats cover wide ranging topics focusing on Sudan's war and civilisation. After finding Part 2 by accident and viewing it, I am documenting all 4 here.

War and Civilisation 1: What we can learn from Sudan - 14 Nov 2023
War and Civilisation 2: Sudan and the Roots of Turmoil - 9 Dec 2023
War and Civilisation 3: The Genealogy of Genocide - 30 Dec 2023
War and Civilisation 4: The State is Corruption - 6 January 2024

Image credit: Ushari Ahmed Mahmud Khalil Facebook

War and Civilisation 1: What we can learn from Sudan 

14 Nov 2023

To view the 26 minute video discussion click here:

https://www.patreon.com/posts/war-and-1-what-92303767

Description:

All raging wars are alike; each peaceful initiative fails in its own way.

September this year marked the 40th anniversary of the implementation of Shari'a Laws in Sudan. 1983 thus took a step out of the geopolitical crossroads into the direction of today.

Even though humanity has waged war for thousands of years, we are still surprised each time a new war erupts. We are baffled by the narrative on the “other” side. We are outraged. Dismayed. And passionately, we fall into the trap of the narrative we believe.

I was a teenager, studying civil engineering and working several jobs at a time, when the Second Civil War in Sudan broke out. The narratives explaining the war seemed lopsided to me, even false. So, I decided to investigate for myself. Ushari and I met at the Sudan Times daily. Bona Malwal was the editor-in-chief at the time. Indignant at the cruelty and injustices around us, we both strove to uncover the truth and right the wrongs. It is rare to meet someone with such integrity and dedication as Ushari. Even after political imprisonment and now in exile, he remains the voice of human conscience.

I hope you will find this conversation interesting and helpful in your own endeavours to better humanity. This is the first of five parts.

You can support Ushari Ahmed Mahmud Khalil’s work by engaging his translation services or donations and follow him on Twitter; YouTube; Faceook.

Ushari Mahmud analyses and reports on the political situation in Sudan. He started as a sociolinguist dedicated to understanding the impact of the diversity of languages in Sudan on the society and politics. His M.A. thesis at the I.A.A.S (Institute for African and Asian Studies) at the University of Khartoum in 1974 was titled “The Phonology of a Dying Nubian Language Birgid”.

He defended his doctoral dissertation in 1979 at Georgetown University on pidgin Arabic in South Sudan, titled “Linguistic variation and change in the aspectual system of Juba Arabic”.

In 1987, he and his colleague, Suleyman Ali Baldo - a defender of human rights - published a report on “Al Dhaein Massacre and Slavery in Sudan” for which both were imprisoned.

His book on language, titled “Arabic in the southern Sudan: History and spread of pidgin creole”.

A relevant article by Zeinab Mohammed Salih: “Viewpoint from Sudan — where Black people are called slaves”.

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War and Civilisation 2: Sudan and the Roots of Turmoil

9 Dec 2023

To view the 32 minute video discussion click here:

https://www.patreon.com/posts/war-and-2-sudan-94372301

Description:

In this part of my conversation with Ushari Ahmad Mahmud Khalil, we delve into the root of the unending turmoil in Sudan. We discuss religion and the role it plays in framing the politics around resources.

Sources and further reading:

Mahmoud Mohammed Taha

Glimpses of the life and thoughts of Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. Documentary by Steve Howard, Ohio University

Interview with Asma Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (daughter) by Steve Howard

Documentary by Ahmed Al Muhanna in 2 parts (Arabic)

A brief history of Mahmoud Mohammed Taha’s life and work

An overview of events regarding Mahmoud Mohammed Taha

Book: Quest for Divinity: A Critical Examination of the Thought of Mahmud Mohammad Taha, by  Mohamed A. Mahmoud

On the thought of Mahmoud Mohammad Taha

Jean-René Milot wrote a Master’s thesis on Mahmoud Mohammed Taha at the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal in 2007

U.S. and Muslim Brotherhood

See books and articles by the Montreal-born, American journalist Ian Johnson

Investigative journalist Robert Dreyfuss’ work, for example: Cold War, Holy Warrior

Eric Reeves on U.S chargé d’affaires to Sudan Steven Koutsis’ statements on U.S interests and policies vis à vis Sudan

Wildlife trafficking

UN report on wildlife trafficking

European Union funding the Janjaweed to Curb Migration

An independent report by the Swedish Development Forum on EU funding the Janjaweed (RSF) to stop migration

A report by Suliman Baldo “Border Control from Hell: How the EU’s migration partnership legitimizes Sudan’s ‘militia state’” (2017)

UN project ReliefWeb on Baldo’s report: “Border Control from Hell: How the EU’s migration partnership legitimizes Sudan’s “militia state” Support Forces (RSF) to stop migration to Europe”

A question to the European Parliament on EU funds for the Rapid Support Forces (Janjaweed) in Sudan to curb migration to Europe

Criticism of EU and UN training and funding the RSF or Janjaweed in Sudan

An article by Bashair Ahmed and Salih Amaar “Escaping Sudan’s Prison: Deciphering the Realities of the EU-Sudan Migration Deal”

Russia, Sudan, and South Sudan Relations

South Sudan:

Putin and South Sudan leader agree to cooperate on security Military base

Russia and South Sudan agreement on mining uranium and lithium in South Sudan

Sudan:

Cooperation on gold and rare metals mining in Sudan

Expert on world politics and professor of political science Natalia Piskounova’s analysis of Sudan’s strife for dominating mining resources

Sudan and Russia agree on military base 

Music By Ayman Mao

Tags Sudan geopolitics religion resources war

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War and Civilisation 3: The Genealogy of Genocide

30 Dec 2023

To view the 28 minute video discussion click here:

https://www.patreon.com/posts/war-and-3-of-95549957

Description:

Sources and further reading

History of slavery in Sudan

Map of eastern slave trade route through Sudan

Professor of Anthropology from South Sudan, Jok Madut Jok, on slavery in Sudan

UN definition of “crimes against humanity”

“My Career Redeeming Slaves” by John Eibner, in the Middle East Quarterly, Dec 1999, pp. 3-16

Ushari and Baldo

On Ushari’s detention and imprisonment for his work on human rights

Sudanese forces for change: beware of Sadiq Almahdi

Map of 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries Sudan

Report on Sharia law and the death penalty

South Sudan Secession

The timeline in the video comes from the Center of International Media Assistance

Al Arabiya on the referendum for the secession of South Sudan

Photo credits

The following come from archaeologist Shadia Taha:

Photograph of camel caravan entering Suakin port in the 1830s from Durham Sudan Archive

Map of trade routes

Plan of Suakin’s districts on the three islands and the historic centre from British Museum

Suakin, between the sea and the desert: connected landscapes

Photographs from and more info on the ancient Sudanese Kingdom of Kush

Photographs of John Garang, Ushari, and myself were taken by Atem Yaak, journalist and former Deputy Minister of Information (from my personal archive).

Photographs of SPLA/M leadership.

Omar al Bashir and John Garang sign peace deal and John Garang joins the government.

Photograph of Addis Ababa airport 1984

Photograph of Juba, capital of South Sudan

An early 20th-century IWW poster depicts the workers who hold the edifices of capitalism on their shoulders. Above are the government and religion. From 1911 IWW newspaper/WikiMedia Commons.

This poster echoes Leo Tolstoy’s famous quote from “What Then Must We Do?”:

“I sit on a man's back choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all means possible… except by getting off his back”.

Photograph of woman, man, and sheep in Khartoum market by Marwan Ali from AP

Photographs of the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue and an American soldier from AP

Photograph of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi from a 2015 article on Donald Trump

Photograph of Old City, Mosul, Iraq by Felipe Dana, AP

Photograph of destroyed Iraq, 20 years on by Khalid Mohammed, AP

Photographs of Iraq from Wiki commons:

Lamassu from the Assyrian gallery at the Iraq Museum, Baghdad

One of the oldest Christian monasteries, Dayro d-Mor Mattai monastery in Bartella, Nineveh, Iraq. Holds a rich collection of Syriac Christian manuscripts

The head of an Akkadian ruler from Nineveh, presumably depicting either Sargon of Akkad, or Sargon's grandson Naram-Sin in bronze

Tags Islamic Brotherhood SPLA/SPLM Sudan civilisation domestication genocide pol slavery war

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War and Civilisation 4: The State is Corruption

6 January 2024

To view the 30 minute video discussion click here:

https://www.patreon.com/posts/war-and-4-state-95977497

Description:

Sources & References

Map of Sudan comes from ISS 

EU tied to violence in South Sudan

Working at the nexus of human and nonhuman animal exploitation

Music by Tinariwen Sahara 

Contact information for Ushari Ahmad Mahmud Khalil

Tags SPLA/SPLM Sudan civilisation politics war

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Is Chad to be the next domino to fall in the Sahel?

THIS tweet posted to X by @jebren_ in reply to Cameron Hudson's Dec 6 tweet copied here below says: "A distinguished forward-looking article that dealt with the internal situation in Chad clearly and put the dots on the letters. Cameron, be assured that the situation in Chad will reach your assumptions in the near future. France and America will not understand what observers of Chadian issues write (perhaps they have their own concerns). Kaka in deep troubles with his own clan and others. cause everyone knows his weakness they’ll try to take advantage! Thanks

Cameron Hudson

@_hudsonc

·

6h

Is #Chad going to be the next domino to fall in the Sahel? My latest analysis for @CSIS argues that not only is the country on the brink of a coup and possibly civil war, but that Washington is deeply unprepared to prevent it.

9:36 PM Dec 6, 2023"

A distinguished forward-looking article that dealt with the internal situation in Chad clearly and put the dots on the letters.
Cameron, be assured that the situation in Chad will reach your assumptions in the near future. France and America will not understand what observers of… https://t.co/jRXJ6BkNSl

— Jebren جبرين (@jebren_) December 6, 2023

__________________________________

HERE is a full copy of the above mentioned analysis:

From the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Commentary by Cameron Hudson
Published December 6, 2023

Chad: The Sahel’s Last Domino to Fall 

Photo: DENIS SASSOU GUEIPEUR/AFP/Getty Images

It is no understatement to say that Africa’s arid Sahel region, occupying a 4,000-mile stretch of North African Sahara from the Atlantic to the Red Sea coasts, is likely the most dangerous and unstable stretch of territory in the world today.

The region has always been crushingly poor and pockmarked by bad governance. But in recent years, the region has been buffeted by a rash of democratic backsliding, nine coups, high levels of terrorist violence, a civil war, and the overall displacement of more than 15 million people. Despite this bleak scenario, the Sahel has a new risk on the horizon as one of its last dominoes risks falling from internal stability and spreading the regional contagion of instability even further.

Chad, the landlocked country in the heart of the region, has largely escaped getting drawn into the chaos that surrounds it on all sides. But it is on a knife’s edge internally and the direction it tilts will affect the fates of tens of millions of people in what is now also the fastest-growing population center on earth. Wedged between a raging civil war to the east in Sudan and an unchecked terrorist insurgency in the western Sahel, Chad’s collapse could open a bridge that merges the flow of fighters, weapons, and violence between these two regions embroiled in conflict: a virtual Pandora’s box clear across Africa.

The view from this side of the Atlantic has always been that Chad is a French problem. Paris’s former colony has continued to remain close to the fold, hosting France’s largest military base on the continent, and now serving as the rally point for French troops retreating out of Niger, where a military coup last July dethroned the region’s last remaining bright spot and democratic partner. In exchange for its loyalty, France has continued to confer its legitimacy on successive Chadian military leaders.

When the country’s longtime military dictator, Idriss Déby Itno, died commanding his troops on the battlefield in 2021, it was President Emmanuel Macron who presided over Déby’s funeral and, in a move so well practiced by generations of French leaders, anointed Déby’s son, Mahamat, as the country’s new leader.

But two years later, Déby is now learning that it is harder to hold power after being handed it as opposed to earning it, either at the ballot box or on the battlefield, as his late father did. Since being thrust into the pink palace, Chad’s presidential residence on the banks of the Chari River, the young leader, at 38, has struggled to consolidate his rule, keep happy the Zaghawa tribal elites who installed him, or manage the country’s complex foreign relationships. Wisely, he has continued his father’s counterterror operations across the region, which has kept him in good standing with foreign backers.

But major cracks in his rule at home are emerging, which could ultimately spell Déby’s demise and usher in a new period of transition and violent instability for the country and the wider region. News in recent months that Déby has turned over use of an airport in the far eastern city of Amdjarass, his father’s ancestral home and burial place, in exchange for financial promises from the United Arab Emirates is angering Chad’s Zaghawa generals, who oppose the Emirati effort to arm the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in neighboring Sudan’s civil war.

The elders of this minority Arab tribe that has ruled Chad since 1990 see RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo—who comes from his own mixed Chadian-Sudanese parentage—as a potential pretender to the throne in Chad and a threat to their rule. Concerns have long circulated in Chadian circles that if Hemedti were ever chased from Sudan he would most certainly retreat westward out of Darfur and into Chad where he would continue to seek power for himself and avoid accountability for his many atrocity crimes. Similarly, Hemedti’s recent efforts to recruit Zaghawa tribesman and draw them into his war has been resisted by most of the Chadian Zaghawa community, many of whom view his ethnic cleansing of the non-Arab Masalit community in West Darfur, with whom they share many cultural and familial ties, as a threat to them.

Reported discussions with Russia over the use of private military companies to help Déby subdue northern rebels and begin to exploit significant gold reserves in the Tibetsi mountain range near the country’s border with Libya have further stoked the ire of the country’s generals, who take pride in their reputation as the region’s most effective fighters. They bristle at the notion of needing outside assistance like their Malian and Burkinabe neighbors. The recent news that Hungary would offer military forces to nominally aid in Chad’s counterterror and human trafficking interdiction efforts is suspected by many of being a thin cover for the creation of a Praetorian guard to protect Déby from the types of palace coups that have recently plagued other heads of state in the region.

Meanwhile, the nationalization of the Chad’s oil sector, along with the impetuous expulsion of Germany’s ambassador for his “discourteous attitude,” all point to a reckless vanity that has rightly caused many around him to question the young leader’s judgment. Déby’s retirement of Chadian generals who had served his father, along with the promotion of childhood friends, like Youssof Boy, seen as the enabler of some of Déby’s worst instincts, as advisors has further catalyzed the country’s political and military elite to question his hold on power.

Despite these many missteps, Déby is still seeking ways to consolidate his rule, with or without the generals he relies on. Last month Déby cut a deal with his principal political opponent, Succès Masra, to return to the country after a year of exile, stemming from a bloody crackdown on his party and pro-democracy protesters last October. In the episode, now referred to as “Black Thursday” by civil society, scores were killed and hundreds more arrested and detained in the country’s most significant pro-democracy protest.

Later this month he will attempt to put in place the second element of his power play. After organizing a national dialogue last year that excluded prodemocracy and armed groups, he will soon ram through a new constitution that lowers the age requirement for the presidency from 40 to 35, thus enabling his candidacy. At the same time, the vote will enact a new restriction requiring candidates to have both parents be Chadian born, a bar that neither of his two main opponents, Masra or Hemedti, can clear. Once legitimized by an election-like process next year, likely to be signed off on by Washington and other capitals still requiring his security services, Déby’s assumption of power will be complete. If he can survive that long.

Chad is today rife with rumors of an impending military coup. But a look at how the West has responded to coups in neighboring Niger and Sudan, neither of which saw sanctions imposed in response, suggests that would-be coup-makers do not have much to worry about, so long as they quickly pledge to make good on previous CT commitments and keep France’s military base operating.

Except this myopia obscures an understanding of Chadian history that suggests the coming coup will not resemble the quick and bloodless episodes that have defined recent power grabs in the region. Since its independence, Chad’s power transfers have been anything but peaceful. Most have been coups, coming in the context of larger civil conflicts. In this sense, past is almost certainly prologue.

Last year, Washington alerted Déby to an aborted coup attempt by forces of southern Christians, supposedly receiving military training in neighboring Central African Republic. This suggests at least an awareness in Washington of the threats Déby faces, if not a willingness to see him maintain power. Similarly, the same armed rebel groups that succeeded in killing Idriss Déby recently declared that they were restarting their armed struggle with his son.

And yet, neither Washington nor France has done much to either push Déby into genuine reforms or to support the demands of the struggling democratic forces in the country. For his many transgressions, Déby has felt not much more than a slap on the wrist in the form of critical statement from Washington calling for accountability for his attacks on protesters last year and a stern talking-to from Macron. But today the stakes are far higher.

Facing ongoing threats to stability across the region and a showdown in Chad, a coup is likely to unleash a wave of violence in a region already beset by instability, creating even more opportunities for extremists to flourish, democracy to fail, and civilians to suffer. Instead of watching passively as either a constitutional coup or a military coup unfolds in Chad, Washington needs a more active plan of engagement that acknowledges the deep divisions in Chadian society as well as the broader risks to internal and regional stability a coup entails. Underpinning this approach must be a clear-eyed strategy that balances the tensions and tradeoffs inherent in seeking to align Washington’s genuine security interests with the demands of a population desperate to rid themselves of dynastic rule.

For nearly 30 years, Chad has presented the outside world with a mirage of stability held in check by a powerful ruling minority whose internal repression was excused because of its utility to Western security interests. Western powers allowed that mirage to persist when Idriss Déby was killed and his son assumed his place. But as Chad faulters, welcoming Déby’s consolidation of his hereditary rule with another slap on the wrist, for fear of exacerbating the country’s internal fissures, will no longer work. Instead, Washington would be better served by getting ahead of the curve and helping to foster a genuine transition in Chad under conditions it can influence before forces beyond anyone’s control impose.

In a region beset by political, security, ethnic, and even demographic threats, where coups d’état are no longer a thing of the past, continuing the charade that Chad is still a stable and reliable security partner only undermines Chadians’ hope for genuine reform and puts at risk the United States’ long-term security interests. It is time to end that charade before the dam breaks.

Cameron Hudson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2023 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

View original: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chad-sahels-last-domino-fal

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