Thursday, August 13, 2009

FULL INTERVIEW: Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir (PBS & Time 13 Aug 2009)

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir spoke with Time magazine's Sam Dealey in early August about the International Criminal Court's warrant for his arrest, the fighting in his country and relations with the United States.

This report is part of a collaboration between the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and Time magazine.

From PBS
Full Interview: Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir
Originally Aired: Thursday, August 13, 2009

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir

SAM DEALEY, Time correspondent: On the issue of Darfur, in testimony last week before the Senate, the United States special envoy Scott Gration said he no longer believed that genocide is taking place in Darfur. Do you feel vindicated?

OMAR AL-BASHIR, Sudan's president: First, we appreciate General Gration's courage. We know that these facts are rejected by influential centers of power. We stress the fact that the situation in Darfur proves that there is no genocide or ethnic cleansing. The evidence is that displaced citizens from areas where there was fighting, and it is natural that in any area where there is military combat, civilians will emigrate, these citizens emigrated to government controlled areas under the Sudanese Army, the police and local authorities. The movement of citizens toward government-controlled areas seeking security is evidence that the government could not be responsible of such acts [genocide, ethnic cleansing].

SAM DEALEY: What aspect of responsibility do you take, then, for Darfur? As we said, there have obviously been some issues as with any more, but were mistakes made?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Any government in the world, when facing an armed rebellion, has a constitutional, legal and moral obligation to resist these militants. This happens everywhere. You will find in all the world's countries that militants that take up arms against a government are classified as "terrorists." Even those who resist occupation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine are classified today as "terrorists." Except in Sudan, when some take up arms, the government is [considered] guilty! This is a clear targeting of the government.

As a government, it is our responsibility to maintain security for all citizens in Darfur. A rebellion happened there, from a small group, and any attempt to picture the militants as representatives of the people of Darfur is a big mistake. This is a minority of outlaws that initiated military operations against the government. The government did its best [in the beginning] to accommodate the situation peacefully, and did not react until the rebels rejected all attempts to reach a peaceful solution.

When the rebels attacked El Fashir, the capital and largest city in Darfur, attacked the airport, destroyed a number of airplanes and even occupied parts of the city, the government then had to fulfill its responsibility.

SAM DEALY: So there are no actions specifically though which you feel in retrospect were mistakes, or....

OMAR AL-BASHIR: In any war, mistakes happen on the ground; this is not the policy of the government. We are a government that functions according to laws. The security apparatus functions according to laws and whoever intentionally transgresses [the laws] is held accountable to law. We are the only country, in the Third World at least, that removed immunity from members of the armed forces, police and security and took them to trial. They were tried and some members of these forces were even executed, because they transgressed. Human mistakes happen .We've seen greater mistakes committed than what has happened in Darfur by ten times in Afghanistan and Iraq, but we hold accountable and put to trial persons [who break the law], as a responsible government.

SAM DEALY: "Do you still maintain that only ten thousand have died in Darfur?"

OMAR AL-BASHIR: This is what we believe the number to be according to all the events that have taken place in Darfur. There is fighting between the armed forces and the rebels, so there are [a number of deaths] among the rebels and members of the armed forces. There are also tribal conflicts, which are not connected to any ethnic group [in particular]; it is not, as portrayed, an "ethnic war."

Most of the intra-tribal fighting in fact is between tribes of Arab origins over resources, because years of drought that hit the area, made the scarcity of resources one reason for conflict, between nomads and peasants, between nomads themselves because gazing lands have become limited, because of the decline in rainfall. Conflict, therefore, between youth that heard their livestock is likely. We maintain that there is a problem in Darfur, and its main reason is environmental before anything else.

Arrest warrant
SAM DEALY: How do you perceive the ICC's arrest warrant. Is it a nuisance or something more serious?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: We are not concerned with the ICC except for one issue; the methods that the Court followed had a dangerous impact in signaling a message to the armed rebel groups that they should not reach peace with this government because its president is wanted by international justice, which will definitely lead to the government's fall, and therefore, there is no need to talk to the government which is perceived to have the international community against it. This is the most dangerous thing with this Court. The ICC is a political court and not a court of justice.

SAM DEALY: So you believe the ICC is an illegitimate organization?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: We think that the ICC is a tool to terrorize countries that the West thinks are disobedient. The African position today, by consensus, is not to cooperate with this court, and it has reached a conviction that this Court is directed against the countries of the Third World and a tool of neo-colonialism.

SAM DEALY: One of the things Mr. Ocampo alleges in his application for indictment is that there is a clear command-and-control structure within the Sudanese government. That you are not only president, but you are Field Marshal of the Armed Forces, and therefore you are directly responsible for every action down to the lowest enlisted man. At the same time, there are ceasefires that are signed, and while the rebels have certainly violated their share, so has the Sudanese government. And to what degree do you control the apparatus of the government?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: As I mentioned, there are laws that govern the armed forces. Yes I am the commander-in-chief to these forces, but there is a joint-chiefs- of-staff, there are joint-chiefs for the army, the air-force, like the organization of any armed forces. The army conducts military operations with the support of the air-force. There are joint-operations-staff, units and leaders that manage operations on the ground, in addition to field-commanders.

For example, the US air-force in Afghanistan mistakenly bombed a wedding and killed 147 civilians. But you cannot say that the US president should be tried for this because he is the commander-in-chief of US forces, not even the [American] head of chiefs-of-staffs would be put to trial. But if it was proven that the field-commander that ordered this operation made this decision without confirming whether this was a gathering of civilians or combatants, then he is the one to be held responsible, and laws are clear on this. I mentioned that the law holds accountable those who transgress the law, and we've held trials.

SAM DEALY: How many cases have been prosecuted?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: I do not recall [exactly], but I do recall that we removed immunity from a member of the [National] Security; he was put to trial in link to some events, and was found guilty and executed. There are a number of other examples that I do not recall at the moment, because they are trials carried out on the ground.

SAM DEALY: One of the effects of course of the ICC, of the arrest warrants, is that you'll be unable to travel to - say - the United Nations. How effectively can you represent the country if you'll be unable to...?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Up to now, I have not felt [any] restrictions of movement. I am not a minister of foreign affairs where I am supposed to travel frequently to other countries, conferences and meetings. A president has his deputies, assistants, and his specialized ministers, so it's not necessary for a president to travel to every country. But I have traveled all necessary travels.

SAM DEALY: What is your governing style? Is your governing to be very hands on and to micromanage, or are you one who likes to delegate more often. What is your actual governing style?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: We implemented the federal system in Sudan. And if you look at the constitution, you can see the degree of powers that were delegated to the states....You will find that most of the powers that existed in the federal government were transferred to the states....... It is not possible for a president in a country like Sudan, the size of Sudan, with the immense problems of Sudan, to administer and manage everything.

SAM DEALY: So you don't control all the power, and you don't exercise all the power?

It's very diffuse throughout the government?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Yes, its spread out and everyone hold's their responsibility. There are regulatory agencies and in each state there are parliaments. Governors are responsible to their parliaments and to the president for their performance. I don't follow the details; no one can follow the details in a country like Sudan.

U.S.-Sudan Relations
SAM DEALY: The items currently on the table with relation to the United States is moving Sudan from the United States terror list, its list of nations that sponsor terrorism; restoring diplomatic relations; and perhaps the end of sanctions. What are the responsibilities of Sudan to achieve these?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: We are convinced that all the accusations made against Sudan are baseless. American intelligence agencies, whether the CIA or FBI, confirm that Sudan does not host or support terrorism. After the events of September 11, many predicted that Sudan would be one of the U.S.'s targets. But the U.S. did not target Sudan because its own agencies confirmed that Sudan does not host or support terrorism... .

U.S. special envoys that came to us, and I recall Danforth and Zoellick. Danforth came and had an appreciated role in helping reach a peace agreement in southern Sudan. He tied the removal of Sudan [from the list of terrorism sponsoring nations] and the removal of sanctions and the blockade against Sudan, and normalizing relations [with the U.S.] to the signing of the peace agreement. He did not mention terrorism or any other activities of Sudan that were needed to remove the sanctions. He said the only thing needed was to sign a peace agreement with the SPLA.

But unfortunately, after we signed, there was no response ... e think there are pressure groups in the United States that are stronger than the government's obligations. After we signed the peace agreement in Abuja, I received a telephone call from President Bush personally, and he spoke with great admiration and appreciation to what had been achieved in Abuja, and that the United Sates was now ready to interact with all openness with Sudan. But of course, he couldn't continue along this line.

SAM DEALY: You feel that the responsibility then, that the failure to follow through on those promises was entirely due to the weakness of the United States government? Were there any actions by the Sudanese government that contributed to that as well?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Until now, no specific action has been required of us in order to have these punishments removed. We were asked to sign a peace agreement to have the punishments removed, we signed, and they have not been removed. We signed a peace agreement in Abuja, and they have not been removed.

We think that the most recent special envoy's efforts, General Gration, and the new direction the American administration is taking to change the policies of the previous administration, and not to fall in its same mistakes. We have great hope that these efforts, and with the complete cooperation between us and the American special envoy, we will normalize relations with the U.S.

South Sudan
SAM DEALY: If the South does vote to secede, what will the North's reaction be?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Giving the citizens of south Sudan the right to self determination is something that all political forces agree on, be it the government or the opposition. Because the war lasted for long periods, the first war was for seventeen years and the second time was for twenty years, we were convinced that unity cannot be imposed by force.

The continuation of war is a continuation of distrust and hatred because war is all injustices. In this situation we decided to give the South the right of self-determination and gave ourselves a period of six years with the goal of building trust between Southern citizens and Northern citizens and to cultivate a culture of peace, because most of the youth in the South today were born and raised during the war.

Our goal is to achieve development in the South that would convince Southern citizens to vote for peace. We think that six years as a transitional period is a short time to rebuild an area the size of Southern Sudan, it is not an easy task.

SAM DEALY: Part of the agreement that ended that civil war was that there will be wealth sharing. And so far some $7 billion dollars has been transferred to the South. What do they have to show for it? Where has that money gone?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: One of the trust-building elements is commitment to the peace agreement, and second, giving our brothers in South Sudan the opportunity to rule their country, because one of their complaints was that there was an attempt to impose custody or hegemony from the North.

Therefore, the agreement stated that the government of South Sudan should receive a share of oil revenue, and at their request, they would establish their own review agencies in South Sudan, and they don't want to be subjected to the review agencies of the federal government, therefore, the government of South Sudan should be asked about these funds. There is a parliament in South Sudan, and I addressed the parliament there, and I asked them, as a legislative and controlling body, to hold the Government of South Sudan accountable and inquire about these funds.

SAM DEALY: Will southern Sudan be a failed state from day one? Do they actually have the capacity or the institutions to run a country?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: Because we know that our brothers don't have the experience of governance, and to govern a place like South Sudan that is ravaged, lacking basic infrastructure and services for citizens, and as we mentioned, the youth grew up during the war and carry weapons, and an unemployed youth caring a weapon might use it to meet his needs.

There is no experience of governance ... We asked them to benefit from the government's experience to establish institutions of governance and to put laws and regulations and to make use of Southerners who were in the civil service, because you cannot govern a state without a civil service. So our brothers, because of the distrust that was created during the war, refused this offer ... We are still in contact with them to help them administer a large country like South Sudan, which is not an easy task.

Future Plans
SAM DEALY: After 20 years in power and with presidential elections coming up next year, did you ever consider not standing for the presidency again?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: The choice is that of the Sudanese people. That is a democratic choice, and we are absolutely committed to having elections next year... We are ready to accept any result, and call on anyone who wishes to observe these elections to come to Sudan and we will make it possible for them to move or be at any place they wish, and to get any information they want because these elections we insist, God willing, will be free and fair, and we will have a large number of witnesses to it ... we believe we will win these elections, but we will not decide winning the elections, but we think we will win it, and we think, that the others [political parties], are aware of our popularity and wide popular base.

SAM DEALY: When will it be enough? When do you think your task will be done, and what is that task, what legacy have you not created yet?

OMAR AL-BASHIR: A person's aspirations to see the betterment of their country has no ceiling. We thought that after signing the peace agreement and achieving peace in south Sudan, that this was an achievement one could end their political life with.

But the agreement itself made it necessary to have the president, and the chair of the SPLA, as president of the Government of South Sudan, to continue [in their positions] to supervise the implementation of the agreement.....

Political work in Sudan, as I see it, is not a comfortable task. It is tiring, exhausting, and with great responsibilities. I used to tell some presidents who's periods had ended that the best thing is to be a "former president;" someone who is respected, appreciated, and without any responsibilities.

Click on label here below to read some previous interviews.

Vit Hassan's magical guide through Sudan

Vit's magical guide through Sudan

His colleague photographer who visited Vit in Sudan David Haberlah says:
"Vit Hassan is for sure the boldest and daring photographer in Sudan. His existance as a Czech-Sudanese Christian-Muslim is theoretically impossible but he is the man to defy any constraints.

Make sure you employ him on any expedition in Africa's biggest country, but before that ask him what "the sun is shining" is standing for ;-)"
Well what's holding you, go and see Vit's work and if you think you have some cents over to support this artist, do it 'cause he deserves it!

Photographs by Vit Hassan. Source of photo montage and text: The Challenge, February 04, 2006 - VIT'S MAGICAL GUIDE THROUGH SUDAN

A massive reservoir built by locals as a WFP food-for-work project in central Sudan’s desolate North Kordofan state

For years, residents of central Sudan’s desolate North Kordofan state spent precious time and money to obtain water. No longer – thanks to a massive reservoir, built as a World Food Programme food-for-work project.

Water Arrives In Sudan’s Drought Belt

Photo: Building the haffir in Sudan's parched North Kordofan region was a community effort. (Copyright WFP/Mohamed Etigani)

This is a great, heartwarming story.

From World Food Programme
Tuesday, 12 August 2009

Rachid Jaafar

By Rachid Jaafar, Spokesperson - Sudan

Water Arrives In Sudan’s Drought Belt
EL TYINA, NORTH KORDOFAN – Water is an elusive commodity in this parched region, where local farmers and nomads often pay hard-earned cash for tins of the precious liquid to meet their daily needs.

Now the rains have arrived to El Tyina, in central Sudan’s North Kordofan region, along with a more sustainable solution – a massive haffir, the Sudanese term for a traditional, hand-dug rain catchment system, built by the local community in exchange for nearly 450 tonnes of WFP food.

“The people are very happy and the local government appreciates it very much,” said Mahendra Balhubai, WFP logistics officer in El Obeid who was involved in delivering food to the project, roughly an hour’s drive away. “And this is also a lesson learned – that it is possible to make a haffir this big.”

A community project

Completed in June and able to hold up to 25,000 cubic metres of water, the reservoir is the largest of about 150 haffirs built and rehabilitated in Sudan since 2002 under WFP’s food-for-work programme. WFP’s partner in the project, Qatar-based NGO Al Hayat International Water Organization, provided expertise and tools.

A massive reservoir built as a WFP food-for-work project in central Sudan’s desolate North K ordofan state

More than a thousand residents, including the elderly and women, toiled under a burning sun for four weeks to build the haffir in a region that is part of Sudan’s drought belt.

“There’s interest in replicating this in other parts of Sudan, and not only because of the size. It was made by the community, all the partners were involved. And it gave people food at a time when there’s a food gap,” Balhubai said, referring to the dry season when the building took place.

Living on the edge

Experts estimate the reservoir will provide enough water to meet the needs of about 1,600 families living in El Tyina and seven other nearby villages, where farmers raise sheep and goats and grow sorghum and groundnuts during the rainy season.

Before the reservoir was constructed, dry spells saw villagers travel many kilometres by foot, donkey or car in search of water. Some paid up to US$ 2 for 200 litres of water – enough for a household’s needs for just a few days and an enormous sum in this impoverished region.

Beyond water, the haffir project has brought a degree of stability to a population living on the edge.

“Many families used to migrate to Um Durman and El Obeid, but they have settled down this year,” said Amany Mohamed, Al Hayat’s coordinator in the project, naming two municipalities in central Sudan.

Now, she said, “they won’t have to migrate to the cities to find food.”
Further reading
Sudan Watch - September 12, 2006: The 21st century's most explosive commodity will be . . . WATER

Call to Lift US sanctions on Sudan (Ahmed Badawi)

Quote of the Day
"Lift US sanctions from Sudan. Sanctions have no support among the local population, Darfur included.  Abolishing unpopular and unjustified sanctions would not prevent the US airing its concerns on Sudan." - Ahmed Badawi

From Alex de Waal's blog Making Sense of Darfur:
Call to Lift US Sanctions from Sudan Deserves Praise not Derision
By Ahmed Badawi
Thursday, August 13th, 2009
The US government and the American people sincerely want to do the right thing by Sudan. Help turn it into a democratic, stable, equitable, prosperous and, preferably, united country. However, US Congressional hearings about Sudan usually follow the same, stale format: a raft of, frankly woefully under-informed, testimonies focused solely on condemning loudly the behaviour of the Sudanese government in the latest conflict of the hour in Africa’s largest country, and calling for harder ‘sticks’ (i.e. ratcheting up US sanctions) to be used to effect the ‘right’ response by Khartoum.

Certainly, a lot of the actions of the Sudanese government during much of the early phase of the Darfur conflict (and in the earlier and much longer north-south civil war) were reprehensible – as Sudan’s own official investigation into the conflict, published in 2005, readily acknowledged. Even so, US Presidential Envoy to Sudan, General J. Scott Gration, never a man to kow-tow to public opinion, has just embarked on what his predecessors knew was the correct course, but were too scared to travel on: swallow hard (very hard), face down the fierce headwinds in US government and civil society, and make an impassioned plea for Congress to remove US economic sanctions from Sudan.

General Gration must have had his full metal jacket on - and reinforced - for the testimony. He also broke the mould by calling for Sudan’s removal from the US State Department’s State Sponsor of Terrorism list, which comes with a thicket of US economic sanctions below the iceberg.

The general noted that there was “no evidence” for Sudan’s inclusion on the list, which he referred to as a “political” (rather than a national security-related) decision; the CIA – hardly an institution prone to overstatement, Senator Russ Feingold - has referred to Sudan’s strong record on counterterrorism cooperation as having “saved American lives”.
Popular in the US he certainly ain’t, but stark raving mad or naive he is definitely not: General Gration simply realises that truth is an offence, not a sin; US sanctions make steering Sudan on to the right track tougher, not easier, and have actually damaged US interests by inflicting harm on, not help to, the very Sudanese people the US seeks to support.

Put simply, US sanctions perpetuate economic under-development and poverty - the universally acknowledged crux of Sudan’s history of internal conflicts. It’s high time the American public realises likewise, and supports repealing the thicket of sanctions quickly.

Sanctions have a direct proportional relationship with the bottom of the pyramid: they hurt the poor hardest. Sudan has been no exception. Take a couple examples of the debilitating – and Medusa-like - micro impact of US sanctions, which go unmentioned in the US media focus on Sudan.

Millions of ordinary Sudanese families and individuals from the north, south, east and west cannot receive directly the lifeline (in most cases, literally) of foreign exchange remittance inflows from family members working abroad in the United States, wreaking havoc on the planning and budgets of millions of Sudanese households for basics like schooling fees and medical bills.

Presently, remittances sent from the United States can only get to ordinary Sudanese families or individuals in two expensive – and delay-ridden – ways: 1) remittances are routed to the recipient via regional money exchange bureaux; and 2) remittances are paid directly to the recipient by a local middleman, once the sender deposits the sum in the US bank account of the middleman.

Both options incur costly ‘processing fees’ and amount to an extra income tax imposed by sanctions on US remittances destined to ordinary Sudanese individuals and families, which over time can equal the cost of sending another child to school.
US sanctions also cause inordinately long delays (often as long as twenty working days) on private remittances sent from the UK and other Western countries to ordinary Sudanese, owing to the dominant role of the US in the global payment and clearance settlement system.

Small and medium size businesses in Sudan – the bedrock of the economy and incubator of job and wealth creation – also find themselves essentially locked out from accessing short-term international trade finance due to US sanctions. The global reputational impact of the sanctions means that even most non-US banks are also unwilling to extend short-term trade credits to all but a handful of Sudanese companies.

Moreover, even local firms that can access trade finance incur a ‘sanctions premium’ on loans which, in turn, feeds through to ordinary Sudanese consumers in the form of higher costs for goods and services; in other words a regressive income tax.
In the key agriculture sector, meanwhile, Sudanese subsistence farmers remain blocked from accessing the lucrative US export market and American technologies and best environmental management practices to boost crop yields; US sanctions therefore narrow the escape from poverty for nearly half of Sudan’s working population.

Health and other humanitarian items imported from the United States are currently exempted from sanctions. But even here, the lengthy, morale-sapping bureaucratic process in getting approval to import spare parts for hospital machinery, issued by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, has resulted in numerous instances of needless deaths of ordinary Sudanese men, women, and infants – as every medic in the country can testify.

The macro impact of US economic sanctions on national public finances has also hit the so-called periphery of Sudan – and especially the south – particularly hard. Sure, Khartoum now has access to some soft loans from China and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and, since 2003, sizeable oil revenue. But the reputational impact of US sanctions means that Sudanese public and private entities still generally have little access to long-term project finance lines from either non-US commercial banks or multilateral financial institutions.

Coupled with US sanctions on the financial and port systems, neither the Sudanese nor the US government are therefore currently able to lay-down quickly fresh ‘big ticket’ national infrastructural investment projects like railways, paved rural feeder roads, and river transportation, all of which would boost national statehood at this critical juncture in Sudan’s history; help ordinary Sudanese get their goods to market; and enhance labour mobility and national social cohesion. Indeed, many areas in Sudan currently function as de facto land-locked states, with all the associated challenges it entails for jump-starting economic and social development projects.

US sanctions are not just limiting the chances for economic advancement for millions of Sudanese: they jeopardize the wealth of future generations of Sudanese (and the lodestar of finance for south Sudan should it opt to secede in 2011).

Sudan’s oil sector remains denied access to the optimal enhanced oil recovery and associated water management technologies afforded by the longer experience and unrivalled R&D budgets of US oil companies, meaning that lots of Sudanese oil may be unrecoverable not so long away from now if American oil titans like Exxon don’t step in soon.

Ordinary Sudanese have also suffered severe material deprivation from the lack of equitable treatment from the IMF – a direct corollary of the US sanctions regime. Sudan’s last dime from the Fund came way back in 1985 (subsidised loans from its sister-institution, the World Bank, dried up in 1993), and the Sudanese government has paid back nearly US$1 billion to the Fund in late interest fines (not principal) over the past fifteen years; and that’s just for IMF debts incurred in the 1970s and early 1980s under the former government of the late President Nimeiri.

These repayments amount to a hefty anti-development tax on all Sudanese and, even with the effects of the ongoing global financial crisis, Sudan is still set to pay back a further US$10 million to the IMF in 2009, which could finance, for example, the building and staffing of fifteen maternity clinics in Darfur or pay school and university fees for one hundred and fifty thousand children in south Sudan; Liberia, in contrast, had paid back zilch when the Fund freed it from its debt arrears in early 2008.
Suffice to add that Sudanese will not see a whiff of the US$17 billion increase in lending to crisis-affected poor countries announced by the Fund at end-July; a double ignominy for ordinary Sudanese who have already effectively subsidised IMF crisis-related loans to their much richer counterparts in Hungary, Latvia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, and Iceland to name a few.

So, what’s in it for the President Obama administration to lift sanctions from Sudan? Big dividends.

It would give President Al-Bashir wiggle room to hasten changing Sudan to an equitable, democratic country, as specified by the landmark 2005 north-south Sudan peace agreement – the policy anchor of US government. No government can ever be expected to feel comfortable about embarking full speed towards whole scale political transformation when its back is against the wall - especially one with justifiable paranoia like Khartoum.

A conducive and fully supportive international diplomatic environment is key to allow Sudan’s political actors to both calmly search for an, as yet, elusive comprehensive peace settlement to Darfur and reach a number of critical milestones for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which are bunched and around the corner; demarcating the border between north and south Sudan, voter registration and thereafter general elections in April 2010, and the 2011 referendum for unity or independence for south Sudan and its accompanying modalities.

Removing the sanctions would help Sudan’s political institutions mature, too. The deafening criticism of Khartoum by Washington attached to US sanctions often crowds out civil society and government discourse on other important, but ‘normal’, policy issues. Agriculture reforms, for example. US private investment into south Sudan, thus far stifled by reputation risk concerns, would also surely grow strongly following the abolition of sanctions.

Predictably, General Gration’s brave call to lift US sanctions from Sudan has been met by weeping, wailing and gnashing of teeth by John Prendergast and John Norris of Enough!, Eric Reeves, Roger Winter and other leading lights in the US activist movement. They have quickly resorted to their default position: Khartoum only knows and responds to the diplomacy of the ‘stick’; and the more frequent the beatings and bigger the stick, the better, too.

The achievement of desired US policy outcomes in Sudan by using sanctions to pressure Khartoum into change is an urban myth, grounded in the legend of being the mine that bore gold: the CPA. In fact, the 1997 “Khartoum Declaration of Principles” first enshrined the concept of self determination for south Sudan by referenda. And it was negotiated and signed when Sudan was in a period of - not so – splendid isolation and malign neglect from the US and the mainstream international community.
Rather, Sudanese oil production, not US sanctions-induced pressure, was the prompter for the end of the north-south war and emergence of the CPA. Once oil production reached a critical mass in 2001, the ruling National Congress party quickly realized it could use oil revenue to build and cement patronage in the north, and the then rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) knew likewise for its position in the south. It’s no coincidence that the most contentious sticking points of the CPA still revolve around oil even today.

The central role that the US government took in the Naivasha peace process that culminated in the CPA was, instead, an unexpected boon of the post-9/11 ‘with or against us’ world tour by the administration of President George W Bush; not only did the US find that President Al-Bashir’s government was with them in the so-called war on terror, but that they were long desperate to normalize relations with the United States, and end the war and make a permanent and just peace with the SPLM.
It is, moreover, difficult to see why John Prendergast, Jerry Fowler (chief executive of the Save Darfur Coalition) and others in the US activist movement believe the ability of US government to influence the policy calculus of Khartoum would be fatally comprised without brandishing the threat of additional sanctions or other instruments of pressure on Khartoum.
Nobody, least of all General Gration, is asking to reinvent the wheel.

Washington manages to engage and influence other countries constructively that have civil conflicts that are either longer or far worse (Uganda, Colombia, Pakistan (Kashmir), DRC, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia (Ogaden) Russia (Chechnya) without being armed to the teeth with the taser of sanctions; so why not the Sudanese government? America can walk and chew gum at the same time with Sudan. And now is that time with Sudan navigating unchartered waters.

Abolishing US sanctions would not mean the US government becoming mute suddenly on Darfur, CPA implementation, human rights or other matters of concern but, instead, just airing those concerns privately to Khartoum and, concurrently, Washington altering back to its standard, more appropriate diplomatic communications modus operandi: dialogue to resolve various snafus and reach key benchmarks set by Washington, rather than just tub-thumping with one eye on making tomorrow’s American news headlines.

Siren voices of activists warning that Khartoum will not keep its side of the bargain if the US government relaxes sanctions are pure mischief making. Not all, or even most, of the delays in implementing recent Sudanese peace deals in the south, east and west can be laid at the door of Khartoum – a bird can’t fly with one wing - and re-configuring a nation-state is never swift or bump-free.

US activists are also being economical with l’actualite by pointing to the reneging on peace agreements with south Sudan by predecessors of the current Sudanese government as ‘evidence’ that Khartoum has a long history of breaking its promises.

Would it be correct not to trust the genuine commitment of the present US administration to observing the Kyoto Protocol simply because President George W Bush refused to do so? No.

Indeed, there appears to be the distinct whiff of Orientalism in the US activists’ jaundiced view of President Al-Bashir’s government record in keeping promises, depicting Khartoum as a bunch of untrustworthy, thieving and conniving Arabs. Overall, moreover, the general stance of those in the United States who support keeping (or even tightening) US economic sanctions has been hewn from a stale caricature that exists in US policy, think-tanks, academician, activist and media circles.
This caricature has stereotyped and cookie-cut the resolution of the Darfur conflict, roll out of the CPA and other topical ‘Sudan challenges’ - to the point of absurdity - as a simple struggle either between “Arabs” and “ Black Africans”; the “Centre” and the “Periphery”; Moslems verses Christians; ancient verses modern; rich and the poor; nomads verses farmers; and fundamentalists against reformists.

Sudanese are all and none of the above. That is the true essence of Sudan.

Political space would open up quickly in the US if there was comprehensive peace for Darfur – so allowing the 2.5 million displaced Darfuris to return home if they choose. But that peace will remain elusive for as long as Darfur’s fractious rebel movement (numbering 21 at the last count) fail to agree on a common agenda for peace talks with Khartoum.

Equally important, Chadian President Idris Deby must step up outreach to politically accommodate (rather than trying to military annihilate) major rebel groups in Chad and make his rule less Zaghwacentric, creating a conducive environment to end the proxy Chad-Sudan war that holds the key for the complete pacification of Darfur.

Fortunately, nonetheless, the situation in Darfur on the ground and a major snag in the implementation of the CPA have ameliorated distinctly over the last few months, giving General Gration headroom to make the call to lift US sanctions the centrepiece of his Congressional testimony. Internally displaced Darfuris are returning home in ever greater numbers. The humanitarian situation in Darfur also remains stable, with Acting USAID head, Eric Gast, noting in his testimony that the “gaps have been addressed” following Khartoum’s expulsion of 13 international aid organisations in March 2009, and adding that “new projects are already underway” in Darfur by the super-sized four replacement international aid bodies admitted by Khartoum.

In short, nobody is dying of starvation in Darfur’s tragic and undignified shelters for the displaced.

Similarly, Hartford, Connecticut, had a higher monthly violent death toll in June than conflict-related killings in Darfur (just three in that month according to data from the international peacekeeping force), while internationally-supported peace talks between the Sudanese government and the militarily strongest part of Darfur’s fractious rebel movement are due to resume later this month in Qatar with a view to reaching a cessation of hostilities and inking a framework peace agreement. The ruling of international arbitrators in late July over the oil-reach town of Abyei, claimed both by the north and south, has also passed off peacefully (so far).

Six years of relentless, high-decibel opprobrium from the US at Khartoum over the Darfur conflict is more than enough, now that the humanitarian and security environments there are relatively secure. I don’t envy his task, but General Gration is right to try to get Congress, American activist and advocacy groups to face up to these facts on the ground in Darfur and shift Washington’s focus on “recovery” which, in turn, means lifting sanctions.

Sure, Khartoum can – and must - still do more to give General Gration the maximum political space he needs in Washington to push through with advocating the lifting/relaxation of US economic sanctions. For starters, it can speed up the return of USAID-funded assets to the organisation that were confiscated from its expelled partner NGOs and generally get out of the way of the international humanitarian effort in Darfur. Khartoum must also hasten the stack of outstanding visa approvals for staff of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Yet, in any case, lifting or relaxing the sanctions should not be about punishing or rewarding the government of President Al-Bashir. Rather, as General Gration noted astutely in his testimony, it is about recognizing the severe price ordinary Sudanese and the challenge of building a modern democratic, peaceful and prosperous nation-state both keep paying for the maintenance of the sanctions.

Playing catch-up in the global race for economic development and growth to lift millions out of acute poverty, and in turn lessen the potential for future conflict in Sudan, is hard enough: more so when isolated by sanctions from a quarter of the world economy and its powerhouse of innovation, technical transfers, corporate governance and general know-how (i.e. the United States).

There is also a glaring and inherent contradiction of maintaining US sanctions on federal Sudanese authorities now that the CPA is up and running; the peace agreement calls for a much larger, if more institutionalised, Sudanese state, which is clearly incompatible with sanctions that are targeted at flattening federal finances and continue to severely impede its role as the prime lead-agency for development and welfare.

Providing huge dollops of humanitarian aid as an interim panacea for this conundrum (aid money “yes”, development funds, “no”), as the previous administration of President George W Bush did, is ultimately not in the interest of ordinary Sudanese either (nor the American tax payer). Such financial inflows into Sudan have proved easily fungible, have encouraged rentierism in housing and other non-tradable sectors (housing rents in Nyala, capital of South Darfur, currently rival those of Manhattan – as they also do in Juba, the main town in southern Sudan), and have distorted local product and labour markets for the worse.
Thank heaven for General Gration – and his supportive boss, President Obama. It had already been way past time for the US government to acknowledge the elephant in the room vis-à-vis its policy approach to Sudan over the last twenty years: ordinary Sudanese don’t crave protection from the caricature of a predatory hooligan state – most of them never come into contact with it in any shape or form – but need protection instead from crushing poverty.

Crucially, the general realises that getting long-term security and stability in Sudan requires Washington to emphasise strengthening economic (rather than political) human rights, enshrined in the UN charter, for the Sudanese population, like the right of opportunities for economic advancement, adequate provision of vital public services and the right to a dignified economic life. In other words, rights which are all incompatible with the maintenance of US sanctions.

Ordinary Sudanese are not ‘tribalists’ 24 hours a day, and need to put food on the table, send their kids to school healthy and clean, and seek better paying jobs; put simply, they have the same life aspirations of you and me. Economic growth is the most effective anti-poverty reduction and conflict-elixir weapon known to humankind – as the examples of China and India have shown. The electrifying growth of the Sudanese economy over the last five years (much clipped this year on account of relatively weak oil prices) has indeed helped hundreds of thousands of Sudanese escape from poverty; street-side tissue box sellers in El Fasher, North Darfur, make the equivalent of US$12 per day – more than most low-ranking civil servants in much of Africa.

But hundreds of thousands of Sudanese still remain trapped in extreme poverty with little immediate hope of change for the better. Exiting from their economic predicament would be speeded massively if US sanctions were rolled back – starting even with just removing some implicit sanctions by Washington both taking Sudan off the terrorism list and supporting Sudan accessing IMF/World Bank financing.

Sanctions ‘101’, US Congress: collective economic punishment is never a smart way to win the hearts and minds of people. Sudan is not apartheid South Africa; sanctions have no support amongst ordinary Sudanese – they just feel their impact. So, help change Sudan into the country its citizens want it to become, and Americans wish it could be.

Don’t shoot the messenger or his message. It might be difficult to stomach or contemplate, but General Gration is certainly brave and right: lift US sanctions from Sudan, Congress, because the innocent of Darfur, south Sudan, and indeed all ordinary Sudanese, are victims of them, too.

The author has written and advised extensively on country risk on Sudan at The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dun & Bradstreet, and Fitchratings. He is also the former Middle East and Africa spokesperson for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington D.C. He was also the speechwriter for the Government of Sudan during the north-south Sudan peace talks. Currently, Ahmed Badawi is an advisor to the Government of National Unity, Sudan, and Chief Consultant to the Global Relations Centre, based in Khartoum.
- - -

From The Guardian CIF
Lift US sanctions on Sudan
By Ahmed Badawi
Wednesday 12 August 2009. Excerpt:
"...lifting sanctions should not be about punishing or rewarding the government of President Omar al-Bashir; collective economic punishment is never a smart way to win hearts and minds. Sudan is not apartheid South Africa – sanctions have no support among the local population, Darfur included.

So, help change Sudan into the country its citizens want it to become, and Americans wish it was. Lift US sanctions from Sudan, Congress – Gration is right, the innocent of Darfur, and all other ordinary Sudanese, are victims of them, too."
Profile

Lift US sanctions on Suan

Ahmed Badawi is a British and Sudanese national, has written and advised extensively on country risk on Sudan at The Economist Intelligence Unit, Dun & Bradstreet; and Fitchratings. He is also the former Middle East and Africa spokesperson for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington D.C. Currently, Ahmed Badawi is an advisor to the Government of National Unity, Sudan, and Chief Consultant to the Global Relations Centre, based in Khartoum.

ahmed.badawimalik@gmail.com

Further reading
Click on label here below to see related reports including Sudan Watch, August 11, 2009 - High Time to Lift Sanctions by Ibrahim Adam.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Sudan quashes killers' death sentences

Article from: Agence France-Presse
Sudan quashes killers' death sentences
From correspondents in Khartoum
August 13, 2009 via Herald Sun, Australia
A SUDANESE appeal court has overnight quashed death sentences handed down last year against four men convicted of the murders of an official of the US Agency for International Development and his driver.

The court heard that the family of John Granville had asked for the four to be jailed for life rather than executed, and that, after initially calling for the death penalty, the family of driver Abdel Rahman Abbas had also changed their minds.

The pair were killed on New Year's Day 2008 and four young Islamists were convicted of the murders.

The court of first instance will now have to reconsider its judgement. Sudanese law does not prevent it from imposing new death sentences despite the appeal court decision.

CECAFA Under-17 Championship (Hassan el Bashir Cup) kicks off in Khartoum, Sudan 19th August, 2009

Logo for 2009 CECAFA U-17 Championship

The second edition of the CECAFA U-17 Tournament, all games were originally to be played in Nairobi, Kenya but have since been moved to Sudan due to financial reasons. The Sudanese FA and El Merreikh Investment Group have agreed to sponsor the tournament.

The cup is also referred to as the Bashir Cup and the Hassan el Bashir Cup by East African media due to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's involvement.

Source: Wikipedia

News just in from Sudan Radio Service, Wednesday 12 August 2009:
Cecafa Under-17 Fixtures Announced
(Juba, Southern Sudan) – Fixtures for the Cecafa under-17 tournament that will kick off in Khartoum on 19 August have been announced.

There are twelve teams participating in this year's tournament.

Speaking to Sudan Radio Service from Juba, the Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Gabriel Changson Chang, said south Sudan is ready to host the tournaments.

[Changson Chang]: “The under-17 CECAFA championship is taking place in Sudan this year between 19th and 30th of this month and there will be three countries or teams and the three groups are divided into three areas. Group One will play in Juba. I think from the 19th for about nine days and then second group will be in Medani and the third group in Khartoum. The final will be played in Khartoum. Before we took the decision for Juba to host that group, the secretary of Cecafa paid a visit to Juba to check our stadium and pitches which he confirmed are suitable for the event. We have also opened four playgrounds for practices and then the main games will be played in the stadiums.”

Sudan is in group A and their first match will be on the 20th against Tanzania in Khartoum, and the second match against Somalia on the 22nd of this month.
Click on label CECAFA U-17 tournament in footnote below for news, fixtures and updates on footballing in Sudan.

Uganda/Sudan: Hippos to Be Based in Juba

AllAfrica.com - Andrew Jackson - ‎Aug 7, 2009‎
Kampala — Uganda's U-17 team, Hippos will be based in Juba, Sudan during the forthcoming Cecafa under -17 Challenge Cup (Hassan el Bashir Cup) that starts ...

Rwanda/Egypt: National Team Starts With Egypt in Cecafa U-17 Cup

AllAfrica.com - Ostine Arinaitwe - ‎8 hours ago‎
Kigali — The national Under-17 team will start their Cecafa Junior Challenge Cup campaign with a tricky test against Egypt. Rwanda is pooled in Group C ...

Kenyan teenagers pooled with Nigeria and Egypt for Cecafa

Daily Nation - Salva Kiir - ‎Aug 6, 2009‎
Both soccer powerhouses will be among the 12 teams that will take part in the two-week long championshipthat kicks off on August 19. ...

Hippos kick off with Kenya; Sekajugo on FIFA medical team

New Vision - Reuben Olita - ‎20 hours ago‎
uganda's Hippos will face Kenya in the first match of the CECAFA Under-17 soccer championships that kicks off in Juba, ...

Rwanda U-17 fine tune for Cecafa tourney

ThisDay - ‎Jul 29, 2009‎
RWANDA Under-17 national team head coach Michael Weiss is optimistic his youthful side can stage a strong challenge at next month's Cecafa Youth ...

Rwanda/Egypt: Junior Wasps Draw Egypt, Join Camp

AllAfrica.com - Bonnie Mugabe - ‎Aug 7, 2009‎
... Under-17 national team joined camp yesterday at Ferwafa headquarters to start final preparations for this month's Cecafa Youth Championship in Khartoum, ...

Twiga Stars need trials

ThisDay - Jimmy Tara - ‎Jul 27, 2009‎
... Rwanda next month, while Serengeti Boys have already started residential training for the Cecafa Youth Challenge Cup kicking off in Sudan on August 19.

Friday's all-important CAF Champions League clash against Sudan's Al Hilal

Update:  Click on label 'CAF Champions League' (in footnote here below) for latest news and results.

CAF Champions League

Photo: The coveted Champions League trophy (Source: football365.co.za)

Nigerian Premier League club Kano Pillars have revealed that they will play their upcoming CAF Champions League matches at night to accommodate Ramadan. Slovenian coach Ivo Sajh is confident his injured skipper Bala Mohammed will be ready for Friday's all-important CAF Champions League clash against Sudan's Al Hilal.

The Sudanese champions El Merreikh are bullish of their chances against their Zambian counterparts in this weekend's CAF Champions League clash.

El-Merrikh F.C, Sudan

Photo: El Merreikh F.C., Sudan (Source: Goal.com)

Ramadan runs from August 21 until September 21 and during that time both Zesco United and Al Hilal travel to Kano for Champions League fixtures.

See further details in latest news reports listed here below.

Nigerian fan

Photo:  Nigerian fan (Source: Goal.com)

Kano Pillars Sweat On Fitness Of Skipper Bala Mohammed

Goal.com - ‎57 minutes ago‎
Slovenian coach Ivo Sajh is confident his injured skipper will be ready for Friday's all-important CAF Champions League clash against Sudan's Al Hilal. ...

El Merreikh Confident Of Victory Versus Zambia's Zesco United

Goal.com - ‎1 hour ago‎
The Sudanese champions are bullish of their chances against their Zambian counterparts in this weekend's CAF Champions League clash. ...

CAF Champions League: Kano Pillars To Play Home Games At Night ...

Goal.com - ‎22 hours ago‎
The Nigerian club have a plan for their two home games in the CAF Champions League group stage, which will fall during the Muslim Ramadan fasting period. ...

CAF Champions League: Confident Kano Pillars Arrive In Sudan

Goal.com - ‎Aug 11, 2009‎
Nigeria's flag bearers fly into Khartoum ahead of the Champions League tie against closest rivals Al Hilal... A 35-man delegation of Nigeria's Kano Pillars ...

Night games on cards for Kano

Football365.co.za - ‎2 hours ago‎
Nigerian Premier League club Kano Pillars have revealed that they will play their upcoming CAF Champions League matches at night in order to accommodate ...

Zesco United Dealt Striking Blow

Lusaka Times - ‎19 hours ago‎
Zesco United have been dealt a big blow with the news that they will be without a key player for their Caf African Champions League Group A game against El ...

Kano Pillars cautions Zesco over El Merreikh match

postzambia.com - ‎Aug 10, 2009‎
NIGERIAN side Kano Pillars of Nigeria has cautioned Zesco United to be for Saturday's Africa Champions League Group A clash Sudanese side El Merreikh. ...

Pillars' Chigozie suspended for Al Hilal Champions League clash

Triumph - ‎Aug 10, 2009‎
Nigeria's Kano Pillars will be without their libero, Maurice Chigozie, for their all-important CAF Champions League Group A clash against Al Hilal of Sudan ...

Security situation in Darfur - Aug 12, 2009

During the past 24 hours, the security situation in Darfur has been reported to be relatively calm.

UNAMID peacekeepers in West Darfur have been conducting farming patrols in a number of villages, including the village of Mabruka about 12 kilometres from El Geneina town, Albanjadid village and Mukjar as part of confidence building and to assist the local community during the rainy season.

While on patrol, the team interacted with the Government of Sudan police and the local community who confirmed that the security situation was calm in the areas.

UNAMID military and police continue to conduct patrols in and around the villages and IDP camps.

Advance party of Tanzanian battalion arrive to boost UNAMID deployment

The African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) today received a boost in its deployment with the arrival of 200 personnel advance party of the first Tanzanian Battalion in Darfur. The primary responsibilities of the Tanzanian advance party will be to prepare the camp site for the arrival of the main battalion and to support the distribution of its contingent owned equipment (COE).

The main body of the Tanzanian Battalion is expected to arrive in the Mission by mid September. They will be deployed in Khor Abeche and Muhajeria in South Darfur.

Currently Tanzania contributes 13 Military observers, 14 staff officers, and 3 liaison officers to the Mission. Tanzania also contributes 29 police advisers. With the new arrival, the total number of military forces deployed in the Mission is 14,182, representing over 70% of its authorized strength.

UNAMID is mandated to assist the parties to the conflict in Darfur in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and any subsequent agreement. It will do so through contributing to the protection of civilians and the creation of security conditions that would allow unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as the voluntary return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to their homes, thus paving the way for the reconciliation and confidence building necessary for durable peace, security and stability in Darfur.

UNAMID Force Commander visits South Darfur

UNAMID Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai today visited the South Darfur capital of Nyala, upon arrival, the Force Commander met with UNAMID officials who briefed him on the Mission’s operational activities including challenges and achievements made. During the visit, General Martin Luther Agwai inaugurated the Pakistani Level III hospital and also attended the medal parade organized in honor of the Bangladeshi multi-role logistics company.

Source: United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)
EL FASHER (DARFUR), Sudan, August 12, 2009/(APO) - UNAMID Daily Media Brief/2009-08-12

Telecoms: 11.745mn mobile phone subscribers in Sudan at end of 2008

New report provides detailed analysis of the Telecommunications market.

From Press Office August 12, 2009
By Companiesandmarkets.com and OfficialWire
LONDON, ENGLAND
Sudan Telecommunications Report Q3 2009 (Business Monitor International)
Sudan Telecommunications: there were 11.745mn mobile subscribers in Sudan at the end of 2008 
Market: Telecommunications
Published Date: 15/06/2009
Report Title: Sudan Telecommunications Report Q3 2009
Table of Contents: View Table of Contents
Report Type: Market Report
Country: Sudan
Number of Pages: 49

By the end of 2008, there were 11.745mn mobile subscribers in Sudan at the end of 2008, giving a penetration rate of just over 30%. It is a country with exceptionally good growth potential, although new growth is inevitably going to put pressure on ARPUs. This is often the case as further expansion in the subscriber base means growing further into the bottom end of the market, capturing ever lower spending customers.

Sudan’s mobile operators are, however, whole heartedly pursuing this further growth, and with investments in expanding networks, a wave of expansion is taking place into rural regions, and the previously underserved, now semi-autonomous South. As well as being expanded into by Zain and more recently MTN, since January 2009, South Sudan has its own dedicated mobile operator. No results are yet available from Vivacell, but it is hoped to include them in our next update.

Q308 had seen a worrying slowdown in mobile growth in Sudan, but Q408 results have shown a fairly dramatic reversal of this trend, and we anticipate that 2009 will have an even higher growth rate than 2008.

Value-added services are not very well developed in Sudan. There is some 3G available, though the quality of service is apparently very limited, and in some cases restricted only to the postpaid subscriber base, which is minimal. MTN has hinted at some more investment in its 3G facilities in its end of year 2008 statement, but details are not available. There is some good potential for the operators to develop VAS, concentrating on the more developed areas and around Khartoum and elsewhere. This could help to counterbalance the move towards the lower end of the market in the growing subscriber base.

Fixed-line services remain something of a mystery, since there is no reliable information from either the operators or the regulator. Suffice to say that fixed-line services, even fixed wireless, are not very widespread. Internet service is even less common; broadband in particular had only an estimated 65,000 subscribers at the end of 2008. However, the country does claim 4mn internet users, so it would appear that the vast majority of people are making use of public facilities. This bodes well for future demand for internet services, but we do not expect broadband to become a widespread service for some years to come, with the cost remaining prohibitively high for most people.

Sudan Telecommunications Report Q3 2009: http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/r.ashx?id=D5O7X8KS185740

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