Sudan: Open Briefing at UN Security Council - The UK is penholder on Sudan and Council president for Feb

"In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations. ...

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft." Read more.

From What's In Blue 
Posted Wednesday 18 February 2026 - full copy:

Sudan: Briefing

Tomorrow morning (19 February), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Sudan. The UK, the penholder on Sudan and Council president for February, has elevated the meeting to ministerial level, with its Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, Yvette Cooper, expected to chair. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo and Director of the Crisis Response Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Edem Wosornu are expected to brief. The Council will also hear from a civil society representative, who will address the situation of women in the context of the conflict in Sudan, including the high incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Sudan as well as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

DiCarlo is expected to provide an overview of the security situation as the conflict approaches its third anniversary in April, amid a dangerous phase marked by intensified hostilities with increasing use of sophisticated weaponry and shifting front lines across multiple regions. The fighting has further fragmented the country and weakened governance structures, exacerbating civilian suffering, mass displacement, and acute food insecurity. The conflict increasingly resembles a war of attrition, with external actors reportedly providing support to the parties and arms continuing to flow from multiple sources, resulting in regional spillover and proxy dynamics. In this regard, reports of cross-border alliances and support networks, including the provision of sanctuary to fighters and the use of neighbouring states as transit routes for weapons and supplies have raised alarm about the risk of further regional destabilisation. Tomorrow, the briefers and several Council members are expected to voice concerns about the trajectory of these perilous trends. (For background and more information, see the brief on Sudan in our February 2026 Monthly Forecast.)

At tomorrow’s meeting, the briefers and Council members are likely to condemn the ongoing violence and reiterate calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Since the conflict erupted in April 2023, reports from the UN and other entities have documented grave violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) by parties to the conflict. In this context, several Council members are expected to urge compliance with IHL and IHRL obligations, while highlighting broader protection concerns, including widespread CRSV. They may also underscore the need to ensure accountability for such violations. (For more information, see our 8 February What’s in Blue story.)

On 13 February, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) offensive in late October 2025 that resulted in the seizure of El Fasher, the capital of the North Darfur state. According to the report, the documented patterns indicate that the RSF and allied Arab militias conducted a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population in the city. OHCHR monitoring suggested that the RSF and allied militias committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, launching indiscriminate attacks, and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2025, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) requested the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (FFM) to conduct an urgent inquiry into alleged violations of international law committed in and around El Fasher following the seizure of the city by the RSF. The findings of the inquiry are expected to be released tomorrow.

Regional and international diplomatic efforts on both the humanitarian and political fronts have continued; however, a significant breakthrough remains elusive. Tomorrow, several Council members are expected to voice support for mediation efforts, with some emphasising the importance of complementarity and coordination among such initiatives.

UN mediation efforts have been led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra, who had regularly briefed Council members during closed consultations on Sudan. Media reports suggest that Lamamra will finish his role by the end of the month. He had been scheduled to brief during consultations following tomorrow’s briefing, but it appears that the consultations are not expected to take place and that Lamamra is not slated to brief.

During a donor conference held on 3 February in Washington DC, US Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos reportedly announced that a document outlining a peace plan had been agreed among the Quad members—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US—aimed at securing a humanitarian truce and opening safe corridors for relief efforts. In a 14 February interview with Foreign Policy, Boulos said that, alongside the Quad, the US has been engaging with several regional countries on the initiative. He added that the US intends to bring the plan to the Security Council with the aim of adopting a resolution.

On 12 February, the Quintet group—comprised of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN—released a joint statement which called for the immediate halting of any further military escalation and urged all concerned sides to support efforts towards a humanitarian truce and the delivery of life-saving assistance.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister, Kamil El-Tayeb Idris, has continued to seek support for his proposal to end the conflict (which he presented during the Council’s 22 December 2025 briefing on Sudan), including during recent visits to Switzerland and Germany. The plan calls for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the RSF from areas under its control. Sudan has also continued efforts to secure readmission to the AU following its suspension after the October 2021 military takeover. In a communiqué adopted following a 12 February AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) ministerial meeting on Sudan, the AUPSC welcomed Sudan’s 22 December 2025 proposal as well as efforts led by the Quintet.

At the same time, the US and European Council members have supported the use of targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for insecurity and violence in Sudan. Yesterday (17 February), the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) proposed the designation of four RSF commanders under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. Since the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee has not yet been appointed as Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the UK circulated the proposal under a no-objection procedure until 24 February. (There is an understanding that respective presidents of the Council will handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs until the chairs have been appointed.) At tomorrow’s meeting, some members may highlight this measure and underline the need to consider expanding the geographic scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur, considering the evolving conflict dynamics across other regions of the country. Several Council members—including the African members, China, and Russia—have opposed this proposal, which some other members have raised in the context of discussions on the renewal of the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, most recently in September 2025.

Tomorrow, Wosornu is likely to provide an overview of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sudan, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. She may emphasise the disproportionate impact of the conflict on women and girls, drawing attention to reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and CRSV.

She may describe how intensifying hostilities are exacerbating risks to civilians, fuelling displacement and humanitarian needs, and shrinking humanitarian space while making operations increasingly dangerous for aid workers. The conflict has been marked by frequent attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, as well as humanitarian assets, personnel, and convoys. Recent OCHA press releases have highlighted a sharp increase in deadly drone strikes across the Kordofan region, resulting in civilian casualties and further deepening the humanitarian crisis. In this context, Wosornu and several Council members are likely to stress the urgent imperative of protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure and condemn their deliberate targeting.

Wosornu is also expected to reiterate calls for full, rapid, and sustained humanitarian access through all modalities and underscore the need for increased and flexible funding to sustain life-saving operations amid rising needs. She may also highlight ongoing efforts by OCHA and its partners to deliver assistance despite acute operational challenges. In a press release issued earlier today, OCHA reported that a UN convoy carrying life-saving supplies for more than 130,000 people has reached the cities of Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan state. The convoy was led by the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), marking the first delivery to the two cities in over three months. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has previously indicated likely famine conditions in both locations.

Council members are currently negotiating a draft press statement on Sudan, circulated by the UK on 12 February, which apparently addresses, among other things, the escalation of violence, worsening humanitarian conditions, and the need for civilian protection. Following a round of comments, the UK circulated a revised version of the draft and placed it under silence procedure until yesterday. However, the A3 members (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Somalia), China, and Russia broke silence, after which an expert-level meeting was organised earlier today to deliberate the matter. At the time of writing, the penholder had not yet circulated a second revised draft.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/02/sudan-briefing-7.php

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Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution to Protect Civilians. VIDEO: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

TODAY (18 November), the UN Security Council is "expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government." Read more.

From Security Council Report 

What's In Blue 

Dated Sunday 17 Nov 2024 - full copy:

Sudan: Vote on a Draft Resolution

Tomorrow morning (18 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution aimed at advancing measures to protect civilians in Sudan. It demands that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) honour and fully implement their commitments in the “Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan”, which was signed by both sides in Jeddah on 11 May 2023. The draft text was co-authored by the UK (the penholder on the Sudan file) and Sierra Leone.

(For background and more information on the situation in Sudan, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast and 27 October and 11 November What’s in Blue stories.)

It appears that the negotiations were contentious, but the co-penholders were keen to finalise deliberations on the text expeditiously, given the pressing situation on the ground. The UK apparently invited the “A3 plus” members (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) to be co-authors on the draft resolution. However, the “A3 plus” members were unable to reach a unified position on taking this on as a group. 

This led to only Sierra Leone choosing to co-pen the resolution. After preliminary discussions with the Council’s permanent members, the co-penholders circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 8 November. Following an expert-level discussion (which was held at Russia’s request), three revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder placed a fourth revised draft in blue without a further silence procedure on 15 November, to be voted on tomorrow morning.

The draft resolution in blue condemns the continued assault by the RSF, a paramilitary group, in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, and demands that the RSF immediately halt all its attacks against civilians in Darfur, Al Jazirah, and Sennar states and elsewhere in Sudan. It also calls on the parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue in good faith to agree to steps to de-escalate the conflict with the aim of urgently agreeing to a national ceasefire.

During the negotiations, Russia suggested strengthening the language by highlighting specific actions by the RSF, such as bombings and shelling, and wanted to broaden the scope of the term “attacks” from targeting civilians to encompassing “any hostile actions”. Russia’s suggestions were not incorporated, but the co-penholders sought to address this issue by adding the term “all” when referring to the RSF’s attacks against civilians in the draft resolution in blue. It seems that France suggested that the resolution should call on both parties to the conflict to halt their offensives and asked to include Khartoum in the listed regions where attacks are occurring. It also argued that calling on both sides to agree to a ceasefire would be inconsistent with singling out one party to halt hostilities. This suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, however.

Several delegations, including Switzerland and the US, also emphasised the importance of addressing both parties in the context of protecting civilians and upholding commitments in line with international humanitarian law (IHL). It seems that some members—including Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Switzerland—supported language specifying IHL violations and other atrocities as one of the listing criteria under the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. However, given strong objections from some members, such as Russia, this language was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.

Some Council members, including Russia, have argued that the Sudanese government remains responsible for protecting civilians and that the Council should not impede its ability to do so. In line with this position, during the negotiations Russia contended that any possible steps on the ground, including humanitarian assistance and measures to advance the protection of civilians, must be preliminarily discussed and agreed upon with the Sudanese government.

It seems that one of the difficult aspects of the negotiations related to language that the co-penholders had proposed pertaining to the monitoring and verification of a potential ceasefire agreement between the warring parties. The initial draft text encouraged the Secretary-General to step up planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification, and to utilise a range of regional mechanisms, including stabilisation and peacebuilding. The text also encouraged the Secretary-General to engage on this issue with international stakeholders, especially the African Union (AU). This language apparently went through some revision, including amending it to encourage cooperation with the AU on “regional mechanisms to help sustain peace, including delivery of stabilization and peacebuilding”.

While several Council members supported this proposal, underlining the imperative of preparing for the eventuality of a ceasefire agreement, others—including Algeria, China, and Russia—expressed reservations. China and Russia suggested deleting this language, apparently arguing that it is premature to discuss monitoring and verification mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement, as this could undermine the Council’s authority and credibility. These members were also apparently concerned that this language might pave the way for the deployment of forces on the ground. During the comments period, at least one Council member apparently suggested including the term “peacekeeping” in the range of mechanisms; this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft text, however.

As a compromise, it appears that Algeria and China suggested deleting the language on regional mechanisms. China also highlighted the need to obtain the consent of the parties concerned before the UN or other partners take action. To address these issues, the co-penholders amended the text, deleting the reference to regional mechanisms, while retaining the language encouraging the Secretary-General to step up planning for support to sustain any ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification and to engage with the AU. Language was also added to the draft text in blue requesting the Secretary-General to engage with the parties to the conflict in this regard.

It appears that members also diverged on whether to include language from the Secretary-General’s 21 October report, which presented recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June. The report acknowledged that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians” in Sudan. Some members—including Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia—apparently advocated for including this language verbatim in the preambular paragraphs. Other members—including the US—rejected this proposal. The US apparently argued that the text should send a strong message to the parties about fulfilling their commitments, rather than reflecting on the conditions for a force, particularly when the resolution does not address the deployment of such a force. The draft resolution in blue incorporates compromise language in the preambular paragraphs, taking note of the conclusions contained in the Secretary-General’s report and his assessment of the conditions on the ground.

A recurring topic of discussion in Sudan-related resolutions has been the terminology used to refer to the central authorities. Some members, such as France and the ROK, supported the term “Sudanese authorities”, whereas others, including China and Russia, preferred using the term “government” or “Sudanese Transitional Sovereign Council (STC)”. (The STC was established in 2019 as the governing body following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir. The body is headed by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.)

In the draft resolution in blue, the co-penholders removed the term “authorities” and retained references to the STC. At the same time, the draft resolution in blue also contains several references to “parties to the conflict”, in the context of humanitarian assistance, cessation of hostilities, adherence to IHL, avoiding attacks on civilian objects, and preventing incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. (For background on Council dynamics on the matter, see the brief on Sudan in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast.)

The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General, following consultations with the STC and other parties to the conflict, as well as the AU, to develop a proposal for a compliance mechanism to facilitate implementation of the Jeddah Declaration commitments. It calls on the parties to the conflict to engage fully in this effort.

Council members also had diverging views about proposed reporting requirements. The initial draft text suggested two reporting provisions: the first requested an update from the Secretary-General within 60 days of adoption of the draft resolution, and the second requested him to provide a written report ahead of the regular 120-day briefing on Sudan, outlining practical options to support mediation efforts, including on the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration and the compliance mechanism referred to in the draft resolution.

While several members apparently supported the reporting requirements, Algeria, China, and Russia opposed them. These members apparently advocated for incorporating additional elements of reporting within the regular 120-day briefing on the situation in Sudan, foregoing the 60-day update and thereby avoiding multiplication of reporting requirements. China also apparently argued that requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a compliance mechanism and submit a report assessing its effectiveness simultaneously is untenable, as potential disagreements on the details of that proposal by concerned parties could undermine or delay the report.

In an apparent compromise, the draft resolution in blue omits the proposed 60-day reporting requirement but requests the Secretary-General to provide a written “update”, instead of a “report”, ahead of the next 120-day Sudan briefing, prescribing practical steps to support mediation efforts, including local-level cessation of hostilities and de-escalation measures, implementation of the Jeddah Declaration, and the development of the compliance mechanism.

Another topic of discussion related to language addressing accountability for violations and abuses of human rights law and IHL violations. Several Council members—including France, Malta, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US—supported broader accountability measures that extend beyond domestic mechanisms. Russia, however, preferred language focusing on domestic measures by the STC. Switzerland apparently proposed language referencing cooperation with regional and international courts and tribunals in accordance with respective obligations, while recalling resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC); however, this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft resolution in blue. The draft resolution in blue urges concrete steps to ensure perpetrators are held accountable, including through adequate, transparent, independent, and credible accountability mechanisms, “including” domestic mechanisms.

View original: 

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/11/103323.php

Video of full meeting:

Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 9786th meeting

Result of voting: 14 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 0 abstentions

See live broadcast courtesy of UN Media 18 Nov 2024 2:30PM GMT UK

http://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ujdmywhg

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