Chadian born camel trader Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa "Hemedti" now controls half of Sudan

"SUDANESE speculate that Hemedti sees himself either as president of a breakaway state, or still harbours ambitions to rule all of Sudan.

It's also possible that he sees a future as an all-powerful political puppet master, head of a conglomerate that controls businesses, a mercenary army and a political party. By these means, even if he isn't acceptable as Sudan's public face, he can still pull the strings.

And as Hemedti's troops massacre civilians in el-Fasher, he is confident that he enjoys impunity in a world that does not care much." Read full report.

From BBC News

By Alex de Waal
Africa analyst
Published Tuesday 4 November 2025, 00:42 GMT - full copy:

He made his money selling camels and gold. Now this warlord controls half of Sudan

Image source, ANADOLU VIA GETTY IMAGES

Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti", has emerged as a dominant figure on Sudan's political stage, with his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now controlling half of the country.

The RSF scored a notable victory recently when it overran the city of el-Fasher, the last garrison held by the Sudanese army and its local allies in the western region of Darfur.

El-Fasher residents are suffering from famine following the RSF's 18-month siege of the city, a UN-accredited group of food security experts confirmed on Monday.

Feared and loathed by his adversaries, Hemedti is admired by his followers for his tenacity, ruthlessness, and his promise to tear down a discredited state.

Hemedti has humble origins. His family is from the Mahariya section of the camel-herding, Arabic-speaking Rizeigat community that spans Chad and Darfur.

He was born in 1974 or 1975 - like many from a rural background, his date and place of birth were not registered.

Led by his uncle Juma Dagolo, his clan moved into Darfur in the 1970s and 80s, fleeing war and seeking greener pastures and were allowed to settle.

After dropping out of school in his early teens, Hemedti earned money trading camels across the desert to Libya and Egypt.

At the time, Darfur was Sudan's wild west - poor, lawless and neglected by the government of then-President Omar al-Bashir.

Arab militiamen known as the Janjaweed - including a force commanded by Juma Dagolo - were attacking the villages of the indigenous Fur ethnic group.

This cycle of violence led to a full-scale rebellion in 2003, in which Fur fighters were joined by Masalit, Zaghawa and other groups, saying they had been ignored by the country's Arab elite.

In response, Bashir massively expanded the Janjaweed to spearhead his counter-insurgency efforts. They quickly won notoriety for burning, looting, raping and killing.

Image source, GETTY IMAGES. Image caption: 

The atrocities of the Janjaweed militia caused international outrage

Hemedti's unit was among them, with a report by African Union peacekeepers saying it attacked and destroyed the village of Adwa in November 2004, killing 126 people, including 36 children.

A US investigation determined that the Janjaweed were responsible for genocide.

The Darfur conflict was referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which brought charges against four men, including Bashir, who has denied carrying out genocide.

Hemedti was one of the many Janjaweed commanders deemed too junior to be in the prosecutor's sights at that time.

Just one, the Janjaweed "colonel of colonels", Ali Abdel Rahman Kushayb, was brought to court.

Last month he was found guilty on 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity and he will be sentenced on 19 November.

In the years following the height of the violence in 2004, Hemedti played his cards skilfully, rising to become head of a powerful paramilitary force, a corporate empire, and a political machine.

It is a story of opportunism and entrepreneurship. He briefly mutinied, demanding back-pay for his soldiers, promotions and a political position for his brother. Bashir gave him most of what he wanted and Hemedti rejoined the fold.

Later, when other Janjaweed units mutinied, Hemedti led the government forces that defeated them, in the process taking control of Darfur's biggest artisanal gold mine at a place called Jebel Amir.

Rapidly, Hemedti's family company Al-Gunaid became Sudan's largest gold exporter.

In 2013, Hemedti asked - and got - formal status as head of a new paramilitary group, the RSF, reporting directly to Bashir.

The Janjaweed were folded into the RSF, getting new uniforms, vehicles and weapons - and also officers from the regular army who were brought in to help with the upgrade.

Image source, AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES. Image caption:

The RSF was an ally of the army, before they fell out

The RSF scored an important victory against the Darfur rebels, did less well in fighting an insurgency in the Nuba Mountains adjacent to South Sudan, and took a subcontract to police the border with Libya.

Ostensibly curbing illicit migration from Africa over the desert to the Mediterranean, Hemedti's commanders also excelled in extortion and, reportedly, people-trafficking.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) called on the Sudanese army to send troops to fight against the Houthis in Yemen.

The contingent was commanded by a general who had fought in Darfur, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, now the head of the army at war with the RSF.

Hemedti saw a chance and negotiated a separate, private deal with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to provide RSF mercenaries.

The Abu Dhabi connection proved most consequential. It was the beginning of a close relationship with the Emirati president, Mohamed bin Zayed

Young Sudanese men - and increasingly from neighbouring countries too - trekked to the RSF recruiting centres for cash payments of up to $6,000 (£4,500) on signing up.

Hemedti struck a partnership with Russia's Wagner Group, receiving training in return for commercial dealings, including in gold.

He visited Moscow to formalise the deal, and was there on the day that Russia invaded Ukraine. After the war in Sudan broke out, he denied the RSF was getting help from Wagner.

Although the RSF's main combat units were increasingly professionalised, it also encompassed a coalition of irregular old-style ethnic militia.

As the regime faced mounting popular protests, Bashir ordered Hemedti's units to the capital, Khartoum.

Punning on his name, the president dubbed him himayti, "my protector", seeing the RSF as a counterweight to potential coup makers in the regular army and national security.

It was a miscalculation. In April 2019, a vibrant camp of civic protesters surrounded the military headquarters demanding democracy.

Bashir ordered the army to open fire on them. The top generals - Hemedti among them - met and decided to depose Bashir instead. The democracy movement celebrated.

Image source, AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES. Image caption: The RSF leader turned on then-President Omar al-Bashir, helping to depose him

For a time, Hemedti was lionised as the fresh face of Sudan's future. Youthful, personable, actively meeting diverse social groups, and positioning himself as the challenger to the country's historic establishment, he tried to change his political colours. That lasted just a few weeks.

As he and the joint head of the ruling military council, Burhan, stalled on handing power to civilians, the protesters stepped up their rallies, and Hemedti unleashed the RSF, which killed hundreds of people, raped women, and threw men into the River Nile with bricks tied to their ankles, according to a report by campaign group Human Rights Watch (HRW), external.

Hemedti has denied the RSF committed atrocities.

Pressed by the quartet of countries formed to promote peace and democracy in Sudan - the US, UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE - the generals and the civilians agreed to a compromise drafted by African mediators.

For two years, there was an unstable coexistence of a military-dominated sovereign council and a civilian cabinet.

As a cabinet-appointed committee investigating the companies owned by the army, security and RSF closed in on its final report - which was set to expose how Hemedti was fast expanding his corporate empire - Burhan and Hemedti dismissed the civilians and took power.

But the coup-masters fell out. Burhan demanded that the RSF come under army command.

Hemedti resisted. Days before a deadline in April 2023 to resolve this issue, RSF units moved to surround the army headquarters and seize key bases and the national palace in Khartoum.

The putsch failed. Instead, Khartoum became a war zone as the rival forces fought street by street.

Violence exploded in Darfur, with RSF units mounting a vicious campaign against the Masalit people.

The UN estimates as many as 15,000 civilians died, and the US described it as genocide. The RSF denied the allegation.

RSF commanders circulated videos of their fighters torturing and killing, advertising the atrocities and their sense of impunity.

The RSF and its allied militia rampaged across Sudan, pillaging cities, markets, universities, and hospitals.

An avalanche of looted goods are for sale in what are popularly known as "Dagolo markets" reaching beyond Sudan into Chad and other neighbouring countries. The RSF has denied its fighters are involved in looting.

Trapped in the national palace under attack from artillery and airstrikes, Hemedti was badly injured in the early weeks of the conflict and disappeared from public view.

When he reappeared months later he showed no remorse for atrocities and was no less determined to win the war on the battlefield.

Image source, REUTERS. Image caption: 

The war in Sudan has forced millions of people to flee their homes

The RSF has acquired modern weapons including sophisticated drones, that it has used to strike Burhan's de facto capital, Port Sudan, and which played a crucial role in the assault on el-Fasher.

Investigative reporting by, among others, the New York Times, has documented that these are transported through an airstrip and supply base built by the UAE just inside Chad. The UAE denies that it is arming the RSF.

With this weaponry, the RSF is locked in a strategic stalemate with its former partner, the Sudanese army.

Hemedti is trying to build a political coalition, including some civilian groups and armed movements, most notably his former adversaries in the Nuba Mountains.

He has formed a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity", taking the chairmanship for himself.

With the capture of el-Fasher, the RSF now controls almost all the inhabited territory west of the Nile.

Following escalating reports of mass killings and widespread condemnation, Hemedti declared an investigation into what he called violations committed by his soldiers during the taking of the city.

Sudanese speculate that Hemedti sees himself either as president of a breakaway state, or still harbours ambitions to rule all of Sudan.

It's also possible that he sees a future as an all-powerful political puppet master, head of a conglomerate that controls businesses, a mercenary army and a political party. By these means, even if he isn't acceptable as Sudan's public face, he can still pull the strings.

And as Hemedti's troops massacre civilians in el-Fasher, he is confident that he enjoys impunity in a world that does not care much.

Alex de Waal is the executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the US.

More about the conflict in Sudan

A simple guide to the war in Sudan

'I was accused of spying and beaten' - a boy's escape from captured Sudan city

New videos show executions after RSF militia takes key Sudan city

'We saw people murdered in front of us' - Sudan siege survivors speak to the BBC

Reports of mass killings in Sudan have echoes of its dark past

Sudan's fertile region where food is rotting amid famine and war

View original: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3vn17r29v9o

Ends

Flooring Hemeti Dagalo the monster from Darfur Sudan may require more than unarmed protesters

• The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum
• By creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control
• In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time
• When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent
• Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes
• Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now

Full story below.

From Foreign Policy

By JÉRÔME TUBIANA 

Dated 14 May 2019, 2:34 PM

The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’s Supposed Transition

The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.

Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, the deputy head of Sudan’s military council, speaks at a news conference in Khartoum on April 30. ASSOCIATED PRESS

After Omar al-Bashir was deposed on April 11, Western diplomats made no mistake about who was in charge. Ambassadors from the United States, Britain, and the European Union did not shake hands with the transitional military council’s president, the little known army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; they met with his younger deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known by the nickname “Hemeti.” 

The story of how an uneducated 40-something chief of the janjaweed—the Arab militias that brought death and destruction to Darfur 16 years ago—became more powerful than his seasoned mentors in the Sudanese junta is, to many, a mystery. 

In fact, Hemeti is the main legacy of Bashir’s 30-year rule. Bashir himself was a product of an alliance of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, unseen elsewhere in the Arab world, but the army grew tired of the wars it had to fight in Sudan’s south, and the Islamists fragmented. When a new war began in Darfur in 2003, Bashir was convinced by Darfuri Arab hard-liners that turning their youths to militias would allow him to win. But by creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control and who represents a security threat not only for Sudan but also for its neighbors.

It seems that for a few days after Bashir’s ousting Khartoum’s civilian opposition trusted that it could negotiate a civilian transition with Burhan and Hemeti. Darfuris were more skeptical, given that they were more intimately familiar with the new men in charge. Burhan was a military intelligence colonel coordinating army and militia attacks against civilians in West Darfur state from 2003 to 2005, at a time when Hemeti was already a known warlord, who would gradually become the janjaweed’s primary leader. 

During its first, most intense years, the war in Darfur led to the deaths of several hundred thousand non-Arab civilians and displaced about 2 million people, earning Bashir an arrest warrant for genocide from the International Criminal Court. 

I met Hemeti a couple of times in 2009, first in a vaguely Orientalist furniture shop he owned in South Darfur’s state capital of Nyala (one of his early business efforts), from which I was driven to a more private office setting. He was a tall man with the sarcastic smile of a naughty child—yet he was then the newly appointed security advisor to South Darfur’s governor, his first official government position, obtained through blackmail and threats of rebellion.

Hemeti hails from a small Chadian Arab clan that fled wars and drought in Chad to take refuge in Darfur in the 1980s. As he told me, his uncle Juma Dagalo failed to be recognized as a tribal leader in North Darfur state, but South Darfur authorities welcomed the newcomers and allowed them to settle on land belonging to the Fur tribe, Darfur’s main indigenous non-Arab group. The place, called Dogi in the Fur language, was rebranded Um-el-Gura, “the mother of the villages” in Arabic, an old name for Mecca. The authorities also armed Dagalo’s followers, who, as early as the 1990s, began attacking their Fur neighbors.

Hemeti was then a teenager who, as he told me, dropped out of primary school in the third grade to trade camels across the borders in Libya and Egypt. When the Darfur rebellion began in 2003, he became a janjaweed amir (war chief) in his area, leading attacks against neighboring Fur villages. To justify joining the government-backed militias, he said the rebels had attacked a caravan of fellow camel traders on their way to Libya, allegedly killing 75 men and looting 3,000 camels. That fell short of his own brutal record as a militia leader. 

In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time.  His violent methods even created tensions with accompanying army officers. 

At the same time, Chad and Sudan began a proxy war through their respective rebel groups. The Chadian government used its own Arab officials to push the janjaweed to betray Khartoum. Bichara Issa Jadallah, a cousin to Hemeti, was then the defense minister in Chad. In 2006, he invited the janjaweed leader to the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, and had him sign a secret nonaggression pact with the Darfur rebel Justice and Equality Movement, behind the back of Khartoum. 

Shortly afterward, Hemeti announced that he had become a rebel. He then received a visit from a TV crew working for Britain’s Channel 4, which shot a documentary in his camp—his first exposure to TV—a medium to which he has become addicted since. But the journalists reportedly came late, and, as they were filming, government negotiators were also in the camp, bargaining over the price to bring Hemeti back into the government fold.

He remained a rebel for only six months before going back to Khartoum’s side. “We didn’t really become rebels,” he told me in 2009, sitting in his governor advisor’s chair. “We just wanted to attract the government’s attention, tell them we’re here, in order to get our rights: military ranks, political positions, and development in our area.” 

Other janjaweed leaders were increasingly critical of the government, including the most powerful among them, Musa Hilal, who in 2013 quit his post as presidential advisor in Khartoum and began forming his own movement. At the same time, some janjaweed were openly fighting the Sudanese intelligence service in downtown Nyala. Hemeti was one of the few janjaweed leaders to remain loyal to Bashir’s government. 

Consequently, Hemeti was picked to lead the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an enhanced paramilitary force—initially in an effort to retake control of the janjaweed, but it didn’t work out as planned. The RSF became uncontrollable and engaged in looting, killing, and rape in Darfur, as well as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The RSF also began exporting Darfur’s violence to central Sudan, ransoming civilians at highway roadblocks north of Khartoum and taking part in repressing demonstrations in the capital in September 2013, when at least 200 protesters were killed. First under the intelligence service, then under the direct control of the presidency, the force became Bashir’s praetorian guard, whose role was to protect the president from protests or from any coup attempt by the army—it turned into a third pole of power within Sudan’s security apparatus, rival to both army and intelligence. Hemeti was appointed brigadier general.

Then, in 2016, as Europe began cooperating with Sudan to curb migration flows, Hemeti’s men began to intercept migrants, from Sudan itself as well as other parts of the Horn of Africa, on their way to Libya, exhibiting them on local and foreign TV stations to demonstrate to the European Union that they were the right people for the job. In fact, the RSF played a double game and filled their cars with migrants whom they sold to Libyan traffickers, who would then often jail them in torture houses. Since Muammar al-Qaddafi’s fall in 2011, migrants in Libya are commonly tortured until they call relatives and convince them to pay a ransom to set them free; those who cannot pay are turned into slaves. But on Sudanese national TV, Hemeti claimed to be acting on behalf of the EU, which he also threatened with reopening the border if he was not paid a ransom for his “hard work.”

When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent led by Burhan, then the ground forces chief of staff. The two men got along well. They reportedly had meetings with Emirati and Saudi officials, discussing the post-Bashir era and telling them that they were the men the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian regimes were looking for: Arab military leaders who were not Islamists friendly with Qatar, Iran, or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

The RSF reportedly received Saudi and Emirati support, including money and weapons. Recently, at a press conference, Hemeti claimed to have set aside some $350 million to save Sudan’s finances and explained that he obtained this money for his role in Yemen and mining gold in Sudan. (He had competed with Hilal for gold concessions and eventually managed to have his rival arrested in 2017.)

In another recent TV appearance, Hemeti described how, in April, Bashir asked him and other military leaders to open fire on protesters, quoting an Islamic law supposedly allowing a ruler to kill 30-50 percent of a population in order to save the rest. He said he then decided “not to resist the change” and not oppose the protesters. 

The first head of the transitional military council, Gen. Awad Ibn Auf, resigned after 24 hours, reportedly disagreeing with Hemeti, who preferred Burhan. In the following days, Hemeti continued his public relations campaign, visiting a wounded protester in the hospital. But at a press conference on April 30, he made clear who he was, accusing the protesters of being drug addicts and stating he could not tolerate them continuously “blocking the streets.” Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes. 

Indeed Hemeti positioned his troops—reportedly 9,000 soldiers who were already in Khartoum and 4,000 who came recently from Darfur—at strategic locations all over the city, ready to fight protesters, the army, or anyone else. (On Monday, protest leaders blamed the RSF when five demonstrators and an army major were shot.) 

Hemeti is reportedly backed by some of the same Darfuri Arab politicians who created the janjaweed 16 years ago. If they rise to power, it would threaten to “steal the revolution from the people,” as one protest slogan put it, transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism. 

While the West seems passive, other countries are more worried, especially Chad. In recent years, in spite of his cousin still being a close advisor to Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, Hemeti has appeared more hostile to the Chadian regime and may be supportive of an Arab takeover in N’Djamena. Chad’s president took power a year after Bashir in Sudan, and Bashir’s fall might legitimately worry him. While relying largely on his own non-Arab Zaghawa tribe, Déby also accommodated other groups, not least Arab politicians who held key positions such as the defense and foreign ministries. 

Even so, ambitious Chadian Arab politicians might not refuse Hemeti’s armed support. The RSF’s ranks include hundreds of Chadian Arab youths and ex-rebels against Déby who took refuge in Sudan. Such combatants may well be more interested in regime change in Chad than in Sudan, risking an unprecedented exportation to Chad of Darfur’s racist violence. 

Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now.

Even in the most optimistic scenario—whereby a new civilian government in Sudan tries to disarm the janjaweed—at least some of them will inevitably get involved in armed activities across Sudan’s borders, in countries where they have already been active, including Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. There are also reports that janjaweed were among Sudanese who joined jihadi groups in Mali. 

The janjaweed’s strength is now comparable to that of the Sudanese regular forces or other armies in the region. Opposing them by force could trigger bloodshed, making the stakes of the ongoing negotiations higher than ever before. 

Flooring the monster may require more than unarmed protesters.

Jérôme Tubiana is a researcher and journalist who has covered conflicts in Chad and Sudan for more than 20 years and the author of Guantánamo Kid: The True Story of Mohammed El-Gharani.

SOURCE: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/14/man-who-terrorized-darfur-is-leading-sudans-supposed-transition-hemeti-rsf-janjaweed-bashir-khartoum/