Sudan: Military has far too much power (Eric Reeves)

• The RSF is still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue. 
• What about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago? 
• If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.
• Will Hemeti disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?
• Will all arrests be made only by policemen?
• One of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.  Read full story:

Analysis from Radio Dabanga.org

By Dr Eric Reeves - NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS, USA

Published Wednesday 07 August 2019

The Constitutional Charter and the future of Sudan

FCC leader Ahmed Rabee and Hemeti with copies of the Constitutional Declaration during the signing ceremony in Khartoum on August 4 (Picture SUNA).

The “Constitutional Charter” (CC) signed on August 4 is an inspiring read, if stripped from the grim context in which it has been brought into being—if we forget the many hundreds who have been killed, wounded, raped, and tortured in the course of the uprising that has brought at least the hope of civilian governance into sight. The insistence on human rights, the rule of law, individual liberties, press freedoms, tolerance, and indeed the priority of peace—all of this provides at least the ghostly outline of a what a free and just Sudan—truly at peace with itself—might look like.

But what has been stipulated in the CC and what seems likely in the near future seem to me two very different things, and I am far from alone in my misgivings. Canvassing Sudanese social media over the past three days—and for months prior to this—I find two major concerns, fundamental issues that many feel have not been addressed by the CC.

The first, and most frequent, is that far too much power has been left in the hands of the military, now a hybrid military, with both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nominally under the command of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” (CC §34).* Moreover, many have observed that the RSF is left fully intact, a force unto itself, and still effectively under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemeti”). And the further from Khartoum one travels, the more fully the RSF seems a force unto itself—nowhere more so than in Darfur, where since the formation of the RSF under Hemeti’s command in 2013, many hundreds of thousands of people—overwhelmingly from the non-Arab/African tribal groups of the region—have been killed or displaced. And the killing and displacement continue.

In Khartoum itself, all evidence points to a concerted plan by the RSF to undertake what has come to be known as the “June 3 Massacre,” in which more than 150 people were killed (perhaps many more), dozens of women and girls raped, and widespread violence of a sort not seen even during the uprising of September 2013. It is impossible to believe that the orders for the deadly clearance of protesters in front of army headquarters did not come from the Transitional Military Council, and indeed “Lt. General” Hemeti (he has no formal military training, a fact reflected in the lack of discipline throughout the RSF). Unsurprisingly, the RSF was again responsible for the deadly violence in El Obeid on July 29.

The second criticism, voiced in various forms, is that the fundamental economic issues in Sudan—a nation struggling under the burden of an economy that has largely collapsed—are nowhere addressed with any specificity. This is perhaps to be expected of an interim constitutional document, but the greatest hindrance to economic rehabilitation in Sudan has long been the inordinate amount of the national budget devoted to the military and security services. All independent Sudanese economists I’ve encountered estimate that the percentage is between 50% and 70% of all national expenditures.

Will the military men who play such a large role in what was to have been a movement to bring about civilian governance in Sudan willingly give up this previously compulsory largesse, provided by the ordinary people of Sudan? Senior officers have enjoyed what is by Sudanese standards a lavish salary and lifestyle: will they give this up in the interest of the nation? And what about control of the Jebel Amir gold mining region, about which so much has been made in recent years? Does anyone really think that Hemeti will willingly give up control of a hugely lucrative area he wrested from former janjaweed leader Musa Hilal several years ago?

The point many Sudanese seem to be making is that the greatest obstacle—both to peace in the country and to economic rehabilitation—is the continuing central role of the armed forces in Sudan’s governance over the next 39 months. It may be that the members of the soon-to-be-dissolve Transitional Military Council (TMC) will no longer be able to move with the same ease of executive fiat as was the case during the al-Bashir years. But there are all too many “work-arounds” evident in the constitutional text, as well as the massive inherent power of the “deep state” that so many Sudanese worry about. 30 years of tyranny, corruption, war, and kleptocracy cannot be whisked away with any document, no matter how eloquent or impressively democratic. And Hemeti has proved himself at once hugely ambitious and unreservedly deceitful and expedient.

Here it is important to remember that the al-Bashir regime abided by not one of the agreements it signed during its long tenure: not the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (annexation of Abyei is only the most egregious violation of the various Protocols of the CPA, signed in January 2005); the Nuba Mountain ceasefire (January, 2002); the Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 2006); the peace agreement with the Eastern Front (October 2006); the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011); and the list goes on and on. If history is any guide, the most likely outcome of recent negotiations will be a slow but eventually wholesale reneging on the agreement as soon as international attention turns away from Sudan—and that will not be a long wait.

But such an outcome has one terrible downside for the military, if it indeed seizes national power: the economy will continue its collapse, and we may be sure that protests will resume, with anger even greater, political frustration even more intense. It’s hard to say what the economic consequences of eight months of sustained demonstrations, protests, and strikes has been—but it has been enormous, and the people of Sudan have seen just how powerful they are. Without a massive shift in economic priorities, which will entail cooperation from Sudan’s work force, agriculture will continue to decline; the ability to finance critical imports—including food, medicine, and refined petroleum products—will further diminish; and inflation that has brought so many Sudanese families to the very edge of survival continues to roar ahead, even as the Sudanese Pound continues its precipitous collapse.

More Challenges

Even now, of course, we must note Sudanese concern about what is not in the CC, and that is the July agreement between the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The armed opposition has universally rejected the CC of August 4, and several political parties in Khartoum have now insisted that any real path forward requires much more participation from those in the armed movements, and especially civil society elements from the regions where the movements have been most active: Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Pessimism is in no short supply.

How will we know if this broadly shared pessimism is warranted? Usefully, the text of the CC provides for some early tests of the military’s willingness to embrace the ideals set forth:

[1] “All people, bodies, and associations, whether official or unofficial, are subject to the rule of law” (§ 5.i). Will we see any change in Darfur, where the rule of law has been only a vague rumour for two decades and more? Where rape, murder, abduction, and pillaging are virtually daily events?

[2] “Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law”(§18.i). Does this apply to RSF commander Hemeti? Will he disclose fully his stake in the large industrial conglomerate Al Junaid Industrial Group, based in the United Arab Emirates? And the role of his brother in the company? And the investments of National Intelligence and Security officials who have been reported as having invested in Al Junaid?

[3] “The General Intelligence Service is a uniformed agency that is competent in national security. Its duties are limited to gathering and analysing information and providing it to the competent bodies. The law defines its obligations and duties, and it is subject to the sovereign and executive authorities by law” (§36). Can we expect to see an end to the arrests and torture for which the “former” National Intelligence and Security Services are notorious? Will all arrests be made only by policemen? These questions are also raised by §45: “Every person has the right to freedom and security. No one shall be subjected to arrest or detention, or deprived of freedom or restricted therefrom except for cause in accordance with procedures defined by law.”

[4] §56 speaks of “the right to access the internet, without prejudice to public order, safety, and morals…” Will we see this? And who decides what is a threat to “to public order, safety, and morals”? Is the conditionality of this language a way to justify future internet shutdowns?

[5] §64 speaks of the State undertaking “to provide primary health care and emergency services free of charge for all citizens, develop public health, and establish, develop and qualify basic treatment and diagnostic institutions.” Does this mean that the ghastly humanitarian embargo imposed by the al-Bashir regime will at long last be lifted from large areas of South Kordofan, after eight years of suffering, hunger, and denial of assistance?

This last test of the intentions of the military could be met tomorrow if a signal were sent to the international community that it should begin to prepare to bring assistance to all parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—and that restrictions on aid delivery in Darfur will also be ended.

In short, we could know very soon whether the Transitional Military Council, prior to its dissolution, means to send a signal of good faith. I’m not holding my breath.

* All citations are from a translation of the version of the Constitutional Charter that was signed on 4 August 2019, prepared by International IDEA (www.idea.int).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the contributing author or media and do not necessarily reflect the position of Radio Dabanga.

Eric Reeves is a regular contributor and commentator to Radio Dabanga. He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, who has spent the past 20+ years as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the USA and internationally **.
His book about Darfur (A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide) was published in May 2007. He has recently published Compromising with Evil: An archival history of greater Sudan, 2007 — 2012 (available at no cost as an eBook)

View Original: https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/op-ed-the-constitutional-charter-and-the-future-of-sudan

More RSF than ever in Darfur Sudan - To live in any area controlled by the RSF is to live in constant fear

Article from 3Ayin.com

Dated Wednesday, 07 August 2019

Silence and fear: Life under the RSF in a Darfur town

Amna Daoud Morsal has worked in Nyala’s main market for decades. At 55, she has developed a well-established market stall in Sudan’s third largest city – a city whose name means the “place of chatting” in the local Daju language. But few have time to chat when the sun starts to set, despite a challenging economy [ https://3ayin.com/sudanese-pay-a-price-for-revolution-as-cost-of-living-soars/ ] where Amna struggles with less and less customers, she must pack her wares hurriedly and rush home. “Ten years ago, you could walk around Nyala till morning time and nobody would ask you anything, there was no danger, no one to steal your things –the situation was safe but now, when the sun is setting, you cannot set foot inside Nyala,” Amna Daoud told Ayin. 

Nyala, like most of the towns and villages in Darfur, have struggled with the presence of pro-government militias for decades, but the heaviest presence to date has been the Rapid Support Force. “To live in any area controlled by the RSF (Rapid Support Forces), Nyala included, is to live in a constant state of fear,” says Nyala resident Abu Al-Bashir Adam. Anything could happen while working in the market, Daoud says, “Even daytime is dangerous, they [RSF] start fights with people, steal money and mobile phones, and if you try to say this is wrong they can shoot you.”

More RSF than ever

Nyala residents have grown accustomed to the heavy presence of the RSF militia –but now even more have trickled in since the revolution started last December calling for civilian rule. Nyala residents believe the additional RSF forces came in an effort to consolidate power and ensure authority during this political transition period. 

The deputy head of the military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (aka “Himmedti”) leads the RSF which until recently took direct orders from former president Omar al-Bashir, terrorizing citizenry and rebels alike in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. 

“Himmedti and his gang [the RSF] have always had a presence in Nyala,” said Ahmed Abdallah* a recent university graduate living in Nyala. “But once the revolution started and people called for civilian rule –they started to be deployed in all public areas across the state.” As one of the main recruiting areas, Nyala hosts ten RSF training camps alone. But it’s not only Nyala. “It’s true that the RSF increased dramatically recently, with the idea to show power and control,” a UN worker based in West Darfur State’s capital city, El Geneina, told Ayin. “Now they drive around here at high speeds, if you don’t get out of their way, you’ll be beaten. As a woman, after 7 pm, there is no way I can walk the streets.”

The RSF have always had a heavy, deadly presence in Darfur to date. According to the 2017 UN Panel of Experts report [ https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1740048.pdf ] the RSF militia are the main perpetrators of abuses against civilians in Darfur including looting, rapes and torching of homes. An Amnesty International June report [ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sudan-fresh-evidence-of-government-sponsored-crimes-in-darfur-shows-drawdown-of-peacekeepers-premature-and-reckless/ ] says they have satellite imagery and testimonials that show the RSF and other government forces continue to commit war crimes and human rights violations in Darfur –including the partial or complete destruction of 45 villages, unlawful killings, and sexual violence. “In Darfur, as in Khartoum, we’ve witnessed the Rapid Support Forces’ despicable brutality against Sudanese civilians – the only difference being, in Darfur they have committed atrocities with impunity for years,” stated Amnesty Secretary General Kumi Naidoo. 

A convenient black hole

The RSF have enjoyed total impunity for years in Darfur partly due to the ousting [ https://africanarguments.org/2009/03/24/ingos-expelled-from-darfur-time-to-acknowledge-the-smoking-and-loaded-gun/ ] of international NGOs and local and foreign journalists 
[ https://nubareports.org/a-q-a-with-award-winning-photographer-adriane-ohanesian/ ] effectively banned [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/captured-in-darfur-south-sudan ] from the region. Phil Cox, a photojournalist and filmmaker, is possibly one of the last foreigners to venture into Darfur in December 2016 when RSF forces kidnapped [ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/05/captured-in-darfur-south-sudan ], tortured and jailed Cox and his colleague Daoud Hari for 70 days. At the time, the Sudanese government issued a massive bounty for their capture, indicative of their deep determination to keep the world’s eyes away from Darfur and what future investigations might reveal, Cox told Ayin. “Darfur has gone from being the focus of global attention and international condemnation that mobilized activists, celebrities and world leaders alike, to a forgotten conflict smothered by an information black hole,” Cox said. “No media team or investigators have had independent access there for years –yet rumours of atrocities and ethnic cleansing have persisted.” 

Darfur Bar Association lawyer, Abdel-Basset Al-Hajj, says the RSF enjoy “official immunity” and no accountability for their actions. “The RSF have no legal justifications to carry out law enforcement, arrest, imprisonment –they enjoy being the police, prosecutor and judge all in one,” Al-Hajj told Ayin. While they enjoy these powers, Al-Hajj said, they carry out these duties with no recourse to the law or training. “They don’t know how to investigate a crime, they simply rely on torture and somehow think this is the rule of law.” 

In July 2017, the RSF raided [ https://nubareports.org/south-darfur-residents-fear-insecurity-with-militia-control-of-police-station/ ] Nyala’s second largest police station in the Al-Masan’i neighbourhood with four heavily armed Land Cruisers, threatening the police officer in charge of the station to leave within 48 hours, according to a police officer from the station preferring anonymity for his security. The RSF order to evacuate the station was made on the pretext that Himmedti purchased the land where the police station was based. A lawyer working for the local land registry who also requested anonymity for security reasons, said the land allegedly purchased by the RSF leader was government-owned property. Lt.-Gen. Mohamed Hamden Daglo did not present any documents regarding the purchase, the lawyer said, and suspect the RSF leader seized the land by force. 

Nyala-based Police Officer Ali Osman* remembers the raid well. “Of course it was not legal but nobody from the local government can talk to them, they may shoot you,” the officer said. Well-equipped and paid salaries five times that of a regular Nyala police officer, Officer Osman told Ayin he is powerless to stop them whenever they steal from the public. “I can’t do anything –those people are outside the law and can kill me.” 

“They have made the security situation more precarious here,” lawyer and El-Geneina resident Ibrahim Shamou said, “crime, murder and theft have increased –[it’s] a state of terror and chaos.”

El Geneina, Daein

Since the revolution started, the RSF also increased their presence in other Darfur capitals cities such as El Geneina and Daein in West and East Darfur, respectfully -targeting and terrorising civilians with the same impunity. There are roughly 200 RSF armed four-wheel drive vehicles (commonly referred to as ‘technicals’) patrolling West Darfur State, lawyer and El-Geneina resident Ibrahim Shamou told Ayin. “They have made the security situation more precarious here,” Shamou said, “crime, murder and theft have increased –[it’s] a state of terror and chaos.” Even farmers outside the city are not safe from the RSF, the lawyer said. With no one to protect them while working in the fields, RSF have been looting farmers of livestock and money since June. 

RSF have arrested local government members in Daein during the state of emergency imposed by the former president back in February with no real recourse to the law, according to Daein resident Maala Awad al-Karim. RSF have also imprisoned a large number of citizens arbitrarily, al-Karim adds, some of which still remain there since February. Many people have ran away from Daein and have attempted to eke out a living in outside villages to avoid the RSF, according to Daein resident and lawyer Mohamed Abdallah. “These militias don’t follow any rule of law,” Abdallah added, “even the courts look at them like people who took the authority of the court without any permission.”

According to Officer Osman*, RSF are already recruiting from outside Sudan, particularly via Chad and receive Sudanese identity cards in Nyala … more on RSF’s regional dynamics: http://bit.ly/2KwT3nw

RSF as a regional force

While the RSF have increased their presence in the Darfur region, there are signs the militia could become more of a regional force. According to Officer Osman, RSF are already recruiting from outside Sudan, particularly via Chad and receive Sudanese identity cards in Nyala. Osman said he could identify them as foreigners from their features and the fact they do not speak Arabic. “We must remember RSF is a tribal militia and Himmedti has influence with his ethnic extensions in bordering countries like Chad where they are coming from,” Osman said. Well funded by exploiting Darfur gold reserves independently of the state and as a parallel budget, the RSF are well placed to become regional mercenaries in East and Central Africa, Nyala lawyer Al-Hajj told Ayin. The RSF can “carry out criminal acts internally and externally,” Al-Hajj said, “and will provide those with interests with all the necessary components to continue and control the reins of the state.”

Future of RSF, future of Sudan

The question still remains if the RSF will continue to control large swathes of the country and whether this influence will expand further both nationally and cross borders during the transitional period. The Transitional Military Council’s deputy leader Himmedti will, after all, likely be part of the ruling sovereign council during this stage. A constitutional declaration agreed upon by the Military Council and opposition on Sunday [4 AUG 2019] also ensures the sovereign council to be lead by a military general for the first 21 months of the transitional period. Nevertheless, the parties also agreed that sovereign council members would not be immune to prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the recently penned constitutional declaration, the RSF are meant to be under the command of the Sudanese army and stipulated that citizen’s rights are to be free from arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment. There are signs of more accountability within the RSF ranks –military authorities allegedly detained [ https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Sudan-detains-nine-soldiers-after-el-obeid-killings/4552902-5220132-rs45nn/index.html ] and dismissed nine RSF soldiers last week, implicated in the killing of six protestors in El Obeid. But the fact that security forces killed 
[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/protesters-killed-live-ammunition-sudan-omdurman-190801190332665.html ] four more protestors in Omdurman just a day prior to the prosecution of the RSF soldiers hardly imbibes confidence for reform within Sudan’s security sector and the RSF militia in particular.

While much-needed RSF reforms may not emerge from the political negotiation process-taking place in Khartoum, the people of Nyala may induce change themselves. Despite the daily intimidation by RSF forces, Nyala residents conducted three separate demonstrations [ https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/protests-unabated-across-sudan%20 ] last month to condemn the ongoing detention of Nyala citizens, the attack on protestors in El Obeid, in solidarity with rape survivors across the country and to call for the revival of independent trade unions. “We don’t know what will happen in Khartoum,” said one Nyala activist, “but we will continue to struggle here no matter the outcome.”

* Names changed to protect their security

The law = RSF

“The RSF have no legal justifications to carry out law enforcement, arrest, imprisonment –they enjoy being

the police, prosecutor and judge all in one,” Al-Hajj told Ayin

View original article here: https://3ayin.com/rsf-in-darfur/

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Kidnapped, tortured and thrown in jail: my 70 days in Sudan

A photograph taken by Cox while being held hostage in Sudan on Christmas Day 2016. Photograph: Phil Cox/Native Voice Films

Phil Cox and Daoud Hari on the Chad-Sudan border in December 2016. Photograph: Native Voice Films

Read full story here: http://trib.al/inI80TQ

Sudan's TMC Hemeti and AFC al-Rabie sign deal

NOTE from Sudan Watch Editor: Sudan's big deal was signed today amidst banners saying "Sudan's joy". I fear for what lays ahead. The old regime has not vanished and Hemeti, a psychopathic camel herding upstart mercenary from Chad, who has four wives and hates politics, doesn't fit in with Khartoum's elite and its social scene.

Sixteen years ago I started this blog Sudan Watch during which time I lost count of the number of agreements signed in Sudan. They all ended up being worth less than the paper they were written on. 

The ink wouldn't be dry before fights started between rebels and government troops. Rebels would then fall out with each other and split into different groups with new names. How else could they make a living?

In the early years I lost count of the number of rebel groups after noting 48. In my view, today's deal is no different from all the others. The youngsters protesting in Khartoum were babies when this blog started.  Sad to say they'll be disillusioned, soon. 

South Sudan is, I believe, a failed state and Sudan is on the brink of becoming one. I wonder whether Sudan and South Sudan are governable. They're so diverse and backward in many ways. They need water.

Sudanese civilians living far from Khartoum are still suffering being attacked and killed. Recent floods caused unhealthy conditions. People are in need of mosquito nets and medicines especially for malaria.

Meanwhile, South Sudan government officials are proposing a house be built for ex-rebel President Kiir in his home town and a private jet be bought for him. He spends tons on constant unnecessary travels. Puke.

Article by AFP.com from Businesslive.co.za

Dated 17 August 2019 - 15:53 AFP.COM

Sudan generals, protest leaders sign transition deal

Heads of state from several countries attended the ceremony in Khartoum

Sudan's protest leader Ahmad Rabie (R), flashes the victory gesture alongside General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (2nd-R), the chief of Sudan's ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC), during a ceremony where they signed a "constitutional declaration" that paves the way for a transition to civilian rule, in the capital Khartoum on August 17, 2019. Picture: EBRAHIM HAMID / AFP

Khartoum - Sudan's military council and protest leaders on Saturday signed a hard-won "constitutional declaration" that paves the way for a transition to civilian rule.

The agreement was signed by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, deputy chief of the military council, and Ahmed al-Rabie, representing the Alliance for Freedom and Change protest umbrella, an AFP reporter said.

Heads of state, prime ministers and dignitaries from several countries -- including Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Egypt's premier Mustafa Madbuli -- attended the ceremony in Khartoum, and the signing was met with applause.

The constitutional declaration builds on a political declaration that was agreed by the military and protesters on July 17.

It formalises the creation of a transition administration that will be guided by an 11-member sovereign council, comprised of six civilians and five military figures.

The agreement follows nearly eight months of protests -- initially against longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir, who fell in April, and then against the military council that deposed him.

Talks between the protesters and the military were mediated by the African Union and Ethiopia, which brought the two sides together again even after a protest sit-in outside military headquarters was brutally dispersed by men in military fatigues on June 3.

Some 120 people were killed during that crackdown, according to doctors linked to the protesters.

The signing ceremony started with Sudan's national anthem, followed by a reading of verses from the Koran and the Old Testament, while the words "Sudan's joy" were emblazoned on banners. AFP

SOURCE: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2019-08-17-sudan-generals-protest-leaders-sign-transition-deal/

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Hemeti BBC interview broadcast ahead of signing ceremony

A BBC News online report dated Saturday 17 August 2019 states that the above mentioned deal was signed by Hemeti and Lt-Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan for the military council, and Ahmed al-Rabie for the Alliance for Freedom and Change umbrella group of pro-democracy protesters.

“We will stick to every single letter we have agreed on," Hemeti told the BBC's Zeinab Badawi in an interview (see below) broadcast ahead of the ceremony.

"Even without the agreement we [would] have to work in this direction because it's in the country's interest," he added. 

"Therefore we have to carry out the agreement, stick to it and support it."

[Sudan Watch Ed:  Puke]

To visit the report and video interview click here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-49379489

Flooring Hemeti Dagalo the monster from Darfur Sudan may require more than unarmed protesters

• The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum
• By creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control
• In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time
• When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent
• Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes
• Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now

Full story below.

From Foreign Policy

By JÉRÔME TUBIANA 

Dated 14 May 2019, 2:34 PM

The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’s Supposed Transition

The interim vice president, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, was in charge of the brutal janjaweed militias. Now he is calling the shots in Khartoum.

Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagalo, the deputy head of Sudan’s military council, speaks at a news conference in Khartoum on April 30. ASSOCIATED PRESS

After Omar al-Bashir was deposed on April 11, Western diplomats made no mistake about who was in charge. Ambassadors from the United States, Britain, and the European Union did not shake hands with the transitional military council’s president, the little known army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; they met with his younger deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known by the nickname “Hemeti.” 

The story of how an uneducated 40-something chief of the janjaweed—the Arab militias that brought death and destruction to Darfur 16 years ago—became more powerful than his seasoned mentors in the Sudanese junta is, to many, a mystery. 

In fact, Hemeti is the main legacy of Bashir’s 30-year rule. Bashir himself was a product of an alliance of the army and the Muslim Brotherhood, unseen elsewhere in the Arab world, but the army grew tired of the wars it had to fight in Sudan’s south, and the Islamists fragmented. When a new war began in Darfur in 2003, Bashir was convinced by Darfuri Arab hard-liners that turning their youths to militias would allow him to win. But by creating the janjaweed and relentlessly empowering them under Hemeti, the Sudanese regime has created a monster it cannot control and who represents a security threat not only for Sudan but also for its neighbors.

It seems that for a few days after Bashir’s ousting Khartoum’s civilian opposition trusted that it could negotiate a civilian transition with Burhan and Hemeti. Darfuris were more skeptical, given that they were more intimately familiar with the new men in charge. Burhan was a military intelligence colonel coordinating army and militia attacks against civilians in West Darfur state from 2003 to 2005, at a time when Hemeti was already a known warlord, who would gradually become the janjaweed’s primary leader. 

During its first, most intense years, the war in Darfur led to the deaths of several hundred thousand non-Arab civilians and displaced about 2 million people, earning Bashir an arrest warrant for genocide from the International Criminal Court. 

I met Hemeti a couple of times in 2009, first in a vaguely Orientalist furniture shop he owned in South Darfur’s state capital of Nyala (one of his early business efforts), from which I was driven to a more private office setting. He was a tall man with the sarcastic smile of a naughty child—yet he was then the newly appointed security advisor to South Darfur’s governor, his first official government position, obtained through blackmail and threats of rebellion.

Hemeti hails from a small Chadian Arab clan that fled wars and drought in Chad to take refuge in Darfur in the 1980s. As he told me, his uncle Juma Dagalo failed to be recognized as a tribal leader in North Darfur state, but South Darfur authorities welcomed the newcomers and allowed them to settle on land belonging to the Fur tribe, Darfur’s main indigenous non-Arab group. The place, called Dogi in the Fur language, was rebranded Um-el-Gura, “the mother of the villages” in Arabic, an old name for Mecca. The authorities also armed Dagalo’s followers, who, as early as the 1990s, began attacking their Fur neighbors.

Hemeti was then a teenager who, as he told me, dropped out of primary school in the third grade to trade camels across the borders in Libya and Egypt. When the Darfur rebellion began in 2003, he became a janjaweed amir (war chief) in his area, leading attacks against neighboring Fur villages. To justify joining the government-backed militias, he said the rebels had attacked a caravan of fellow camel traders on their way to Libya, allegedly killing 75 men and looting 3,000 camels. That fell short of his own brutal record as a militia leader. 

In 2006, armed with new equipment, he led several hundred men on a raid across the rebel-held area of North Darfur. The janjaweed rammed non-Arab men with their pickup trucks and raped women in the name of jihad—according to witnesses I met at the time.  His violent methods even created tensions with accompanying army officers. 

At the same time, Chad and Sudan began a proxy war through their respective rebel groups. The Chadian government used its own Arab officials to push the janjaweed to betray Khartoum. Bichara Issa Jadallah, a cousin to Hemeti, was then the defense minister in Chad. In 2006, he invited the janjaweed leader to the Chadian capital, N’Djamena, and had him sign a secret nonaggression pact with the Darfur rebel Justice and Equality Movement, behind the back of Khartoum. 

Shortly afterward, Hemeti announced that he had become a rebel. He then received a visit from a TV crew working for Britain’s Channel 4, which shot a documentary in his camp—his first exposure to TV—a medium to which he has become addicted since. But the journalists reportedly came late, and, as they were filming, government negotiators were also in the camp, bargaining over the price to bring Hemeti back into the government fold.

He remained a rebel for only six months before going back to Khartoum’s side. “We didn’t really become rebels,” he told me in 2009, sitting in his governor advisor’s chair. “We just wanted to attract the government’s attention, tell them we’re here, in order to get our rights: military ranks, political positions, and development in our area.” 

Other janjaweed leaders were increasingly critical of the government, including the most powerful among them, Musa Hilal, who in 2013 quit his post as presidential advisor in Khartoum and began forming his own movement. At the same time, some janjaweed were openly fighting the Sudanese intelligence service in downtown Nyala. Hemeti was one of the few janjaweed leaders to remain loyal to Bashir’s government. 

Consequently, Hemeti was picked to lead the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an enhanced paramilitary force—initially in an effort to retake control of the janjaweed, but it didn’t work out as planned. The RSF became uncontrollable and engaged in looting, killing, and rape in Darfur, as well as in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

The RSF also began exporting Darfur’s violence to central Sudan, ransoming civilians at highway roadblocks north of Khartoum and taking part in repressing demonstrations in the capital in September 2013, when at least 200 protesters were killed. First under the intelligence service, then under the direct control of the presidency, the force became Bashir’s praetorian guard, whose role was to protect the president from protests or from any coup attempt by the army—it turned into a third pole of power within Sudan’s security apparatus, rival to both army and intelligence. Hemeti was appointed brigadier general.

Then, in 2016, as Europe began cooperating with Sudan to curb migration flows, Hemeti’s men began to intercept migrants, from Sudan itself as well as other parts of the Horn of Africa, on their way to Libya, exhibiting them on local and foreign TV stations to demonstrate to the European Union that they were the right people for the job. In fact, the RSF played a double game and filled their cars with migrants whom they sold to Libyan traffickers, who would then often jail them in torture houses. Since Muammar al-Qaddafi’s fall in 2011, migrants in Libya are commonly tortured until they call relatives and convince them to pay a ransom to set them free; those who cannot pay are turned into slaves. But on Sudanese national TV, Hemeti claimed to be acting on behalf of the EU, which he also threatened with reopening the border if he was not paid a ransom for his “hard work.”

When Sudanese troops joined the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, Hemeti’s RSF played a key role alongside a Sudanese army contingent led by Burhan, then the ground forces chief of staff. The two men got along well. They reportedly had meetings with Emirati and Saudi officials, discussing the post-Bashir era and telling them that they were the men the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian regimes were looking for: Arab military leaders who were not Islamists friendly with Qatar, Iran, or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

The RSF reportedly received Saudi and Emirati support, including money and weapons. Recently, at a press conference, Hemeti claimed to have set aside some $350 million to save Sudan’s finances and explained that he obtained this money for his role in Yemen and mining gold in Sudan. (He had competed with Hilal for gold concessions and eventually managed to have his rival arrested in 2017.)

In another recent TV appearance, Hemeti described how, in April, Bashir asked him and other military leaders to open fire on protesters, quoting an Islamic law supposedly allowing a ruler to kill 30-50 percent of a population in order to save the rest. He said he then decided “not to resist the change” and not oppose the protesters. 

The first head of the transitional military council, Gen. Awad Ibn Auf, resigned after 24 hours, reportedly disagreeing with Hemeti, who preferred Burhan. In the following days, Hemeti continued his public relations campaign, visiting a wounded protester in the hospital. But at a press conference on April 30, he made clear who he was, accusing the protesters of being drug addicts and stating he could not tolerate them continuously “blocking the streets.” Even those who used to laugh at his blunt speeches stopped seeing him as a joke and now saw him as a threat to their democratic hopes. 

Indeed Hemeti positioned his troops—reportedly 9,000 soldiers who were already in Khartoum and 4,000 who came recently from Darfur—at strategic locations all over the city, ready to fight protesters, the army, or anyone else. (On Monday, protest leaders blamed the RSF when five demonstrators and an army major were shot.) 

Hemeti is reportedly backed by some of the same Darfuri Arab politicians who created the janjaweed 16 years ago. If they rise to power, it would threaten to “steal the revolution from the people,” as one protest slogan put it, transform Sudan from a military regime into a militia state, and replace Islamism with Arab supremacism. 

While the West seems passive, other countries are more worried, especially Chad. In recent years, in spite of his cousin still being a close advisor to Chad’s president, Idriss Déby, Hemeti has appeared more hostile to the Chadian regime and may be supportive of an Arab takeover in N’Djamena. Chad’s president took power a year after Bashir in Sudan, and Bashir’s fall might legitimately worry him. While relying largely on his own non-Arab Zaghawa tribe, Déby also accommodated other groups, not least Arab politicians who held key positions such as the defense and foreign ministries. 

Even so, ambitious Chadian Arab politicians might not refuse Hemeti’s armed support. The RSF’s ranks include hundreds of Chadian Arab youths and ex-rebels against Déby who took refuge in Sudan. Such combatants may well be more interested in regime change in Chad than in Sudan, risking an unprecedented exportation to Chad of Darfur’s racist violence. 

Given that the Bashir regime repeatedly failed to abide by its international commitments to disarm the janjaweed, it seems even less likely now.

Even in the most optimistic scenario—whereby a new civilian government in Sudan tries to disarm the janjaweed—at least some of them will inevitably get involved in armed activities across Sudan’s borders, in countries where they have already been active, including Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. There are also reports that janjaweed were among Sudanese who joined jihadi groups in Mali. 

The janjaweed’s strength is now comparable to that of the Sudanese regular forces or other armies in the region. Opposing them by force could trigger bloodshed, making the stakes of the ongoing negotiations higher than ever before. 

Flooring the monster may require more than unarmed protesters.

Jérôme Tubiana is a researcher and journalist who has covered conflicts in Chad and Sudan for more than 20 years and the author of Guantánamo Kid: The True Story of Mohammed El-Gharani.

SOURCE: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/14/man-who-terrorized-darfur-is-leading-sudans-supposed-transition-hemeti-rsf-janjaweed-bashir-khartoum/

Sudan: Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan to be appointed 1st President of Sovereign Council, Hemedti Deputy

Article from Aawsat.com

By Sawsan Abu Hussein and Ahmed Younes - Cairo, Khartoum

Dated Saturday, 10 August, 2019 - 08:00

Sudan: Burhan to Be Appointed 1st President of Sovereign Council, Hemedti Deputy

A senior Sudanese military commander announced on Friday that Gen. Abdel Fattah Burhan, who currently presides over Sudan’s Transitional Military Council (TMC), would be appointed the head of the future Sovereign Council.

“The Sovereign Council will chair the first transitional period under the leadership of Abdel Fattah Burhan, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo will be his deputy,” Gen. Salah Abdelkhalig, a TMC member, told Sputnik news agency.

The TMC and the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change agreed on Saturday on a constitutional declaration to govern the transitional period following months of political instability.

The declaration stipulated that the presidency of the Transitional Sovereign Council shall be assumed by the military for the first period of 21 months. It shall be composed of five representatives of the military and five representatives of the civil community, in addition to one other member who will be appointed by a collective vote.

The civilian-picked prime minister will appoint a cabinet where the defense and home ministry seats have been reserved by the military.

Abdelkhalig stressed that the constitutional agreement was “one of the most important strategic achievements, as it has saved the country from the civil war disaster.”

Meanwhile, Cairo is expected to witness important talks between representatives of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front and the coalition of Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change, to negotiate controversial issues between the two parties related to achieving peace and ending war with the armed movements.

The armed movements - operating under the Revolutionary Front – expressed reservations over the constitutional document signed with the TMC, noting that it failed to include the “peace paper” that was approved in Addis Ababa.

SOURCE: https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1851861/sudan-burhan-be-appointed-1st-president-sovereign-council-hemedti-deputy